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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 1503 (HP)

Jaram Singh v. Anil Kumar Khachi

2019-10-04

SANDEEP SHARMA

body2019
JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of instant contempt petition (civil) filed under Art. 215 of the Constitution of India read with Ss. 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioners to initiate contempt proceedings against the respondents for willful violation/disobedience of judgment dated 7.8.2009 passed in CWP(T) No. 2162 of 2008 titled as Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Department Inspector Grade-II Union vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and another and two other connected petitions i.e. CWP(T)'s Nos. 3189 and 4244 of 2008, which has been further affirmed in LPA No. 10 of 2010 titled Roshan Lal and others vs. the State of Himachal Pradesh and others, decided on 6.9.2016. 2. Certain undisputed facts, which have led to filing of the instant contempt petition and may be crucial for the adjudication of the controversy at hand, are that the Inspector Grade-II Union filed OA No. 1369 of 1993, seeking therein direction to the State Government for merger of cadre of Inspector Grade-II with that of Inspector Grade-I, on Punjab pattern. Aforesaid Original Application subsequently came to be transferred to this Court and registered as CWP(T) No. 2162 of 2001 after abolition of erstwhile Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, whereafter, matter came to be heard and decided by the Single Judge of this Court. State Government issued necessary Notification merging the cadre of Inspector Grade-II with that of Inspector Grade-I on 1.8.1995. 3. Another set of employees being aggrieved with the issuance of Notification dated 1.8.1995, also approached erstwhile Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal by way of OA No. 879 of 1996, which also came to be transferred to this Court and registered as CWP(T) No. 3189 of 2008. Yet another set of employees filed OA No. 533 of 1997, which was also transferred and registered in this Court as CWP(T) No. 4244 of 2008, for enforcement of Notification dated 1.8.1995 issued by the State Government. 4. State Government, with a view to balance equities inter se two warring sections, filed a supplementary affidavit of Mr. V.C. Katoch, the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation), on 7.7.1997 in OA No. 879 of 1996. Operative portion of the same is as under: "6(i) The Government notification No. Coop-A(1)-1/95, dated 1.6.1996 merging the Inspector Grade-II with that of Inspector Grade-I shall be effective w.e.f. 1.8.1995 instead of 1.7.1995. V.C. Katoch, the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation), on 7.7.1997 in OA No. 879 of 1996. Operative portion of the same is as under: "6(i) The Government notification No. Coop-A(1)-1/95, dated 1.6.1996 merging the Inspector Grade-II with that of Inspector Grade-I shall be effective w.e.f. 1.8.1995 instead of 1.7.1995. In this way, the promotion orders issued on 24.7.1995 whereby services of 12 Inspectors were regularized shall remain intact. (ii) The present applicants in O.A. No. 879/1996 as well as other similarly situate persons promoted on 1.6.1996 will not reverted and they will be entitled for benefits available under F.R. 22-C while fixing their pay. (iii) That the inter-se seniority of the applicants (Clerks) promoted on 1.6.1996 and the merged Inspector cadre will be based on the length of service of the concerned clerks and Inspectors. This will be done in relaxation of the existing provision of the R&P Rules for the post of Inspector Grade-I. (iv) That State Government contemplates framing of new R&P Rules for the category of Inspector Grade-I wherein we are proposing to increase the promotion to a reasonable level of clerks against 30% quota as available at present." 5. Learned Single Judge, after ascertaining from learned counsel for the parties, whether petitions as referred to above can be disposed of on the basis of working formula suggested as per supplementary affidavit, directed State of Himachal Pradesh to do the needful as per supplementary affidavit filed by Mr. V.C. Katoch, in OA No. 879 of 1996 {CWP(T) No. 3189 of 2008}, as referred to above. Careful perusal of the aforesaid judgment of learned Single Judge clearly reveals that the counsel appearing for the parties, in all the three petitions, informed this Court that the formula evolved by Mr. V.C. Katoch, by way of supplementary affidavit, is acceptable to the parties. Record also reveals that Review Petition No. 56 of 2009 was also filed, which was dismissed vide judgment dated 20.1.2009. 6. