JUDGMENT : 1. Two affidavits have been filed one by the petitioner and another by the respondent by exchanging the affidavits, the same has been taken on record. 2. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the letter as contained in Letter No.817 dated 09.05.2017 passed by the respondent no.2, by which, the allotment of the plot made in favour of the petitioner being Plot No.A-80/1(P), has been cancelled on the ground of violation of terms and conditions of the order of allotment. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that a piece of land has been allotted by the Bokaro Industrial Area Development Authority (in short BIADA) on 18.07.2009 by virtue of decision as contained under Letter No.753 bearing Plot No.A-80/1(P) measuring an area of 0.07 acres on the basis of certain terms and conditions of the contract/agreement. 4. It is admitted case of the petitioner as would appear from the impugned decision as contained under Letter No.817 dated 09.05.2017, due to paucity of money the machine could not have been set up but undertakings have been given that within six months the machine would be installed and the unit would be operative. Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, contains that although the show cause has been issued on the alleged ground of running of school but no such school is being run over the plot in question rather it has been used also as the tuition point imparting from the business, for which, the plot has been allotted and therefore, there is no violation of any terms and conditions of the contract. He has tried to demonstrate this fact by annexing the photographs by way of supplementary affidavit filed today in the court. 5. Mrs. Richa Sanchita, appearing for the respondent-BIADA, has submitted by taking aid of the stand taken by the respondent-BIADA in the counter affidavit that the petitioner, right from very beginning. has not utilized the said land for the purpose for which it has been allotted rather it is being run as a school as on date also the school is running, to that effect, the specific stand has been taken by way of affidavit filed today in the Court by serving copy of the same upon the learned counsel for the petitioner. She, therefore, submits that the impugned decision as has been communicated vide communication dated 09.05.2017 may not be interfered with. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of their rival submissions, this Court before entering into the legality and propriety of the impugned decision, deem it fit and proper to discuss about the terms of the agreement which has been annexed by the respondent-BIADA in their counter affidavit wherein under the head “execution of agreement bond” the possession over the land will have to be delivered to the unit after payment of first installment of the price of land and execution of bond in form enclosed and therefore, the unit will have to execute the lease deed in the prescribed form. The unit shall have to give preference in employment as well as in practical training in his factory to the local people area. The price of the land will be finally determined after calculation of the total cost of development of the land. The allotee must get the plan of factory shed proved within three months of the date of allotment for which he must submit necessary plans to the Chief Inspector of Factory within one month of the date of taking possession of the land in terms of the said execution of agreement bond. 7. It is evident from the stand taken in the counter affidavit that in pursuance to the condition stipulated in the execution of agreement bond the settlee will have to execute the sale deed in prescribed form subject to deposit of the price of the land but no lease deed has been executed and although the possession of the land has been handed over on 18.07.2009. 8. 8. The petitioner has not started using the unit for the purpose of which it has been allotted and set up rather he has started running a school, which the petitioner is now contending to be a tuition point, be that as it may, it is the admitted case of the petitioner that on the date of filing of the reply to the show cause printing press has not been established in the said premises due to paucity of money the machine could not have been set up but the assurance has been given for installation of the machine within a period of six months, this specific stipulation shows the admitted fact about the issues that as on the date of filing of the show cause, the machine for operating the printing press has not been installed. However, he has taken the ground that in the printing press photo copy and book binding is going on. 9. The authority of the respondent-BIADA has issued show cause on several occasions having not been responded but ultimately it has been responded wherein fact about the non-installing the machine has been admitted with the undertaking to install it within a period of six months. 10. It is further admitted fact that the petitioner has not made any application for approval of the factory shed to be approved by the Chief Inspector of the Factory within one month from the date of taking possession of land although the possession of the land has been given to the petitioner as on 18.07.2009 as would appear from Annexure-B to the counter affidavit. 11. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner at this juncture submits that the show cause does not contain any condition about the non-approval of the plan of factory shed and therefore, the authority cannot take ground which is not the part of the show cause but this Court on scrutiny of the show cause, has found that the specific allegation has been levelled against the petitioner to the effect that the plot in question has not been utilized for the purpose, for which, it has been allotted in favour of the petitioner and the petitioner has also admitted that the machine has not been installed due to paucity of money, however, his contention is that through the photocopy the work of printing press is going on as also of the book binding and within a month the work of the printing press would be started. The question herein is that when a terms of contract having been entered in between the petitioner and the authority of the BIADA which has duly been signed by both the parties, the terms contains therein is binding, one of the condition is a plan of factory shed to be approved within the three months from the date of possession of the land to be obtained from the Chief Inspector of Factory