JUDGMENT : Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J. Heard Sri Vikram Suryavanshi, Advocate holding brief of Sri Vinay Kumar Singh Chandel, learned counsel for the revisionist. 2. The present revision has been filed against the judgment dated 25.04.2019 passed by the Special Judge (POCSO Act)/Additional District & Sessions Judge, Court No.8, Ghaziabad rejecting application (Application No.4ga) filed under Order IX Rule 13 CPC for recall of the ex parte order dated 22.08.2017 in SCC Suit No.08 of 2017 (Saloni Lal Vs. Mohit). 3. The undisputed facts of the case are that the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC was filed on 21.09.2017 seeking recall of the ex parte order dated 22.08.2017, and it was only on 19.03.2019 that an application bearing Application No.22 Ga was filed before the Court of Additional District Judge, Court No.9, Ghaziabad seeking permission to deposit the decretal amount. The court below referring to the provisions contained under Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 and the legal proposition with regard to mandatory nature of the said provision has rejected the application on the ground that the application seeking to deposit the decretal amount under Section 17 was beyond the prescribed time period. 4. Contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist is that the proviso to Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 is not mandatory in nature but is directory, and the court below ought to have adopted a liberal approach and allowed the application of the revisionist to deposit the decretal amount. 5. The issue which is sought to be raised in the present case is no longer res integra in view of the authoritative pronouncement made in the case of Kedarnath Vs. Mohan Lal Kesarwari & Ors., (2002) 2 SCC 16 wherein it has been held that the language of proviso to Section 17(1) of the Act, 1887 is mandatory, and the application for setting aside the decree must be accompanied by deposit in court of amount due or preceded by an application seeking leave to furnish security. The relevant observations made in the judgment are as follows:- "5. It is not disputed at the Bar that such a suit as was filed by the appellant-landlord is, in the State of U.P., to be heard and disposed of by a Court of Small Causes and hence would be governed by the provisions of the PSCC Act. The relevant observations made in the judgment are as follows:- "5. It is not disputed at the Bar that such a suit as was filed by the appellant-landlord is, in the State of U.P., to be heard and disposed of by a Court of Small Causes and hence would be governed by the provisions of the PSCC Act. Section 17 thereof provides as under: "17. Application of the Code of Civil Procedure.--(1) The procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall, save insofar as is otherwise provided by that Code or by this Act, be the procedure followed in a Court of Small Causes in all suits cognizable by it and in all proceedings arising out of such suits: Provided that an applicant for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte or for a review of judgment shall, at the time of presenting his application, either deposit in the court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment, or give such security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment as the court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed. (2) Where a person has become liable as surety under the proviso to sub-section (1), the security may be realized in manner provided by Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908." It is relevant to note that the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 17 has undergone a material change through an amendment brought in by Act 9 of 1935. Earlier these were the words -- "security to the satisfaction of the court for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment, as the court may direct" which have been deleted and substituted by the present words -- "such security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment as the court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed". The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the 1935 amendment was set out as under: "The Act is designed to remove certain doubts which have arisen in the interpretation of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the 1935 amendment was set out as under: "The Act is designed to remove certain doubts which have arisen in the interpretation of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. As the section stands, an applicant is required to give security to the satisfaction of the court at the time of presenting his application. It follows that, in order to ascertain what security satisfies the court, the applicant must already have made an application in that behalf. There is some doubt whether the words ''as the court may direct' apply to the deposit of the whole decretal amount as well as to the giving of approved security. The Act is intended to make it clear that the preliminary application to ascertain what security will satisfy the court must be made and decided before the substantive application for the order to set aside the decree, and that it always is open to the applicant to adopt the alternative course of depositing the total decretal amount. (Vide Statement of Objects and Reasons, Gazette of India, 1935, Part V, p. 90)." 