JUDGMENT : 1. This is a defendants’ second appeal from a decree of Sri Rajendra Pal, the then Additional District Judge, Court no.3, Fatehpur passed in Civil Appeal no.91 of 1998, allowing the said appeal and reversing an original decree of Sri A.K. Gupta, the then Second Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Fatehpur in Original Suit no.3 of 1991, dismissing the suit aforesaid for cancellation of registered sale deeds dated 27.09.1988 and 09.08.1990. 2. This appeal was admitted to hearing on 13.08.2004 on the following substantial questions of law framed at the foot of the memorandum of appeal as questions nos. (e) and (f) : (e) Whether the lower Appellate Court was justified in setting aside the findings of the Trial Court without meeting out its reasonings and analysis of evidence on record by the Trial Court regarding fraud, payment of consideration and capacity of executant, Rampal to execute the sale deeds under challenge? (f) Whether the sale deeds have been wrongly cancelled even for the personal share of executant, Rampal? 3. Sri D.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Mangal Rai, learned counsel for the appellants was heard on 28.02.2019 and the appeal was posted for further hearing to 07.03.2019. On 07.03.2019, it was adjourned. On 11.03.2019, Sri D.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate resumed his submission assisted by Sri Jitendra Kumar, Advocate. His arguments did not conclude on that day, and the appeal was adjourned to the following day i.e. 12.03.2019. Sri R.K. Pandey, learned Advocate on behalf of the respondents remained present during the hearing. Again on 12.03.2019, Sri D.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Jitendra Kumar, learned Advocate resumed his submissions and concluded in support of the appeal. The appeal was ordered to be adjourned to the following day for Sri R.K. Pandey, learned counsel for the respondents to answer. On 13.03.2019, Sri R.K. Pandey, learned Advocate argued in reply. Sri D.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Jitendra Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants remained present during the hearing. Sri R.K. Pandey, learned counsel for the respondents concluded his submissions. Nothing was added in rejoinder on behalf of the appellants. Thus, judgment was reserved on 13.03.2019. 4. On 13.03.2019, Sri R.K. Pandey, learned Advocate argued in reply. Sri D.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Jitendra Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants remained present during the hearing. Sri R.K. Pandey, learned counsel for the respondents concluded his submissions. Nothing was added in rejoinder on behalf of the appellants. Thus, judgment was reserved on 13.03.2019. 4. The original plaintiff who is respondent to this appeal, that is to say, Laxmi Narain, now represented by his heirs and legal representatives, respondents nos.1/1, 1/2 and 1/3, shall be hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff. The original defendants to the suit were three in number, to wit, Gaya Prasad, Sudhir Kumar and Randhir Kumar. Defendants nos.2 & 3, Sudhir Kumar and Randhir Kumar are sons of the defendant, Gaya Prasad. Gaya Prasad died pending this appeal and is represented by his widow, Smt. Shiv Pyari, appellant no.1/1 and appellants nos.2 & 3, that is to say, the two original defendants, Sudhir Kumar and Randhir Kumar in the right of their father, the deceased defendant appellant, Gaya Prasad as appellants nos.1/2 and 1/3. All the appellants shall be collectively referred to as the defendants hereinafter, and wherever there is an individual reference, they will be referred to as defendant followed by the name. 5. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that the plaintiff filed a suit against the defendants seeking cancellation of the registered sale deed dated 27.08.1988 executed by one Rampal, the plaintiff's father in favour of the defendants, Sudhir Kumar and Randhir Kumar, both sons of the defendant, Gaya Prasad, and another sale deed dated 09.08.1990 executed by Rampal, last mentioned in favour of the defendants, Sudhir Kumar and Randhir Kumar. It was the plaintiff's case that the original owner of the property was one Madar. He had a son, Rampal. Rampal had two sons, Gaya Prasad and Laxmi Narain. Of these, Laxmi Narain is the plaintiff. Gaya Prasad had two sons, Sudhir Kumar and Randhir Kumar, besides two daughters, Savitri Devi and Gayatri Devi. Thus, the plaintiff, Laxmi Narain and the defendant, Gaya Prasad are brothers. He had a son, Rampal. Rampal had two sons, Gaya Prasad and Laxmi Narain. Of these, Laxmi Narain is the plaintiff. Gaya Prasad had two sons, Sudhir Kumar and Randhir Kumar, besides two daughters, Savitri Devi and Gayatri Devi. Thus, the plaintiff, Laxmi Narain and the defendant, Gaya Prasad are brothers. The suit property is detailed at the foot of the plaint in three schedules, v] c] vkSj l The entire suit property went to Gaya Prasad, Laxmi Narain and their father, Ram Pal, to all seeming by survivorship after Madar with the two brothers, Laxmi Narain and Gaya Prasad, and their father claiming to hold an undivided share of a one-third each in the suit property. It is asserted in the plaint that Ram Pal, the plaintiff's father passed away on 14.11.1991, aged 85 years. He had lost his senses for the past 10 years ante-dating his decease, and would stay ill. He was unable to understand the consequences of his actions, or comprehend the impact of others' actions on his rights. It is claimed that the defendant, Gaya Prasad, who was Rampal's elder brother, took undue advantage of the latter's disability and his position of trust, that he forsook to play a fraud upon Rampal by causing him to execute the sale deeds dated 27.09.1988 and 09.08.1990 in favour of defendants, Sudhir Kumar and Randhir Kumar. It is claimed that the defendant, Gaya Prasad, who was Rampal's elder brother, took undue advantage of the latter's disability and his position of trust, that he forsook to play a fraud upon Rampal by causing him to execute the sale deeds dated 27.09.1988 and 09.08.1990 in favour of defendants, Sudhir Kumar and Randhir Kumar. The