ORDER : 1. This case was heard on 29.11.2018 and was fixed for delivery of judgment on 20.12.2018. For unavoidable circumstances, judgment could not be delivered on 20.12.2018 and was re-fixed today. Accordingly, judgment is delivered today in the open court. 2. Heard Mr. B.D. Deka, learned counsel assisted by Mr. N. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. R. Dhar, learned Government Advocate, Assam. Also heard Mr. G. Uddin, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 4 to 6. 3. By filing this petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner seeks quashing of order dated 26.8.2008 passed by Assam Board of Revenue at Guwahati (Board) in Case No. 183 RA(K)/2005 whereby appeal filed by respondent Nos. 4 to 6 was allowed by the Board by remanding the matter to the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup (Metro) for fresh decision after carrying out field verification. 4. Case of the petitioner is that one Mukhram Bhakat @ Bhagat had leased out a plot of land measuring 1 katha, 2 lessas covered by Dag No. 329(01d)/1023 (New) of Annual Patta No. 31(Old)/55 (New) of Sahar Ulubari (Part II) under Ulubari Mouza, Guwahati City in favour of father of the petitioner Guru Prasad Bhuyan through a lease deed dated 6.5.1964. 5. It is stated that Mukhram Bhakat @ Bhagat had allowed Guru Prasad Bhuyan to construct dwelling house as well as shop house over the leased out land. After construction, house was assessed by the Gauhati Municipal Corporation (GMC) whereafter due municipal taxes were paid by father of the petitioner. It is further stated that Mukhram Bhakat had subsequently sold off the said plot of land to Guru Prasad Bhuyan through an unregistered sale deed dated 16.2.1985 and formally delivered possession of the land to Guru Prasad Bhuyan. Petitioner has asserted that Guru Prasad Bhuyan was in possession of the said plot of land till his death in December 1986. After his death, petitioner being his legal heir and successor took over possession of the said plot of land whereafter she constructed a tin roof house and a boundary wall to demarcate the land in question. Petitioner has stated that she is paying land revenue, municipal taxes and electricity dues in respect of the land in question as well as the house constructed thereon. 6. Petitioner has stated that she is paying land revenue, municipal taxes and electricity dues in respect of the land in question as well as the house constructed thereon. 6. Since possession of annual patta land was transferred by the original pattadar to the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, she made an application before the concerned Circle Officer, Guwahati for cancellation of the annual patta in the name of the original pattadar and to grant settlement of the land in question in her favour. On the basis of such application, a non-renewal case was registered before the Circle Officer, Guwahati Revenue Circle being NR1/2001-2002. After hearing the concerned parties and considering the evidence tendered by them, Circle Officer passed an order dated 10.1.2003 forwarding the case records to the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup for cancellation of annual patta and for grant of settlement to the applicant. 7. In the hearing before the Additional Deputy Commissioner, respondent Nos. 4 to 6 had submitted objection. However, Additional Deputy Commissioner vide his order dated 18.7.2005 approved and confirmed the order passed by the Circle Officer dated 10.1.2013. 8. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, respondent Nos. 4 to 6 preferred an appeal before the Board under section 147 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulations, 1886 which was registered as Case No. 183 RA(K)/2005. Board accepted the plea of respondent Nos. 4 to 6 and remanded the matter back to the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup (Metro) to pass a fresh de novo order after carrying out necessary field verification. 9. It is against this order that the present writ petition came to be filed. 10. This case was admitted for hearing on 19.1.2009. 11. Respondent Nos. 4 to 6 have filed a common affidavit objecting to the prayer of the petitioners. Stand taken in the affidavit is that writ petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties inasmuch as other legal heirs of Guru Prasad Bhuyan have not been arrayed as parties to the proceeding; so also, Revenue Department, Government of Assam as well as all the legal heirs of Mukhram Bhagat. Respondent Nos. 4 to 6 have denied leasing out and selling of the land in question to Guru Prasad Bhuyan by alleging the lease deed as well as the sale deed to be fake and fraudulent. Respondent Nos. 4 to 6 have denied leasing out and selling of the land in question to Guru Prasad Bhuyan by alleging the lease deed as well as the sale deed to be fake and fraudulent. Additionally, it is contended that the alleged sale deed being unregistered would have no legal consequence. 12. It may be mentioned that during the pendency of the writ petition, respondent No. 4 expired and he has since been substituted by his legal heirs Om Prakash Pandit and Jai Prakash Pandit as respondent Nos. 4(i) and 4(ii) respectively. 