JUDGMENT : I.A. No.2158 of 2015 : I.A No.2158 of 2015 has been filed for condonation of delay of 653 days in filing the present revision application. This application is not opposed by the learned counsel for O.P No.2. In view of the reasons stated in the application, I.A No.2158 of 2015 is allowed and the delay of 653 days is condoned. Cr. Rev. No.334 of 2015 With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, this criminal revision petition is taken up for final hearing at this stage itself. 2. The petitioner, the step-son of O.P No.2, has challenged the order dated 22.02.2013 passed in M.P No.82 of 2006 by which he has been directed to pay Rs.2000/-to his step-mother and Rs.1000/- each to O.P Nos. 3 to 5, his step-brothers. 3. Mr. Rahul Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two-fold contentions;(i) step-brothers do not fall under the ambit of section 125 Cr.P.C, and (ii) a step-mother who has a son is not entitled to claim maintenance from his step-son. 4. To substantiate his contention, Mr. Rahul Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the decision in “Kirtikant D. Vadodaria Vs. State of Gujarat and another” reported in (1996) 4 SCC 479 . 5. At the outset, it needs to be recorded that in the proceeding under section 125 Cr.P.C which was instituted on an application filed by O.P Nos. 2 to 5, the petitioner has not led any evidence. 6. It is a case pleaded by O.P Nos.2 to 5, the applicants, that the petitioner has been granted appointment on their father opting for voluntary retirement under Clause 9.5.3 of NCWA and his appointment was conditional upon his maintaining the family which includes O.P Nos.2 to 5. The opposite parties have pleaded that upon their submitting 'No Objection' for appointment of the petitioner he was granted appointment. To controvert this stand taken by the opposite parties, the petitioner has not produced his letter of appointment, a document which he could have produced but not tendered in evidence. On this issue therefore the stand taken by the opposite parties stands concluded. 7. Before the Family Court, the applicants have examined three witnesses; P.W-1-Ram Awatar Ram and P.W 2-Urmila Devi who is the mother of O.P No.2 are the witnesses besides the applicant-Sarita Devi as P.W 3. On this issue therefore the stand taken by the opposite parties stands concluded. 7. Before the Family Court, the applicants have examined three witnesses; P.W-1-Ram Awatar Ram and P.W 2-Urmila Devi who is the mother of O.P No.2 are the witnesses besides the applicant-Sarita Devi as P.W 3. These witnesses have deposed in the court that after death of his first wife Ram Baran Chouhan, father of the petitioner, has solemnized marriage with O.P No.2 in the year 1983. From his first marriage, Ram Baran Chouhan had two sons namely, Sewa Chouhan and the petitioner. From his marriage with O.P No.2 he had three sons; Abhay Kumar aged about 17 years, Pradeep Kumar aged about 15 years and Ravi Shankar aged about 13 years at the time of filing of the petition under section 125 Cr.P.C. The petitioner has taken a stand that O.P No.2 was never married to his father and O.P Nos.3 to 5 were not born from the wedlock of O.P No.2 with his father, but in view of the evidences laid by the opposite parties his stand must fail. There is another reason why this stand of the petitioner cannot be accepted. The opposite parties have pleaded that name of O.P No.2 and her three sons were duly recorded in the service record of late Ram Baran Chouhan. 8. Insofar as reliance placed on “Kirtikant D. Vadodaria Vs. State of Gujarat and another” is concerned, suffice it would be to record that in the present case the opposite parties have primarily laid a claim for maintenance on the basis of grant of appointment to the petitioner in lieu of their father opting for voluntary retirement under Clause 9.5.3 of NCWA. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Kirtikant D. Vadodaria” has observed as under: 15. The point in controversy before us however is whether a ‘step-mother’ can claim maintenance from the step-son or not, having regard to the aims and objects of Section 125 of the Code. While dealing with the ambit and scope of the provision contained in Section 125 of the Code, it has to be borne in mind that the dominant and primary object is to give social justice to the woman, child and infirm parents etc. and to prevent destitution and vagrancy by compelling those who can support those who are unable to support themselves but have a moral claim for support. and to prevent destitution and vagrancy by compelling those who can support those who are unable to support themselves but have a moral claim for support. The provisions in Section 125 provide a speedy remedy to those women, children and destitute parents who are in distress. The provisions in Section 125 are intended to achieve this special purpose. The dominant purpose behind the benevolent provisions contained in Section 125 clearly is that the wife, child and parents should not be left in a helpless state of distress, destitution and starvation. Having regard to this special object the provisions of Section 125 of the Code have to be given a liberal construction to fulfill and achieve this intention of the legislature. Consequently, to achieve this objective, in our opinion, a childless step-mother may claim maintenance from her step-son provided she is a widow or her husband, if living, is also incapable of supporting and maintaining her. The obligation of the son to maintain his father, who is unable to maintain himself, is unquestionable. When she claims maintenance from her natural born children, she does so in her status as their ‘mother’. Such an interpretation would be in accord with the explanation attached to Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 because to exclude altogether the personal law applicable to the parties from consideration in matters of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code may not be wholly justified. However, no intention of legislature can be read in Section 125 of the Code that even though a mother has her real and natural born son or sons and a husband capable of maintaining her, she could still proceed against her step-son to claim maintenance. Since, in this case we are not concerned with, we express no opinion, on the question of liability, if any, of the step-son to maintain the step-mother, out of the inherited family estate by the step-son and leave that question to be decided in an appropriate case. Our discussion is confined to the obligations under Section 125 Cr PC only. 9. A reading of the decision in “Kirtikant D. Vadodaria” makes it abundantly clear that only in a situation wherein a mother has her real and natural born son and husband capable of maintaining her she cannot proceed against her step-son to claim maintenance. 10. The situation in the present case is quite different. 9. A reading of the decision in “Kirtikant D. Vadodaria” makes it abundantly clear that only in a situation wherein a mother has her real and natural born son and husband capable of maintaining her she cannot proceed against her step-son to claim maintenance. 10. The situation in the present case is quite different. At the time when O.P No.2 moved an application under section 125 Cr.P.C her husband had died and her sons were minor who obviously could not have maintained her. 11. In the above facts, finding no infirmity in the order dated 22.02.2013 passed in M.P No.82 of 2006, Criminal Revision No.334 of 2015 is dismissed. Revision dismissed