JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been preferred claiming the following reliefs: “(i) by an appropriate writ, order or direction, the order impugned dated 16.03.2019 (Annexure-5) passed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.), Sojat, District Pali in Civil Original Petition No.6/2015 (Kirti Devi Versus Sangeeta) may kindly be set aside and in consequence thereof, the application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC (Annexure-3) filed by the petitioner-Non Applicant may kindly be allowed as prayed for amendments in the Defendant. (ii) Any other appropriate order or direction which this Hon’ble Court deem just fit and proper may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner. (iii) Cost of the writ petition may kindly be awarded in favour of the petitioner.” 2. Brief facts of this case, as noticed by this Court, are that the respondent No.1/applicant filed an election petition under Section 43 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 read with Rule 80 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj (Election) Rules, 1994 before the Court of learned District Judge, Pali, which was subsequently transferred to the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge, Sojat. 3. The petitioner-defendant filed reply to the election petition and submitted that she was having all the requisite qualifications, and thus, was eligible to contest the election for the post of Sarpanch and to hold the office of Sarpanch, as she stood elected in the elections. 4. The bone of contention in the present case is that the petitioner-defendant No.1 filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC, while seeking amendments in the reply and prayed to add and amend the pleadings with regard to the subsequent events. In the said application, it was submitted that due to the subsequent events, the amendment in the pleadings was necessary, and that, such amendment would not affect the nature of the suit. The respondent however, opposed the said application by filing reply, and the learned trial court rejected the application vide order dated 16.03.2019. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the amendment application was sought to be allowed, as the subsequent events have left the petitioner with no option, but to bring the subsequent propositions on record to have an effective adjudication of the proceedings. 6. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the amendment application was sought to be allowed, as the subsequent events have left the petitioner with no option, but to bring the subsequent propositions on record to have an effective adjudication of the proceedings. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that if the amendment, as sought for, is not allowed, the same shall prejudice the rights of the petitioner and the power under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC can be exercised by the learned court below at any stage, even at the appellate stage, if justified. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that in view of the details of the criminal proceedings, stage of the investigation, status of C.R. No.38/2015 of Police Station, Shivpura, details of the bail application decided by the Hon’ble High Court and all those documents, which have been brought on record by the respondents, the petitioner was required to be permitted to amend the pleadings. The documents taken on record on 10.09.2018 and 30.11.2018 at the instance of the respondents were vital and required the response from the present petitioner. 8. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment rendered by this Hon’ble Court at Jaipur Bench in Krishan Kumar & Anr. Vs. Ram Bharosi Bansal Thro’ LR’s & Anr., reported in 2019 (2) DNJ (Raj.) 498, relevant portion of which reads as under: “7. Thus, each case has to be examined on its own facts and it would have to be seen as to what is the amendment sought for. In the present case, as noticed above, the petitioners sought to make amendment with the purpose to bring on record the new added constructions made by the respondents. Admittedly, the suit has been filed for permanent injunction and the application was moved seeking amendment in the suit. In view of this Court, such an amendment would not affect nature of the suit. In Kedar Nath Agrawal (Dead) and another Vs. Dhanraji Devi (Dead) and another, (2004) 8 SCC 76 , the Apex Court while relying upon the earlier law laid down by the Apex Court, held as under:- 16. In our opinion, by not taking into account the subsequent event, the High Court has committed an error of law and also an error of jurisdiction. Dhanraji Devi (Dead) and another, (2004) 8 SCC 76 , the Apex Court while relying upon the earlier law laid down by the Apex Court, held as under:- 16. In our opinion, by not taking into account the subsequent event, the High Court has committed an error of law and also an error of jurisdiction. In our judgment, the law is well settled on the point, and it is this: The basic rule is that the rights of the parties should be determined on the basis of the date of institution of the, suit or proceeding and the suit/action should be tried at all stages on the cause of action as it existed at the commencement of the suit/action. This, however, does not mean that events happening after institution of a suit/proceeding, cannot be considered at all. It is the power and duty of the court to consider changed circumstances. A court of law may take into account subsequent events inter alia in the following circumstances: (i) The relief claimed originally has by reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate; or (ii) It is necessary to take notice of subsequent events in order to shorten litigation; or (iii) It is necessary to do so in order to do complete justice between the parties. [Re: Shikharchand Jain v. Digamber Jain Praband Karini Sabha and Ors., SCC p. 681, para 10].” 