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment (Annexure C-1) passed by learned Single Judge, which was otherwise passed with the consent of the parties including State of Himachal Pradesh, some of the employees, who being aggrieved by Notification dated 1.8.1995, had approached Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, by way of CWP(T) No. 3189 of 2008, filed LPA No. 10 of 2010 before a Division Bench of this Court. However, Division Bench of this Court having noticed that impugned judgment was passed with the consent of the parties, refused to interfere. 7. Similarly, another LPA No. 108 of 2010 titled Rajesh Jaswal vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others filed by directly recruited Inspector Grade-I claiming seniority over merged Inspector Grade-I, was also dismissed on 8.12.2016, whereafter, on 25.2.2017, final seniority list of Inspectors Cooperative Societies came to be circulated. It also emerges from the record that writ petitioners namely Rajesh Jaswal and others had also filed SLP(C) No. 7783 of 2017 in Hon'ble Apex Court, against the judgment and order dated 8.12.2016, whereby their LPA was dismissed by Division Bench of this Court, but such SLP was subsequently dismissed as having become infructuous, vide order dated 22.9.2017 passed by Hon'ble Apex Court. 8. Since in the seniority list as referred to above, principle of "length of service" as enumerated in para-6 of supplementary affidavit dated 7.7.1997 filed by the respondent-State at the time of passing of judgment dated 7.8.2009, which subsequently came to be upheld in LPA No. 10 of 2010, decided on 6.9.2016, was violated, petitioners were constrained to file instant contempt petition, seeking therein appropriate action against the respondents. 9. Pursuant to notice issued in the petition at hand, Registrar Cooperative Societies, Shri Beer Singh Thakur, filed his personal affidavit, wherein factual narration of facts as taken note herein above stands duly admitted. However, in para-8 of the supplementary affidavit, above named officer took altogether different stand by sating as under: "8. That the contempt petitioners in the contempt petition have alleged that the department of the deponent in violation of the judgment dated 07.08.2009 passed in CWP(T) 2162 of 2008 as confirmed in LPA No. 10 of 2010 have finalized the inter-se seniority of merged Inspectors and clerks and has wrongly placed the petitioners below some of the mergerist Inspectors and clerks who are otherwise junior to them on the basis of length of service. In this behalf submissions of the replying deponent is that the petitioners No.1, 2 and 3 had joined their duties in the cadre of Sub-Inspectors on 21.01.1987, 17.01.1987 and 17.01.1987 respective and one Smt. Kiran Gurang who had joined her duties on 20.02.1987 was placed above petitioners in the final seniority list of Sub-Inspectors dated 01.02.1991 on the basis of merit as determined by the public service commission. It is pertinent to submit here that the seniority of the Sub-Inspectors as it stood on 01.02.1991 was finalized on the basis of the general principles of seniority as contained under para 13.4.3 of Hand Book on Personnel Matters Vol.I (Second Edition) of the Government of Himachal Pradesh. While fixing the inter-se seniority in the cadre of Inspectors on the basis of Judgment dated 07.08.2009 of the Hon'ble High Court, the original seniority of the mergerist Inspectors and the promoted clerks in their own feeder category was not disturbed. Though, the petitioners had joined their duties in feeder category i.e. Sub-Inspector before the mergerist Inspectors and promoted clerks as shown in the table of para-6 of the contempt petition but on the basis of merit they were junior to Smt. Kiran Gurang and Sh. Kuldeep Kumar, who have joined their duties after the promoted clerks shown in table, therefore, the petitioners were placed below these incumbents in the seniority list of Inspectors. There are numerous instances where the incumbents who had ranked higher in the merit of Public Service Commission had been placed higher in seniority list irrespective of the fact that they had joined their duties much later than the incumbents ranked lower in merit of the Public Service Commission. It is pertinent to submit here that the petitioners had never made any representation on the final seniority list of Sub-Inspectors as it stood on 01.02.1991. 