aforesaid sale deeds, that shall be hereinafter referred to as the impugned sale deeds were sought cancellation of by the plaintiff on grounds mentioned in paragraph 6 of the plaint, numbering seven, to wit, (1) the sale deeds were not executed of his free will by Rampal; (2) Rampal had lost his capacity to comprehend the actions of others and the consequences of his own acts due to illness, ten years ante-dating the execution of the sale deeds; (3) the defendant, Gaya Prasad played fraud upon Rampal by ferrying him to Bindki, purportedly for his medical treatment, where he fraudulently got the impugned sale deeds executed; (4) defendant, Randhir Kumar being a student at the time of the execution of the impugned sale deeds had no source of income to make good the sale consideration shown to be paid in the impugned sale deeds, thus, rendering the impugned sale deeds executed without passage of any consideration; (5) Rampal had got no money on him and he died within a period of three months, post-execution of the impugned sale deeds with no evidence of passage of sale consideration; (6) Rampal had got no right to execute the impugned sale deeds relating to the properties purporting to be conveyed thereby; and (7) the marginal witnesses of the sale deeds, Santosh Kumar and Girija Shankar, are the sons-in-law of the defendant, Gaya Prasad, and not independent witnesses. 6. The suit proceeds on a cause of action that the defendants were called upon by the plaintiff to get the sale deeds cancelled, but he did not abide by that demand leading the plaintiff to bring the present suit seeking cancellation of the impugned sale deeds. A joint written statement was filed on 02.05.1991 by the defendants. The defence set up by the defendants goes to the effect that the suit property detailed in the three schedules is not the self-acquired property of the plaintiff's and the defendant, Gaya Prasad's grandfather, Madar, but the self-acquired property of their father, Rampal. A joint written statement was filed on 02.05.1991 by the defendants. The defence set up by the defendants goes to the effect that the suit property detailed in the three schedules is not the self-acquired property of the plaintiff's and the defendant, Gaya Prasad's grandfather, Madar, but the self-acquired property of their father, Rampal. The suit property in the time of Rampal saw the construction of a house and an ahata. This property by way of construction of a house and the ahata were made by the father of the plaintiff and the defendant, Gaya Prasad, that is to say, Rampal alone. The ahata was constructed over land earmarked for the new abadi of the Gaon Sabha, that Rampal took forcible possession of. He would live in the house, and in the ahata would tether his cattle and store other necessaries. He was the sole owner in possession of the suit property. 7. It is asserted that the property being self-acquired by Rampal, he had a right to alienate the same. About five years ante-dating the institution of the suit, a dispute arose between the plaintiff, the defendants and Rampal, who were until then living as a joint family. It led to a partition of house and hearth between them where Rampal chose to stay with the plaintiff till his death. Rampal wanted to go on pilgrimage (teerth yatra), and also needed money to eke out a living. He, therefore, persuaded the defendants to purchase the suit property, that he sold in two parts. He sold the house for a valuable sale consideration of Rs.13,000/-by registered sale deed dated 27.09.1988 accompanied by delivery of possession of the suit property, that is to say, the house. Subsequently, he sold the ahata and the agricultural land to defendants nos.2 & 3 for a valuable sale consideration of Rs.1 lakh, with that transaction being effected through a registered sale deed dated 09.08.1990. Rampal spent the money that he got as proceeds of the sale on his daily needs and the pilgrimage he undertook. Rampal died on 19.11.1990 aged 85 years. He was not at all ill or infirm. He was in enjoyment of good and robust health. It is incorrect to say that he was ill where he suffered from an impaired mental faculty to understand the consequences of his actions. Rampal died on 19.11.1990 aged 85 years. He was not at all ill or infirm. He was in enjoyment of good and robust health. It is incorrect to say that he was ill where he suffered from an impaired mental faculty to understand the consequences of his actions. It is also denied that any fraud was played upon Rampal in the execution of the two impugned sale deeds. It is further pleaded that it is incorrect to say that Rampal had no right to sell the suit property conveyed by the impugned sale deeds. The plaintiff had good knowledge of execution of the sale deeds contemporaneous in time, but he did not take any steps during the life time of Rampal. The suit was instituted after Rampal's death. It is also pleaded that about 18 years ante-dating the institution of the suit, the plaintiff and the defendants were living together jointly, and Rampal had purchased 10 bighas, 13 biswas land in the names of the plaintiff's sons, and that property was purchased during the period of time when the family was still joint. It was purchased out of the joint family nucleus, and thus, defendant, Gaya Prasad also had a half share in that agricultural property purchased by Rampal in the name of the plaintiff's sons, of which the members of the joint family remained in joint occupation and possession. It is pleaded that once the dispute between members of the family erupted, defendant, Gaya Prasad threatened to file a suit for declaration. However, the plaintiff pre-empted him by filing a like suit for a declaration that the property purchased by Rampal in the name of the plaintiff's sons was not part of the joint family property. It is also pleaded that the plaintiff has shown his age incorrectly. He is aged about 44 years, but has shown his age to be 50 years. The suit for cancellation of the sale deeds suffers from misjoinder of causes of action as two separate suits ought to have been filed seeking cancellation of the two sale deeds as required by Order XI, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, the