but no such application has been made before the Chief Inspector of factory and as such the said terms and conditions has been flouted by the petitioner. The question of not raising the aforesaid issue in the show cause even accepting the said argument of the petitioner to be true, then, also no relief can be extended in favour of the petitioner because of the fact that the petitioner as on date is admitting that no such application has been filed before the Chief Inspector of factory which is one of the conditions stipulated in the terms of contract and therefore, even if the matter would be remitted before the authority concerned, for its consideration afresh there is no likelihood in the change of the outcome of the decision since the change in the decision would only arise if the fact about non-approval of the factory plan is in dispute. If the matter would be remitted before the authority it will nothing but lead to futile exercise and will be empty formality and therefore, this Court after taking into consideration the settled position of law that the principle of natural justice cannot be treated to be a straitjacket formula rather it is to be tested on the basis of facts and circumstances and the principle of natural justice is to be followed where the factual aspect is in dispute so that the person against whom if any action is proposed to be taken he may be provided with an opportunity of hearing to defend himself but where the fact itself is not in dispute no purpose would be served reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital, U.P. & Ors. reported in (2004) 4 SCC 281 wherein at Paragraph-64 is being quoted herein below: “64. Right of hearing to a necessary party is a valuable right. Denial of such right is serious breach of statutory procedure prescribed and violation of rules of natural justice. In these appeals preferred by the holder of lands and some other transferees, we have found that the terms of government grant did not permit transfers of land without permission of the State as grantor. Remand of cases of a group of transferees who were not heard, would, therefore, be of no legal consequence, more so, when on this legal question all affected parties have got full opportunity of hearing before the High Court and in this appeal before this Court. Rules of natural justice are to be followed for doing substantial justice and not for completing a mere ritual of hearing without possibility of any change in the decision of the case on merits. In view of the legal position explained by us above, we therefore, refrain from remanding these cases in exercise of our discretionary powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.” In the case of Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Guahati and Ors. reported in (2015) 8 SCC 519 , wherein their Lordships have held at paragraph-39 which is being quoted herein below: “39. We are not concerned with these aspects in the present case as the issue relates to giving of notice before taking action. reported in (2015) 8 SCC 519 , wherein their Lordships have held at paragraph-39 which is being quoted herein below: “39. We are not concerned with these aspects in the present case as the issue relates to giving of notice before taking action. While emphasizing that the principles of natural justice cannot be applied in straitjacket formula, the aforesaid instances are given. We have highlighted the jurisprudential basis of adhering to the principles of natural justice which are grounded on the doctrine of procedural fairness, accuracy of outcome leading to general social goals, etc. Nevertheless, there may be situations wherein for some reason-perhaps because the evidence against the individual is thought to be utterly compelling-it is felt that a fair hearing “would make no difference”-meaning that the hearing would not change the ultimate conclusion reached by the decision-maker.” 12. This Court after taking into consideration the reasoning assigned in the impugned decision as also the admission made on the part of the petitioner to the effect that due to paucity of money, the machine could not have been installed, is of the view that the petitioner has not followed the terms and conditions of the contract which prompted the authority to come out with the show cause notice by giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and after due consideration the decision has been taken, therefore, this Court is of the view that no interference is required by this Court by issuing writ of certiorari since there is no error apparent on the face of record or no perversity of finding as has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the power of writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, so far as it relates to issuance of writ of certiorari, the scope is very limited, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. Radhakrishnan reported in A.I.R. 1964 477 Supreme Court wherein at paragraph no.7 their Lordships have been pleased to held as follows:- “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors. reported in 1955 Supreme Court 233 wherein at Paragraph-21, which is quoted hereinbelow :- “With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Sawarn Singh Vrs. State of Punjab reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Heinz India (P) Ltd. Vrs. State of U.P. Reported in (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordhsips have been please to hold at paragraph no.66 and 67 as under:- “66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangahara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” In the case of Thansingh Vrs. Supdt. of Taxes reported in A.I.R. 1964 1419 Supreme Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not jointly determine question which requires elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. In another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey reported in (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference with the finding of the tribunal has been please to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para 17 has held as under:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: …...... The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: …...... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 13. In view of the entirety of the facts and circumstance of the case and basing upon the judgment as has been referred hereinabove the order impugned is required no interference, accordingly, the writ petition fails and hence it is dismissed.