JUDGMENT : All these Writ Petitions relate to the revision of seniority of District Judges. The petitioners in all these Writ Petitions got appointment as District Judges by transfer from Sub Judges/Chief Judicial Magistrates in Kerala Judicial Service. All of them are aggrieved by the orders issued on the representations submitted by directly recruited District Judges, by which the seniority assigned to them is revised and re-fixed placing them below the directly recruited District Judges appointed on the basis of notification issued on 16.04.2007. 2. The petitioners in WP(C).No.40046 of 2017 are challenging the seniority assigned to all the 4 directly recruited District Judges appointed pursuant to the notification issued on 06.04.2007. The petitioners in the other two Writ Petitions are aggrieved by the seniority assigned to Sri. Jayachandran, one among the 4 directly recruited District Judges, who is the 6th respondent in W.P.(C) No.40046 of 2017 and the 3rd respondent in the other two Writ Petitions, placing him above them. In all the three cases the grievance is over the decision of the Administrative Committee of the High Court and the consequential revision of their seniority. The brief facts leading to the Writ Petition in each of the cases, as stated in the respective writ petitions are given below. WP(C) No.40046 of 2017 3. Petitioners commenced their services as Munsiffs in the Kerala Judicial Service. On further promotions, they were appointed as District Judges as per Exts.P3 and P4 orders issued by the Governor on 29.5.2007 and 16.05.2008 respectively and they joined as District Judges on 06.07.2007 and 30.05.2008 respectively. Exts.P3 and P4 orders were issued based on the recommendations of the High Court, which forwarded a panel of Sub Judges/Chief Judicial Magistrates and it was stated therein that the appointments were made without prejudice to the claim of the candidates to be recruited directly from the Bar under Rule 2(b) of Kerala State Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'Special Rules'). 4. As per Ext.P5 notice dated 02.07.2016, the petitioners were informed that a Special Committee of three Judges was constituted to consider the representations submitted by respondents 3 to 6, claiming seniority over some of the District Judges who were appointed by transfer. Ext.P5 series of representations submitted by them and Ext.P6 provisional seniority list were forwarded to the petitioners and they were requested to appear before the committee on 16.07.2016. Ext.P5 series of representations submitted by them and Ext.P6 provisional seniority list were forwarded to the petitioners and they were requested to appear before the committee on 16.07.2016. In Ext.P5, the 3rd respondent requested to assign him seniority above serial no.117 in the light of the judgment in All India Judges' Association and others vs. Union of India and others, AIR 2002 (SC) 1752 , pointing out that the vacancy of directly recruited District Judges arose much prior to the appointment of the Additional District Judges ranked at serial nos.117 to 135. In another representation submitted on 22.3.2015 he requested to assign him seniority above serial nos.112 to 135 in the draft seniority list. 5. The 4th respondent in his representation submitted on 23.02.2015 requested to assign him seniority above rank no.112, in the light of the dictum laid down in the Full Bench judgment in Haneefa V State of Kerala: 2012(4) KLT 583 , claiming seniority above the Additional District Judges appointed by transfer after 01.01.2005. 6. The 5th respondent submitted representation dated 22.3.2015 in which he claimed similar reliefs pointing out that the appointment of the District Judges made as per orders dated 29.05.2007 and 06.05.2008 were made without prejudice to the claim of direct recruits. 7. The 6th respondent stated that his appointment was delayed for no fault on his part and that he had submitted a representation seeking notional seniority from 30.03.2009, the date on which other candidates were appointed by direct recruitment. Furnishing the dates and events relating to the steps initiated for direct recruitment starting from 16.04.2007 and culminating in his appointment on 22.10.2010, he stated that he had approached this Court initially, challenging the exclusion of candidates who did not fulfill the age requirement. Thereafter, he challenged the grant of grace marks and he was given appointment only thereafter in implementation of that judgment, replacing the ineligible candidates. Therefore, relying on various judgments, he stated that he was entitled to notional seniority from 30.03.2009, the date on which others were appointed by direct recruitment based on the very same selection. An additional representation was submitted on 18.09.2014. 8. The petitioners thereupon submitted Exts.P7 and P7(a) objections stating that their seniority is to be determined, based on the date of order of first appointment to the said category, in accordance with Rule 6 of the Special Rules. An additional representation was submitted on 18.09.2014. 8. The petitioners thereupon submitted Exts.P7 and P7(a) objections stating that their seniority is to be determined, based on the date of order of first appointment to the said category, in accordance with Rule 6 of the Special Rules. They stated that respondents 3 to 6 were appointed by direct recruitment only in the year 2009 and 2010 and that they were not entitled to claim seniority above the petitioners who were appointed in the year 2007 and 2008 and requested to reject their representations. They also pointed out that their probation was declared on completion of two years service. Pointing out that the 6th respondent was appointed only on the basis of the direction of this Court in the judgment reported in Jayachandran vs. High Court of Kerala, 2010 (4) KHC 1 : 2010(4) KLT 49 (hereinafter referred to as 'Jayachandran's case'), it was stated that even the direction in the judgment was not seen complied with. 9. By Ext.P1 office memorandum dated 26.10.2017 the seniority list of District Judges was recast, placing both the petitioners below respondents 3 to 6, who were appointed on direct recruitment from the Bar. As per Ext.P15 letter the appeals submitted by them against Ext.P1 order were rejected stating that they have exhausted their administrative remedy. Exts.P1 and P15 orders are under challenge on grounds of violation of principles of natural justice, absence of reasons, refusal to furnish the reports submitted by the Special Committee, to the petitioners and also the report of the Administrative Committee based on which Ext.P1 order was issued. The main contention of the petitioners in the Writ Petition is that they were not informed of any reason for revising the seniority list. It is their further contention that they were heard by a committee of three Judges. It is stated that the Administrative Committee disagreed with the report of the Special Committee and arrived at a conclusion against the petitioners without informing them the reasons for disagreement, without giving them an opportunity to furnish their contentions against the reason for those disagreements and without even furnishing any of the reports. It was stated that the Administrative Committee did not even consider the points or grounds raised by them and issued an order merely on the grounds urged by respondents 3 to 6 and the Full Bench decision in Haneefa's case (supra). It was stated that the Administrative Committee did not even consider the points or grounds raised by them and issued an order merely on the grounds urged by respondents 3 to 6 and the Full Bench decision in Haneefa's case (supra). W.P.(C) No.40069 of 2017 10. The petitioner is a Selection Grade District Judge. Her initial appointment was in Kerala Judicial Service as a Judicial Second Class Magistrate on 25.02.1991. On further appointment as Munsiff/Magistrate on 01.01.1992 and promotion as Sub Judge on 20.01.2005, she was promoted as District Judge on 02.07.2010 and thereafter as Selection Grade District Judge on 04.08.2015. She was appointed as District Judge as per Ext.P5 order dated 03.07.2010 of the Governor of Kerala, along with 14 others. The appointment was made provisionally and subject to the final decision in W.P(c).Nos.21094/2009, 25168, 23647, 20683, 25561, and 25914 of 2009. Her probation was declared as per Ext.P6 order dated 21.10.2013 w.e.f 04.08.2012. As per Ext.P7 order dated 17.03.2017 she was promoted as Selection Grade District Judge w.e.f 04.08.2015 on completion of 5 years as District Judge. Whileso, M/s.K.Babu, Sri Kauser Edapaggath and Sri Badharudheen-directly recruited District Judges submitted representations before the High Court claiming seniority over those appointed by transfer as per Ext.P1 order dated 29.05.2007, by which 6 Sub Judges and Chief Judicial Magistrates were appointed as District and Sessions Judges, without prejudice to the claim of the candidates to be recruited directly under Rule 2(b) of the Special Rules. The 3rd respondent filed Ext.P8 representation dated 11.04.2012 claiming seniority on par with those officers who were appointed by direct recruitment as per Ext.P2 order dated 30.03.2009. He thereafter submitted Ext.P8(a) representation also, on 18.09.2014. The petitioner submitted Ext.P9 objection against the claim of the 3rd respondent stating that she has been continuing in the post of District & Sessions Judge since 04.08.2010 and her probation was declared w.e.f 04.08.2012 and therefore she is entitled to seniority from the date of order of her appointment as per Rule 6 of the Special Rules. She pointed out that the 3rd respondent had taken charge only on 24.02.2011 based on his order of appointment issued on 22.12.2010. The petitioner submitted that a Special Committee consisting of 3 Judges of this Court had heard them and considered the representations. She pointed out that the 3rd respondent had taken charge only on 24.02.2011 based on his order of appointment issued on 22.12.2010. The petitioner submitted that a Special Committee consisting of 3 Judges of this Court had heard them and considered the representations. The petitioner asserts that after the hearing, the committee which heard them had rejected the claim of the 3rd respondent, finding that seniority of promotees and direct recruits had to be retained on the basis of the actual dates of appointment as the quota prescribed for direct recruitment had been broken down and was inoperative during the relevant period. The petitioner submitted that another special committee was constituted earlier which had also rejected the claim of the 3rd respondent. But the Administrative Committee, without accepting those reports, decided to revise the seniority as per Ext.P10 minutes and based on that, Ext.P11 order was issued recasting the seniority list, reversing the findings of the Special Committee. The petitioner submitted that the decision of the Administrative Committee is illegal and it suffers from the vice of unreasonableness. It is pointed out that while appointing the 3rd respondent it was specifically made clear that the appointment would be effective from the date he assumed charge and that the 3rd respondent did not choose to challenge the same in any judicial proceedings. The petitioner, who was promoted as District Judge on 04.08.2010, is ranked junior to the 3rd respondent, who took charge only in 2011. Though the petitioner submitted Exts.P12 & P13 representations requesting to restore her seniority, she was informed as per Ext.P14 letter that her administrative remedy was already exhausted. 