9. Reliance has also been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the decision rendered by this Hon’ble Court in Samindra Pal Singh @ Kaka Jat Sikh, reported in 2019 (2) DNJ (Raj.) 525, relevant portion of which reads as under:- “12. It is true that a specific averment regarding accrual of cause of action has not been made by the plaintiff, however, a complete and comprehensive reading of the plaint reveals that not only the factum of the knowledge of the Will to the plaintiff has been stated but also the essential facts relating to cause of action have been mentioned. 13. In considered opinion of this Court, the requirement of disclosing the cause of action is to be considered after complete reading of the plaint. It is the disclosure and not mentioning of the cause of action, which is required under law. 13. In considered opinion of this Court, the requirement of disclosing the cause of action is to be considered after complete reading of the plaint. It is the disclosure and not mentioning of the cause of action, which is required under law. Hence, since the plaintiff in the present case has inadvertently forgot to mention such date, the Trial court can very well permit amendment in the plaint to meet the ends of justice. The lacunae as pointed out by the defendant was not fatal to the maintainability of the suit, more particularly in the facts obtaining in the present case. 15. Whereas in the present case, the amendment has been sought at the stage of trial itself and if the same is allowed, it will not change the nature of the suit. Therefore, the judgment cited by the learned counsel is clearly distinguishable on facts.” 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Jawahar Singh Vs. Vedpal Singh, reported in 2012 (4) Civil Court Cases 304 (Allahabad), relevant portion of which reads as under:- “3. The background facts may be noticed in brief: The aforestated suit has been filed for specific performance of contract to sell. Pleadings are complete. Parties have led their evidence and the evidence is closed. When the matter came-up for final hearing, at that stage, the defendant filed an application for permission to amend the written statement by adding that the suit is barred by sections 20 and 34 of Specific Relief Act. The said application has been rejected by the order under revision. 4. When the matter was taken-up yesterday, the applicant's Counsel was directed to obtain instruction whether the defendant would like to produce evidence in support of the above plea or not. Today, Shri Lalit Kumar, Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant made a statement before me that if the amendment in the written statement is allowed, the defendant would not lead any other or further evidence and the Trial Court may proceed to hear the final arguments. 5. A bare perusal of the amendment application would show that the defendant is trying to raise a legal plea that the said suit is barred by sections 20 and 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 5. A bare perusal of the amendment application would show that the defendant is trying to raise a legal plea that the said suit is barred by sections 20 and 34 of the Specific Relief Act. The said amendment is being opposed by learned Counsel for the opposite party on the ground that it has been filed with a design to delay the disposal of suit. The fact remains that the amendment sought for is legal in nature, it is not going to affect the proceeding in the suit in view of the categorical stand taken by the defendant that the defendant would not lead any evidence.” 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in Sumeer Jassal Vs. Smt. Pushpa Rani & Ors., reported in 2012 (3) Civil Court Cases 776 (P&H), relevant portion of which reads as under:- “5. After hearing the counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner and the defendants-respondents, there is no doubt that the plaintiff petitioner seeks a declaration claiming the property of Suresh Chander Jassal who was real brother of Tripta Devi. Initially he had claimed the property of Suresh Chander Jassal in the capacity as son of Suresh Chander Jassal and Pushpa Rani but subsequently on achieving majority he wants to claim the property of Suresh Chander Jassal as adopted son. The dispute is amongst the family members. It is apparent from the circumstances that the plaintiff-petitioner had opted to change his stand after an application for medical examination was filed by Pushpa Rani to establish that she was unable to bear a child on account of condition of her uterus. No doubt the application on the face of it appears to be mala fide. Provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC prohibiting the amendment of the pleadings after the trial has commenced at the same time also permits that all such amendments shall be permitted as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. In the present case, the controversy regarding the petitioner having been adopted by defendant Pushpa Rani and deceased Suresh Chander Jassal, requires to be finally settled for all times to come. In the present case, the controversy regarding the petitioner having been adopted by defendant Pushpa Rani and deceased Suresh Chander Jassal, requires to be finally settled for all times to come. The amendment though having been sought after framing of he issues, appears to be absolutely necessary for determining the status and rights of the plaintiff in the capacity as adopted son of Suresh Chander Jassal and defendant Pushpa Rani for claiming right of inheritance in the property of Suresh Chander Jassal. Allowing