Code). It is also averred that the property shown in Schedule l is agricultural property, of which the plaintiff was never in possession, and, thus, the suit is barred by Section 331 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. It is also averred that the property shown in Schedule l is agricultural property, of which the plaintiff was never in possession, and, thus, the suit is barred by Section 331 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. The plaintiff also wants a declaration about title regarding the house and the ahata, to which he has no right. The suit was also assailed as undervalued and the court fee paid was said to be insufficient. The agricultural land, part of the suit property, is not an acquisition of Madar, but that too is a self-acquired property of Rampal. The suit was also resisted as barred by the principles of acquiescence and estoppel. A plea of misjoinder was also raised as it is urged that the impugned sale deeds have been executed in favour of defendants, Sudhir Kumar and Randhir Kumar, but not Gaya Prasad, who has been unnecessarily impleaded. 8. On the pleadings of parties, the following issues were struck by the Trial Court: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the sale deeds cancelled according to the grounds mentioned in paragraph 6 of the suit? (2) Whether the suit is barred by Order II, Rule 6 of the CPC? (3) Whether the suit is barred by Section 331 of the U.P. Z.A. &L.R. Act? (4) Whether the suit is undervalued and the court fee paid is insufficient? (5) Whether the suit is barred by the principle of estoppel and acquiescence? (6) Whether the suit is bad due to misjoinder of parties? (7) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? 9. The Trial Court decided issues nos. 2, 5 and 6 being defendants’ issues upon failure of the defendants to discharge his onus probandi, under Section 101 of the Evidence Act. 10. Issues nos.3 and 4 were decided as preliminary issues by an order dated 20.10.1997, which forms part of the Trial Court’s judgment. These issues were answered in the negative, that is to say, in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. Thus, the Trial Court dealt with issue no.1 as the substantial issue on which the event in the suit turned. These issues were answered in the negative, that is to say, in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. Thus, the Trial Court dealt with issue no.1 as the substantial issue on which the event in the suit turned. The Trial Court by a very detailed opinion recorded on the said issue with reference to the evidence on record answered the issue in the negative holding that on basis of the conclusions reached by the Court, it cannot be said that on grounds mentioned in paragraph 6 of the plaint, the impugned sale deeds are liable to be cancelled. It was opined that the impugned sale deeds were valid documents, and there appears to be no justification to cancel the same. On the basis of the said findings and the conclusions on other issues in whatever manner reached, the Trial Court ordered the suit to stand dismissed with costs. 11. Aggrieved, the plaintiff appealed to the learned District Judge, where the appeal was numbered as Civil Appeal no.91 of 1998. It came up for determination, upon assignment, before the Additional District Judge, Court no.3, Fatehpur on 22.10.2003. The learned Additional District Judge by his judgment of the aforesaid date, allowed the appeal, set aside the decree of the Trial Court and decreed the plaintiff’s suit for cancellation, ordering the impugned sale deeds to be cancelled. The parties were directed to bear their own costs. 12. This is what has brought the defendants in appeal from the appellate decree under Section 100 of the Code, where they ask this Court to set aside the appellate decree and restore that of the Trial Court with costs throughout. 13. At the outset, Sri D.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate has made it bold to say that the lower Appellate Court has not formally, but substantially failed to discharge its mandatory duty under Order XLI, Rule 31 of the Code by its failure to reverse the well reasoned and specific findings recorded by the Trial Court, rendering the appellate determination bad in law. About this obligation of the lower Appellate Court under Order XLI, Rule 31 of the Code, Sri D.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate submits that a Court of Appeal before reversing a finding of fact recorded by the Trial Court has to bear in mind reasons ascribed by the Court of first instance for the conclusions reached. About this obligation of the lower Appellate Court under Order XLI, Rule 31 of the Code, Sri D.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate submits that a Court of Appeal before reversing a finding of fact recorded by the Trial Court has to bear in mind reasons ascribed by the Court of first instance for the conclusions reached. The lawful course for the disposal of an appeal by the first Appellate Court mandates that it must specifically reverse such findings as aforesaid recorded by the Trial Court, before it proceeds to reverse, or vary the decree of the first instance. In support of aforesaid propositions of law, Sri D.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar, (2015) 1 SCC 391 . He has invited the attention of the Court, in particular, to paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the report in Vinod Kumar (supra), that reads thus: 10. As far back in 1969, the learned Judge V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. (as His Lordship then was the Judge of the Kerala High Court) while deciding the first appeal under Section 96 CPC in Kurian Chacko v. Varkey Ouseph [ AIR 1969 Ker 316 ], reminded the first appellate court of its duty as to how the first appeal under Section 96 should be decided. In his distinctive style of writing and subtle power of expression, the learned Judge held as under: (AIR p. 316, paras 1-2) “1. The plaintiff, unsuccessful in two courts, has come up here aggrieved by the dismissal of his suit which was one for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The defendant disputed the plaintiff's title to the property as also his possession and claimed both in himself. The learned Munsif, who tried the suit, recorded findings against the plaintiff both on title and possession. But, in appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge disposed of the whole matter glibly and briefly, in a few sentences. 