JUDGMENT : By Court Heard learned counsel for the parties. The present writ petition has been filed against the order dated 04.05.2011 passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Ranchi under Section 28 (7) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 in B.S.E. Appeal No. 2/2008 and the original order dated 17.11.2008 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi in B. S. Case No.1/2006 under Section 28(1) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953. By these impugned orders, benefit claimed by the petitioner has been denied. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was employee of the respondent-company from 24.03.1980 to 31.10.1990 and thereafter he has resigned for personal reason. Subsequently, he has been re-employed on 01.06.1993 on temporary basis and subsequently he has been confirmed on 01.12.1993 on the post of Divisional Manager. In 2002 at his request, he has been transferred from Guwahati to Ranchi. Petitioner has been noticed by the employer vide letter dated 09.07.2002 for his poor performance. He has submitted a letter dated 12.04.2004 under the Voluntarily Retirement Scheme for separation from service w.e.f. 30.04.2004. Separation has taken place on 30.04.2004. Vide letter dated 07.05.2004 it has been informed to the petitioner that his separation is as per the separation package arrived at on the basis of oral discussion between the parties. Content of the letter dated 07.05.2004 is quoted hereinunder: “Mr. A C Verma Ranchi May 7, 2004 As per the mutual discussion between yourself and the Management, the Management acknowledges your separation from the services of the company with effect from 30th April, 2004. The Management also would like to inform you that the separation package as decided during your discussion is accepted. Hence your name has been deleted from the company’s roll from the above-mentioned date. The Management would also like to thank you for your long association with the Company and also for the services rendered by you. We are hereby advising the Accounts Department to kindly arrange for your full and final settlement of your dues along with the separation package at the earliest. For BERGET PAINTS INDIA LIMITED Sd/ (S BHATTACHARYA) SR GENERAL MANAGER CORPORATE H.R. & PERSONNEL” Thereafter vide letter dated 24.08.2004, the petitioner has demanded benefit under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme. We are hereby advising the Accounts Department to kindly arrange for your full and final settlement of your dues along with the separation package at the earliest. For BERGET PAINTS INDIA LIMITED Sd/ (S BHATTACHARYA) SR GENERAL MANAGER CORPORATE H.R. & PERSONNEL” Thereafter vide letter dated 24.08.2004, the petitioner has demanded benefit under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme. The said letter has been replied vide letter dated 16.09.2004 stating therein that the benefit accruable to the petitioner has already been accounted in the bank account of the petitioner on 05.05.2004. Legal notice has been given on behalf of the petitioner dated 23.12.2004 demanding benefit under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme. Vide letter dated 16.08.2005, petitioner has regretted for issuing the legal notice but reiterated his demand for the benefit under Voluntary Retirement Scheme. Last demand letter is dated 23.08.2005. Thereafter petition has been moved under Section 28 (1) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 on 03.01.2006 claiming benefit under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme. The said application has been registered as B.S Case No.1/2006. The Labour Court on the basis of pleadings of the parties has formulated three issues which are as follows: “(I) Whether the petition filed by the petitioner is maintainable ? (II) Whether the petition is barred by law of limitation and law of estoppel ? (III) Whether the petitioner is entitled to get relief u/s. 28 of B.S.E. Act read with rule 22 of J.S.E. Rules 2001?” All the issues have been answered against the petitioner-workman. It has been held that the present application is barred by law of limitation as well as on the principle of estoppel. Further, findings have been recorded that since issue nos. I and II have been decided against the petitioner and as such the issue no. III has not been discussed in detail. Being aggrieved, an appeal has been preferred being B.S.E. Appeal No.2/2008 under Section 28(7) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953. The Appellate Authority has reappreciated the evidence and has approved the finding recorded by the Original Authority. III has not been discussed in detail. Being aggrieved, an appeal has been preferred being B.S.E. Appeal No.2/2008 under Section 28(7) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953. The Appellate Authority has reappreciated the evidence and has approved the finding recorded by the Original Authority. Issue No.3 has been discussed and decided by the Appellate Authority holding therein that although management has floated the VRS scheme by way of general package open for all employees to opt, but the management has absolute freedom to accept or not to accept offer under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme and was free to offer special package to any individual employee. The petitioner is covered under the special package and as such, claim for VRS is not admissible. On such finding, the claim of the petitioner stands rejected by the Appellate Authority. Impugning both the