the amendment will not absolve the plaintiff-petitioner to establish by cogent evidence and in accordance with the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, that he had actually been adopted or that he would be entitled to the property of Suresh Chander Jassal to the extent of half share in the property of Suresh Chander Jassal as per the rules of succession. It is not out of place to observe here that the plaintiff-petitioner has also filed a suit for injunction against the defendants-respondents claiming share in the property left by Suresh Chander Jassal. In the said application, a similar amendment has been allowed. In order to avoid contradictory adjudication of the same matter in two different cases, in the interest of justice, the amendment application deserves to be allowed, however, by compensating the defendants-respondents for unnecessary harassment caused due to delay application for amendment.” 12. Reliance has also been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in Sahib Singh & Anr. Vs. Kuldeep Kumar & Ors., reported in 2011 (1) Civil Court Cases 461 (P&H), relevant portion of which reads as under: “6. The law of amendment, especially the written statement is liberal. The delay in filing the application for amendment is not a ground to disallow it. The defendants have taken the plea that they were not in the knowledge of the fact that plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 are inter se related. So, on that account, the above said plea could not be taken earlier. So, from the perusal of the bare provisions, it is revealed that in case the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial, in that case the amendment can be allowed. So, on that account, the above said plea could not be taken earlier. So, from the perusal of the bare provisions, it is revealed that in case the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial, in that case the amendment can be allowed. The stage of the commencement of trial has been adjudicated by the Apex Court in authority reported as Baldev Singh and Ors. v. Manohar Singh and Anr., AIR 2006 SC 2832 (1). The relevant para 17 of the said judgment is reproduced as under: “17. Before we part with this order, we may also notice that proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC provides that amendment of pleadings shall not be allowed when the trial of the Suit has already commenced. For this reason, we have examined the records and find that in fact, the trial has not yet commenced. It appears from the records that the parties have yet to file their documentary evidence in the suit. From the record, it also appears that the suit was not on the verge of conclusion as found by the High Court and the Trial Court. That apart, commencement of trial as used in proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 in the Code of Civil Procedure must be understood in the limited sense as meaning the final hearing of the suit, examination of witnesses, filing of documents and addressing of arguments. As noted hereinafter, parties are yet to file their documents, we do not find any reason to reject the application for amendment of the written statement in view of proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC which confers wide power and unfettered discretion to the Court.” 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment rendered by this Hon’ble Court in Radheyshyam Sharma Vs. Additional District Judge (FT) No.22, Bhilwara & Ors., reported in 2011 (1) Civil Court Cases 534 (Raj.), relevant portion of which reads as under: “16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment rendered by this Hon’ble Court in Radheyshyam Sharma Vs. Additional District Judge (FT) No.22, Bhilwara & Ors., reported in 2011 (1) Civil Court Cases 534 (Raj.), relevant portion of which reads as under: “16. Thus, the legal position settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court as above, makes it abundantly clear that the Order VI Rule 17 as it was existing prior to the amendment of Civil Procedure Code, (Amendment) Act, 2002 empowers the court to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings at any stage of the proceedings on such terms as deemed fit by the court. The application seeking amendment cannot be rejected solely on the ground of delay. However, the discretion vested in the court to allow the amendment of the pleadings at any stage of the trial or even at the appellate stage has to be exercised judicially. Whether an amendment is to be allowed in a particular case or not has to be decided by the court after examining the facts and circumstances of the case in their entirety. 17. In the instant case, having considered the pleading of the parties, this Court is of the considered opinion that the amendment sought for is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the lis between the parties. It goes without saying that if the defendants are permitted to lead further evidence in view of the amendment incorporated then, the plaintiff will have right to lead evidence in rebuttal, therefore, apparently, no serious prejudice is likely to be caused to the plaintiff.” 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the judgment rendered by this Hon’ble Court at Jaipur Bench in Vasudev & Ors. Vs. Anar Devi & Ors., reported in 2014 (2) DNJ (Raj.) 654, relevant portion of which reads as under:- “10. Having considered the nature of the amendments sought for by the petitioners/plaintiffs in the application preferred under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC dt. 15.5.2012, I find that it does not change the nature of the suit in view of the pleaded facts under paragraph 1 and 2 of the plaint, which is implicit in the factual matrix detailed out therein. 12. 