2. An appellate court is the final court of fact ordinarily and therefore a litigant is entitled to a full and fair and independent consideration of the evidence at the appellate stage. Anything less than this is unjust to him and I have no doubt that in the present case the learned Subordinate Judge has fallen far short of what is expected of him as an appellate court. Anything less than this is unjust to him and I have no doubt that in the present case the learned Subordinate Judge has fallen far short of what is expected of him as an appellate court. Although there is furious contest between the counsel for the appellant and for the respondent, they appear to agree with me in this observation.” (emphasis supplied) This Court in number of cases while affirming and then reiterating the aforesaid principle has laid down the scope and powers of the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC. 11. We consider it apposite to refer to some of the decisions. 12. In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari [ (2001) 3 SCC 179 : (2001) 1 SCR 948 ], this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 188-89, para 15) “15. … The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. … while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it.” The above view has been followed by a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Madhukar v. Sangram [ (2001) 4 SCC 756 : AIR 2001 SC 2171 ], wherein it was reiterated that sitting as a court of first appeal, it is the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. 13. In H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith [ (2005) 10 SCC 243 ], this Court stated as under: (SCC p. 244, para 3) “3. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. 13. In H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith [ (2005) 10 SCC 243 ], this Court stated as under: (SCC p. 244, para 3) “3. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both on questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in the present case has not recorded any finding either on facts or on law. Sitting as the first appellate court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording the finding regarding title.” 14. Again in Jagannath v. Arulappa [ (2005) 12 SCC 303 ], while considering the scope of Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 303, para 2) “2. A court of first appeal can reappreciate the entire evidence and come to a different conclusion.” 15. Again in B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy [ (2010) 13 SCC 530 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 808], this Court taking note of all the earlier judgments of this Court reiterated the aforementioned principle with these words: (SCC pp. 530-31, paras 3-5) “3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state: (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. 4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazariv. Purushottam Tiwari [ (2001) 3 SCC 179 : (2001) 1 SCR 948 ], SCC p. 188, para 15 and Madhukar v. Sangram [ (2001) 4 SCC 756 : AIR 2001 SC 2171 ] SCC p. 758, para 5.) 5. In view of the above salutary principles, on going through the impugned judgment, we feel that the High Court has failed to discharge the obligation placed on it as a first appellate court. In our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the regular first appeal shows that it falls short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the claim of both parties, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law.” 14. Learned Senior Counsel has further relied in support of his contention about the obligations of an Appellate Court while writing a judgment, particularly of reversal, upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Laliteshwar Prasad Singh and others v. S.P. Srivastava (Dead) through Legal Representatives, (2017) 2 SCC 415 . He has drawn the attention of the Court to paragraph 14 of the report, where their Lordships have held thus: “14. The points which arise for determination by a court of first appeal must cover all important questions involved in the case and they should not be general and vague. He has drawn the attention of the Court to paragraph 14 of the report, where their Lordships have held thus: “14. The points which arise for determination by a court of first appeal must cover all important questions involved in the case and they should not be general and vague. Even though the appellate court would be justified in taking a different view on question of fact that should be done after adverting to the reasons given by the trial Judge in arriving at the finding in question. When the appellate court agrees with the views of the trial court on evidence, it need not restate effect of evidence or reiterate reasons given by the trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the trial court would ordinarily suffice. However, when the first appellate court reverses the findings of the trial court, it must record the findings in clear terms explaining how the reasonings of the trial court are erroneous.” (Emphasis by Court) 15. Learned Senior Counsel has also placed reliance upon a decision of this Court dealing with the obligations of an Appellate Court writing a judgment of reversal in Doodhnath and another vs. Lakhan, AIR 2006 All 3 where S.N. Srivastava, J. held thus in paragraphs 7 and 9 of the report: “7. Coming to the analytical examination of the judgments of the two courts below, it is clear from a perusal of the judgment of the trial court that the trial court framed as many as four issues and decided each and every point by appraising the evidence adduced in the case. I have also been taken through the judgment of the trial court as well as the lower appellate Court. It would appear that the trial court analytically scanned the evidence