orders passed under Section 28 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953, the present writ petition has been filed. The issue raised by the parties before this Court is two folds. i. Whether the separation has taken place under VRS Scheme or under Special Package. ii. Whether the application filed under Section 28 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 is barred by law of limitation and estoppel or not ? So far as the first issue regarding the separation of service under Voluntary Retirement Scheme or Special Package is concerned, it is admitted position of the parties, firstly petitioner has applied for VRS vide application dated 12.04.2004 w.e.f. 30.04.2004 and secondly, separation between the parties has taken place w.e.f. 30.04.2004. Thus, the proposed date of separation made by the petitioner vide application dated 12.04.2004 has been accepted and acted upon. Natural corollary is that it is under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme as the application for separation was made under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme. This had been disputed by the respondent-employer by putting new narrative that it was under a special package and not under Voluntary Retirement Scheme. Referring para-10 of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, it has been argued that it was sole discretion of the employer to accept such offer or not. 4. From perusal of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, it is evident that once an application made by the employee, he has been stopped from withdrawing the proposal. The employer has option either to accept or reject but withdrawal by the employee is not permissible. 4. From perusal of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, it is evident that once an application made by the employee, he has been stopped from withdrawing the proposal. The employer has option either to accept or reject but withdrawal by the employee is not permissible. As per the scheme, acceptance or rejection has to be in written, but instead of any such written acceptance of rejection, a new story has been put forth by the employer that it was under the special separation package. This narratives pleaded by the employer has to be proved by him only. To prove such pleading, the employer has relied upon the oral evidence of Dipankar Rudra, who was holding the post of Divisional Sales Manager and Shishir Rai, who was holding the post of General Manager (HR and Personnel). Both have deposed before the Labour Court that separation was on the basis of mutual agreement between the parties not under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme. It is trite that evidence can be given by a person, who is witness to the transaction. It has neither been pleaded nor deposed by both the witnesses that they were present when the mutual discussion has taken place. Such evidence is no evidence and any finding recorded on the basis of such evidence has to be termed as perverse because it is based on no evidence. Thus, this Court finds that the employer has failed to prove the narrative put by him that the separation was on the basis of mutual discussion between the parties. On the other hand, application has been made under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme indicating the date of separation and that has been acted upon also. In view of above discussion, this Court finds that the separation has taken place under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme and not under the special separation package arrived at between the parties on the basis of mutual discussion. Even the date of discussion has not been disclosed. So far as issue no. II regarding limitation is concerned, Section 28 (1) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 and Rule 22 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Rule 2001 is quoted hereinunder: “28. Even the date of discussion has not been disclosed. So far as issue no. II regarding limitation is concerned, Section 28 (1) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 and Rule 22 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Rule 2001 is quoted hereinunder: “28. Claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages and penalty for malicious or vexatious claims.—(1) Where contrary to the provisions of this Act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employee, or any payment of wages has been delayed, or any sum is otherwise due from the employer to the employee, such employee, or any legal practitioner or any authorised agent or any officer of a registered trade union or any Inspecting Officer may make an application in such manner, within such time, and to such authority as may be prescribed for a direction under sub-section (2). 22. Application under sub-section (1) of section 28.