6. The object behind establishing Small Cause Courts conferred with jurisdiction to try summarily such specified category of cases which need to be and are capable of being disposed of by adopting summary procedure of trial is to secure an expeditious disposal and to curtail the lengthy procedure of litigation. Excepting an order for compensatory costs in respect of false or vexatious claims or defences or an order imposing fine or directing the arrest or detention in the civil prison of any person (except where such arrest or detention is in execution of a decree), orders and decrees of Courts of Small Causes are not appealable: they are only revisable by the High Court (or by the District Court under Section 115 CPC as amended in its application to the State of U.P.). The jurisdiction to entertain and hear an application to set aside a decree passed ex parte or for a review of judgment by Courts of Small Causes is sought to be qualified and narrowed down by imposing a condition as to deposit or giving security for performance or compliance by enacting proviso to sub-section (1). Such a provision fits in the scheme of the PSCC Act. Such a provision fits in the scheme of the PSCC Act. Although there is no authoritative pronouncement by this Court (none brought to our notice) interpreting the nature and scope of the proviso however, the learned counsel for the appellant brought to our notice a number of decisions delivered by the High Courts of Allahabad, Oudh, Madras, Orissa, Rajasthan and Lahore which have taken the view that the proviso is mandatory and non-compliance therewith would entail dismissal of the application because such non-compliance cannot be condoned or overlooked by the court. They are, to wit: Mohd. Ramzan Khan v. Khubi Khan, 1938 AIR Lahore 18 : ILR 1937 Lah 728 (DB)], Murari Lal v. Mohd. Yasin, (1939) AIR Allahabad 46 : 1938 All LJ 1078], Shikhani v. Bishambhar Nath, 1941 AIR(Oudh) 103 : 1940 OWN 1190], Jagdamba Prasad v. Ram Das Singh, (1943) AIR Allahabad 288 : 1943 All LJ 241], Roshan Lal v. Brij Lal Amba Lal Shah, 1944 AIR(Oudh) 104 : 1943 OWN 486], Vembu Amal v. Esakkia Pillai, (1949) AIR Madras 419 : (1949) 1 MLJ 71 ], Khetra Dolai v. Mohan Bissoyi, (1961) AIR Orissa 37 : ILR 1960 Cut 481] and Dhanna v.Arjun Lal, (1963) AIR Raj. 240 : 1963 Raj LW 571]. As the present case arises from the State of Uttar Pradesh, the learned counsel for the appellant cited a series of decisions delivered by the Allahabad High Court so as to show the view of the law being consistently taken there. These are: Krishan Kumar v. Hakim Mohd. Umar, (1978) AllLJ 738 : 1978 All LR 541], Sharif v. Suresh Chand, (1979) AWC 256, Roop Basant v. Durga Prasad, (1983) 1 ARC 565, Mohd. Islam v. Faqir Mohd., (1985) 1 ARC 54, Krishna Chandra Seth v. Dr. K.P. Agarwal, (1988) 1 ARC 310, Mamta Sharma v. Hari Shankar Srivastava, (1988) 1 ARC 341, Mohd. Yasin v. Jai Prakash, (1988) 2 ARC 575, Purshottam v. Special Addl. Sessions Judge, Mathura, (1991) 2 ARC 129, Ram Chandra v. IXth ADJ, Varanasi, (1991) AIR Allahabad 223, Sagir Khan v. District Judge, Farrukhabad, (1996) 27 AllLR 540 , Mohd. Nasem v. Third ADJ, Faizabad, (1998) AIR Allahabad 125 : 1998 All LJ 760] and Beena Khare v. VIIIth ADJ, Allahabad, (2000) 2 ARC 616 . 7. Sessions Judge, Mathura, (1991) 2 ARC 129, Ram Chandra v. IXth ADJ, Varanasi, (1991) AIR Allahabad 223, Sagir Khan v. District Judge, Farrukhabad, (1996) 27 AllLR 540 , Mohd. Nasem v. Third ADJ, Faizabad, (1998) AIR Allahabad 125 : 1998 All LJ 760] and Beena Khare v. VIIIth ADJ, Allahabad, (2000) 2 ARC 616 . 7. The learned counsel for the respondent brought to our notice Surendra Nath Mittal v. Dayanand Swarup, (1987) AIR Allahabad 132 : (1985) 2 ARC 517], Chigurupalli Suryanarayana v. Amadalavalasa Coop. Agricultural Industrial Society Ltd., (1975) AIR A.P. 196 : (1975) 1 Andh WR 129] and Tarachand Hirachand Porwal v. Durappa Tavanappa Patravali, (1943) AIR Bombay 237 : 45 Bom LR 470]. All the three decisions are Single Bench decisions. Suffice it to observe that the first two decisions are more or less ad hoc decisions which do not notice other decisions and the general trend of judicial opinion. The view propounded therein does not appeal to us. The Bombay decision does not lay down any general proposition of law and proceeds on its own facts. 8. A bare reading of the provision shows that the legislature has chosen to couch the language of the proviso in a mandatory form and we see no reason to interpret, construe and hold the nature of the proviso as directory. An application seeking to set aside an ex parte decree passed by a Court of Small Causes or for a review of its judgment must be accompanied by a deposit in the court of the amount due from the applicant under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment. The provision as to deposit can be dispensed with by the court in its discretion subject to a previous application by the applicant seeking direction of the court for leave to furnish security and the nature thereof. The proviso does not provide for the extent of time by which such application for dispensation may be filed. We think that it may be filed at any time up to the time of presentation of application for setting aside ex parte decree or for review and the court may treat it as a previous application. The obligation of the applicant is to move a previous application for dispensation. It is then for the court to make a prompt order. The obligation of the applicant is to move a previous application for dispensation. It is then for the court to make a prompt order. The delay on the part of the court in passing an appropriate order would not be held against the applicant because none can be made to suffer for the fault of the court." 