ORDER : Heard the parties. 2. Instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioners for a direction upon the respondents to reinstate the petitioners in services with all consequential benefits since they have already been acquitted in Chaibasa (Sadar) P.S. Case No. 31 of 2001, corresponding to G.R. Case No. 211 of 2001, by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class at Chaibasa vide order dated 30.05.2016. Petitioner has further prayed for quashing the appellate orders passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Singhbhum (Kolhand Division), Chaibasa, whereby, the appellate-authority has uphold the termination order by rejecting the memo of appeal preferred by the petitioners. Further prayer has been made for quashing the dismissal orders dated 12.01.2001, 22.05.2001, 25.08.2001 & 25.11.2001 respectively, whereby the Superintendent of Police, Chaibasa has dismissed the petitioners from their services with immediate effect in light of inquiry made by the respondents wherein, certificates produced by all the petitioners were found forged and fabricated. 3. Bereft of unnecessary details, the facts of the case in short is that on the basis of written complaint of one Bhupendra Singh, Sergeant Major, Police Line, Chaibasa in the context of some malpractices adopted by the petitioners in the recruitment process pursuant to Advt. No. 1 of 1998, an F.I.R. being Chaibasa (Sadar) P.S. Case No. 31 of 2001 dated 24.05.2001 corresponding to G.R. Case No. 211 of 2001/T.R. No. 1 of 2016, registered under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 472, 473 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code has been instituted for taking appropriate actions against 39 constables, including the present petitioners, who got their appointments by producing forged and fabricated certificate of Home Guard and consequently, vide different orders, orders of dismissal from services were issued with respect to the aforesaid persons. Aggrieved by the same, one Sanjit Kumar has challenged the order of dismissal by filing W.P.(S). No. 2187 of 2003 and the Hon’ble Court after hearing the parties, remitted the matter back to the D.I.G. of Police, South Chhotanagpur Range, Ranchi to determine the appeal. Similarly, one Surendra Bhagat also moved this Hon’ble Court by way of filing W.P.(S). No. 4196 of 2004. However, on the request of counsel for the petitioner the case was permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to file appeal against the order of dismissal. Similarly, one Surendra Bhagat also moved this Hon’ble Court by way of filing W.P.(S). No. 4196 of 2004. However, on the request of counsel for the petitioner the case was permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to file appeal against the order of dismissal. It is the specific case of the petitioners that after facing trial, they have been acquitted from the charges levelled against them vide order dated 30.05.2016, passed in G.R. Case No. 211 of 2001. After obtaining the copy of the order of acquittal dated 30.05.2016, some of the petitioners have preferred representations before the Deputy Director General of Police, Singhbhum (Kolhan Range), Chaibasa requesting for setting aside the departmental proceeding in connection with Advt. No. 1 of 1998. But when nothing has been done by the respondents, the petitioners have been constrained to knock the door of this Hon’ble Court. 4. It is the further case of the petitioners that some of them have filed departmental appeals before the Superintendent of Police, West Singhbhum and the Superintendent of police has been pleased to uphold the orders of dismissal of the petitioner Nos. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14 and 15 vide order dated 15.11.2016 during the pendency of the writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the allegations levelled against these petitioners and action on the part of the respondent is malafide inasmuch as the present petitioners have already been acquitted from the charges imposed upon them and as such, they are legally entitled for their reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits. Learned counsel further argues that petitioners have not participated in the departmental proceeding and as such, the order was passed behind their back since no opportunity was given to the petitioners of being heard as they were facing criminal trial before the learned Trial Court at Chaibasa and as such, could not prove their innocence before the competent authority during the departmental proceedings. Learned counsel further submits that since all the petitioners have already been acquitted honorably, a direction may be given to consider their cases for reinstatement in service. 6. Per contra, counter-affidavit has been filed. Mr. Learned counsel further submits that since all the petitioners have already been acquitted honorably, a direction may be given to consider their cases for reinstatement in service. 6. Per contra, counter-affidavit has been filed. Mr. Samir Sahay, learned counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently opposes the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners and submits that the orders passed against the petitioners in the departmental proceeding were passed after following due process of law and based on material evidence available on relevant records. Learned counsel denies the submissions of the petitioner that the respondents have not considered their grievances or that the authorities have not followed the directions of the Hon’ble Court. Learned counsel further argues that the appeal were preferred by the petitioners after delay of 15 years and as such, rightly the same was dismissed as barred by limitation. 7. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of the parties, this Court is of the considered opinion that the case of the petitioners need consideration on the ground of parity. Earlier, several persons, who were appointed as constables in the year 1986 and against whom FIR was lodged bearing Chaibasa (Sadar) P.S. Case No. 31 of 2001 dated 24.05.2001 for committing illegality in the appointment of constables pursuant to Advt. No. 1 of 1998, had moved this Court challenging the order of dismissal on the ground that in the criminal cases they have been acquitted, as the charges in the disciplinary proceeding and in the criminal cases are same. The Hon’ble Court directed the respondents to reconsider the cases of those petitioners. The cases of present petitioners are same and similar to those petitioners, who had moved this Court in W.P.(S). No. 7819 of 2013 and that of W.P.(S). No. 4360 of 2017. The Hon’ble Court vide its judgment dated 19.10.2016, disposed of the W.P.(S). No. 7819 of 2013, setting aside the punishment order and appellate order and remitted the matter back to the disciplinary authority with a direction to pass appropriate order on the quantum of punishment taking into consideration the fact of the acquittal of those petitioners in the criminal case. Further a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide its order dated 04.04.2019 passed in W.P.