9. That it is also pertinent to submit here that Sh. Narender Dutt one of the Inspectors among the mergerist had filed a Civil Writ Petition in the Hon'ble High Court baring No. CWP No. 7501 of 2013 challenging the seniority list of Inspectors on the similar facts and issues discussed herein above. The petitioner in this petition had prayed to place him above the promoted clerks in the seniority list who had joined after him on the basis of formula suggested by Sh. V.C. Katoch the then Joint Secretary (Coop.) to the Govt. of HP. A copy of CWP No. 7501 of 2013 is annexed herewith for the kind perusal of this Hon'ble High Court and marked as Annexure R-IV. The department of the deponent had filed reply to the petition and took the stand as reiterated in para-8 supra. V.C. Katoch the then Joint Secretary (Coop.) to the Govt. of HP. A copy of CWP No. 7501 of 2013 is annexed herewith for the kind perusal of this Hon'ble High Court and marked as Annexure R-IV. The department of the deponent had filed reply to the petition and took the stand as reiterated in para-8 supra. A copy of reply filed by the department of the deponent to the CWP No. 7501 of 2013 is annexed herewith for the kind perusal of this Hon'ble High Court and marked as Annexure R-V. On establishment of the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, the writ petition was transferred to the Ld. Administrative Tribunal and was numbered as TA-4244 of 2015. The TA was not decided on merit as the petitioner withdrew the same on 06.01.2017. A copy of order dated 06.01.2017 of the Ld. Administrative Tribunal is annexed herewith for the kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court and marked as Annexure RVI. 10. That the replying deponent humbly submits that keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the inter-se seniority if the mergerist Inspectors and promoted clerks has been fixed as per mandate of judgment dated 07.08.2009 and 06.09.2016 in a bonafide manner as per length of service and without disturbing the intra seniority of their respective cadres. The replying deponent has not disobeyed or circumvented the judgments of the Hon'ble High Court in any manner. As per spirits of the judgments, arrears of pay to the entitled/eligible mergerist Inspectors have been paid and even the eligible mergerist Inspectors have been promoted to the next promotional post of DI/DAO and further to the post of ARCS." 10. Petitioners, by way of rejoinder, reiterated that while implementing the formula of "length of service" for determining seniority of the incumbents of two cadres, respondents have introduced a new formula, which was not the part of the formula devised by the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh. Petitioners have further claimed that Notification dated 11.2.2011 and letter dated 5.7.2011 (Annexure R-II and Annexure R-III of compliance affidavit dated 13.9.2017, age Pp. 47 and 49) are in consonance with the formula suggested by the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation), which was further approved by this Court. Petitioners have further claimed that Notification dated 11.2.2011 and letter dated 5.7.2011 (Annexure R-II and Annexure R-III of compliance affidavit dated 13.9.2017, age Pp. 47 and 49) are in consonance with the formula suggested by the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation), which was further approved by this Court. While fixing seniority of mergerist inspectors on the basis of length of service, as approved by this Court, respondents have virtually modified the formula as approved by this Court by fixing seniority without disturbing the seniority in their respective cadres, which was not the part of the formula approved by this court. 11. On 16.12.2017, this Court having carefully perused the aforesaid affidavit filed by Registrar Cooperative Societies, sought clarification qua interpretation of para-4 of the instructions pertaining to seniority (page-89) from the Principal Secretary (Cooperation) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh and till then, directed that no promotions shall be made on the basis of seniority. 12. By way of affidavit dated 3.1.2018 filed by Principal Secretary (Cooperation) in compliance to aforesaid order dated 16.12.2017, respondents submitted that the general principle for determining seniority in the case of direct recruits provides that relative seniority of the recruits shall be determined by the order of merit in which they are selected for appointment on the recommendations of the Union Public Service Commission (Commission) or other selecting Authority. Person appointed as a result of earlier selection shall remain senior to those appointed as a result of subsequent selection; provided that where person recruited initially on temporary basis is confirmed subsequently in order different from the order of merit, inducted at the time of their appointment, seniority shall follow order of confirmation and not original order of merit. 13. In view of aforesaid clarification, respondents claimed that in view of approved order of merit, selection recommended by the Commission cannot be altered/changed subsequently except in case of temporary recruits subsequently confirmed. 