13. Mr. Deka, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that view taken by the Board is not correct. Factum of handing over of possession of the land in question through lease deed is on record which has been acknowledged by the revenue authorities. Such transfer of annual patta while disentitling the original patta holder from renewal of the annual patta would not, however, act as a bar for the State to settle the said land with the transferee since by virtue of such transfer, the annual patta land would be converted into Government land. Once it is Government land, it is a matter between the Government and the transferee. In support of his submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance on a number of decisions. 14. Opposing the submissions of Mr. Deka, Mr. G. Uddin, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 4 to 6 first of all submits that there was neither any lease nor any sale of the land in question. Therefore, Board was justified in directing the Deputy Commissioner to cause an enquiry into this aspect of the matter as this would require factual verification. Secondly, he submits that there was no lease deed or sale deed. Those were manufactured by the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner for wrongful gain in so far the land in question is concerned which has been appropriated by the petitioner to the exclusion of other legal heirs of the predecessor-in-interest. His other submission is that since neither the lease deed nor the sale deed were registered though those were mandatorily required to be registered under section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, no reliance can be placed on such lease deed or sale deed and consequently no benefit can flow out of such unregistered deeds. His other submission is that since neither the lease deed nor the sale deed were registered though those were mandatorily required to be registered under section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, no reliance can be placed on such lease deed or sale deed and consequently no benefit can flow out of such unregistered deeds. He, however, admits that both the predecessor-in-interest and the petitioner were in possession of the land in question as tenant. 15. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received the due consideration of the court. Also perused the materials on record and the decisions cited at the Bar. 16. Before adverting to the relevant legal provisions, it would be apposite to advert to the order dated 10.1.2003 passed by the Circle Officer, Guwahati Revenue Circle. 17. A perusal of the said order would go to show that in the hearing, both the parties were present and they were heard. The report of the Lat Mandal which was called for was considered. The report indicated that first party, i.e., petitioner herein was having possession of the land in question along with the house standing thereon with pakka boundary wall surrounding the said plot of land. Report further disclosed that father of the petitioner had purchased the said land from Mukhram Bhagat by kacha sale deed in the year 1985 whereafter petitioner is having possession. It was further mentioned that land was within urban area and free from any ceiling proceeding with no valuable trees standing thereon. In the course of the hearing, Pancham Pandit, son of late Mukhram Bhagat stated that neither he nor any of his brothers had possession over the land in question for the last 15 years and consequently did not pay any land revenue, municipal tax and electricity bill. Accepting the contention of the petitioner that Guru Prasad Bhuyan was in possession of the land in question since 1964 and the admission of Pancham-Pandit that none of the three sons of Mukhram Bhagat had possession over the land in question, Circle Officer forwarded the case record in original to the higher revenue authorities for declaring the land in question as Government land as possession of the annual patta land had already been transferred in violation of the terms of annual patta. 18. 18. Though order dated 18.7.2005 of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup (Metro) is a cryptic one, nonetheless it discloses that respondent Nos. 4 to 6 had filed objection and were represented by lawyer. On due consideration, Additional Deputy Commissioner recorded that physical possession of the land in question by the petitioner was not denied. It was also confirmed that possession of the annual patta land was not with the original pattadar or his successor but with the petitioner since long. Therefore, order of the Circle Officer dated 10.1.2003 was approved and confirmed. 19. On appeal, Board noted from the relevant record that late Mukhram Bhagat was the original annual patta holder of the land in question. During his lifetime, he had handed over the land in question to respondent Nos. 4 to 6 but had denied execution of the unregistered sale deed in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner. Board, therefore, took the view that except the unregistered sale deed, there was no other evidence on record to show that the land in question was transferred by Mukhram Bhagat to the father of the petitioner. It was also observed that Additional Deputy Commissioner had passed the order without hearing respondent Nos. 4 to 6. Accordingly, matter was remanded back to the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup for a de novo decision after carrying out necessary field verification. 20. In the course of the hearing, on a query by the court, Mr. G. Uddin, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 4 to 6 submitted that respondent Nos. 4 to 6 have not challenged the unregistered sale deed relied upon by the petitioner before the civil court. They have also not filed any police complaint alleging fraud and manipulation. 