11. Pointing out the prayers made in Ext.P3-W.P(C).No.16206/2010 filed by the 3rd respondent, challenging the moderation given to candidates appointed by direct recruitment, the petitioner submitted that the prayer no.iv for a direction to appoint the 3rd respondent as District & Session Judge w.e.f 30.03.2009, the date of original appointment of the direct recruits, was not granted by this Court and therefore it has to be presumed that such a prayer was declined. Therefore, his claim for appointment from a date prior to the date indicated in his order of appointment is hit by constructive res judicata. Therefore, his claim for appointment from a date prior to the date indicated in his order of appointment is hit by constructive res judicata. It is also stated that the Division Bench, while allowing the Writ Petition filed by the 3rd respondent, by the judgment in Jayachandran's case had only directed that the select list would be recast excluding moderation marks. As a result of such recasting, the rd respondent was also found eligible for inclusion in the rank list along with the 3 others who were already appointed as District Judges. It is pointed out that the Full Court of the High Court had decided to recommend to the Government to permit the other 3 persons whose inclusion in the rank list and the appointments were found proper, to continue in service w.e.f 21.05.2009 itself and to appoint the 3rd respondent from the date he assumes charge. The order of his appointment issued by the Governor was in tune with the recommendation made by the Full Court of the High Court. It is also pointed out that the appointment of the petitioner was not one made adhoc or provisional; even though it was stated to be subject to the result of certain Writ Petitions, all those Writ Petitions were those filed by direct recruits and the appointments made by transfer were not challenged in those Writ Petitions. Pointing out that appointment of a District Judge has to be made in consultation with the High Court as provided in Article 233 of the Constitution of India, it was argued that the Full Court had consciously recommended the appointment of the 3rd respondent with effect from the date on which he assumed charge and therefore the Administrative Committee was not competent to vary the decision of the Full Court, as consultation envisaged in Article 233 is only with the High Court. According to the petitioner, the Administrative Committee is incompetent to take any decision overriding the decision of the Full Court of the High Court. WP(C) No.40043/2017 12. In WP(C).No.40043/2017 the petitioner was appointed as District Judge as per order dated 02.07.2010 of the Governor from the category of Sub Judge/CJM. His appointment was stated to be provisional and subject to the result of WP(C).Nos.21094/09, 25168/09, 23647/09, 20683/09, 25561/09 and 25914/09. Those Writ Petitions were closed in view of the judgment in Jayachandran's case. WP(C) No.40043/2017 12. In WP(C).No.40043/2017 the petitioner was appointed as District Judge as per order dated 02.07.2010 of the Governor from the category of Sub Judge/CJM. His appointment was stated to be provisional and subject to the result of WP(C).Nos.21094/09, 25168/09, 23647/09, 20683/09, 25561/09 and 25914/09. Those Writ Petitions were closed in view of the judgment in Jayachandran's case. His probation was declared with effect from 27.08.2012 as per Ext.P3 order. He was thereafter promoted as Selection Grade District Judge as per Ext.P4 order dated 17.03.2017. He claims that his appointment was regular and against the quota earmarked for promotion of Sub Judge/CJM. Therefore, his seniority is liable to be determined with respect to the date of order of his appointment as District Judge. He received a notice, in connection with representation submitted by directly recruited District Judges claiming seniority. A hearing was held by a Special Committee of Judges pursuant to that. He stated that the claim of Sri.Jayachandran for seniority with effect from 30.03.2009 cannot be accepted as he was appointed as District Judge only as per order dated 22.10.2010. At the same time, all those who had undergone the process of selection along with him got appointment as District and Sessions Judges in the year 2009. Consequent to the judgment in the Writ Petition filed by Sri.Jayachandran the select list for direct recruitment was recast though the original appointees could continue. Seniority is to be fixed on the basis of the date of order of the appointment. The petitioner challenges Exts.P10 minutes of the administrative Committee and Ext.P11 order reassigning seniority. It is stated that his appointment was not conditional and therefore his seniority was not liable to be revised and the 3rd respondent cannot be assigned seniority with effect from a date earlier to his appointment. It is stated that Sri.Jayachandran never objected to his appointment though it was made clear that it would take effect only from the date on which he assumes charge and therefore the further claims are hit by constructive resjudicata. Contentions in the Counter Affidavit of High Court 13. In the counter affidavit filed by the High Court, it is stated that the Administrative Committee had in its meeting held on 29.8.2006, as per Ext.R2(f), decided to take steps for direct recruitment against 6 posts of District and Sessions Judges. Contentions in the Counter Affidavit of High Court 13. In the counter affidavit filed by the High Court, it is stated that the Administrative Committee had in its meeting held on 29.8.2006, as per Ext.R2(f), decided to take steps for direct recruitment against 6 posts of District and Sessions Judges. It was also decided to fill up those vacancies in exigency of service, by appointment by transfer pending completion of the proceedings for direct recruitment. It is stated that the cadre strength of District and Session Judges was 96 at the relevant time and that there were only 18 direct recruits as against their quota of 24. At the same time, there were 126 promotee District Judges as against their quota of 72. Ext.R2(a) notification for direct recruitment was issued on 06.04.2007 on the basis of the decision taken in Ext.R2(f) on 29.08.2006. Pending completion of the process of direct recruitment, the vacancies were filled on appointment by transfer, in tune with the decisions taken on 29.8.2006 and 29.5.2007 in exigencies of service. Accordingly, Sri. John Illikadan, the 1st petitioner in W.P.(C).No.40046 of 2017 and 5 others were appointed by transfer from among Sub Judges/Chief Judicial Magistrates. Their appointments were made without prejudice to the claims of the candidates to be recruited directly from the Bar for satisfying the quota for direct recruitment provided under Rule 2(b) of the Special Rules. During the pendency of selection for direct recruitment, the Administrative Committee of the High Court had in its meeting held on 21.02.2008 resolved to recommend five CJMs/Sub Judges for appointment as District Judges purely on adhoc basis as per Ext.R2(g) minutes dated 21.02.2008 and Smt.K.P.Indira, the 2nd petitioner in that Writ Petition was appointed acordingly in the Fast Track Court on adhoc basis. The Governor of Kerala appointed six candidates including respondents 3 to 5 in W.P.(C) No.40046 of 2017 as District and Sessions Judges as per SRO No.292/2009 dated 30.03.2009. That order was subject to the final decision in various Writ Petitions which were pending before this Court, which were finally disposed of by judgment dated 12.11.2009 in Asha. P V High Court of Kerala and others: 2009 (4) KHC 721 . In that decision exclusion of candidates on the basis of being below the minimum age limit was held illegal and it was directed to consider such candidates also for appointment against the 6 vacancies notified. P V High Court of Kerala and others: 2009 (4) KHC 721 . In that decision exclusion of candidates on the basis of being below the minimum age limit was held illegal and it was directed to consider such candidates also for appointment against the 6 vacancies notified. On the basis of that judgment, Sri.Jayachandran and others were considered and the select list was recast. The same selection was subject to another challenge against awarding of grace marks which culminated in judgment dated 13.09.2010 in Jayachandran's case (supra) based on which the select list was recast and Sri.Jayachandran was appointed on 22.12.2010. Simultaneously three candidates who were already appointed had to go out as their appointments were cancelled. The three candidates whose inclusion was found to be proper, could continue in the post of District Judges based on their appointments made in 2009. Producing Ext.R2(h) draft seniority list of District and Session Judges as on 01.06.2006, it is stated that 54 promotees were in excess of their quota at the relevant time and that they could continue only because Fast Track Courts, which were established on adhoc basis, were functioning and officers were posted in those courts on promotion from the cadre of Sub Judges/CJMs on adhoc basis. Those Fast Track Courts were made permanent only on 14.11.2012, when Government issued Ext.R2(i) order dated 14.11.2012 and substantive appointment could be made against those posts only from that date. For the purpose of seniority, substantive appointments within the quota earmarked for appointment by transfer, applying the same on the cadre strength, alone can be taken. Six more Subordinate Judges/CJMs were appointed by transfer pending direct recruitment. Therefore, the petitioners in WP(C).No.40046 of 2017 were appointed purely on adhoc basis and against the vacancies beyond their quota. Seniority can be determined under Rule 6 of the Special Rules, only with reference to appointments within the quota as held in the judgment in Haneefa's case (supra) by the Full Bench. Therefore, when the transfer appointees were appointed against the vacancies in the quota for direct recruitment, they cannot claim seniority on the basis of their initial appointment. Therefore, the interse dispute between the petitioners and the respondents is squarely covered by the dictum laid down in Haneefa's case. Therefore, when the transfer appointees were appointed against the vacancies in the quota for direct recruitment, they cannot claim seniority on the basis of their initial appointment. Therefore, the interse dispute between the petitioners and the respondents is squarely covered by the dictum laid down in Haneefa's case. The question of break down of quota rule does not arise in this case and therefore the judgment in Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers' Association vs. State of Maharashtra and others : 1990 (2) SCC 715 cannot be applied, in favour of promotees. There was no inaction on the part of the High Court in implementing the quota and there was no deviation in implementing the rules. The ratio in Rudhra Kumar Sain and others vs. Union of India and others : (2000) 8 SCC 25 would not apply in the case of the petitioners and rules applicable to the District Judges of Delhi are not similar to the Special Rules which govern the case of petitioners and party respondents. Once appointment is made by the Governor in consultation with the High Court in terms of Article 233, all matters in connection with their service come under the domain of the High Court. The direct recruits were entitled to seniority above those appointed by transfer. All those who were appointed by transfer pending direct recruitment would rank only junior to the direct recruits. The select list of direct recruits was recast on the basis of the judgment in WP(C) No.16206 of 2010 filed by Sri.Jayachandran and thereafter Sri.Jayachandran replaced Sri.Badharudeen A, who was appointed on 30.03.2009, at turn No.41, on the basis of merit. 25 District Judges were appointed by transfer between the original date of appointment of direct recruits on 30.03.2009 and the date of appointment of Sri.Jayachandaranon 22.10.2010. Though Sri. Jayachandran was appointed only on 22.10.2010 the vacancy against which he was appointed existed prior to 16.04.2007. 14. In the orders of appointment of the petitioners in W.P.(C).Nos.40069 and 40043 of 2017, issued in the year 2010 it was not specified that their appointments would be subject to the result of the Writ Petition, because at that time all the 6 vacancies against which direct recruitment was resorted to, were filled up. 14. In the orders of appointment of the petitioners in W.P.