ORDER : Heard the parties. 2. Petitioners have approached this Court with a prayer for setting aside the order dated 13/15.12.2016, passed by the respondent, whereby he has rejected the claim of the petitioners for making payment of interest on account of delayed payment of gratuity. Further prayer has been made for a direction upon the respondents to pay the interest @ 18% per annum on the amount of gratuity as well as CMPF. 3. The factual exposition as has been delineated in the writ petition is that husband of petitioner No. 1, Lal Babu Gupta died in harness on 13.08.2005 at Regional Hospital, N.K. Area, Dakra, while working as Ex-Mech. Fitter of Rohini Project of CCL at Dakra. After his death, the petitioner No. 1 claimed for payment of death-cum-retiral benefits and for compassionate appointment. When the respondent-authorities have not acted upon her claims, she filed writ petition being W.P.(S). No. 2413 of 2006. The said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 17.04.2009 and thereafter, the respondent-authorities had paid the pension, PF and Gratuity to the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioners submitted their representation dated 29.11.2016, before the Chief Labour Commissioner for payment of interest over the delayed payment of gratuity and CMPF but surprisingly, vide order dated 13/15.12.2016, the respondents have rejected the claim of the petitioner for payment of interest on the ground that it was a belated claim since the petitioner claimed interest after six years from the date of passing of the order by the Controlling Authority. Challenging the rejection order dated 13/15.12.2016 with respect to payment of interest on gratuity amount, the petitioners have knocked the door of this Court. 4. Mr. Abhishek Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners strenuously urges that petitioners are entitled for interest on gratuity, as the same was delayed at the behest of the respondent-authorities, inasmuch as the petitioners were entitled for the said amount in the year 2005 itself, when the husband of petitioner No. 1 died. Learned counsel further argues that though his appeal was dismissed on the point of delay but there is no limitation prescribed under the law for moving the competent-authority or the Hon’ble Court for interest. Learned counsel further argues that though his appeal was dismissed on the point of delay but there is no limitation prescribed under the law for moving the competent-authority or the Hon’ble Court for interest. As the petitioner No. 1 is the widow, she moved this Court when she was advised by a legal expert and as such, the respondents be directed to pay the interest on the amount of gratuity, for which the petitioner are entitled for in the year 2005 but the actual payment was made in the year 2009. Learned counsel further argues that as per Section 7(3)(a) of the Gratuity Act, petitioner is entitled for simple interest. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Madan Prasad, learned CGC appearing for the respondents, vehemently opposes the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners and argues that petitioners are not entitled for any interest on gratuity. Learned counsel draws the attention of the Court towards several paragraphs of the counter-affidavit and submits that petitioner No. 1 was duly heard by the competent authority on the point of determination of amount of gratuity and after determination, the same was paid to her in the year 2009. Learned counsel further argues that petitioners if at all aggrieved by the non-payment of interest of gratuity, it was open for them to move before the competent-authority but the petitioners moved before the respondent-authorities after an inordinate delay and as such, the same was dismissed on the ground that petitioner has approached after eight years and as such, this writ petition is not maintainable on the point of delay. 6. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of the parties, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made out for interference. The amount of gratuity for which the petitioner was entitled for was determined by the competent-authority and vide its order dated 16.10.2009, the respondents have paid the same to the petitioners. If at all the petitioner was aggrieved on the part of non-payment of interest on delayed payment of gratuity, it was open for them to move before the competent-authority. The appellate-authority was approached after a delay of eight years and the appeal was dismissed on this ground itself. The petitioner were never vigilant regarding interest on the gratuity and it was only after eight years, the petitioners have approached this Court. 7. The appellate-authority was approached after a delay of eight years and the appeal was dismissed on this ground itself. The petitioner were never vigilant regarding interest on the gratuity and it was only after eight years, the petitioners have approached this Court. 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Naib Subedar Lachhman Dass Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1977 SC 1979 , has observed that “for the first time in September, 1970 the appellant invoked the extra-ordinary powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for challenging the legality of an order dated 21.12.1966. The writ petition was filed after a gross delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation and, therefore, the High Court was justified in dismissing it summarily. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board & others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 , has held as under: “Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 8. In view of the aforesaid judgments, the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioners that limitation will not come in the way of granting interest on delayed payment of gratuity, is totally misconceived. No petition can be entertained after long delay of eight years. 9. There is no merit in the instant writ application and hence, it is dismissed.