6. The scope of the proviso of Section 17 of the Act, 1887 again came up for consideration before the Larger Bench of this Court in Raj Kumar Makhija and Ors. Vs. S.K. and Co. and Ors., (2012) 3 ARC 113 (DB) wherein upon a reference being made on the question as to whether the proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887 completely bars any rectification or removal of a bona fide error after the expiry of the period of limitation when substantial compliance by way of deposit of decretal amount and furnishing security has been made within the period of limitation particularly when Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has been made applicable to Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was held following the judgment in the case of Kedarnath vs. Mohan Lal Kesarwari & Ors., (2002) 2 SCC 16 that there being no provision under Section 17 of the Act, 1887 conferring power on the court to condone the delay in making the deposit, provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not be available to deposit contemplated under Section 17 of the Act. The Larger Bench answered the reference in the following terms:- "45. Viewed as above, we answer the question referred to us in the following manner: 1. Any application filed by the tenant/defendant to made good the shortfall either in deposit or security after expiry of period of limitation is of no consequence. The application for setting aside of the exparte decree will be dismissed for non compliance of the said proviso to Section 17 of the Act. 2. Any amount deposited after the expiry of the period of limitation will not be taken into consideration for judging the compliance of the proviso to Section 17 of the Act. However, Court ignores the shortfall in deposit of a negligible amount on the principle of deminimis, as explained above. 3. 2. Any amount deposited after the expiry of the period of limitation will not be taken into consideration for judging the compliance of the proviso to Section 17 of the Act. However, Court ignores the shortfall in deposit of a negligible amount on the principle of deminimis, as explained above. 3. There being no provision conferring power on the Court to condone the delay in making the deposit, provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act will not be applicable to deposit contemplated under the proviso to Section 17 of the Act." 7. In view of the aforesaid foregoing discussion the contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist that the proviso to Section 17(1) of the Act, 1887 is not mandatory, cannot be accepted. 8. The scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (in short 'the Act, 1887') fell for consideration in a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Trilok Singh Chauhan V. Ram Lal & Ors., (2018) 2 SCC 566 wherein referring to the earlier judgment in the case of Hari Shankar Vs. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, (1963) AIR SC 698 Bell & Co. Ltd. Vs. Waman Hemraj, (1938) AIR Bombay 223 and Mundri Lal Vs. Sushhila Rani, (2007) 8 SCC 609 it was held as follows:- "15. The scope of Section 25 of the 1887 Act, came for consideration before this Court on several occasions. In Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, (1963) AIR SC 698, in paras 9 and 10, this Court laid down the following: (AIR p. 701) "9. The section we are dealing with, is almost the same as Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. That section has been considered by the High Courts in numerous cases and diverse interpretations have been given. The powers that it is said to confer would make a broad spectrum commencing, at one end, with the view that only substantial errors of law can be corrected under it, and ending, at the other, with a power of interference a little better than what an appeal gives. It is useless to discuss those cases in some of which the observations were probably made under compulsion of certain unusual facts. It is useless to discuss those cases in some of which the observations were probably made under compulsion of certain unusual facts. It is sufficient to say that we consider that the most accurate exposition of the meaning of such sections is that of Beaumont, C.J. (as he then was) in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, 1937 SCCOnLine(Bom) 99 : (1938) 40 Bom LR 125 : AIR 1938 Bom 223], where the learned Chief Justice, dealing with Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, observed: (SCC OnLine Bom paras 3-4) ''3. ... The object of Section 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law. 4. The section does not enumerate the cases in which the Court may interfere in revision, as does, Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference; but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the Court which made the order had no jurisdiction, or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the Court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the Court can interfere. But, in my opinion, the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at.' This observation has our full concurrence. 10. What the learned Chief Justice has said applies to Section 35 of the Act, with which we are concerned. Judged from this point of view, the learned Single Judge was not justified in interfering with a plain finding of fact and more so, because he himself proceeded on a wrong assumption." 16. Another judgment which needs to be noted is judgment of this Court in Mundri Lal v. Sushila Rani, (2007) 8 SCC 609 . Judged from this point of view, the learned Single Judge was not justified in interfering with a plain finding of fact and more so, because he himself proceeded on a wrong assumption." 16. Another judgment which needs to be noted is judgment of this Court in Mundri Lal v. Sushila Rani, (2007) 8 SCC 609 . This Court held that jurisdiction under Section 25 of the 1887 Act, is wider than the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. But pure finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence may not be interfered with, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25 of the 1887 Act. The Court also explained the circumstances under which, findings can be interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25. There are very limited grounds on which there can be interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25; they are, when (i) findings are perverse or (ii) based on no material or (iii) findings have been arrived at upon taking into consideration the inadmissible evidence or (iv) findings have been arrived at without consideration of relevant evidence." 9. Counsel for the revisionist has not been able to point out any material error or illegality in the order passed by the trial court so as to warrant interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act, 1887. 10. The revision lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.