-(1) An application under sub-section (1) of section 28 shall be made to a Sub-divisional Magistrate or an Assistant Commissioner of Labour [or Deputy Commissioner of Labour] of the local area or the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, mentioned in column 2 of the Schedule hereto annexed having their respective jurisdiction as specified in column 4 of the said Schedule or an Officer authorised in this behalf by notification in the Official Gazette within six months from the date on which the deduction from the wages was made or the date on which the payment of wages was due to be made as the case may be Provided that an application may be admitted after the period of six months if the applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period: By the above enactment, procedure has been provided to the employee for realisation of wages. Wages defined under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and has been imported in Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953. Wages defined under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and has been imported in Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953. Section 2(20) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 and Section 2(VI) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is quoted hereinunder: “2(20) “Wages” means wages as defined in the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (IV of 1936) and includes the dearness allowance as the workman is for the time being entitled to;” “2[(vi) “wages” means all remuneration (whether by way of salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money or capable of being so expressed which would, if the terms of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment, and includes-(a) any remuneration payable under any award or settlement between the parties or order of a Court; (b) any remuneration to which the person employed is entitled in respect of overtime work or holidays or any leave period; (c) any additional remuneration payable under the terms of employment (whether called a bonus or by any other name); (d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum, whether with or without deductions but does not provide for the time within which the payment is to be made; (e) any sum to which the person employed is entitled under any scheme framed under any law for the time being in force; but does not include— (1) any bonus (whether under a scheme of profit sharing or otherwise) which does not form part of the remuneration payable under the terms of employment or which is not payable under any award or settlement between the parties or order of a Court; (2) the value of any house-accommodation, or of the supply of light, water, medical attendance or other amenity or of any service excluded from the computation of wages by a general or special order of [the appropriate Government]; (3) any contribution paid by the employer to any pension or provident fund, and the interest which may have accrued thereon; (4) any travelling allowance or the value of any travelling concession; (5) any sum paid to the employed person to defray special expenses entailed on him by the nature of his employment; or (6) any gratuity payable on the termination of employment in cases other than those specified in sub-clause (d)]” From perusal of the above definition of wages, it is evident that anything payable on consideration of the employment i.e. the services rendered by the employee are covered under the definition of wages. Any separation benefits are also covered. Special procedure has been prescribed under the Act, over and above the general law. It contemplates that an application has to be made by the employee within such time and to such authority as may be prescribed. Under Rule 22 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Rules, 2001 (Supra). An application has to be made within six months from the date on which wages became due. Power to condone the delay has been given to the authority if sufficient cause is shown. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the limitation will start from the date of refusal. In the present case, date of refusal is 23.08.2005 and as such, the present application has been filed within time. An argument has also been advanced that no petition is required for condonation of delay and further if there is sufficient explanation in the petition, then on that basis, delay can be condoned. It has also been argued by referring to the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Improvement Trust, Ludhiana Vs. Ujagar Singh and Ors. reported in (2010) 6 SCC 786 wherein it has been held that genuine claim should not be rejected on the ground of limitation. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has argued that nothing can be added or subtracted in the statute or Rules made therein. The Rules stipulate that limitation will start from the date when wages has become due. In the present case, wages has become due on the date of separation i.e. 30.04.2004 and as such, limitation has expired in the year 2004 itself, while the application has been made under Section 28 of the Act of 1953 in January, 2006 i.e. after more than one year. Perused the record, flow of dates are as follows: (i) 01.06.1993 is the date of Appointment. (ii) 12.04.2004 is the date of Application for VRS made by the petitioner. (iii) 30.04.2004 is the effective date of separation from service proposed by the petitioner. (iv) 07.05.2004 is the letter by which Employer has accepted the separation on mutual discussion between the parties by granting special separation package. (v) 24.08.2004 is the demand of employee for benefits as per VRS. (vi) 16.09.2004 is the reply by the employee regarding benefit. (vii) 23.12.2004 is the date of legal notice by the petitioner. (iv) 07.05.2004 is the letter by which Employer has accepted the separation on mutual discussion between the parties by granting special separation package. (v) 24.08.2004 is the demand of employee for benefits as per VRS. (vi) 16.09.2004 is the reply by the employee regarding benefit. (vii) 23.12.2004 is the date of legal notice by the petitioner. (viii) 16.08.2005 is the letter by the petitioner regretting legal notice. (ix) 23.08.2005 is the letter by the employer denying any further payment. (x) 03.01.2006 is the application made under Section 28(1) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953. So far limitation is concerned, Rule is very clear that limitation starts when the wages has become due. These clear terms of Rule requires no further explanation or interpretation. 