JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, whereby and whereunder the order dated 20.08.2018 passed by the Controlling Authority, Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) Ranchi, under Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 by which the Controlling Authority has decided with a direction to pay a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- along with simple interest @ 10% per annum from the date it became payable i.e. 01.02.2017 till actual date of payment to the opposite parties within 30 days from the date of entitlement to the authority. Further the order dated 14.11.2018 passed by the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (C), Dhanbad by which the appeal has been returned to the petitioner on the ground of non-compliance of the second proviso to Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 since the petitioner has not deposited the awarded amount of gratuity along with interest before the appellate authority. 2. 2. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner as per the pleading made in the writ petition that the respondent no.2 was working as Ex Chief of Township (General Manager P & A) retired from service on 31.01.2017 and after retirement the CPF amount accrued to him to the tune of Rs.31,94,785/- has been paid to him but the other post retiral dues has not been paid due to pendency of the disciplinary proceeding and as such the respondent No.2 has been treated to be continued in service as an employee of the petitioner-Corporation and the said disciplinary proceeding also has been culminated into penalty of reduction by two stages of time scale of pay and therefore, the amount of gratuity has not been released which prompted the respondent no.2 to approach before the Controlling Authority by filing an application for adjudication of his right for getting the amount of gratuity which has been adjudicated vide order dated 20.08.2018, on contest by holding and directing the entitlement of the petitioner for payment of Rs.10,00,000/ along with simple interest @ 10% per annum from the date with effect from 01.02.2017 till actual date of payment by the opposite party within 30 days of the receipt of the order, against which an appeal has been preferred Under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 but same has been returned on the ground of non-fulfilment of the mandatory condition for entertaining an appeal as provided under Second proviso to Section 7 (7) of the Act, 1972. Against both the order i.e. passed by the Controlling authority as well as the appellate authority are under challenge by way of the instant writ petition. 3. Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, learned senior counsel for the petitioner assisted by Ms. Against both the order i.e. passed by the Controlling authority as well as the appellate authority are under challenge by way of the instant writ petition. 3. Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, learned senior counsel for the petitioner assisted by Ms. Richa Sanchita, has submitted that the adjudication made by the Controlling Authority with respect to the direction for payment of a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- along with simple interest @ 10% per annum, so far the statutory amount of Rs.10,00,000/ to be paid in favour of the petitioner as gratuity there is no dispute and there cannot be any dispute but only grievance of the petitioner-Corporation is the disbursement of the amount of Rs.10,00,000/ along with 10% simple interest per annum is unwarranted, it is for the reason that the respondent no.2 himself has delayed in approaching before the authority and as such if delay has been committed on his part he cannot be entitled for the simple interest @ 10% per annum but this aspect of the matter has not been considered by the Controlling Authority which prompted the petitioner to approach before the appellate authority but the appellate authority has returned the same on the pretext of non-depositing the awarded amount of gratuity along with interest, it has been submitted further even as on date there is no difficulty in approaching the appellate authority by depositing the amount of gratuity exclusive of the interest @ 10% (simple) since the mandates of the Act, 1972 does not provide to deposit the amount of gratuity along with any interest in addition to that. 4. Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 has submitted by refuting the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the ground which now being agitated on behalf of the petitioner is not worth to be considered as because the petitioner has failed to show bona fide even by not depositing the principal amount of gratuity and if the petitioner would have deposited principal amount of Rs.10,00,000/ then the matter would have been different and in that respect the appellate authority would have considered the aforesaid aspect of the matter but the principal amount since has not been deposited, therefore, the appeal has been returned back to the petitioner and therefore even on today the petitioner can approach the appellate authority for consideration of the appeal in accordance with law. So far as the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that there is no provision to deposit any penal amount even by way of interest at the time of filing of the appeal because interest cannot be treated to be the amount of gratuity, submission has been made in this regard that provision of subsection 7 of Section 7 and the second proviso thereof along with subsection 4 of Section 7 wherein it has been provided that the amount so determined by the Controlling Authority if found to be payable would be deposited before the appellate authority, the appeal can be entertained but having no done so there is no error in the decision taken by the appellate authority in returning the appeal to the petitioner. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and after appreciation of the rival submissions it has been gathered from the argument advanced by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner who has submitted at Bar that there is no dispute about payment of Rs.10,00,000/ as per the provision of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 since the said amount is to be paid under the mandate of the Act, 1972. The issue has been raised by questioning the order passed by the Controlling Authority, so far as it relates to the direction about payment of 10% interest (simple) which cannot be said to be admissible due to the fault lies on the part of the respondent no.2, who has filed the application for getting the amount of gratuity having been filed after lapse of one and half years and as such, there can be any direction for payment of interest @ 10% and on the said ground appeal has been preferred but the appeal has been returned back. Further, the submission has been considered by this Court, as has been submitted by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that after retirement to entertain an appeal to deposit the amount of gratuity as provided under proviso second of subsection 7 of Section 7 of the Act, 1972 but according to him, the second proviso only stipulates the principal amount of gratuity and nothing else and therefore, this Court is to answer the issue about the deposit of amount of gratuity, whether in case of an order passed by the Controlling Authority along with interest and in that circumstances the amount required to be deposited as a pre-condition to file an appeal before the Controlling Authority inclusive of interest or exclusive of interest? 