15.5.2012, I find that it does not change the nature of the suit in view of the pleaded facts under paragraph 1 and 2 of the plaint, which is implicit in the factual matrix detailed out therein. 12. Considering the date of institution of the suit, date of written statement filed, settlement of issues in the year 2009 and deletion of issues number 1, 2 and 3 on 25.4.2012; I am of the opinion that the amendment sought for by the petitioners/plaintiffs, deserves to be allowed in order to ensure determination of real questions in the controversy between the parties.” 15. Reliance has also been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment rendered by this Hon’ble Court in Oomkar & Ors. Vs. Narayan Lal Meena & Ors., reported in 2013 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1018, relevant portion of which reads as under:- “8. It is true that the scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is limited and very narrow. The law in this regard is fairly settled, but at the same time, the interference by this Court is not ruled out in all cases. The background of the case in hand, where the suit has been filed for cancellation of the power of attorney itself in favour of the defendant No.1 Narayan Lal Meena and for cancellation of the subsequently executed sale deeds by him in favour of other defendants with the background of the case mentioned in the application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC casts a shadow of doubt. 11. From the facts narrated above, this Court is clearly of the opinion that even at this stage, the learned trial court ought to have applied its mind to the background of the case and then considered whether such amendment deserves to be allowed or not. Unfortunately, this consideration does not appear to have been made in the impugned order. The procedural impediments like point of time when such amendment application ought to have been filed and stage of case of course are relevant factors, but in the present case in hand, it does not appear to this Court that it is too late in the day for the plaintiffs to seek amendment at this stage. The trial is admittedly pending at plaintiffs’ evidence only. The trial is admittedly pending at plaintiffs’ evidence only. Since 2010 of course the trial is stayed by this Court vide order dated 15.12.2010 passed by a co-ordinate bench of this Court. About 2 and 1/2 years have passed since then. Lest any further delay is caused in the trial, instead of sending the matter back to the learned trial court for reconsideration of the said application, this Court is of the opinion that the amendment application deserves to be allowed by this Court.” 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Chandra Narain Tripathi Vs. Kapil Muni Karwariya, reported in 2011 (4) Civil Court Cases 767 (Allahabad), relevant portion of which reads as under:- “21. The proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code was inserted by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 2002 w.e.f. 1.7.2002, which reads as follows: "Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial." 22. The proviso, therefore, is in the mandatory form and curtails the jurisdiction of the Court to allow an amendment after the trial has commenced. However, there is an exception to this proposition and that is the Court may allow an amendment even after the commencement of the trial if it comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party seeking the amendment could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial. In the case of Vidyabai & others v. Padmalatha and another, AIR 2009 SC 1433 , the Apex Court has very clearly held that for the purposes of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code the relevant date for the commencement of the trial is the date on which issues are framed, therefore, for the purposes of the amendment application moved by the respondent, the expression "commencement of the trial" as contemplated by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code has a meaning different from the meaning assigned to that expression under the 1951 Act. If the date of the filing of the election petition is taken as the date of the commencement of the trial for the purposes of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code, the application of the said proviso would never arise in the matter of an amendment not only of written statements but also of the election petitions. The question of an amendment arises only after filing of pleadings (plaint and written statement) and not prior to that. If the date of commencement of the trial for the purposes of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code is taken as the date of presentation of the election petition in the High Court, no occasion will ever arise either for the petitioner or the respondent to amend his pleading. In such situation, not only section 86(5) of the 1951 Act but also Order VI Rule 17 of the Code would be inapplicable. Such an interpretation instead of harmonising various provisions would result in absurdity. Therefore, the rule of harmonious construction has to be applied so as to give effect to various provisions of 1951 Act and Order VI Rule 17 of the Code. It is well settled that when on a construction of a Statute two views are possible, one which results in an anomaly and the other gives effect to the statute, it is the duty of the court to adopt the latter construction. In this view of the matter, the date on which the trial commences within the meaning of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code can not be held to be either a date prior to the date of presentation of pleadings or the date on which the pleading is presented in the court. Therefore, the relevant date seems to be the date on which