14. On 26.4.2018, this Court having perused aforesaid affidavit, directed the respondents to file fresh affidavit clarifying the stand taken in para-2 of the affidavit dated 3.1.2018, filed by Principal Secretary (Cooperation). On 31.5.2018, Principal Secretary (Cooperation) filed a fresh supplementary affidavit in terms of order dated 17.5.2018, giving therein complete details with regard to facts and circumstances, which led to filing of affidavit dated 7.7.1997 by Mr. On 31.5.2018, Principal Secretary (Cooperation) filed a fresh supplementary affidavit in terms of order dated 17.5.2018, giving therein complete details with regard to facts and circumstances, which led to filing of affidavit dated 7.7.1997 by Mr. V.C. Katoch, the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, on the basis of which judgment dated 7.8.2009, came to be passed by learned Single Judge in different set of petitions filed by different petitioners. 15. It would be apt to take note of following paras of the affidavit filed by the then Principal Secretary (Cooperation): - "(h) That after scrapping of the Hon'ble H.P. Administrative Tribunal, the O.A. No. 1369 of 1993 was converted to CWP (T) No. 2162 of 2008, the O.A. No. 879 of 1996 to CWP(T) No. 3189 of 2008 and O.A. No. 533 of 1997 to CWP(T) No. 4244 of 2008. It is submitted that all the above mentioned CWPs were decided by the Ld. Single Judge of this Hon'ble Court by a common judgment dated 7.8.2009. (i) That Sh. Deepak Sanan, the Registrar Co-operative Societies, H.P., who then was, gave a detailed account to the State Government of the administrative complication being faced by the department in the implementation of merger notification as well as promotion orders. He also suggested possible solution to resolve the problems after holding meetings with the representatives of NGO's Association of the Department and Inspector Grade-II. The points of mutual understanding between the two feeder categories, as conveyed to the Government on 29.11.1996, are reproduced as under:- "Both parties are basically agreed on the following:- (i) That the merger should take place. (ii) That both the Inspector and clerks promoted on 24.07.1995 should not be adversely affected and should remain senior to the Inspector Gr. II benefitted by the merger. (iii) That the Clerks promoted on 01.06.1996 should not be reverted. (iv) That the inter-se seniority of the clerks promoted on 01-06-1996 and the merged Inspector cadre should be based on length of service of the concerned Clerks and Inspectors. II benefitted by the merger. (iii) That the Clerks promoted on 01.06.1996 should not be reverted. (iv) That the inter-se seniority of the clerks promoted on 01-06-1996 and the merged Inspector cadre should be based on length of service of the concerned Clerks and Inspectors. In order to ensure that all these objections are met, the date of merger of both grades of Inspectors can be any date after 24-07-1995 (preferably 01-08-1995) and the D.P.C. of 01-06-1996 with respect to Clerks should be allowed and the Clerks promoted on that date should be placed in the seniority list of Inspector as per their length of service ... " A copy of the above letter dated 29.11.1996, written by the then Registrar Co-operative Societies, H.P. to the Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Co-operation) to the Govt. of H.P., is enclosed herewith as Annexure R-1, for the kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court. (j) That based on the above proposal of the Registrar, on 7.7.1997, the Joint Secretary (Co-operation) to the Government of H.P. filed a supplementary affidavit in O.A. No. 879 of 1996 as converted to CWP(T) No. 3189 of 2008 titled as Roshan Lal and others vs. State of H.P. and another, which affidavit and the formula suggested therein, later on, became part of the common judgment dated 7.8.2009, rendered by the Ld. Single Bench of the Hon'ble High Court. (k) That the original proposal to resolve the impasse between Inspector Grade-II and Clerks vis-a-vis their seniority was sent by the Registrar to the State Govt., therefore, the import and intent of the formula proposed by the Joint Secretary (Co-operation) on 7.7.1997 in O.A. No. 879 of 1996 can be traced in the letter of the Registrar dated 29.11.1996 (supra) written, to the Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Co-operation). (l) That the last para of the letter of the Registrar, unequivocally, spells out the intention and clarify as to how the seniority of merged Inspector Grade-II and promoted Clerks is to be determined. For the sake of brevity, the same is reiterated as follows: "In order to ensure that all these objectives are met, the date of merger of both grades of Inspectors can be any date after 24-07-1995 (preferably 01-08-1995) and the D.P.C. of 01-06-1996 with respect to clerks should be allowed and the Clerks promoted on that date should be placed in the seniority list of Inspector as per their length of service.". (m) That from above, it is clear that it has never been the intent and mandate of the aforesaid proposal to disturb the settled position of seniority of the 147 merged Inspectors Grade -II inter se, assigned by the commission/selecting authority. Here was no dispute with regard to the inter se seniority lo the merged Inspector Grade II cadre, until the 23 promoted Clerks were placed as per their length of service in between the merged Inspectors. Thus while placing the Clerks in the seniority list of Inspectors, only the length of service of the promoted Clerks, and not of the merged Inspectors, was to be taken into account while, at the same time, the already assigned original inter se seniority of the merged Inspectors was not to be disturbed. (n) That the inter se seniority of the merged Inspectors was fixed by the department with due caution and precision as per the instructions contained under para 4 of Hand Book of Personnel Matters, Vol.