adduced and disbelieved the statements of the D.Ws. 1 and 2 noticing glaring discrepancies in their statements and ultimately, converged to the conclusions that the plaintiffs were the owners of the property in question. On the other hand, the lower appellate court heavily relied upon the Amin's report and wandered off into discussing points, which were, in view of controversy involved, less relevant to the controversy involved in the case. On the other hand, the lower appellate court heavily relied upon the Amin's report and wandered off into discussing points, which were, in view of controversy involved, less relevant to the controversy involved in the case. Besides one noticeable aspect is that the conclusion of the lower appellate court about possession of plaintiff to the extent of few cubic feet towards east of their eastern door is not a logical one and the conclusion has been drawn without any valid basis and it would appear that the lower appellate court has discounted material facts on record while converging to the conclusion. It would further appear from a perusal of the judgment that the lower appellate court did not frame any question of law for determination and it would rather appear that the court below jumped from one point to another without traversing upon points which were very material for consideration and therefore judgment does not clearly suggest that the court has applied its judicial mind to the appreciation of the evidence and therefore manifestly conveys the process of judicial thinking by which it differs from the conclusions of the courts below. 9. In view of the above discussion. I am of the view that the judgment of the lower appellate court does not comport with the requirement as envisaged in Order 41, Rule 31 of the C.P.C. and it does appear that the court below has not applied its judicial mind at all while delivering verdict. Therefore, the judgment and decree passed by lower appellate court cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. The first substantial question of law is accordingly decided holding that the judgment of the lower appellate court does not comport with the requirements as envisaged in Order 41, Rule 31 C.P.C. and therefore, it is no judgment in the eye of law.” 16. Learned counsel for the plaintiff is not much at issue about the aforesaid proposition of law, but has sought to support the appellate judgment on the reasoning that fraud and undue influence being the findings returned by the Appellate Court to reverse the Trial Court, those findings cannot be flawed even if not specifically reversing those of the Trial Court, inasmuch as the executant, Rampal was an illiterate, rustic, old man of feeble health, in whose case burden of proof would rest upon the defendants, and not the plaintiff. The aforesaid issue would be adverted to later in this judgment. For the moment, the concern of this Court is to test the submission advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, that in writing a judgment of reversal, the Appellate Court has fallen far short of its duty under Order XLI, Rule 31 of the Code to specifically reverse the findings recorded by the Trial Court by entering its own reasonings of disagreement with each. 17. In substantiation of his contention that the lower Appellate Court has utterly failed to specifically reverse the material findings on facts in issue, and relevant facts recorded by the Trial Court, the learned Senior Counsel has been at pains to take the Court through six specific findings recorded by the Trial Court, and the relative disposition thereof by the lower Appellate Court. 18. Learned Senior Counsel has referred to in the first instance to the finding of the Trial Court about the fact of fraud claimed by the plaintiff to have been played upon the deceased, Rampal in securing execution of the impugned sale deeds. Finding on the said plea has been recorded in meticulous detail between pages 94 to 100 of the paper book. A perusal of the finding of the Trial Court shows that the Trial Court has cautiously evaluated in detail the evidence available on record, carefully analyzing the evidence of witnesses of the plaintiff to conclude that the executant of the impugned sale deeds, Rampal was not at all in such bad health, or at all in feeble state of mind where the defendants could have defrauded him to execute the impugned sale deeds against his free will. The conduct, state of health and mind of the executant was testified to by the plaintiff himself in the witness box, besides PW-2, Shyam Pal and PW-3, Shiv Mangal. PW-2, Shyam Pal is said to have spoken to Rampal, 2 – 4 months prior to his decease, whereas PW-3, Shiv Mangal has testified that he spoke to him 4 – 5 days before he passed away. PW-2, Shyam Pal is said to have spoken to Rampal, 2 – 4 months prior to his decease, whereas PW-3, Shiv Mangal has testified that he spoke to him 4 – 5 days before he passed away. The report of the conversation between the deceased executant on one hand and PW-2 and PW-3 on the other has been analyzed in detail, amongst other evidence to conclude that the deceased was in a fit state of mental and physical health, though the Trial Court has remarked that old age related ailments would logically be there, but those cannot lead to the inference that an old man who is otherwise in good mental and physical health has lost his faculty to take a prudent decision, creating or contracting legal obligations. This Court in no manner may be understood to endorse that detailed finding based on the health of the deceased executant and the alleged fraud played upon him in securing execution of the impugned sale deeds. This is all by way of a reference to those findings so as to appreciate the nature, depth and their well reasoned character. 