issues are framed, therefore, the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code is not applicable in respect of an amendment sought for before settlement of issues. Mr. N.K. Pandey further tried to contend that the day on which fifteen days period expires from the date of presentation of the written statement is liable to be treated as the date of the commencement of trial of an election petition for the purposes of the aforesaid proviso. The date so suggested by Mr. Mr. N.K. Pandey further tried to contend that the day on which fifteen days period expires from the date of presentation of the written statement is liable to be treated as the date of the commencement of trial of an election petition for the purposes of the aforesaid proviso. The date so suggested by Mr. Pandey has no legal support whereas the date on which issues are framed has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Vidyabai (supra) and other cases as the date on which the trial commences within the meaning of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code. Therefore, I do not find any force in the aforesaid submission.” 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Mustzab Khan & Ors. Vs. Arvind Kumar Mittal & Ors., reported in 2010 (1) Civil Court Cases 202 (Allahabad), relevant portion of which reads as under: “8. It is true that the amendment can be allowed at any stage of the proceeding and liberal view should be taken but the amendment can be allowed only if the amendment sought is necessary to adjudicate the real issue involved. The amendment has been sought relating to the mutation proceedings which has been held to be not material and would not assist in coming to the conclusion in the suit. In the suit the real issue involved is whether the sale deed executed in 1971 in favour of respondent No. 2 are valid sale deed and whether they are legally in possession of the property in dispute. It is settled principle of law that the mutation proceeding is only a summary proceeding and does not decide the title on the property. Therefore, in my view, the court below has rightly held that the amendment sought is of no assistance to decide the real issue of the suit.” 18. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that after framing of the issues, the petitioners have tried to delay the proceedings by all means, and the aforementioned application moved by the petitioner is nothing but one of them, as the petitioner wants to set the clock back in the election petition. 19. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that after framing of the issues, the petitioners have tried to delay the proceedings by all means, and the aforementioned application moved by the petitioner is nothing but one of them, as the petitioner wants to set the clock back in the election petition. 19. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the investigation in the aforementioned criminal case had already been completed, and since all the details pertaining to the qualification/eligibility were already available with the petitioner at all times, therefore, seeking any amendment at this stage, shall be detrimental to the cause of justice. 20. Learned counsel for the respondent also submitted that the documents produced by the respondent were in accordance with law, and though the same pertained to the subsequent events, but were mere description of the events, and not of any effect and fact, which would be controverted. 21. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the petitioner has been given ten chances to complete her evidence, but she is trying to adopt delaying tactics, so as to complete her tenure as an elected Sarpanch, without having the due qualification. 22. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Chander Kanta Bansal Vs. Rajinder Singh Anand, [Appeal (Civil) No.1893 of 2008 decided on 11.03.2008], relevant portion of which reads as under:- “(8) In order to find out whether the application of the defendant under Order VI Rule 17 for amendment of written statement is bonafide and sustainable at this stage or not, it is useful to refer to the relevant provisions of CPC. Order 6 Rule 17 reads thus: "17. Amendment of pleadings.-The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties: Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial." This rule was omitted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999. However, before the enforcement of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999, the original rule was substituted and restored with an additional proviso. The proviso limits the power to allow amendment after the commencement of trial but grants discretion to the court to allow amendment if it feels that the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial in spite of due diligence. It is true that the power to allow amendment should be liberally exercised. The liberal principles which guide the exercise of discretion in allowing the amendment are that multiplicity of proceedings should be avoided, that amendments which do not totally alter the character of an action should be granted, while care should be taken to see that injustice and prejudice of an irremediable character are not inflicted upon the opposite party under pretence of amendment. (9) With a view to shorten the litigation and speed up the trial of cases Rule 17 was omitted by amending Act 46 of 1999. This rule had been on the statute for ages and there was hardly a suit or proceeding where this provision had not been used. That was the reason it evoked much controversy leading to protest all over the country. Thereafter, the rule was restored in its original form by amending Act 22 of 2002 with a rider in the shape of the proviso limiting the power of amendment to some extent. The