(C).Nos.40069 and 40043 of 2017, issued in the year 2010 it was not specified that their appointments would be subject to the result of the Writ Petition, because at that time all the 6 vacancies against which direct recruitment was resorted to, were filled up. Consequent to the judgment in the Writ Petition filed by Sri.Jayachandran, there occurred a change in the persons who occupied those 6 posts in the direct recruitment quota, when the select list was recast including Sri.Jayachandran. As direct recruitment was already over on 30.03.2009, no condition was stipulated in the appointment of the District Judges who were appointed by transfer. When there was a direction to recast the select list and appointment had to be made from such a select list, the condition stipulated in the orders of appointment of the petitioners in W.P(C) No.40046 of 2017 would apply to those who were appointed subsequent to them also in that quota. Even if there is no recital in the order of appointment, seniority can be claimed only from the date when the vacancy arose in the quota for transferees. The grievance of Sri. Jayachandran for getting included his name in preference to a candidate with lesser merit and the delayed appointment on account of illegalities in the selection cannot stand in the way of correcting the mistakes occurred in drawing the select list. In the light of the judgment in Pilla Sitaram Patrudu v. Union of India : AIR 1997 SC 250 , Balwant Singh Narwal v. State of Haryana: 2008 (7) SCC 728 , Surendra Narain Singh v. State of Bihar : 1998 (5) SCC 246 , Sasidhar Reddy Sura v. State of A.P: 2014 (2) SCC 158 etc., a candidate who lost the opportunities on account of illegal action is liable to be protected. If the appointment was denied wrongfully such wrongful appointment was liable to be corrected. Once Sri.Jayachandran was placed above Sri.Badharudeen, whatever benefits which were available to Sri.Badharudeen were liable to be extended to Sri.Jayachandran, even though his actual appointment happened to be after much delay, which was not on account of his fault. 15. If the appointment was denied wrongfully such wrongful appointment was liable to be corrected. Once Sri.Jayachandran was placed above Sri.Badharudeen, whatever benefits which were available to Sri.Badharudeen were liable to be extended to Sri.Jayachandran, even though his actual appointment happened to be after much delay, which was not on account of his fault. 15. Regarding the constitution of the Administrative Committee, it is stated that the Full Court of the High Court had in its meeting held on 12.06.1986 taken a resolution in Ext.R2(l) regarding the distribution of administrative works of the High Court. As per that resolution, the Administrative Committee consisting of Chief Justice and four other Judges who are nominated by the Chief Justice form the Administrative Committee. The consideration of representation from judicial officers regarding service problems is assigned to the Administrative Committee. It is stated that such authorization was granted in accordance with law. Counter Affidavit of respondents 3 and 4(M/s. Babu and Kauser Edapagath) in W.P. (C) No.40046 of 2017 16. Respondents 3 and 4, in the counter affidavit filed in W.P(C).No.40046 of 2017, stated that the minutes of the Administrative Committee held on 19.10.2017 had clearly stated that 25% of the posts of District & Sessions Judges were to be filled up by direct recruitment from the Bar and the remaining 75% by appointment by transfer from Subordinate Judiciary. It was also stated that the cadre strength was 96 in 2006 and out of 24 posts in the quota for direct recruitment, only 18 were appointed. The notification for direct recruitment, which the High Court has produced as Ext.R2(a) was issued on 16.04.2007 for filling up 6 vacancies by direct recruitment. The suitability of 6 Sub Judges/Chief Judicial Magistrates was considered and a panel of 6 officers was prepared for appointment by transfer against the 6 vacancies earmarked for 6 direct recruits specifically stating that: “without prejudice to the claim of the candidates to be recruited direct from the Bar as provided under Rule 2(b) of the Special Rules.” Those 6 officers thus appointed, joined between 04.07.2007 and 20.07.2007 subsequent to the issuance of notification for direct recruitment by which the process of selection for direct recruitment from the Bar commenced. Ext.R2(b) Government order dated 30.03.2009 appointing 6 directly recruited District & Sessions Judges was issued against the vacancies earmarked for them. Ext.R2(b) Government order dated 30.03.2009 appointing 6 directly recruited District & Sessions Judges was issued against the vacancies earmarked for them. Therefore, those transferees who occupied the post of direct recruits were not entitled to seniority on the basis of the date of their appointment and their seniority cannot be counted except on appointment against a substantive vacancy within the quota fixed for that category. Therefore, the Administrative Committee had the right to recast the seniority. The question relating to the seniority, quota, substantive appointment, etc. is already considered in the Full Bench judgment in Haneefa' s case. In this case the Administrative Committee had, as early as on 31.07.2006 decided to fill up the vacancies in 25% quota by direct recruitment considering the fact that the cadre strength was 96 and there were only 18 directly recruited District Judges as against 24 required. Both the petitioners in W.P(C).No.40046/17 were appointed without prejudice to the claim of the direct recruits and they accepted that condition and joined duty in the cadre of District Judges knowing fully well that their appointments were made without prejudice to the claim of direct recruits under Rule 2(b) of the Special Rules. In respect of the appointment of Smt.K.P.Indira also, the Administrative Committee had, in its meeting held on 21.02.2008 as per Ext.R2(g) minutes, clearly recorded that the said appointment was against the vacancies which arose on continuance of the fast track courts established on adhoc basis. There was no regular appointment for them and therefore they cannot claim seniority. The Fast Track courts were made permanent only as per Ext.R2(i) Government Order dt.14.11.2012. It is stated that the petitioners could have been said to be appointed to the service if such appointment was in accordance with rules and therefore the seniority of the petitioners can be reckoned only from the date on which they were appointed within the quota set apart for them. When the appointments were made against vacancies arising in another quota there cannot be any claim for seniority on the basis of such appointment even if there is an order issued by the Government. When the appointments were made against vacancies arising in another quota there cannot be any claim for seniority on the basis of such appointment even if there is an order issued by the Government. In the minutes of the meeting of the Administrative Committee held on 29.8.2006, the total number of vacancies which were to be filled up in that year was found to be 6, referring to the cadre strength of 96 and after referring to the number of posts available for direct recruits. The Special Rules were amended as per notification issued in the gazette extraordinary dt.12.6.2008. Referring to Rule 18(a) KS&SSR, it is stated that when a person who is appointed temporarily to a post on the cadre of any service, class or category otherwise than in accordance with rules governing the appointment thereto, he shall commence his probation from the date of such date of subsequent appointment or from the earlier date as the appointing authority determined without prejudice to the seniority of others. Therefore, the orders declaring the probation of the petitioners cannot have any force in the eye of law, in the matter of determination of seniority. It is stated that the Administrative Committee found that the special committee which was constituted initially had not extended an opportunity of hearing to those officers who had submitted the representation and therefore it was decided to rehear the matter and thereafter another special committee was constituted for hearing all affected parties. When the committee found that the issue was covered by Haneefa's case and the appointment of transferees was made subject to the claims of direct recruits, it was resolved to assign seniority to the directly recruited District Judges above the transferred appointees. Counter Affidavit of Jayachandran (6th respondent in W.P.(C) No. 40046/2017 and 3rd respondent in W.P.(C) No. 40069 and 40043 of 2017), as filed in W.P.(C) No.40069 of 2017 17. The High Court invited applications for appointment to 6 posts of District Judges by direct recruitment from the Bar, on 16.07.2007. The notification provided for a selection consisting of a written test and a viva-voce. The candidates belonging to general and OBC categories securing not less than 50% marks in each paper of the written examination alone were eligible for being called for viva voce. In the list of successful candidates his name was at sl.no.21. The notification provided for a selection consisting of a written test and a viva-voce. The candidates belonging to general and OBC categories securing not less than 50% marks in each paper of the written examination alone were eligible for being called for viva voce. In the list of successful candidates his name was at sl.no.21. After the viva voce, when the rank list was published on 13.01.2009, those who had not attained the age of 35 years were excluded. From that rank list, 6 candidates -3 in the general category and 3 in various reservation categories, were appointed as per Ext.R3(b) order dated 30.03.2009. Sri.Jayachandaran challenged his non inclusion in the rank list, filing W.P(c).No.2021/2009. The select list was thereafter set aside as per judgment dated 12.11.2009 in W.P(C).No.2021/2009 and connected cases [Asha P.'s case]. The SLP filed against the same was dismissed on 15.12.2009 as per Ext.R3(c) order. At the same time, it was directed that the candidates who had already been posted would continue in office till the select list was recast and appointments were made as directed in the judgment in the Writ Petitions. Thereafter, he came to know that some of the candidates, who were appointed were granted grace marks as moderation; whereas 7 candidates including him had secured the qualifying marks of 50% marks in each of the 3 papers, and he was the 3rd one to be included in the rank list based on merit. But 45 candidates were made eligible for viva voce, granting 20 marks by way of moderation in each of the 3 papers. He thereupon filed W.P(c).No.200/2010 before the Supreme Court, which was disposed of on 14.05.2010 giving liberty to move the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. He thereupon filed W.P(C).No.16206/2010 challenging the grant of moderation, which was allowed by the Division Bench as per judgment dt.30.09.2010 in Jayachandran's case (supra), declaring that the decision of the recruitment committee to provide moderation was illegal and that a decision regarding the suitability to fill up the original 6 posts advertised should have been taken after subjecting the only 7 candidates to viva voce examination. It was directed to proceed with the selection from out of the 7 candidates in accordance with law by recasting the select list. It was directed to proceed with the selection from out of the 7 candidates in accordance with law by recasting the select list. Though the 3 candidates, who were appointed on 30.03.2009 on the basis of grace marks, filed SLP, it was dismissed on 08.10.2010 as per Ext.R3(d) order. Thereafter, the High Court had drawn up a merit list from among the 7 candidates, who secured the qualifying score without moderation. Sri. Jayachandran stood at No.3 and Sri Badharudeen stood at rank No.5 in Ext.R3(e) merit list. In Ext.R3(f) select list, Sri Babu was retained at turn No.37, no candidate was available as against turn No.38 and 40; Sri Kauser Edappagath was allotted against turn No.39; Sri. Jayachandran was allotted at turn No.41, replacing Sri Badharudeen in the order of merit. Those who were appointed at turn Nos.38, 40 and 42 had to quit service; thereafter, Sri Badharudeen was shifted to turn No.42, a reservation vacancy earmarked for OBC (Muslim). Sri. Jayachandran was thereafter appointed on 22.12.2010, as per Ext.R3(g) order and he joined duty on 24.02.2011. At the same time, the other 3 persons, whose inclusion in the select list was not varied, had joined duty in 2009 itself. Pointing out that the appointment was delayed for no fault of his, Sri. Jayachandran submitted a representation before the 2nd respondent on 11.04.2012, requesting to assign him notional seniority from 30.03.2009 with consequential benefits. It was followed by another representation Ext.R3(i) dated 18.09.2014 relying on the judgment in