-I. It is worth mentioning that seniority in cases of delay in reporting for duty after selection is governed by the Govt. of India O.M. No. 9/23/71-Estt.(D) dated 6.6.1978 and O.M. No. 351015/2/93/Estt.(D) dated 9.8.1995. As such, the candidates who join within the period as specified in the above O.Ms will have their seniority fixed under the seniority rules applicable to the service/post concerned to which they are appointed, without any depression of seniority. Thus, in a cadre of service, a candidates high in merit but joining late within the specified period cannot be lowered in sonority on account of the fact that a candidate junior to him in merit has joined the service earlier. (o) That while fixing the inter se seniority of the Inspector Grade II, the above mentioned rules (as discussed in preceding para) regarding determination of seniority was scrupulously followed. It is respectfully submitted that the Inspector Grade II who has been assigned higher merit by the Commission or other selecting authority thus, cannot become junior to another Inspector Grade II only because he had joined his duty late after selection. (p) Therefore, without disturbing the already fixed inter se seniority of Inspector Grade II, the promoted clerks as per their length of service were placed in between the sonority of Inspector Grade-II as per the spirit of the supplementary affidavit of Sh. V.C. Katoch. (p) Therefore, without disturbing the already fixed inter se seniority of Inspector Grade II, the promoted clerks as per their length of service were placed in between the sonority of Inspector Grade-II as per the spirit of the supplementary affidavit of Sh. V.C. Katoch. In determining the seniority of Inspectors Grade-I, the Clerks who had longer length of service than merged Inspectors have been placed higher on the board in the seniority list as per their length of service while the original seniority of merged Inspectors inter se, as assigned by the Commission or other selecting authority, has been kept intact as per the instructions of Personnel Department and for the reason that it was never the intent and spriti of the supplementary affidavit to reshuffle the seniority of the merged Inspectors inter se, as per their length of service. With all humility it is submitted that before filing the affidavit dated 7.7.1997, detailed deliberations took place t various levels in the department and between the representatives of merged Inspector Grade-II and Clerks promoted on 1.6.1996. And, keeping in view those deliberations, the Affidavit filed on 7.7.1997 is required to be appreciated by this Hon'ble Court. (q) That after issuing the tentative seniority list of Inspector Grade-I as it stood on 31.12.2007, post merger, the department received some representations from the merged Inspectors challenging the method and manner in which they were placed in the seniority list. These representations were decided by the Registrar in accordance with the instructions contained in the Hand Book of Personnel Matters Vol.-I and as per the spirit of the supplementary affidavit of the State Govt. (supra). Aggrieved by the decision of the Registrar, the aggrieved parties approached the State Government. The govt. also upheld the decision of the Registrar. The Govt. was also aware of the object behind filing the supplementary affidavit and the manner in which the relative seniority of both the cadres was to be fixed in the combined seniority of Inspector Grade-I as per the proposal of the Registrar dated 29.11.1996. Accordingly, the representations were decided at the Govt. level. The Govt. was also aware of the object behind filing the supplementary affidavit and the manner in which the relative seniority of both the cadres was to be fixed in the combined seniority of Inspector Grade-I as per the proposal of the Registrar dated 29.11.1996. Accordingly, the representations were decided at the Govt. level. It is submitted that one of the similarly situate merged Inspector Grade-II filed an O.A. No. 7501 of 2013 titled Narinder Dutt vs. State of H.P. in the Hon'ble H.P. Administrative Tribunal against the above decision of the Govt./ Registrar but, later on, withdrew the O.A. in order to secure