6. This Court for answering this question, deem it fit and proper to refer the provision of Section 7 (7) which reads as under: “7 (7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days. [Provided further that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the controlling authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section (4), or deposits with the appellate authority such amount.]” It is evident from sub-section 7 of Section 7 which provides that if a person is aggrieved by an order under sub-section 4 may, within sixty days from the date of receipt of the order prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf, which contains two provisos and the relevant herein is the second proviso, which contains a condition for entertaining the appeal to the effect that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the controlling authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section (4), or deposits with the appellate authority such amount. 7. It is evident from second proviso to sub section 7 to Section 7, wherein it has been stipulated that an amount equal to the amount of gratuity is required to be deposited under sub section 4, therefore, sub section 4 of Section 7 also needs to be referred herein which reads as under: “7 (4) (a) If there is any dispute as to the amount of gratuity payable to an employee under this Act or as to the admissibility of any claim of, or in relation to, an employee for payment of gratuity, or as to the person entitled to receive the gratuity, the employer shall deposit with the controlling authority such amount as he admits to be payable by him as gratuity. [(b) Where there is a dispute with regard to any matter or matters specified in clause (a), the employer or employee or any other person raising the dispute may make an application to the controlling authority for deciding the dispute.] [(c)] The controlling authority shall, after due inquiry and after giving the parties to the dispute a reasonable opportunity of being heard, determine the matter or matters in dispute and if, as a result of such inquiry any amount is found to be payable to the employee, the controlling authority shall direct the employer to pay such amount or, as the case may be, such amount as reduced by the amount already deposited by the employer.] [(d)] The controlling authority shall pay the amount deposited, including the excess amount, if any, deposited by the employer, to the person entitled thereto. [(e)] As soon as may be after a deposit is made under clause (a), the controlling authority shall pay the amount of the deposit- (i) to the applicant where he is the employee; or (ii) where the applicant is not the employee, to the [nominee or, as the case may be, the guardian of such nominee or] heir of the employee if the controlling authority is satisfied that there is no dispute as to the right of the applicant to receive the amount of gratuity.” It is evident from sub section 4 to Section 7 that percolates about in situation of disbursement of gratuity payable to an employee or about the admissibility of the claim or in relation to an employee for payment of gratuity, in case of such dispute with regard to any matter or specified in Clause (a) the employer or employee or any other person raising the dispute may make an application to the controlling authority for deciding their dispute and the controlling authority shall, after due enquiry and after giving the parties to the dispute a reasonable opportunity of being heard, determine the matter or matters in dispute and if, as a result of such enquiry any amount is found to be payable to the employee, the controlling authority shall direct the employer to pay such amount, the word “any amount is found to be “payable” to the employee which the controlling authority is directed to be paid to the employee by the employer” will be said to be the amount required to be deposited under sub section 4 as provided under second proviso to sub section 7 of Section 7. Such conclusion is based upon the reason that sub section 4 to Section 7 since provides the provision for adjudication of the dispute and after adjudication any conclusion is being arrived by the controlling authority with respect to determination of the amount of gratuity, the same will only be questioned before the appellate authority by the employer and therefore, the word “found to be payable” is of significance since the employer will be said to be aggrieved with the amount to be payable and if the amount to be payable is along with interest, the entire amount will be said to be payable by the employer against which the appeal is to be filed as per the provision under sub section 7 of Section 7 of the Act, 1972. So far as fact in hand is concerned, it is admitted condition that the amount of gratuity has been determined under sub section 4 of Section 7 under the Act, 1972 wherein direction has been passed for payment of Rs.10,00,000/ towards gratuity along with simple interest @ 10% per annum, meaning thereby the amount of Rs.10,00,000/ would be paid along with simple interest 10% per annum and the said amount would be payable by the employer to the employee as per the adjudication made under sub section 4 to Section 7 of the Act, 1972. This Court is of the view, while answering the issues framed hereinabove, if any appeal would be filed by the employer against an order passed by the controlling authority, the same is to be filed and to be accepted only on fulfilment of the conditions to entertain the appeal as per the provision of subsection 7 of Section 7 and as has been held hereinabove that the amount of gratuity of Rs.10,00,000/ has been determined to be paid with the simple interest @ 10% per annum, therefore, the amount to be payable and hence as per the second proviso to sub section 7 of Section 7, the appeal ought to have been filed by the petitioner by depositing the amount found to be payable i.e. Rs.10,00,000/ along with simple interest @ 10% per annum although the petitioner aggrieved has not deposited even Rs.10,00,000/ and therefore, the appeal has not been entertained. 8. 8. In view thereof, I find no reason to issue writ of certiorari in view of the fact that while issuing the writ of certiorari, the writ Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is having very limited jurisdiction and the same can be entertained only in case of violation of principles of natural justice for the finding suffers from perversity i.e. if there is any illegality or there is any infringement of fundamental right. It needs to refer herein that the scope of interference of the High Court to issue writ of certiorari sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited, as has been discussed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. Radhakrishnan reported in 1964 A.I.R. 477 Supreme Court wherein at paragraph no.7 their Lordships have held as follows:- “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Sawarn Singh Vrs. State of Punjab reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey reported in (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference with the finding of the tribunal has been please to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para 17 has held as under:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: …...... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 9. Before parting with the order, this Court is of the view that if the petitioner wants to approach before the appellate authority, it is open for the petitioner to approach before the appellate authority for its consideration in accordance with law, subject to fulfilment of the condition as stipulated under sub section 7 of Section 7 of the Act, 1972. 10. Accordingly, the writ petition stands disposed of. Consequently, I.A. Nos.8039 of 2019 also stands disposed of.