Sasidhar Reddy Sura v. State of A.P & Ors: (2014) 2 SCC 158 . As no action was taken, he filed WP(C).No.857/2017 before the Supreme Court, which was withdrawn without prejudice to his other remedies available in law. Thereafter, his representations were considered which led to Ext.P10 decision assigning him notional seniority from the date on which he was to be appointed; according to him the High Court had only undone the injustice done to him, despite being rank No.3 in the merit list; the judgment in his case or the appointment made with effect from the date he assumed charge will not stand in the way of proper assignment of seniority in accordance with his merit found in the select list; the direction to recast the select list would take within its sweep all legal consequences including grant of seniority in accordance with the position in such recat select list. It is further stated that the appointment of the petitioner was made subject to decision in various Writ Petitions and those Writ Petitions, which were filed by direct recruits were closed taking note of the judgment in Jayachandran's case. Their appointments continued to be provisional and were subject to the directions in Jayachandran's case. It is also pointed out that at the time when the petitioner was appointed, all the 6 vacancies notified for direct recruitment were filled up, but 3 of those who were appointed initially, had to quit the service and the 3rd respondent was appointed against one among those 6 vacancies notified. It is further stated that the appointment of the petitioner in the year 2010 was beyond the quota, as the cadre strength of District Judge was only 96, out of which 24 posts had to be filled up by direct recruitment. There were only 72 posts for appointment by promotion. Her appointment was possible only because the 38 Fast Track/Adhoc Courts established in the year 2003 continued to function as ad-hoc courts till the year 2012. An appointment made in excess of the quota cannot be reckoned as one made under Rule 5 of KS&SSR. Therefore, she was entitled to reckon her seniority only from the date on which her appointment was regularised within the quota earmarked for appointment by transfer. According to him, Rule 6 of the Special Rules cannot be pressed into service in an extraordinary circumstance where appointment of one of the candidates was denied for none of his fault. The 3rd respondent points out that he had already filed a representation in April, 2012 itself. 18. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri Bechu Kurian Thomas for the petitioner in W.P(C).No.40069/2017, Sri S.P.Aravandakshan Pillai, for the petitioner in W.P(c).No.40043/17 and Sri Govindaswami for the petitioners in W.P(c).No.40046/17; Sri Elvin Peter for the High Court-the 1st and 2nd respondents in all these cases, Senior Advocate Sri O.V.Radhakrishanan for respondents 2 and 3 in W.P. © No. 40046/2017 and Senior Advocate Sri P.Ravindran appearing for Sri Jayachandran who is the respondent No.6 in W.P(C).No.40046/2017 and the 3rd respondent in the other 2 cases. 19. 19. While the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner in W.P(c).No.40046/2017 is mainly on the violation of principles of natural justice and on Rule 6 of the Special Rules, the contention raised by the petitioner in W.P(c).No.40069/2017 is with respect to constructive resjudicata, the authority of the administrative committee to determine seniority contrary to what is provided in the order issued by the Governor and also the determination of seniority as per the special rules with reference to the date of order of appointment in which there was no condition as contained in any other orders and also the promotion as Selection Grade District Judge which remains unchallenged. Similarly, the contention of the petitioner in W.P(C).No.40043/2017 is also relating to right to the seniority on the basis of the date of order of appointment. Relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Prem Nath v. State of Rajasthan: AIR 1967 SC 1599 , Sri.Bechu Kurian Thomas, the learned Senior Counsel, argued that the Administrative Committee does not have any authority to substitute the High Court and that consultation envisaged in Article 233 of the Constitution of India, is that of the High Court and that no decision of Administrative Committee can override the decision of the Full Court of the High Court and that Administrative Committee is only an internal arrangement. It was also argued that the respondents ought to have produced the entire records including the reports of the Special Committees before this Court, in the light of the judgment in Haridatt Kainthla V State of HP: AIR 1980 SC 1426 , when the decision of the Administrative Committee, which reversed the decision in their favour, was under challenge. Relying on the judgment in Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Assn. v. State of Maharashtra: (1990)2 SCC 715 , it was argued that Smt. Sophy, the petitioner is entitled to be assigned seniority above Sri. Jayachandran. It was also pointed out that in the absence of any challenge either to the orders of their appointment or at any rate, the orders promoting the petitioner as Selection Grade Distict Judge, even the orders impugned cannot affect the petitioner adversely, in the light of the judgment in Raghavan Nair M.P V State Insurance Officer: 1971 KLT 583 . It was also pointed out that in the absence of any challenge either to the orders of their appointment or at any rate, the orders promoting the petitioner as Selection Grade Distict Judge, even the orders impugned cannot affect the petitioner adversely, in the light of the judgment in Raghavan Nair M.P V State Insurance Officer: 1971 KLT 583 . It was also pointed out that the 3rd respondent, who did not challenge the judgment of the Division Bench which declined his prayer for appointment along with the other direct recruits, cannot have any claim for appointment from an earlier date as it is barred by constructive res judicata. Relying on the judgments of the Apex Court in MMRDA Officers Assn. Kedarnath Rao Ghorpade v. Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority: (2005) 2 SCC 235 , Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner: AIR 1978 SC 851 , Sri. Govindaswami, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in one case, argued that the orders impugned are bereft of reasons and the respondents cannot justify the orders by supplementing reasons not disclosed in the orders. It was argued that in the light of the judgment in State of Orissa V Binapani Dei: AIR 1967 SC 1269 , the impugned orders are liable to be set aside for being violative of principles of natural justice. The orders cannot be sustained in the light of the judgments in Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra: (1998)7 SCC 84 and Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra: (1999) 7 SCC 739 , also, as the petitioners were not heard before taking a decision disagreeing with the report of the Special Committee. The judgments in Baleswar Das V State of UP: AIR 1981 SC 41 : (1980)4 SCC 226 , Rudra kumar Sain V Union of India: AIR 2000 SC 2808 : (2000)8 SCC 25 , etc. were relied on in support of the contention that the service from the date of their appointment is liable to be reckoned for seniority, when they continued without any reversion. 20. M/S O.V.Radhakrishnan and P.Ravindran, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the party respondents, argued that the issue arising in this case is covered by the judgment of the Full Bench in Haneefa's case. 20. M/S O.V.Radhakrishnan and P.Ravindran, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the party respondents, argued that the issue arising in this case is covered by the judgment of the Full Bench in Haneefa's case. Relying on Haneefa's case, V. Venkata Prasad v. High Court of A.P : (2016) 11 SCC 656 and The Gauhati High Court Through the Registrar General V Goto Ete and others: JT 2018 (4) SC 583, it was argued that the adhoc service rendered by the petitioners cannot be counted for seniority. It was argued that when appointments were made without prejudice to certain things, those appointments cannot be said to have been made regular and the judgment in Rudrakumar Sain's case (supra), would not be applicable. Relying on the judgments in V.B.Badami v. State of Mysore : AIR 1980 SC 1561 , para.47A of the judgment in Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Assn. V State of Maharashtra : (1990) 2 SCC 715 , etc., it was argued that a mere officiation in a post cannot make the appointment substantive based on which seniority can be claimed. Learned Senior Advocate Sri. O.V. Radhakrishnan argued that the petitioners are liable to be nonsuited as they have given false and misleading statements in Ground I and para.6 of the W.P(c)No.40069 of 2017, in the light of the dictum laid down in the judgments in Muthu Karuppan V Parithi Ilamvazhuthi: (2011) 5 SCC 496 , Bineet Kumar Singh In re : (2001) 5 SCC 501 and Sciemed Overseas Inc. v. BOC India Ltd: (2016) 3 SCC 701,etc. It was also argued that while challenging the order issued on the basis of the decision of the Administrative Committee, the report of the Administrative Committee based on which it is passed is not challenged; all the 32 persons should have been included in the party array, while challenging the seniority list. 21. Regarding the finding of the Special Committee that quota rule was broken down, which was varied by the Administrative Committee, it is pointed out that Administrative Committee has stated sufficient reasons for taking the decision, and the issue was covered by a Full Bench decision of this Court. It was also pointed out that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief which is not prayed for and only those reliefs which are prayed for can be granted by the Court. It was also pointed out that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief which is not prayed for and only those reliefs which are prayed for can be granted by the Court. Further it was argued that the petitioners have not produced any materials to show that their appointments were within the quota. It is also pointed out that after accepting conditional appointments, the petitioners are estopped from challenging the same. 22. Regarding the contention of the petitioners that they were not heard by the Administrative Committee, while reversing the decision of the Special Committee, learned Senior Counsel Sri P.Ravindran argued that the decision which is under challenge is an institutional decision and when the High Court is the authority to decide, it is open to the High Court to delegate its authority to any committee and it is settled law, in the light of the judgment in Kalinga Mining Corpn. v. Union of India: (2013)5 SCC 252 that the principle that the person who heard alone shall decide, does not apply to the present case. It is also pointed out that Art.233 does not provide for any temporary appointment by the Governor. It provides only for permanent appointment and when such appointments were made without prejudice to the claim of direct recruits, the petitioners cannot be heard to raise any contention to the effect that their appointments were regular. The issue is already dealt with in the judgment in Haneefa's case. The learned Senior Counsel relied on the judgment in Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh v. State of Punab & others: 2018 (4) KLJ 261 , State of Bihar v. Madan Mohan Prasad : (1976) 1 SCC 529 : AIR 1976 SC 404 , B.S. Yadav v. State of Haryana : 1980 Supp SCC 524, etc. in support of the contention that seniority can be reckoned only on appointment within the quota. In the light of the judgment in Sasidhar Reddy Sura: (2014) 2 SCC 158 , it was argued that when Sri.Jayachandran was found eligible for appointment, he is entitled to all benefits which the other direct recruits appointed on the basis of the very same selection could enjoy. In the light of the judgment in Sasidhar Reddy Sura: (2014) 2 SCC 158 , it was argued that when Sri.Jayachandran was found eligible for appointment, he is entitled to all benefits which the other direct recruits appointed on the basis of the very same selection could enjoy. The judgments in State of U.P. v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi: (1978) 2 SCC 102 : (1978) 2 SCC 102 , Indira Devi V High Court of Kerala: 2014 (2) KLT 920, etc., were relied on to support the action of the Administrative Committee. 