new proviso lays down that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the commencement of trial, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. But whether a party has acted with due diligence or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. This would, to some extent, limit the scope of amendment to pleadings, but would still vest enough powers in courts to deal with the unforeseen situations whenever they arise. (10) The entire object of the said amendment is to stall filing of applications for amending a pleading subsequent to the commencement of trial, to avoid surprises and the parties had sufficient knowledge of the others case. It also helps in checking the delays in filing the applications. Once, the trial commences on the known pleas, it will be very difficult for any side to reconcile. It also helps in checking the delays in filing the applications. Once, the trial commences on the known pleas, it will be very difficult for any side to reconcile. In spite of the same, an exception is made in the newly inserted proviso where it is shown that in spite of due diligence, he could not raise a plea, it is for the court to consider the same. Therefore, it is not a complete bar nor shuts out entertaining of any later application. As stated earlier, the reason for adding proviso is to curtail delay and expedite hearing of cases. (11) Keeping the above broad principles in mind, let us ascertain whether the defendant has justiciable cause to file an application praying for amendment of a written statement for bringing an agreement dated 10.09.1982. We have already referred to the fact that the plaintiff had approached the court seeking a decree for mandatory injunction as early as on 1986. We also refer to the fact that within a short duration i.e. in 1986 itself, the defendant has filed a written statement. Absolutely, there is no whisper about the prior partition agreement dated 10.09.1982. No doubt, in the application for amendment, it was stated that her son who is a Chartered Accountant all along was looking after this suit and he died in the year 1998. It is also available from the very same application that apart from her first son, namely, Sunit Gupta, defendant has another son by name Navneet Agarwal. Admittedly, the son who looking after the suit was none else than a Chartered Accountant. In such circumstances, if the alleged agreement dated 10.09.1982 between the plaintiff and defendant was in existence nothing prevented her son, Chartered Accountant, to bring it to the notice of her counsel and refer it in the written statement filed in the year 1986. It is relevant to mention that in the reply, the plaintiff has specifically denied the same and asserted that the alleged agreement/partition deed dated 10.09.1982 is a forged document and based on the same, the proposed amendment cannot be allowed. It is also not in dispute and best known to both parties the suit which is of the year 1986 came to be taken up for trial only in 2004 and admittedly on the date of filing of the petition for amendment, the trial was on the verge of completion. It is also not in dispute and best known to both parties the suit which is of the year 1986 came to be taken up for trial only in 2004 and admittedly on the date of filing of the petition for amendment, the trial was on the verge of completion. It was brought to our notice that both sides have closed their evidence and completed their argument, but only at this stage the defendant filed the said application for amendment of her written statement. As discussed above, though first part of Rule 17 makes it clear that amendment of pleadings is permitted at any stage of the proceeding, the proviso imposes certain restrictions. It makes it clear that after the commencement of trial, no application for amendment shall be allowed. However, if it is established that in spite of "due diligence" the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial depending on the circumstances, the court is free to order such application. The words "due diligence" has not been defined in the Code. According to Oxford Dictionary (Edition 2006), the word "diligence" means careful and persistent application or effort. "Diligent" means careful and steady in application to one's work and duties, showing care and effort. As per Black's Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition), "diligence" means a continual effort to accomplish something, care; caution; the attention and care required from a person in a given situation. "Due diligence" means the diligence reasonably expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to discharge an obligation. According to Words and Phrases by Drain-Dyspnea (Permanent Edition 13A) "due diligence", in law, means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. "Due diligence" means reasonable diligence; it means such diligence as a prudent man would exercise in the conduct of his own affairs. It is clear that unless the party takes prompt steps, mere action cannot be accepted and file a petition after the commencement of trial. As mentioned earlier, in the case on hand, the application itself came to be filed only after 18 years and till the death of her first son Sunit Gupta, Chartered Accountant, had not taken any step about the so-called agreement. Even after his death in the year 1998, the petition was filed only in 2004. As mentioned earlier, in the case on hand, the application itself came to be filed only after 18 years and till the death of her first son Sunit Gupta, Chartered Accountant, had not taken any step about the so-called agreement. Even after his death in the year 1998, the petition was filed only in 2004. The explanation offered by the defendant cannot be accepted since she did not mention anything