6. In the present case, the date of separation is 30.04. 2004 and as such, limitation will start from 01.05.2004 when the wages has become due. The plea of petitioner that limitation will start from the last date of refusal i.e. 23.08.2005 is contrary to the Rule 22 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Rule, 2001. Reference can be made to the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Transport Corpn. of India Ltd. Vs. Veljan Hydrair Ltd. reported in (2007) 3 SCC 142 . Para-11 of the judgment is quoted hereinbelow: “11. Section 24-A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 provides that neither the District Forum nor the State Commission nor the National Commission shall admit a complaint unless it is filed within two years from the date on which the cause of action has arisen. The term "cause of action" is of wide import and has different meanings in different contexts, that is when used in the context of territorial jurisdiction or limitation or the accrual of right to sue. It refers to all circumstances or bundle of facts which if proved or admitted entitles the plaintiff (complainant) to the relief prayed for. The term "cause of action" is of wide import and has different meanings in different contexts, that is when used in the context of territorial jurisdiction or limitation or the accrual of right to sue. It refers to all circumstances or bundle of facts which if proved or admitted entitles the plaintiff (complainant) to the relief prayed for. In the context of limitation with reference to a contract for carriage of goods, the date of cause of action may refer to the date on which the goods are entrusted, date of issue of consignment note, the date stipulated for delivery, the date of delivery, the date of refusal to deliver, the date of intimation of carrier's request to wait for delivery as the goods are being traced, the date of intimation of loss of goods, or the date of acknowledgement of liability.” Reference can be made to the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Khatri Hotels Private Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Anr. reported in (2011) 9 SCC 126 . Para-30 is quoted hereinbelow: “30. While enacting Article 58 of the 1963 Act, the legislature has designedly made a departure from the language of Article 120 of the 1908 Act. The word `first' has been used between the words `sue' and `accrued'. This would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. To put it differently, successive violation of the right will not give rise to fresh cause and the suit will be liable to be dismissed if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the day when the right to sue first accrued.” The cause of action and date of starting of limitation is two separate concept. There may be multiple cause of action, but there cannot be multiple point of initiation of limitation. 7. In the present case, order of refusal is dated 23.08.2005, that may be a cause of action, but that is not starting point of limitation. It is equally settled law that once period of limitation starts, it cannot be stopped by any litigating party even by mutual agreement between the parties. Thus, this Court finds that the present application dated 03.01.2006 is beyond the period of limitation. It is equally settled law that once period of limitation starts, it cannot be stopped by any litigating party even by mutual agreement between the parties. Thus, this Court finds that the present application dated 03.01.2006 is beyond the period of limitation. Limitation goes to the root of the matter and affects jurisdiction. Power of condonation of delay has been given to the Labour Court by Rule 22 (supra). In the present case, there is no prayer for condonation of delay. In fact pleading has been made that it is within the limitation, but equally it should be kept in mind that in the matter of limitation, the Court should not be hyper technical. If sufficient reason is reflected in the pleadings that may be considered. But, in the present case, reason for delay in filing the petition is negotiating approach of the petitioner. Petitioner is supposed to negotiate within the period of limitation. He cannot go on negotiation with employer till the assurance is given. In the present case, even no assurance has been given by the employer. In fact the claim of the petitioner has been denied as long back as in the year 2004 itself vide letter dated 16.09.2004, (Ext.-8). Even thereafter, the petitioner was persuading the employer to release more amount under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme. Thus from the sequence of facts discussed hereinabove, this Court finds that there is no prayer for condonation of delay. Entire sequence of facts have been taken into consideration. The delay is due to the reason that the petitioner was persuading to the employer for release of some more amount under Voluntary Retirement Scheme. This cannot be a ground or sufficient cause for condonation of delay. 8. Thus, this Court finds that Court below has rightly rejected the application on the ground of limitation. In view of the above discussion, the present writ petition is dismissed on the ground of limitation.