23. Sri Elvin Peter argued that when the direction in the judgment in Jayachandran's case (supra) to recast the select list was implemented, Sri. Jayachandran was found eligible for appointment. It was pointed out that the petitioners could be appointed and continued only because there were vacancies in the quota of direct recruits and thereafter because of the existence of the adhoc fast track courts. Sri Govindaswami pointed out that even after a direction to recast the select list, the High Court had not issued any further proceedings recasting the select list. At the same time, the direct recruits who were already appointed were allowed to continue. Therefore, it was argued that in the absence of a further appointment, consequent to the judgment in Jayachandran's case, the retention of direct recruits itself was not proper. Heavy reliance was placed on Baleswar Das's case contending that officiating service is liable to be reckoned towards seniority. It was also pointed out that in case the quota has to be reckoned on the cadre strength it would come only to 25% of the 65%, for the District Judges, when the post available for direct recruitment would be only 16 as the 65% of 96 posts would be only 62. 24. Sri Aravindakshan Pillai, the learned Counsel for the petitioner in W.P(C) 40046 of 2017, relying on the proviso to Rule 27(a) of KS& SSR, argued that the appointees by transfer were eligible for appointment even against the quota of direct recruits, when there was nobody to occupy the quota for direct recruitment as provided in the proviso. It was aruged that as long as the provisions contained in the proviso to Rule 27(a) is not inconsistent with Rule 6, the same will apply in the case of seniority of District Judges. 25. It was aruged that as long as the provisions contained in the proviso to Rule 27(a) is not inconsistent with Rule 6, the same will apply in the case of seniority of District Judges. 25. Having heard the contentions on either side, it is seen that the grievance of the petitioners in all these cases is against the revision of seniority, though they have urged different grounds. The issues to be considered are whether the Administrative Committee was right in taking a decision discarding the recommendation of the special committee; whether the direct recruits i.e, respondents 3 to 6 in W.P.(c).No.40046 of 2017 are entitled to be assigned seniority above the petitioners who were appointed by transfer (hereinafter referred to as 'promotees') and whether Sri. Jayachandran, who is also a direct recuit but got appointment more than a year after the appointment of other direct recruits and subsequent to the appointment of petitioners, is entitled to be assigned seniority above the promotee District Judges. 26. The decision of the Administrative Committee has been assailed seriously, pointing out that Full Court alone was competent to take a decision in the matter. It is relevant to note Ext.R2(l) resolution dated 12.06.1986 of the Full Court, in respect of distribution of administrative work in the High Court and constitution of Administrative Committee with the Chief Justice and 4 other Judges nominated by the Chief Justice. The constitution of such a committee and distribution of work to such a committee, for convenient transaction of administrative work has been upheld in various judgments of the Apex Court. In the judgment in State of U.P. v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi: (1978) 2 SCC 102 , the Apex Court considered the contention that a decision of the High Court under Article 235 has to be taken by entire Judges of the High Court and not by a committee of Judges. It is relevant to note relevant portion of the judgment in paras.15 and 16 which read as follows: “15. Yet another misconception may now be cleared. It is urged on behalf of the respondent by his learned counsel Shri Misra that under Article 216, ‘High Court’ means the entire body of Judges appointed to the Court and therefore, the control over the subordinate judiciary which is vested by Article 235 in the High Court must be exercised by the whole body of Judges. It is urged on behalf of the respondent by his learned counsel Shri Misra that under Article 216, ‘High Court’ means the entire body of Judges appointed to the Court and therefore, the control over the subordinate judiciary which is vested by Article 235 in the High Court must be exercised by the whole body of Judges. The thrust of the argument is that the High Court cannot delegate its functions or power to a Judge or a smaller body of Judges of the Court. This argument requires consideration of the question whether any delegation as such is involved in the process whereby a Judge or a Committee of Judges of the court like the Administrative Committee in the instant case, is authorised by the whole court to act on behalf of the court. 16. Xxxx If every Judge is to be associated personally and directly with the decision on every one of these matters, several important matters pertaining to the High Court’s administrative affairs will pile into arrears like court arrears. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the control will be better and more effectively exercised if a smaller committee of Judges has the authority of the court to consider the manifold matters falling within the purview of Article 235. Bearing in mind therefore the nature of the power which that article confers on the High Courts, we are of the opinion that it is wrong to characterise as ‘delegation’ the process whereby the entire High Court authorises a Judge or some of the Judges of the Court to act on behalf of the whole Court. Such an authorisation effectuates the purpose of Article 235 and indeed without it the control vested in the High Courts over the subordinate courts will tend gradually to become lax and ineffective. Administrative functions are only a part, though an important part, of the High Court’s constitutional functions. Judicial functions ought to occupy and do in fact consume the best part of a Judge’s time. For balancing these two-fold functions it is inevitable that the administrative duties should be left to be discharged by some on behalf of all the Judges. Administrative functions are only a part, though an important part, of the High Court’s constitutional functions. Judicial functions ought to occupy and do in fact consume the best part of a Judge’s time. For balancing these two-fold functions it is inevitable that the administrative duties should be left to be discharged by some on behalf of all the Judges. xxx” It was held that though the control over subordinate courts is vested institutionally in the High Courts by Article 235, the power to prescribe the manner in which that control is to be exercised in practice, vests in the High Court; High Courts must be enabled to transact their administrative business more conveniently and an awareness of the practical difficulties involved in a consideration by the whole court, even by circulation, of every day-to-day matter pertaining to control over the District and subordinate Courts, under Article 235 of the Constitution, would conclude that the High Courts have the power to authorise an Administrative Judge or an Administrative Committee of Judges to act on behalf of the Court. It was held that such authorisation cannot be found as delegation and that authorising one Judge or some of the Judges of the Court to act on behalf of the whole Court, would effectuate the purpose of Article 235 and without such authorisation, the control vested in the High Courts over the subordinate courts would be ineffective. It was further held in Para 17 as follows: “17. xxxx The Administrative Judge or the Administrative Committee is a mere instrumentality through which the entire Court acts for the more convenient transaction of its business, the assumed basis of the arrangement being that such instrumentalities will only act in furtherance of the broad policies evolved from time to time by the High Court as a whole. Each Judge of the High Court is an integral limb of the Court. He is its alterego. It is therefore inappropriate to say that a Judge or a Committee of Judges of the High Court authorised by the Court to act on its behalf is a delegate of the Court.” Therefore, the contention that the question of seniority could have been decided only by the Full Court is unsustainable. 27. He is its alterego. It is therefore inappropriate to say that a Judge or a Committee of Judges of the High Court authorised by the Court to act on its behalf is a delegate of the Court.” Therefore, the contention that the question of seniority could have been decided only by the Full Court is unsustainable. 27. In High Court of Judicature of Bombay v. Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil : (1997)6 SCC 339 , the competence of Administrative Committee to decide on the question of penalty in disciplinary proceedings against a member of the subordinate judiciary was considered. It was held that the control under Article 235 is of the High Court as head of the judiciary in the State, subject to the resolutions by the Full Court and further delegation in that behalf. It was held that for the convenient transaction of administrative business in the Court, the Full Court of the Judges of the High Court generally passes a resolution authorising the Chief Justice to constitute various committees including the committee to deal with service matters of members of subordinate Judiciary. Article 235, therefore, relates to the power of taking a decision entirely by the High Court with respect to the members of the subordinate judiciary, which acts through the Committee of the Judges authorised by the Full Court. It was held that once a resolution is passed by the Full Court of the High Court, there is no further necessity to refer the matter again to the Full Court while taking such procedural steps relating to control of the subordinate judiciary. 28. The decision of the Administrative Committee would amount to that of the High Court in exercise of its power vested under Article 235 of the Constitution of India to control the subordinate judiciary. When the issues relating to service problems of those in subordinate judiciary are allocated to Administrative Committee, in Ext.R2(l) resolution of the Full Court, it is not necessary that the matter should be considered by the Full Court and it cannot be said that the decision of the committee is without authority. 29. When the issues relating to service problems of those in subordinate judiciary are allocated to Administrative Committee, in Ext.R2(l) resolution of the Full Court, it is not necessary that the matter should be considered by the Full Court and it cannot be said that the decision of the committee is without authority. 29. In State of Bihar v. Madan Mohan Prasad: AIR 1976 SC 404 : (1976) 1 SCC 529 , it was held that when Article 235 of the Constitution vests the power of confirmation in the High Court, the power of determining the seniority in the service is also with the High Court, however subject to rules. In B.S. Yadav and others v. State of Punjab & others: AIR 1981 SC 561 , also the power of the High Court to determine the seniority, under Article 235 of the Constitution was recognised. In view of the aforesaid decisions, the competence of the Administrative Committee to take a decision on the issue cannot be disputed. Therefore, the contentions advanced against the competence of Administrative Committee are unsustainable. In Premnath's case (supra), the issue which arose for consideration was relating to the appointment of District Judge, in the absence of decision of the High Court, which was found contrary to Article 233. Once appointment is made, all other matters relating to the service conditions of District and Sessions Judges are under control of the High Court and those matters can be allocated to committees for convenience of administration. Therefore, the judgment in Premnath's case (supra) would not apply to the factual circumstances arising in these cases. 