when she was examined as witness. (12) As rightly referred to by the High Court in Union of India vs. Pramod Gupta (dead) by LRs and Others, (2005) 12 SCC 1, this Court cautioned that delay and laches on the part of the parties to the proceedings would also be a relevant factor for allowing or disallowing an application for amendment of the pleadings. (13) As observed earlier, the suit filed in the year 1986 is for a right of passage between two portions of the same property dragged for a period of 21 years. In spite of long delay, if acceptable material/materials placed before the court show that the delay was beyond their control or diligence, it would be possible for the court to consider the same by compensating the other side by awarding cost. As pointed out earlier, when she gave evidence as D.W.1, there was no whisper about the written document/partition between the parties. On the other hand, she asserted that partition was oral. Now by filing the said application, she wants to retract what she pleaded in the written statement, undoubtedly it would deprive the claim of the plaintiff. We are also satisfied that she failed to substantiate inordinate delay in filing the application that too after closing of evidence and arguments. All these aspects have been considered by the High Court. We do not find any ground for interference in the order of the High Court, on the other hand, we are in entire agreement with the same.” 23. Learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Ram Babu & Ors. Vs. District Judge, Unnao & Ors., reported in 2011 (2) Civil Court Cases 282 (Allahabad), relevant portion of which reads as under:- “12. Learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Ram Babu & Ors. Vs. District Judge, Unnao & Ors., reported in 2011 (2) Civil Court Cases 282 (Allahabad), relevant portion of which reads as under:- “12. Under the proviso no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless in spite of due diligence, the matter could not be raised before the commencement of trial. It is submitted, that after the trial of the case has been commenced, no application of pleading shall be allowed unless the above requirement is satisfied. 13. In the case of Vidyabai and Ors. v. Padmalatha and Anr. (supra) wherein Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under: – "By reason of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 22 of 2002) Parliament inter alia inserted a proviso to Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code, which reads as under: Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial." It is couched in a mandatory form. The Court's jurisdiction to allow such an application is taken away unless the condition precedent therefore are satisfied viz. it must come to a conclusion that in spite of due diligence the parties could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial. It is the primal duty of the Court to decide as to whether such an amendment is necessary to decide the real dispute between the parties. Only if such a condition is fulfilled, the amendment is to be allowed. However, proviso appended to Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code restricts the power of the Court. It puts an embargo on exercise of its jurisdiction. The Court's jurisdiction, in a case of this nature is limited. Thus, unless the jurisdictional fact, as envisaged therein, is found to be existing, the Court will have no jurisdiction at all to allow the amendment of the plaint.” 24. It puts an embargo on exercise of its jurisdiction. The Court's jurisdiction, in a case of this nature is limited. Thus, unless the jurisdictional fact, as envisaged therein, is found to be existing, the Court will have no jurisdiction at all to allow the amendment of the plaint.” 24. After hearing learned counsel for the parties as well as perusing the record of the case alongwith the precedent law cited at the Bar, this Court is of the opinion that the last document under Section 65 of the Evidence Act was permitted to be taken on record on 30.11.2018, which was merely a secondary evidence and could be proved or disproved during the course of proceedings. 25. This Court finds that the petitioner thereafter, has completed her evidence, but did not choose to file any application until 02.03.2019. This Court also finds that the learned court below has rightly held that the documents taken on record were not changing any facts on which the election petition was based and the petitioner had sufficient opportunities to cross-examine the respondent on those documents. 26. This Court further finds that the learned court below was justified in holding that at this stage in the given facts and circumstances, it was a fit case, where the application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC could not have been allowed, as it was not required and it would only delay the election petition, which is already delayed during adjudication. 27. As regards the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the powers under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC can be exercised at any stage even at the appellate stage, this Court finds that in this case, it is not questioned whether the power can be exercised or not, but the question is whether the same is necessary or not, and the learned court below has rightly held that the amendments sought were already within the knowledge of the petitioner, and thus, at this belated stage, bringing them on record and setting the clock back after the evidence has been rendered, would be a futile exercise. 28. The judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 29. In light of the aforesaid observations, the present writ petition is dismissed. Stay Application No.5776/2019 also stands dismissed accordingly.