21. A perusal of the impugned order passed by the Board dated 26.8.2008 would reveal that it had not considered admission of Pancham Pandit to the effect that neither he nor any of his brothers were in possession of the land in question which was in the possession of the petitioner for the last more than 15 years (15 years from 2003). 22. Having noticed the above, the relevant legal provisions may be adverted to. 23. Settlement Rules have been framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulations, 1886. Rule 1(2)(c) defines ‘annual lease’. 22. Having noticed the above, the relevant legal provisions may be adverted to. 23. Settlement Rules have been framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulations, 1886. Rule 1(2)(c) defines ‘annual lease’. As per the definition clause, an ‘annual lease’ means a lease granted for one year only and confers no right in the soil beyond a right of user for the year for which it is given. If confers no right of inheritance beyond the year of issue. It confers no right of transfer or of subletting and shall be liable to cancellation for any transfer or subletting even during the year of issue. As per the proviso, State Government may waive their right to cancel the annual lease and may allow its automatic renewal till such time the State Government may direct in cases where land is mortgaged to the Government or to a State sponsored Cooperative Society. 24. Thus, what ‘annual lease’ means is that firstly it is a lease granted for one year only. Secondly, it confers only right of user in the soil for the year of lease. Thirdly, it confers no right of inheritance beyond the year of issue. Fourthly, it confers no right of transfer or of sub-letting. Fifthly, if there is such transfer or sub-letting, the annual lease is liable to be cancelled. 25. The effect of transfer of an annual lease upon transferee and transferor was considered by a Division Bench of this court way back in the year 1951 in the case of Jamur Ali v. Chafina Bibi, AIR 1951 Assam 20. After referring to the definition of an ‘annual lease’ it was held that it did not prohibit transfer of annual pattas; rather it permitted transfers but such transfers are limited in their duration to the period covered by annual patta. Interpreting the said provision, it was held that when an annual patta-holder purports to transfer his ownership in such land for consideration, the transferee takes good title to the property subject only to the paramount title of the Government. In other words, if the Government so chooses, it may, at the expiry of the period of annual patta, refuse to grant an annual patta to the transferee. It was, however, clarified that this is a matter between the Government and the transferee and not a matter between the transferor and the transferee. 26. In other words, if the Government so chooses, it may, at the expiry of the period of annual patta, refuse to grant an annual patta to the transferee. It was, however, clarified that this is a matter between the Government and the transferee and not a matter between the transferor and the transferee. 26. This interpretation of the definition of annual lease and the consequences which may follow following transfer of ownership or possession thereof holds good till date even though more than half a century has gone by. In fact, later decisions of this court have reiterated the proposition of law propounded in Jamur Ali (supra) [please see Safatun Nessa v. Gitarani Kundu, (1987) 2 GLR 64 and Govinda Ch. Das v. Boloram Boro, 2000 (2) GLT 669]. 27. At this stage, it would be useful to refer to section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 which deals with documents of which registration is compulsory. A perusal of section 17 would go to show that a lease deed of an immovable property for a period exceeding one year or a sale deed of an immovable property value of which is Rs. 100 and upwards is required to be registered. 27.1 Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 deals with effect of non-registration of documents which are compulsorily required to be registered under section 17. It says that if such a document is not registered, it will not affect any immovable property nor confer any power to adopt nor to be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power. However, as per the proviso, an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by the Registration Act, 1908 or by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered, may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under the Specific Relief Act, 1877 or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. 28. High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Ram Vidya Bhushan Singh v. Rati Ram, AIR 1963 HP 49 explained this position by holding that a deed which under the law is compulsorily registrable but is not registered is admissible in evidence for the collateral purpose of examining the nature and character of possession. 28. High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Ram Vidya Bhushan Singh v. Rati Ram, AIR 1963 HP 49 explained this position by holding that a deed which under the law is compulsorily registrable but is not registered is admissible in evidence for the collateral purpose of examining the nature and character of possession. In the facts of that case, it was held that the document marked ‘X’ was admissible in evidence for the collateral purposes of showing the nature and character of respondents' possession over the land in question. 