(S). Further a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide its order dated 04.04.2019 passed in W.P.(S). No. 4360 of 2017 (reported in 2019 (3) JLJR 188 ), observed as follows: “Since the acquittal is not on the benefit of doubt, the finding on the contrary in the order dated 31.03.2017 (impugned order) is bad and cannot be sustained. I, thus set aside the impugned order dated 31.03.2017 and remit the matter to the Superintendent of Police, Chaibasa, to pass appropriate order on the representation of the petitioner after treating the acquittal of the petitioner to be Honourable.” 8. It is not in dispute that all the petitioners were honorably acquitted in the criminal cases. After their acquittal, the respondents have not passed any order considering their honourable acquittal in the cases and the different orders passed by this Court remitting the matters back to the disciplinary authority. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Inspector General of Police Vs. S. Samuthiram, reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 has observed that the “Meaning of Honourable Acquittal in the following words: When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possible be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.” Similarly, in case of Union of Territory, Chandigarh Administration and others Vs. Pradeep Kumar and Anr., reported in (2018) 1 SCC 797 [: 2018 (1) JLJR (SC) 163], while dealing with the reinstatement in the service on acquittal in criminal cases, it is held by Hon’ble Apex Court that mere acquittal will not give a right to the petitioner to reinstate. Acquittal is not conclusive of suitability of the candidate to be employed unless said acquittal is honourable. The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that unless the acquittal is honourable, the person cannot claim the benefit of reinstatement in service. Thus, from the aforesaid judgments, it can comfortably be said that an acquittal should be honourable to seek reinstatement. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(S). No. 4360 of 2017 (reported in 2019 (3) JLJR 188 ) has come out with a clear finding that, “On this background, I have gone through the judgment passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class in G.R. No. 211 of 2001 (S)/R. No. 02 of 2016. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(S). No. 4360 of 2017 (reported in 2019 (3) JLJR 188 ) has come out with a clear finding that, “On this background, I have gone through the judgment passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class in G.R. No. 211 of 2001 (S)/R. No. 02 of 2016. After a full-fledged contested trial, the Trial Court in a well-reasoned judgment has held that the charges were not established against the persons, who are facing trial. The Court also came to the conclusion that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove this case. After reading the entire judgment, I find that nowhere it gives any little impression that the acquittal is based on benefit of doubt. Thus, I have no hesitation to hold that acquittal of the petitioner is honourable and not on the benefit of doubt.” 9. As such, the cases of the present petitioners also need consideration on the ground of doctrine of parity. It would be apposite to refer to a decision rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Rajendra Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., reported in (2013) 3 SCC 73 , para-9 of which is reproduced herein below: The Doctrine of Equality applies to all who are equally placed; even among persons who are found guilty. The persons who have been found guilty can also claim equality of treatment, if they can establish discrimination while imposing punishment when all of them are involved in the same incident. Parity among co-delinquents has also to be maintained when punishment is being imposed. Punishment should not be disproportionate while comparing the involvement of co-delinquents who are parties to the same transaction or incident. The Disciplinary Authority cannot impose punishment which is disproportionate, i.e., lesser punishment for serious offences and stringent punishment for lesser offences.” Since it has been held by learned Trial Court in its judgment dated 30.05.2016, delivered in G.R. No. 211 of 2001 (S) that, “Accordingly, on the basis of the above made discussion, I come to the conclusion that prosecution has miserably failed to prove this case for the offence alleged Under Sections 419/420/462/468/471/472/473/120B of IPC., against the above named accused persons namely 1. Surendra Bhagat, 2. Sachidanand Yadav, 3. Lav Kumar Yadav, 4. Akhilesh Prakash Sen Singh, 5. Maan Singh Tiu, 6. Prem Kumar, 7. Nanku Yadav, 8. Lalit Vijay, 9. Surendra Bhagat, 2. Sachidanand Yadav, 3. Lav Kumar Yadav, 4. Akhilesh Prakash Sen Singh, 5. Maan Singh Tiu, 6. Prem Kumar, 7. Nanku Yadav, 8. Lalit Vijay, 9. Suresh Chandra @ Ramesh Chandra, 10. Vikash Sharma, 11. Ashok Kumar Yadav, 12. Bijrendra Kumar Rai, 13. Sanjit Kumar, 14. Ranjit Kumar Singh, 15. Khudiya Khalkho, 16. Md. Naushad, 17. Mani Shankar Kumar, 18. Upendra Yadav, 19. Shiv Mangal Prasad, 20. Sanjay Kumar Yadav, 21. Keshav Chandra Pandey, 22. Santosh Kumar Yadav, 23. Anand Kumar, 24. Bhagwan Sawainya, 25. Md. Hassan, 26. Ravindra Prasad, 27. Pankaj Kumar and 28. Baban Yadav. Hence, on the basis of the facts and circumstances, I am of the opinion that above named accused persons are acquitted thereunder for the offence Under Sections 419/420/462/468/471/472/473/120B of IPC., All accused persons are on bail hence, their bailors are discharged from liabilities of their bail bonds.” 10. Considering the aforesaid orders, directions and observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court as has been held in case of Inspector General of Police Vs. S. Samuthiram, reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 , I am of the view that since the prosecution has miserably failed before the learned Court below to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. 11. As a logical sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, I hereby quash and set aside the orders dated 12.01.2001, 22.05.2001, 25.08.2001 & 25.11.2001, whereby the Superintendent of Police, Chaibasa has dismissed the petitioners from their services. As a result of the quashment of the impugned orders, the matters are remitted back to the Superintendent of Police, Chaibasa to reconsider the same and pass a fresh order taking into consideration the honourable acquittal of the petitioners and also observations made above by this Court, within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 12. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition stands disposed of.