19. The learned Senior Counsel has taken the Court through the findings of the lower Appellate Court regarding fraud where the lower Appellate Court has dealt with the findings of the Trial Court, as above detailed. This finding finds record in paragraph 21 of the impugned judgment in appeal, where it is recorded in following words : “According to the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the parties and according to the perusal of the evidence oral and documentary, the main question has to be considered in this light is that whether the fraud was placed in executing the sale-deed or not? The learned counsel for the appellant had taken the grounds of fraud in para 6 of the plaint. The first ground taken is that Rampal was an old and infirm and ill and had no understanding capacity at the time of the execution of the sale-deeds. According to the evidence, although the plaintiff alleged that Rampal was ill 10 years earlier prior to the execution of the sale-deed, but he had also executed a sale-deed in the year 1982, so this thing cannot be presumed. But according to the evidence it is correct that at the time of the execution of the sale-deeds Rampal was ill. According to the evidence, although the plaintiff alleged that Rampal was ill 10 years earlier prior to the execution of the sale-deed, but he had also executed a sale-deed in the year 1982, so this thing cannot be presumed. But according to the evidence it is correct that at the time of the execution of the sale-deeds Rampal was ill. This fact has come in the oral evidence of the defendants also and according to paper no.83-C the age of Rampal at the time of sale-deeds was 86 years. Thus it is clear that at the time of execution of sale-deeds Rampal was ill, infirm and had no understanding capacity and according to the evidence it is clear that Rampal was forced to go to Bindki for treatment and sale-deed were executed by playing fraud. The case law 2001 R.D.(92) page 161 is fully applicable in this case and the burden of proof shifted upon the defendants to prove that Rampal was of correct and fit mental and physical position, but the defendants filed to discharge this burden.” 20. The finding recorded by the lower Appellate Court does not at all specifically reverse the detailed finding with reference to relevant evidence recorded by the Trial Court regarding mental and physical health of the executant, Rampal at the time he executed the impugned sale deeds, or the finding based on relevant evidence that no fraud was played by the defendants. The lower Appellate Court has presumed that Rampal being aged, going by his years, was so ill and infirm that he had no capacity to understand the consequences of his action. He was forced to go to Bindki for treatment, where the impugned sale deeds were got executed by the defendants. There is no evidence referred to by the learned Judge in appeal, on basis of which he concluded that on account of old age and ailment, Rampal was so impaired in body and mind that he lost his capacity to understand. The lower Appellate Court also has not referred to any evidence to conclude that Rampal was forced to go to Bindki. This Court is, therefore, of clear opinion that the detailed finding of the Trial Court about fraud has not been specifically reversed, with requisite reasoning recorded to disagree with the Trial Court. The lower Appellate Court also has not referred to any evidence to conclude that Rampal was forced to go to Bindki. This Court is, therefore, of clear opinion that the detailed finding of the Trial Court about fraud has not been specifically reversed, with requisite reasoning recorded to disagree with the Trial Court. The learned Trial Court has further recorded a finding regarding passage of sale consideration to the executant, Rampal and financial capacity of the buyers. The said finding is recorded at pages 102 – 104 of the paper book carrying the Trial Court’s judgment. The learned Trial Court has further recorded a finding regarding passage of sale consideration to the executant, Rampal and financial capacity of the buyers. The said finding is recorded at pages 102 – 104 of the paper book carrying the Trial Court’s judgment. The said finding reads thus (in Hindi vernacular): tgkWa rd Á’uxr cSukeks ds fcyk cny o e`rd jkeiky dks dksbZ #i;s ÁkIr gksus dk loky gS rks bl laca/k esa gkykfda ih0MCyw0 1 oknh y{eh ujk;u us vius eq[; ijh{kk esa dgk gS fd cSukeks dk dksbZ iSlk Áfroknhx.k us jkeiky dks ugha fn;k gSA ysfdu blds vykok dksbZ vU; fo’oluh; lk{; oknh dh vksj ls ÁLrqr ugha fd;k x;k gS ftlls ;g fo’okl fd;k tk lds fd Áfroknhx.k us dksbZ ÁfrQy cSukeks dk e`rd jkeiky dks ugha fn;kA bl laca/k esa oknh dh vksj ls ÁLrqr vU; lk{kh ih0MCyw0 2 txnh’k o ih0MCyw0 3 f’koeaxy us vius lk{; esa dqN ugha dgk gSA vr% oknh dks nqykjs cuke mi lapkyd pdcUnh o vU; vkj0Mh0 1957 ist 206 dh uthj dk dksbZ ykHk ugha fn;k tk ldrk fd ;fn ÁfrQy ikl ugha gqvk gS rks /kkjk 25 lafonk vf/kfu;e ds rgr nLrkost dks ‘kwU; ekuk tk;sxkA tcfd nwljh vksj Áfroknhx.k dh vksj ls leLr lk{khx.k us Á’uxr cSukes fn0 27&9&88 o 9&8&90 dk 13000@& #i;s o 1]00]000@& #i;s ÁfrQy e`rd jkeiky dks vnk dj cSukek fuLikfnr djuk crk;k gSA Mh0MCyw0 1 Áfroknh x;k Álkn us viuh Áfrijh{kk esa Li”V#i ls dgk gS fd 13000@& #i;s mlus y{ehujk;u ds lkeus jkeiky ds gkFk esa fn;k rFkk cSukes ds ckn jkeiky rhFkZ;k=k ij x;k th vdsys x;k Fkk rFkk nwljk cSukek mlus jkeiky dks fookfnr tehu o gkrs dk lq/khj o ju/khj ds gd esa djk;k Fkk 1]00]000@& #i;s mlus y{ehujk;u o lq[kiky ds lkeus jkeiky dks fn;k FkkA y{ehujk;u rks Lo;a oknh gS gh rFkk mlus LokHkkfod #i ls viuh ftjg esa vius lkeus e`rd jkeiky dk mijksDr /kujkf’k nsus ls euk fd;k gSA ysfdu vU; lk{kh lq[kyky dks Áfroknhx.k }kjk Mh0MCyw0 2 ds #i esa U;k;ky; ds le{k ijhf{kr djk;k x;k gS] ftlus vius lk{; esa Li”V #i ls dgk gS fd gkrk o tksr vkjkth dk lkSnk 1]00]000@& #i;s esa mlds lkeus r; iks[rk gqvk Fkk mijksDr #i;s cSukes ds igys ns fn;s x;s Fks rFkk ml le; og Hkh ekStwn FkkA mijksDr lk{kh dh Áfrijh{kk esa ,slk dksbZ fojks/kkHkkl ugha gS ftlls fd mlds lk{; ij vfo’okl fd;k tk ldsA blds vfrfjDr Lo;a Á’uxr cSukes isij la[;k 28 d o 72 d dh iq’r ij mifocU/kd }kjk fd;s x;s i`”Bkadu ds voyksdu ls fl) gksrk gS fd e`rd us mijksDr cSukes ds tj leu eq0 13000@&#i;s o 1]00]000@& #i;s Øe’k% igys gh ik fy, rFkk bl rF; dks Lo;a e`rd jkeiky foØsrk us mifoca/kd ds lkeus Lohdkj fd;k gSA ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; dh [k.MihB }kjk ckyk Álkn cuke Hkksyk ukFk o vU; 1981 ,u0vks0lh 29 ¼bykgkckn½ esa fu/kkZfjr fd;k gS fd iathdj.k vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 60¼2½ ds vuqlkj ;g mi/kkj.kk dh tk