29. Earlier in Venkata Krishnarao v. G. Appalaswamy, AIR 1957 AP 845 , similar view was taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court by holding that a document which was required to be registered but not registered was admissible in evidence for the limited purpose of considering whether an offence of bribery was committed or not. 30. Considering section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 in conjunction with section 49 thereof, Supreme Court in Anthony v. K.C. Ittoop, (2000) 6 SCC 394 : AIR 2000 SC 3523 held that under section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 a lease of immovable property from year-to-year or for any term exceeding one year can be made only by a registered instrument but as per the second paragraph thereof all other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. It was held that when lease is a transfer of right to enjoy property and such transfer can be made expressly or by implication, the mere fact that an unregistered instrument came into existence would not stand in the way of the court to determine whether there was in fact a lease otherwise than through such deed. Elaborating further, Supreme Court held that when it is admitted by the parties that appellant was inducted into possession of the building by the owner thereof and that appellant was paying monthly rent, legal character of appellant's possession has to be attributed to a jural relationship between the parties. Such a jural relationship cannot be placed anything different from that of lessor and lessee falling within the purview of the second paragraph of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. Such a jural relationship cannot be placed anything different from that of lessor and lessee falling within the purview of the second paragraph of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the fact situation of that case, finally it was held that there was no possibility for holding that nature of possession of the appellant in respect of the building was anything other than as a lessee. Taking a different view would be contrary to the reality. 31. Adverting to the facts of the present case, report of the Lat Mandal which was relied upon by the concerned Circle Officer clearly reveal that possession of the land in question was being enjoyed by the petitioner for a long time. She had constructed boundary wall and house thereon and was paying land revenue, municipal taxes, electricity bill, etc. One of the sons of the original annual patta holder Pancham Pandit admitted that neither he nor any of his brothers had any possession over the land in question for the last 15 years, i.e., 15 years from 2003. This factum would clearly indicate that possession of the land in question was with the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner and not with the original pattadar of the annual patta. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 4 to 6 submitted at the time of hearing that petitioner and her father were tenants. Even if this contention is accepted status of the petitioner or that of her father would be that of a tenant having permissive occupation. If this is the position, then effect of rule 1(2)(c) of the Settlement Rules will come into play. Since original annual pattadar had transferred the possession of the land to the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, it would entail non-renewal of annual patta to him or to his legal heirs. Therefore, no fault can be found with the order passed by the Circle Officer suggesting that the land be made Government land as the possession of the annual patta land had been transferred in violation of rule 1(2)(c) of the Settlement Rules. These aspects of the matter were not considered by the Board while setting aside the affirmation order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner. 32. These aspects of the matter were not considered by the Board while setting aside the affirmation order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner. 32. Though order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner as noticed above was cryptic in nature, in the opinion of the court, the same would not be a vitiating factor inasmuch as by the said order, Additional Deputy Commissioner had only approved and affirmed the reasoned order of the Circle Officer. Additional view taken by the Board that Additional Deputy Commissioner did not hear the respondents is also not correct inasmuch as they were represented by lawyer who though filed attendance did not appear. However, respondents had filed objection which was considered. Since Additional Deputy Commissioner found that physical possession of the annual patta land by the petitioner was not denied and since it was confirmed that possession of the annual patta land was not with the original pattadar or his successor but with the petitioner and her predecessor-in-interest since long, order of the Circle Officer was rightly confirmed. 33. That being the position, Board was not justified in remanding the matter back to the Deputy Commissioner for a de novo decision without considering the aforesaid factors and the legal provisions. 34. Consequently, judgment and order dated 26.8.2008 passed by the Board in Case No. 183 RA(K)/2005 is set aside and quashed. 35. Parties to bear their own costs.