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2019 DIGILAW 1481 (RAJ)

Vinesh v. State of Rajasthan

2019-05-13

MANOJ KUMAR GARG

body2019
JUDGMENT 1. Instant misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the petitioners for quashing of FIR No. 212/2016, dated 17.05.2016 PS Sumerpur for offences under Sections 498A, 406 and 323 IPC. 2. Counsel for the petitioners submits that earlier an FIR has been filed by the respondent-complainant against the petitioners on the same facts in which a compromise has been arrived at between the parties. The respondent-complainant was examined before the trial court and was declared hostile. Thereafter on the basis of the compromise, the petitioner No. 1 Vinesh was acquitted by the competent court of law. Counsel submits that this second FIR has been filed on the same facts and prays for quashing of the same. To buttress his contention, the counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Babubhai & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [MANU/SC/0643/2010] . 3. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor as well as learned counsel for the respondent-complainant submit that after compromise, the respondent-complainant went with the petitioner No. 1 and after some time, the petitioners again started cruelty with her and also kept her dowry articles. In these circumstances, this second FIR has been lodged by the respondent-complainant and there is no question of quashing the same looking to the gravity of the offence. 4. I have considered the arguments advanced before me by the counsel for the parties and carefully gone through the statement of the respondent-complainant. 5. In her statement, the respondent-complainant has specifically deposed that after compromise, she went with the petitioner No. 1 at her matrimonial home and after some time, the petitioners again started cruelty with her and demanded dowry. She further stated that at many occasions the petitioners gave beating to her consequent to which she received internal injuries on her body. She further deposed that the petitioners also kept her gold articles and turned out her from the matrimonial home and they also used abusive language against her. 6. In the case of Babubhai (Surpa) relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner, the Honble Supreme Court has quashed the FIR while observing that the second FIR has been filed on the same facts. The facts of the present case is altogether different. 6. In the case of Babubhai (Surpa) relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner, the Honble Supreme Court has quashed the FIR while observing that the second FIR has been filed on the same facts. The facts of the present case is altogether different. After compromise, the respondent-complainant went with the petitioner No. 1 at her matrimonial home and thereafter again the petitioner started cruelty with her and also gave beating and threw her outside the matrimonial home. On these facts, the respondentcomplainant filed the second FIR. In such circumstances, the present case is altogether different from the case cited by the petitioners. 7. Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. v. Choudhary Bhajanlal & Ors. : 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335] , laid down guidelines for exercising inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash FIR and criminal proceedings. The Court held: "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not primafacie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. 2. Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." 8. Yet again, Supreme Court, in case of Janta Dal v. H.S. Choudhary : (1992) 4 SCC 305 ] , while relying on Choudhary Bhajanlals case (supra), held: "This inherent power conferred by Section 482 of the Code should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a premature decision in a case wherein the entire facts are extremely incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved whether factual or legal are of great magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to the cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. This Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., to which both of us were parties have dealt with this question at length and enunciated the law listing out the circumstances under which the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction in quashing proceedings. We do not, therefore, think it necessary in the present case to extensively deal with the import and intendment of the powers under Sections 397, 401 and 482 of the Code." 9. In another decision in the case of Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi & Ors, JT 2007 (11) 122 , the Honble Apex Court held that while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court cannot go beyond the allegations made in the F.I.R or rely upon extraneous consideration. For the purpose of finding out the commission of a cognizable offence, the High Court is only required to look into the allegations made in the complaint or the F.I.R. 10. In a subsequent decision, Vinod Raghuvanshi v. Ajay Arora & Ors. : (2013) 10 SCC 581 ] , in a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act, Supreme Court affirmed the order passed by the High Court whereby it declined to exercise inherent powers for quashment of criminal proceedings. The Court observed: "It is a settled legal proposition that while considering the case for quashing of the criminal proceedings the court should not "kill a still born child", and appropriate prosecution should not be stifled unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. The Court observed: "It is a settled legal proposition that while considering the case for quashing of the criminal proceedings the court should not "kill a still born child", and appropriate prosecution should not be stifled unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance. When a prosecution at the initial stage is to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is whether the uncontroverted allegations as made, prima facie establish the offence. At this stage neither can the court embark upon an inquiry, whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence nor should the court judge the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein. More so, the charge-sheet filed or charges framed at the initial stage can be altered/amended or a charge can be added at the subsequent stage, after the evidence is adduced in view of the provisions of Section 216 CrPC. So, the order passed even by the High Court or this Court is subject to the order which would be passed by the trial Court at a later stage." 11. In another case of N. Soundaram v. P.K. Pounraj & Anr. : (2014) 10 SCC 616 ] , Supreme Court, while reiterating the principles laid down in Bhajan Lal (supra) on scope of exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., held: "It is well settled by this Court in a catena of cases that the power under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly and cautiously to prevent the abuse of process of any Court and to secure the ends of justice [See State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal]. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should refrain from giving a prima facie decision unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. Taking the allegations and the complaint as they were, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence was made out, only then the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings in the exercise of its power under Section 482, CrPC [See MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi]. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance. [See Vinod Raghuvanshi v. Ajay Arora]." 12. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance. [See Vinod Raghuvanshi v. Ajay Arora]." 12. Learned Public Prosecutor has submitted a report dated 10.04.2019 received from the concerned Police Station wherein it has come that the Police has found the offences to be proved against the petitioner No. 1-Vinesh, who is husband of the respondent-complainant and against rest of the accused petitioners, no offence was found to be proved by the Police. The report dated 10.04.2019 is hereby taken on record. 13. In view of the report dated 10.04.2019, the misc. petition filed by the petitioners No. 2 to 5 has become infructuous and dismissed as such. 14. So far as the misc. petition filed by petitioner No. 1 is concerned, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case so also in the light of the judicial pronouncements of Honble Apex Court as also the report dated 10.04.2019, no case for quashing of FIR No. 212/2016, dated 17.05.2016 PS Sumerpur is made out. Hence, this misc. petition qua the petitioner No. 1 is hereby dismissed. 15. Stay petition is also dismissed.