ldrh gS fd nLrkost dk leqfpr #i ls iathdj.k vf/kfu;e ds rgr fn;s x;s rjhds ls fd;k x;k gS rFkk /kkjk 52 o 58 mijksDr vf/kfu;e ds rgr lanfHkZr rF; mlh rjg ?kfVr gq, tSlk fd mfYyf[kr fd;k x;k gSA vr% mijksDr ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa ;g ugha dgk ldrk fd fookfnr cSukes fcyk cny gSA 21. The said finding has been dealt with by the lower Appellate Court in paragraph 23 of its judgment, which reads as follows: “The second ground is relating to the sale-consideration. In this respect, it is clear from the evidence of D.W.3 Sudheer Kumar who was the student at that time and had no source of earning at the time of execution of the sale-deed. He admitted in his statement that Rs.40,000/-he got from his inlaws, Rs.50,000/-from his maternal uncle and Rs.13,000/-he got from his father. But no evidence has been adduced by the defendants regarding the taking of the aforesaid amount and no documentary evidence also produced in this regard. Thus it is clear that money was not passed to Rampal, regarding the execution of the sale-deeds. According to the evidence, it is also clear that there is no evidence that how the money was spent by Rampal, which was got in the execution of the sale-deed.” 22. The said finding also has not been specifically reversed by the lower Appellate Court, particularly, with reference to the Sub-Registrar’s endorsement regarding passage of sale consideration, of which the Trial Court has taken due note by attaching that probative value, which these endorsements carry by virtue of Sections 52, 58 and 59 of the Registration Act. This Court does not say that the finding of the lower Appellate Court is intrinsically wrong or for that matter right, on the evidence available. All that is said is that the lower Appellate Court has not specifically reversed the finding of the Trial Court on the issue of passage of sale consideration, recorded by the Trial Court with reference to the available evidence on record, in accordance with the Appellate Court’s obligation under Order XLI, Rule 31 of the Code. The Trial Court has again recorded findings about the rights and capacity of the vendor, Rampal to execute the sale deeds, that finds place at pages 104 – 110 of the paper book carrying the Trial Court’s judgment. 23. The Trial Court has again recorded findings about the rights and capacity of the vendor, Rampal to execute the sale deeds, that finds place at pages 104 – 110 of the paper book carrying the Trial Court’s judgment. 23. The Trial Court has recorded findings regarding title of the executant, Rampal to the exclusion of his sons on a very detailed analysis of entries in the revenue papers, including the khatauni and the Consolidation Forms, the law applicable as to tenure, and the nature of the right, if any, held by Madar, the absence of evidence about Madar’s death, that is to say, whether it was before abolition of Zamindari or afterwards and the conduct of the plaintiff in never applying for mutation of his name to the extent of 1/3rd share claimed by him now. On the basis of all these, and consideration of other material evidence, the Trial Court has recorded a clear finding against the plaintiff, holding Rampal to be the exclusive owner of the property, with all rights vested in him to alienate the same. The said finding of the Trial Court has been dealt with by the lower Appellate Court at page 15 of the judgment (page 75 of the paper book) where the lower Appellate Court has expressed itself in the following words: “Thirdly, Rampal had also no right to dispose of the property of Ahata and house as it was the property coming from the ancestors and there was no evidence produced by the defendants to prove that the property was self-acquired by Rampal. Regarding the agricultural property, also it is clear that Rampal could not get better title than of his father because the revenue records filed by the appellant clearly shows that the agricultural property was not self acquired and Rampal had no right to sell without the consent of the heirs.” 24. A perusal of the finding recorded by the lower Appellate Court again shows that it has reversed a very detailed finding of the Trial Court regarding exclusive title of Rampal, on the basis of no reasoning. The finding of reversal is nothing beyond a cryptic conclusion contrary to what the Trial Court has decided on analysis of evidence referred to in its finding. This Court again does not say that the finding of the lower Appellate Court is intrinsically bad. The finding of reversal is nothing beyond a cryptic conclusion contrary to what the Trial Court has decided on analysis of evidence referred to in its finding. This Court again does not say that the finding of the lower Appellate Court is intrinsically bad. All that is said is that in recording such a finding, the lower Appellate Court was expected by law to specifically reverse the Trial Court with good reasons recorded on the basis of evidence, that has not been done. 25. Regarding the issue as to veracity of the marginal witnesses to the sale deeds being related to the defendants, the Trial Court has held with reference to evidence that the fact that marginal witnesses, Santosh Kumar and Girija Shankar are sons-in-law of defendant, Gaya Prasad does not inherently disqualify them to be marginal witnesses. The Trial Court has taken note of their evidence and found them on the analysis of it to be good witnesses, who have testified to the entire transaction of execution and registration. Marginal witness, Santosh Kumar was examined as DW-4 before the Trial Court and his evidence has been analyzed to enter a finding about the facts that the marginal witnesses being related to the defendants, would not of itself detract from the validity of the sale deeds, and further that DW-4 has testified to all substantial steps of the transaction satisfactorily. This finding may be good or bad, but it has not been dealt with by the lower Appellate Court and reversed, if at all, with reasons assigned. In paragraph 24 of the appellate judgment it has been held: “(24) Regarding the martinal (sic 'marginal') witnesses of the sale-deed, it is clear that there is no independent witness. Both the marginal witnesses are relations of the defendants and it also creates doubt and the case law cited by the learned counsel for the appellant this fact is effective and fully apply.” 