30. On a perusal of the decision of the Administrative Committee, it is seen that sufficient reasons are stated for arriving at the conclusion. Therefore, the contention that the orders are liable to be set aside, in the absence of reasons, cannot be accepted. The reliance on the judgments in MMRDA Officers Assn's case or Kedarnath Rao Ghorpade's case or Mohinder Singh Gill's case (supra) is therefore misplaced. 31. As the petitioners in all these cases argued that the Administrative Committee reversed the decision of the Special Committee which heard them, I have called for the reports of the Special Committees and perused the same. 32. 31. As the petitioners in all these cases argued that the Administrative Committee reversed the decision of the Special Committee which heard them, I have called for the reports of the Special Committees and perused the same. 32. The next contention is regarding violation of principles of natural justice as the petitioners were not heard before the decision was taken by the Administrative Committee, disagreeing with the report of the Special Committee. It is relevant to note that the questions relating to seniority and other service conditions of District judges are to be determined by the High Court, in accordance with the Special Rules. The Special Committee was constituted by the Administrative Committee. Ext.R2(l) resolution dated 12.06.1986 of the Full Court of the High Court would show that representations relating to service problems of judicial officers are to be dealt with by the Administrative Committee. Therefore, the decision is by the competent authority. Hence, as rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel, relying on Kalinga Mining Corpn's case (supra), it cannot be said that the Administrative Committee which authorised the matter to a Special Committee should have heard the petitioners. Therefore, the judgments in Binapani Dei's case or Kunj Behari Misra's case or Yoginath D. Bagde's case (supra) will not be of any help to the petitioners. At any rate, the petitioners have not stated the prejudice if any caused to them. Merely because the Special Committee had submitted a recommendation in their favour it cannot be said that prejudice is caused to them because of that, unless the petitioners substantiate that such recommendation was correct and that of the Administrative Committee is not correct. 33. As the petitioners in all these cases argued that the Administrative Committee reversed the decision of the Special Committee which heard them, I have called for the reports of the Special Committees and perused the same. It is seen that the special committee had reported that the quota rule was broken down and was inoperative and therefore requests of the direct recruits were untenable. But no arguments were put forth by the petitioners to substantiate how there occurred a break down of the quota rule. Their contention is that seniority as per Rule 6 of the Special Rules is to be determined based on the date of order of appointment and from the date of their continuous officiation in the posts. 34. But no arguments were put forth by the petitioners to substantiate how there occurred a break down of the quota rule. Their contention is that seniority as per Rule 6 of the Special Rules is to be determined based on the date of order of appointment and from the date of their continuous officiation in the posts. 34. However, I shall examine whether there was any break down of quota rule, in which event seniority has to be reckoned on the basis of the respective dates on which orders were issued appointing each of the District Judges irrespective of the source of recruitment. It is therefore necessary to examine the Special Rules for appointment of District and Session Judges. As on the date on which Ext.R2(a) notification for direct recruitment was issued on 16.04.2007, the Kerala State Higher Judicial Service, consisted of Selection Grade District and Sessions Judges in category (1) and District and Sessions Judges (including Additional District and Sessions Judge) in category (2). As per Rule 2(a) of the Special Rules appointment of Selection Grade District and Sessions Judges was to be made by promotion from category (2). Rule 2(b) of the Special Rules provides for appointment to category (2) which reads as follows: “Appointment to category (2) shall be made by transfer from category 1, Subordinate Judges/Chief Judicial Magistrates of the Kerala Judicial Service or by direct recruitment from the bar, provided that the number of posts in category (2) to be filled or reserved to be filled up by direct recruitment shall be one third of the permanent posts in categories (1) and (2) taken together.” Seniority is governed by Rule 6, relevant portion of which reads as follows: “6. Seniority of persons appointed to categories (1) or category (2) shall, unless he has been reduced to a lower rank by punishment, be determined with reference to the date of the order of his first appointment to the said category: xx (2) If two or more persons are appointed by the very same order either to category (1) or to category (2) their inter-se seniority shall be determined by the serial order in which their names appear in the appointment order.” 35. Ext.R2(f) minutes of the meeting of the Administrative Committee of the High Court, held on 29.08.2006, would show that the committee decided to take steps for direct recruitment of six District Judges from the Bar. The Committee had taken note of the cadre strength of District Judges as 96 and the number of then existed District Judges appointed by direct recruitment was only 18 as against the required 24, taking note of the proposed amendment by which the direct recruitment was to 25% of the posts. Simultaneously, it was also resolved to fill up the existing and arising vacancies in exigencies of service by appointing six officers in the cadre of Sub Judges/Chief Judicial Magistrates. One among the six officers was Sri. John Illikadan, the first petitioner in W.P.(C).No.40046 of 2017. Immediately thereafter, Ext.R2(a) notification was issued on 16.04.2007 inviting applications for filling up 6 vacancies of District and Sessions Judges by direct recruitment from the Bar. As per Ext.R2(g) minutes of the meeting of the Administrative Committee, held on 21.02.2008, it was resolved to send a panel of 5 officers from Kerala Judicial Service for appointment as District and Sessions Judges. It was further resolved as follows: “Also resolved that since the vacancies in the category of District and Sessions Judges have arisen on account of the continuance of Fast Track courts, which were established on ad-hoc basis, the appointment of the Sub Judges /Chief Judicial Magistrates as District and Sessions Judges be purely on ad-hoc basis and they be given regular appointment as and when regular vacancies arise subject to the claim of the candidates to be recruited from the Bar under Rule 2(b) of the Kerala State Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1961.” Smt.K.P.Indira, the 2nd petitioner in W.P.(C) No.40046 of 2017 was sl.no.1 in the panel of the 5 officers in Ext.R2(g) minutes. It is relevant to note that there is no dispute over the decisions in Exts.R2(f) or R2(g) minutes or over Ext.R2(a) notification. 36. The selection pursuant to Ext.R2(a) notification underwent several challenges. Appointments were made based on that as per Ext.R2(b) order dated 30.03.2009. M/s Babu, Kauser Edappagath and Badharudeen are the only candidates who withstood the challenges, while three candidates had to go out. The exclusion of several candidates like Sri. 36. The selection pursuant to Ext.R2(a) notification underwent several challenges. Appointments were made based on that as per Ext.R2(b) order dated 30.03.2009. M/s Babu, Kauser Edappagath and Badharudeen are the only candidates who withstood the challenges, while three candidates had to go out. The exclusion of several candidates like Sri. Jayachandran in the select list, on the ground that they were below the minimum age limit prescribed in the rules amended subsequent to the notification, was held illegal, only as per the judgment rendered on 12.11.2009 in Asha P. & others' case, when it was directed to re-cast the select list after considering such excluded candidates. It was thereafter that the moderation granted to the candidates was challenged and was found illegal in the judgment dated 13.09.2010, in Jayachandran's case (supra). Thus the proceedings for direct recruitment came to an end only on appointment of Sri. Jayachandran who was ranked 3 in the merit list, on 22.10.2010. The rank list was recast by including Sri. Jayachandran against the 3rd turn of general category and accommodating Sri.Badharudeen below him in the reservation turn of OBC. In the meanwhile, as per Ext.P3 order dated 29.05.2007 and Ext.P4 order dated 16.05.2008 (produced in their case), M/s.John Illikadan and Smt.K.P.Indira-petitioners in W.P.(C) No.40046 of 2017 were appointed “without prejudice to the claim of the candidates to be recruited direct from the bar as provided under Rule 2(b) of the Kerala State Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1961.” 37. The directly recruited District judges submitted representations requesting to assign them seniority in accordance with rules, above sl. no.112, pointing out that vacancies for direct recruitment arose much before the appointment of the promotees who were appointed against their vacancies. Sri. Jayachandran requested to assign him seniority along with those appointed by direct recruitment. The special committee, which heard the petitioners found that the quota rule had broken down and therefore the seniority of the respective appointees would be governed by the date of their appointment. Sri. Jayachandran requested to assign him seniority along with those appointed by direct recruitment. The special committee, which heard the petitioners found that the quota rule had broken down and therefore the seniority of the respective appointees would be governed by the date of their appointment. But the Administrative Committee, found that the issue was covered by the judgment of the Full Bench, which was not considered by the Special Committee correctly and therefore the committee considered the matter and found that there was no break down in the quota rule and the direct recruits are entitled to be assigned seniority based on the vacancies which arose in the quota earmarked for direct recruitment, as a result of which those who were appointed in their place in exigencies of service were to be pushed down. In this context it is relevant to have a look at the judgment of the Full Bench in Haneefa's case, where the issue arose when promotees were to be reverted in order to accommodate direct recruits. The petitioners in these cases assert that no reversion was necessary in this case for accommodating the direct recruits and therefore Haneefa's case would not apply. Even if reversion was not necessary, what is relevant to note is whether there were vacancies within the quota for promotees. 38. When the cadre strength was only 96 and the number of direct recruits necessary was found to be 24 in Ext.R2(f) minutes, the fact that promotees could continue without reversion because of the continuance of fast track courts would not mean that there were vacancies within the cadre, for promotees. Admittedly, when M/s. John Illikkadan and K.P. Indira were appointed in 2007 and 2008 on ad-hoc basis and subject to the claims of direct recruits, M/s. Sophy and Mohamed Vaseem, who were appointed only in 2010, by transfer, cannot claim any right for regular appointment over and above them. Therefore, they will not have any special right or privilege just because their appointments were not made conditional. 39. In Haneefa's case, the Full Bench of this Court, after interpreting the very same provisions in the Special Rules held that Rule 2(b) of the Special Rules provide for a quota for direct recruitment from the Bar. Therefore, they will not have any special right or privilege just because their appointments were not made conditional. 