26. The finding of the lower Appellate Court on this score is far from satisfactory to serve as a valid finding of reversal of the Trial Court, about this part of the Trial Court’s opinion. Once again, this Court does not wish to say that conclusions of the lower Appellate Court are decidedly wrong, but certainly these conclusions are so cryptic that they cannot in law be regarded as valid reversal of the Trial Court’s finding. Once again, this Court does not wish to say that conclusions of the lower Appellate Court are decidedly wrong, but certainly these conclusions are so cryptic that they cannot in law be regarded as valid reversal of the Trial Court’s finding. Learned counsel for the defendants has also drawn the attention of the Court to a definitive finding recorded by the Trial Court in the penultimate paragraph of the findings on issue no.1, where the Trial Court has categorically held, with reference to the evidence of the plaintiff in the witness box, where it is said that the plaintiff testifying as PW-1 has acknowledged in his cross-examination that the suit was filed for cancellation of one sale deed alone, whereas in the plaint, two sale deeds dated 22.09.1988 and 09.08.1990 have been sought cancellation of. The Trial Court has held that this brings about a variance between pleadings and evidence; a contradiction that cannot be ignored. The lower Appellate Court has not at all looked into the aforesaid finding and has concluded in favour of the plaintiff on the basis of findings, all of which are not effective reversals of the Trial Court’s detailed findings that have served as foundation of the judgment to dismiss the suit. This Court does not wish to comment about that part of the findings where the Trial Court has remarked that the plaintiff while taking stand in the dock has said in his cross-examination that the suit was filed to challenge only one sale deed, whereas the suit challenges two. This is a matter which may require some clarification to be sought by the lower Appellate Court, to which this Court proposes to remand the matter, by asking the plaintiff to clarify his pleadings, or otherwise to determine the matter in accordance with law. 27. Learned counsel for the defendants has further urged that the decree of the lower Appellate Court is liable to be set aside and reversed as pleadings of fraud or undue influence should be specific, and, with full particulars of the fraud pleaded. He has argued in the last about the issue regarding reversal of burden in this case upon the defendant to exclude fraud owing to illiteracy and old age of the executant, Rampal. He has argued in the last about the issue regarding reversal of burden in this case upon the defendant to exclude fraud owing to illiteracy and old age of the executant, Rampal. He has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Afsar Sheikh and another vs. Soleman Bibi and others, 1996 (2) SCC 142 and upon allied issues on Dina Nath and another vs. Dan Behari Lal (Decd.) through L.Rs. and another, 1999(1) A.W.C. 90 but this Court is not minded to examine the said question once it is apparent that the lower Appellate Court has not discharged its duty, in accordance with Order XLI, Rule 31 of the Code, to specifically reverse well reasoned findings of the Trial Court, before reversing the decree. 28. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has attempted to support the judgment of the lower Appellate Court on the plea that burden of proof to establish fraud lies upon the defendants in this case, as it is a case of issues between relatives of the executant, where there was an active, confidential and fiduciary relationship existing between parties. He has argued that the burden of proof lies upon the defendants. He has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishna Mohan Kul vs. Pratima Maity, (2004) 9 SCC 468 and to the same effect the decision of their Lordships in Pratima Chowdhury vs. Kalpana Mukherjee and another, (2014) 4 SCC 196 besides a decision of this Court in Daya Shankar vs. Smt. Bachi & otheres, 1982 AIR All 376 . All that this Court wishes to say about burden of proof is that it will be for the lower Appellate Court to consider the said question also, when it re-determines the appeal on remand in accordance with law. This Court does not wish to burden this order of remand with a guidance or finding on questions of law or fact once this Court is minded to send the matter back to the lower Appellate Court on an open remand, subject only to the guidance that the lower Appellate Court must conform to the mandate of Order XLI, Rule 31 of the Code, particularly, while writing a judgment of reversal. If it has reversed the decree of the Trial Court, it must reverse every finding on which that decree is based by assigning cogent reasons based on evidence, may be different from the Court of first instance. 29. The substantial question of law framed and marked as '(e)', being one of the questions on the basis of which this appeal was admitted and heard, is answered in the negative and in terms detailed above. In view of the answer to that question, the other substantial question is not required to answered in this appeal. 30. In the result this Appeal succeeds and is allowed in part. The impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court shall stand set aside with a remit of the matter to the lower Appellate Court, where Civil Appeal no.91 of 1998 shall stand restored to the file of that Court for decision afresh in accordance with law, and whatever has been said in this judgment. 31. All parties shall appear before the lower Appellate Court on 5th July, 2019, which shall fix a date thereafter for hearing and decide the appeal within three months of the date fixed for first appearance of the parties. The costs in this Court and before the Courts below shall abide by and follow the event in appeal. 32. Let the lower courts records be sent down at once to the lower Appellate Court. 33. It is, accordingly, ordered.