39. In Haneefa's case, the Full Bench of this Court, after interpreting the very same provisions in the Special Rules held that Rule 2(b) of the Special Rules provide for a quota for direct recruitment from the Bar. In paragraph 61 of the judgment it was held that unless a candidate is appointed to a quota to which he is eligible, no right will accrue to him for seniority based on such appointment. Relying on the judgment in Prasad Kurien v. Augustine: 2008(2) KLT 533(SC), it was held that whenever the Special Rules prescribe a ratio or percentage, it should be computed on the cadre strength as provided in Rule 5 of KS& SSR, and therefore when a particular quota is fixed for appointment by direct recruitment and by transfer, the appointment has to be made within that ratio and that an appointment made in accordance with the Special Rules alone can be said to be an appointment based on which seniority can be claimed. Following a series of judgments of the Apex Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Assn. v. State of Maharashtra ( (1990) 2 SCC 715 ), State of W.B. v. Aghore Nath Dey ( (1993) 3 SCC 371 ), Union of India v. Dharam Pal ( (2009) 4 SCC 170 ), CH. Narayana Rao v. Union of India & Ors. (2010) 10 SCC 247 ) and State of Haryana & Ors. v. Vijay Singh & Ors. (2012 (3) KLT SN 148 (C.No. 152) SC = 2012 (8) SCC 633 ), Division Bench judgment of this Court in Aloysius v. Sarada Muraleedharan ( 1995 (2) KLT 741 ), where Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India ( AIR 1991 SC 284 ), was relied on it was held that when a promotion is made outside the quota, the seniority would be reckoned only from the date on which vacancy arose within the quota for promotion and that the previous service would be rendered fortuitous. It was observed that though the result of pushing down the promotees appointed in excess of their quota may work out hardship, it is unavoidable and any construction otherwise would be illegal, nullifying the force of statutory rules and would offend Arts. 14 and 16(1). 40. It was observed that though the result of pushing down the promotees appointed in excess of their quota may work out hardship, it is unavoidable and any construction otherwise would be illegal, nullifying the force of statutory rules and would offend Arts. 14 and 16(1). 40. It is seen that the Administrative Committee did not accept the report of the Special Committee seeing that the same was contrary to the judgment of the Full Bench. There was no basis also for a conclusion that there was a break down of quota rule. On the face of Exts.R2(f) and R2(g) minutes and Ext.R2(a) notification, it cannot be said that the quota rule had broken down. The appointments by transfer were made pending compleition of the proceedings for direct recruitment purely on provisional basis. None of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners put forth any argument as to breaking down of the quota rule, though all of them raised serious allegations against the Administrative Committee in not accepting the recommendation of the Special Committee. I do not find anything wrong in the decision of the Administrative Committee which followed the judgment of the Full Bench and also in coming to the conclusion that there was break down of quota rule. When it was held that the Special rules prescribed for a quota after interpreting Rule 2(b) thereof, it cannot be said that quota was operative only from the date of Full Bench Judgment, that too, when it was applied against an earlier batch of District Judges. There are no pleadings in the writ petitions that there was a break down of quota rule. Therefore, as held in D. Ganesh Rao Patnaik v. State of Jharkhand: (2005) 8 SCC 454 , it is not necessary to look into that question. However, the petitioners do not have a case that there was any impossibility to follow the quota rule. On the other hand, there was conscious decision and consequential steps to implement quota rule. 41. Going by the judgment of the Full Bench, in Haneefa's case, the petitioners are entitled to seniority only with effect from the date on which vacancy arose within their quota. On the other hand, there was conscious decision and consequential steps to implement quota rule. 41. Going by the judgment of the Full Bench, in Haneefa's case, the petitioners are entitled to seniority only with effect from the date on which vacancy arose within their quota. The fact that the cadre strength was 96; that there were only 18 direct recruits and that six more were necessary to satisfy their quota, as seen from Ext.R2(f) minutes, would show that the direct recruits were entitled to seniority in preference to the petitioners and the petitioners would be entitled to seniority only when there arose any further vacancy withinin the 96 posts in the cadre strength. 42. The next question to be examined is with respect to the claim of Jayachandran. He got appointment only in 2010. The Special Committee found that he did not seek any relief on judicial side, though his appointment itself had made it clear that his appointment would take effect only from the date of assuming charge. But it remains a fact that his appointment happened to be delayed for no fault on his part. He was before this Court initially against his exclusion for being below the minimum age limit and thereafter against the moderation. In both the judgments, direction was to recast the select list. Those who were above the minimum age limit and did not require moderation continued in the post provisionally and they got their appointment regularised. The main contention raised is that, in the Writ Petition filed by him, he had sought for appointment with effect from the appointment of other direct recruits; it was not granted and therefore his claim is barred by constructive res judicata. But it is relevant to note that the direction of the Division Bench was to recast the select list with the only 7 candidates who secured the cut off marks. Therefore, it cannot be said that this Court declined the relief prayed for by him. Ext.R3(f) select list was thereafter drawn with him as rank no.3 in the merit list. Further cause of action arises only after his appointment, granted on 22.10.2010, based on which he joined on 24.02.2011. It is seen that he submitted his representation, on 11.04.2012 and thereafter on 18.09.2014, requesting for appointment with effect from the date on which the other 3 direct recruits were appointed. Further cause of action arises only after his appointment, granted on 22.10.2010, based on which he joined on 24.02.2011. It is seen that he submitted his representation, on 11.04.2012 and thereafter on 18.09.2014, requesting for appointment with effect from the date on which the other 3 direct recruits were appointed. That request has been considered and the Administrative Committee has found that he was eligible for appointment along with others directly recruited on the basis of Ext R2(a) notification. 43. It is true that the Full Court of the High Court decided to give him appointment only prospectively, while deciding to regularise the appointment of other direct recruits from the date of their appointment. But when the aggrieved party claimed appointment from an earlier date and when it is found that the appointment was delayed not on any fault on his part, it cannot be said that the benefits the other direct recruits could enjoy cannot be extended to him. In this context, it is relevant to note that the Apex Court in the judgment rendered on 05.12.2013, in Sasidhar Reddy Sura's case (supra), found that the denial of appointment as District Judge on the ground that petitioner therein was below 35 years of age, though the Andhra Pradesh Higher Judicial Rules were not amended prescribing such restriction on age limit, was illegal. The selection was made purusant to notification dated 19.08.2010. The Apex Court directed that the appellant therein shall be appointed with effect from the date on which he should have been appointed, but without the benefit of payment of salary for the period he did not work. In the judgment in Surendra Narain Singh and others V State of Bihar & others: AIR 1998 SC 1841 , the Munsiffs appointed in September 1976 on the basis of a supplementary list of 33 candidates under the Bihar Judicial Service Recruitment Rules, 1955, which was issued only after appointments were made, under the new recruitment rules of 1974, were directed to be assigned seniority above those appointed under 1974 rules. It was held that the delay in forwarding the list nominating the 32 candidates was not their fault and they would have been appointed along with others appointed between March to May 1975. It was held that the delay in forwarding the list nominating the 32 candidates was not their fault and they would have been appointed along with others appointed between March to May 1975. In Sanjay Dhar V State of Jammu and Kashmir: (2000)8 SCC 182 , the Apex Curt considered a case where the J&K PSC, pursuant to notification for selection of Munsiff's issued in 1992, rejected the application of a candidate on the ground that the certificate of experience he produced, which was issued by the Registrar of the High Court and countersigned by the District Judge was not sufficient. However, he appeared in the process of selection, based on interim orders. After he got appointment based on a subsequent selection conducted in 1996, he challenged the denial of appointment and claimed seniority. Apex court found that the rejection of candidature was not proper. It was held that the appellant would be entitled to appointment with effect from the date on which others were appointed based on the same notification. Similarly, in the judgment in Prem Prakash v. Union of India : AIR 1984 SC 1831 : the Supreme Court had directed appointment of 2 Scheduled Caste candidates to the Delhi Judicial Service, when the denial of appointment was found illegal. It was directed that they should be assigned seniority, as if they were appointed along with others appointed on the basis of the results of 1980 examinations, but without remuneration for the intervening period. In Pilla Sitaram Patrudu v. Union of India: (1996) 8 SCC 637 , the Apex Court considered the case of an Assistant Executive Engineer, whose appointment was delayed till 1981; whereas others were appointed in 1978. The Apex Court did not interfere with the order of CAT, to consider his case for promotion as Executive Engineer, though he did not have 8 years service in the feeder category, observing that his appointment was delayed till 1981 for no fault of his. The Apex Court did not interfere with the order of CAT, to consider his case for promotion as Executive Engineer, though he did not have 8 years service in the feeder category, observing that his appointment was delayed till 1981 for no fault of his. In the judgment in Balwant singh Narwal V State of Haryana and others: (2008) 7 SCC 728 , the Supreme Court upheld the action of State Government in assigning notional seniority to the Principals who could not be appointed on account of litigations, after inclusion in the select list of 2013, below other Principals who were appointed from that select list and repelled the claim of other Principals who got appointment in the meanwhile based on subsequent selections. In State of J&K v. Sat Pal: (2013) 11 SCC 737 , the Apex Court found that denial of appointment to a scheduled Caste candidate who was ranked just below a candidate who did not join duty in the post of Junior Engineer (Civil), Grade II, despite his representations, was illegal and directed the Government to appoint him and directed to assign him seniority immediately below those who were appointed under the same process of selection, but without remuneration for the period he did not discharge his duties. 44. In Richa Misra v. State of Chhattisgharh and others, (2016)4 SCC 179 , the Apex Court was considering the case of an Excise Sub Inspector for appointment as DSP, claiming age relaxation under Rule 4 of Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Special Provision for Appointment of Women) Rules, 1997 which provides for relaxation of age by 10 years for appointment of women in public services in all posts, in addition to the upper age limit prescribed in any service rules. Eventhough it was found that the relevant Recruitment Rules did not provide for age relaxation, the Apex Court held that in the light of the provisions in the examination rules, 1997 Rules and also the rules amended in 2005, contained such a provision, it was held that she was entitled to age relaxation, on a purposive interpretation of the provisions and directed appointment along with others who were appointed on the basis of the examination conducted in 2005. In the light of these judgments the contention that the Administrative Committees's decision is one overriding the decision of the Full Court or the order of the Governor is unsustainable. In the light of these judgments the contention that the Administrative Committees's decision is one overriding the decision of the Full Court or the order of the Governor is unsustainable. It is relevant to note that a similar contention that the order of Governor cannot be varied, was advanced in Venketa Prasad's case(supra), (which will be considered elaborately later) and found unsustainable. It is also relevant to note that even without considering these issues, once it is found that the promotees were appointed in excess of the quota, these questions would be irrelevant as far as the dispute between direct recruits and promotees are concerned. 45. What is directed in the impugned order is re-assigning of seniority. Going by the judgment of the Full Bench, Sri. Jayachandran is entitled to be appointed against a vacancy available in the quota for direct recruits. The petitioners would have been eligible for appointment in accordance with rules only if vacancies had arisen within their quota. As long as such a vacancy has not arisen before the date on which vacancies arose within the quota of direct recruits and even before the actual appointment of Sri. Jayachandran, none of them will be entitled to seniority above him. 46. Both sides relied on a series of judgments of the Apex Court and this Court. The judgments in Rudrakumar Sain's case or Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association Case do not help the petitioners, as long as their appointments were not made against the quota earmarked for them. In S.B. Patwardhan and another V State of Maharashtra and others: AIR 1977 SC 2051 , the Apex Court was considering the dispute between promotee Deputy Engineers and directly recruited Deputy Engineers; the rules which provided for seniority, with reference to the date of confirmation, were under challenge in that case and that rules were held unconstitutional. Those rules or the judgment where those rules were in question, do not have any application in the present case. 47. Those rules or the judgment where those rules were in question, do not have any application in the present case. 47. In V.B. Badami V State of Mysore: AIR 1980 SC 1561 : (1976)2 SCC 901 , the Apex Court was considering a seniority dispute between directly recruited and promotee Junior Scale Officers under the Mysore Administrative Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1957; it was held that where Rules prescribe quota between direct recruits and promotees, substantive appointment can only be in respect of clear vacancies in the permanent strength of the cadre and that the promotees who are occupying the vacancies of direct recruits or vacancies beyond their quota cannot claim any right to hold promotional posts or seniority on the basis of their officiation in such posts. As per Note 3 to Rule 5 of the KS&SSR, whenever a ratio or percentage is fixed under the Special Rules, for appointment by direct recruitment and by transfer, the same shall be applied on the cadre strength. Therefore, the quota for direct recruits and for appointees by transfer is to be apportioned on the 96 posts of District and Sessions Judges, which was the undisputed cadre strength. There is no provision in the rules for fixing seniority on the basis of continuous officiation. 48. The contention of the petitioners relying on the judgment in Baleswardas' case is unsustainable in the light of the judgment in Direct Recruits Engineering Class II Officers' case, Haneefa's case, Venketa Prasad's case etc, where it is laid down that seniority can be reckoned only on appointment against a substantive vacancy in the quota earmarked for the respective source. The judgment in O.P. Singla and another V Union of India & another: (1984) 4 SCC 450 , was discussed by the Full Bench in Haneefa's case, which took note of the difference in the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules and the Special Rules. The Delhi Rules provide only for a maximum limit for direct recruitment; whereas the Special Rules applicable in the present case provided for direct recruitment against one third of the posts. The Delhi Rules provide only for a maximum limit for direct recruitment; whereas the Special Rules applicable in the present case provided for direct recruitment against one third of the posts. Similarly, the determination of seniority under Rule 8 as well as the absence of rules like Rules 16 and 17 of the Delhi Rules relating to creation of temporary posts and filling up of substantive vacancies by temporary appointments from the Judicial Service, make that judgment inapplicable to the facts of the case governed by the Special Rules of Kerala. It is also relevant to note that even in that judgment, the Apex Court held that in order to be a member of service there should be a substantive appointment against a post in the service in accordance with rules. Therefore, that judgment is of no help to the petitioners, in that view also. Both sides relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engineer Officers' case. Petitioners claimed seniority based on their continuous officiation in the post. This claim was also considered by the Full Bench. It is pertinent to note that in State of W.B. v. Aghore Nath Dey: (1993) 3 SCC 371 , Apex Court explained the conclusion A in the Direct recruit Engineer Officers' case and held that the corollary set out in Conclusion (A) is that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stopgap arrangement, the officiation in such posts cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority. All these are discussed in the judgment in Haneefa's case as well as Venketa Prasad's case. 49. In Venketa Prasad's case, relied on by the party respondents, the Apex Court has considered the dispute between District Judges appointed by transfer temporarily in fast track courts on 04.05.2002 and direct recruits appointed on 03.01.2003 in Andhra Pradesh. The representation submitted by direct recruits claiming seniority from the date of their appointment was decided in their favour and seniority was assigned to them accordingly, seeing that appointments against fast track courts were made under rules issued for it and there were no vacancies within the cadre to make appointment by transfer. The appointees by transfer challenged the same on the ground that the order of the Governor appointing them did not make their appointment ad-hoc. The appointees by transfer challenged the same on the ground that the order of the Governor appointing them did not make their appointment ad-hoc. The reliance made by them on Rudrakumar Sain's case and Direct Recruit Class II Engineers' case was not accepted. The Apex Court referring to the history of establishment of fast track courts, the litigations which arose on appointments in those courts, etc, referred to the directions 1 and 14 in para 10 of the judgment in Brij Mohan Lal (1) V. Union of India: (2002) 5 SCC 1 , where it was directed that first preference for appointment of Judges in fast track Courts has to be given to eligible judicial officers; and that no right would be conferred on such judicial officers for claiming regular promotion on the basis of their ad-hoc promotion and that the service in that post would be treated as service rendered in their parent cadre. It was further clarified in Brij Mohanlal(2) V. Union of India: (2012) 6 SCC 502 . In several states including Andhra Pradesh, separate rules were issued for appointments in fast track courts, which provided only for ad-hoc appointment, though the procedure for appointment was as in the case of regular appointment. The Apex Court further reiterated the dictum laid down in O.P. Singla V Union of India: (1984) 4 SCC 450 that in order to be a member of service, appointment has to be made in a substantive capacity and to a post in the service and found that the promotees were not appointed against substantive vacancies; the proposition in Debabrata Dash V Jatindrakumar : (2013) 3 SCC 658 is that membership of service is limited to the persons who are appointed within the cadre strength by direct recruitment and by promotion. The proposition in the judgment in State of Haryana V Vijay Singh: (2012) 8 SCC 633 , that ad-hoc service cannot be counted for fixing seniority was also reiterated. The Andhra Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1958, are more or less similar to the Kerala Higher Judicial Service Special Rules, 1961, as it existed before amendment in 2008. The directions in the judgments in Brij Mohanlal's case 1 and 2 are applicable to all appointments made under the Fast Tract Courts Scheme. The Andhra Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1958, are more or less similar to the Kerala Higher Judicial Service Special Rules, 1961, as it existed before amendment in 2008. The directions in the judgments in Brij Mohanlal's case 1 and 2 are applicable to all appointments made under the Fast Tract Courts Scheme. The Apex Court after considering the claims in the light of the Andhra Pradesh Rules, 1958, found that regular vacancies in the quota for direct recruitment arose much before vacancies arose in the quota for appointment by transfer and therefore those appointed in the fast track courts on ad-hoc basis were not entitled to seniority above the direct recruits. Therefore, the fact that the petitioners could continue without reversion would not enable them to get their seniority assigned except from the date on which vacancies within the quota for appointment by transfer arose. 50. The seniority dispute was again considered by the Apex Court in Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigar v. State of Punjab and others: 2018(4) KLJ 261 . Though the rules therein provided for a rota, the Apex Court has analysed the rules before amendment and after amendment and found that the number of posts available in the respective quota had to be arrived at based on the ratio/percentage on the cadre strength prior to the amendment and the revised ratio shall be applied on the posts added to the cadre strength subsequent to amendment. 51. The claim of the District Judges appointed under the Fast Track scheme in the ad-hoc courts is considered in the judgment in Gauhati case (supra) referring to the directions issued in Brij Mohan Lal's case, where it is reiterated that the promotees appointed against ad-hoc Fast track Courts would be eligible for seniority only with reference to their appointment against the vacancies in accordance with the Special Rules in the quota for promotees. 52. It is relevant to note that when seniority of directly recruited District Judges is determined against the vacancies which arose in their cadre apportioning the vacancies for direct recruits and promotees, all the direct recruits would be eligible for seniority above the promotees, because the vacancies for the promotees arose only in the year 2012 when the establishment of fast track courts were made regular. Therefore, even without any change in the proposal made by the Full Court and the order of his appointment by the Governor, Sri. Jayachandran would be entitled to be assigned seniority against one of the vacancies which were available for direct recruitment and his appointment was made much before the date of Ext.R2(i) order. In that view also, there is nothing wrong in recasting the seniority and the objections raised as against his claim and the finding of the Special Committee would be irrelevant, in that event. 53. As there was no final seniority list, the contention that settled seniority cannot be unsettled is unsustainable. The claims were raised in the year 2012 itself. In the light of the judgment of the Full Bench, Venketa Prasad's case, etc., the order of appointment envisaged under Rule 6 is only an appointment in accordance with the Special Rules in the quota earmarked for each source, applying the ratio/percentage on the cadre strength of 96. The appointment of the petitioners could not have been made before the fast track courts were made regular as per Ext.R2(i) order in 2012. 54. In the above view of the matter, the decision of the Administrative Committee, impugned in these cases, and the impugned seniority list, as recast, do not suffer from any illegality. The writ petitions are dismissed.