his promotion. He, ultimately, was promoted to the post of DAA/DI/ when the Registrar finalized the seniority list owing to withdrawal of O.A. by the applicant. the contempt petitioners herein were also promoted to the post of DI/DAO after the finalization of seniority list of Inspector Grade-I and they received all financial benefits attached to the higher post. It is only after the contempt petitioners availed the benefits of promotion that they chose to file the present Contempt Petition. This Hon'ble court, on the prayer of the contempt petitioners, vide order dated 16.12.2017 has been pleased to restrain the respondents not to make promotions on the basis of final seniority of Inspector Grade-I (Annexure C-4). The Interim order dated 16.12.2017 has been ordered to be continued till further orders by this Hon'ble Court vide order dated 4.1.2018. (r) That in the supplementary affidavit dated 7.7.1997, filed by the Joint Secretary (Co-operation), it has been mentioned that the inter-se seniority shall be fixed in relaxation of the existing provision of R&R Rules for the post of Inspector Grade-I. In this regard it is submitted that under clause 11 of the R&P Rules dated 15.5.1986 roaster for determination of inter se seniority among each feeder category has been prescribed which is to be taken as base for preparation of seniority in the higher cadre of Inspector Grade-I. A copy of the R&P Rules is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure R-2. The said condition of following the roaster point was to be relaxed to the extent that the seniority list of the promoted incumbents from the clerical cadre could be prepared on the basis of length of service in their respective grade vis-a-vis combined cadre of Inspector Grade-I and Grade-II. The said condition of following the roaster point was to be relaxed to the extent that the seniority list of the promoted incumbents from the clerical cadre could be prepared on the basis of length of service in their respective grade vis-a-vis combined cadre of Inspector Grade-I and Grade-II. It is submitted that proposal to this effect, after discussions with the representatives of both the categories that is Inspector Grade-II and Clerks, was submitted by the Registrar Co-operative Societies to the Government vide letter dated 27th June, 1996, a copy of which is enclosed and marked as Annexure R-3, for the kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court." 16. It is apparent from the perusal of aforesaid affidavit that an attempt has been made by the respondents to project that it was never the intent and mandate of the proposal which ultimately came to be placed before learned Single Judge in the shape of affidavit filed by Mr. V.C. Katoch, the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation), to disturb the settled position of merit of Inspector Grade-II inter se assigned by the Commission/selecting Authority. As per proposal, while placing Clerks in the seniority list of Inspector, only length of service of promoted clerks and not that of merged Inspectors was to be taken into account and already assigned original inter-se seniority of the merged Inspectors was not to be disturbed. 17. After filing of the aforesaid affidavit, a few of the persons who are working as Inspectors, District Inspectors and District Auditors, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the interim order dated 16.12.2017, whereby Department was restrained from effecting promotions on the basis of seniority list (Annexure C-4), approached this Court by way of application filed under Order I, rule 10 CPC, seeking their impleadment in the present proceedings. While opposing aforesaid prayer made on behalf of the officials as referred to above, petitioners reiterated that seniority list has been issued in flagrant violations of the judgment as such, same cannot be given effect to. 18. On 19.11.2018, Division Bench of this Court, having noticed judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in A. Satyanarayana & Others vs. S. Purushotham & Others, (2008) 5 SCC 416 , wherein it has been held that a Government servant in his service, must have 2-3 promotional avenues and he should not be allowed to stagnate on one post, directed learned Additional Advocate General to seek current instructions. On 28.11.2018, learned Additional Advocate General reiterated that the seniority list has been drawn strictly in terms of supplementary affidavit filed by Mr. V.C. Katoch, the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation), however, this Court directed respondents to file a fresh affidavit stating therein aforesaid fact. 19. Pursuant to order dated 28.11.2018, Additional Chief Secretary(Cooperation) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh has filed a supplementary affidavit, stating therein that affidavit in compliance to directions issued by this Court on 17.5.2018, stands already filed on 29.5.2018, narrating therein admitted facts and circumstances, in which impugned seniority list was prepared. In this affidavit, respondents again reiterated that the seniority list of the Inspector Grade-I and promoted Clerks has been fixed strictly in terms of supplementary affidavit filed by Mr. V.C. Katoch, the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation). 20. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 21. It is not in dispute that judgment said to have been violated came to be passed on the basis of working formula suggested by way of supplementary affidavit filed by the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation). State Government, with a view to balance equities inter se mergerist Inspectors and promoted Clerks placed on record formula, as has been taken note herein above, which inter alia provided for determining seniority amongst two cadres on the basis of length of service in their respective cadres. 22. Para-6 (iii) of the affidavit filed by the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation) on 7.7.1997, clearly suggests that as per formula agreed inter se parties, inter-se seniority of clerks promoted on 1.6.1996 and merged Inspectors cadre is/was to be decided on the basis of length of service of the concerned Clerks and the Inspectors, and such exercise is/was to be done in relaxation of the existing provisions of R&P Rules for the post of Inspector Grade-I. Consistent stand from day one of the respondents has been that seniority of Clerks and Inspector Grade-I has been fixed in the spirit of supplementary affidavit filed by the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation). 23. Mr. Ashok Sharma, learned Advocate General, vehemently argued that there is no willful disobedience and violation, if any, of judgment dated 7.8.2009, passed by learned Single Judge of this Court which has been further upheld in LPA, because, final seniority list of the Inspectors (Cooperative Societies) circulated after dismissal of LPA's Nos. 23. Mr. Ashok Sharma, learned Advocate General, vehemently argued that there is no willful disobedience and violation, if any, of judgment dated 7.8.2009, passed by learned Single Judge of this Court which has been further upheld in LPA, because, final seniority list of the Inspectors (Cooperative Societies) circulated after dismissal of LPA's Nos. 10/2010 and 108 of 2010, is strictly in terms of working formula suggested by Mr. V.C. Katoch, the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation). He further contended that inter-se seniority of the mergerist Inspectors and promoted Clerks has been fixed as per mandate of judgments dated 7.8.2009 and 6.9.2016 in a bona fide manner as per length of service and without disturbing intra seniority of their respective cadres and as such, present contempt petition deserves outright rejection. Mr. Sharma, learned Advocate General further contended that general principles of determining seniority in the case of direct recruits provide that relative seniority of the recruits shall be determined by the order of merit, in which they were selected for appointment on the recommendations of the UPSC or other selecting Authority and as such, person appointed as a result of earlier selection being senior to the petitioner has been rightly placed above in the seniority. Mr. Sharma, learned Advocate General further contended that if discussion and deliberations held by the Government prior to filing of affidavit of Mr. V.C. Katoch, the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation) are examined/perused carefully, it was never the intent and mandate of the proposal to disturb the settled position of Inspector Grade-II, inter se. As per proposal, while placing clerks in the seniority list of the Inspectors, only length of service of the promoted clerks and not of the merged Inspectors was to be taken into account. Lastly, Mr. Sharma, learned Advocate General contended that though inter-se seniority of Inspector Grade-I and promoted Clerks has been fixed in view of the spirit of the affidavit filed by Mr. V.C. Katoch, the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation) but if petitioners are not satisfied with the aforesaid decision taken by the Government, they are required to file substantive petition challenging therein aforesaid decision of the Government but definitely there is no contempt, if any on the part of the respondents, who in their wisdom have complied with the judgment in question. 24. To the contrary, Mr. Dilip Sharma, learned Senior Advocate duly assisted by Mr. 24. To the contrary, Mr. Dilip Sharma, learned Senior Advocate duly assisted by Mr. Manish Sharma, Advocate, representing the petitioners, while referring to clause 6(iii) of supplementary affidavit of the Joint Secretary (Co-operation), which stands reproduced in the judgment dated 7.8.2009, passed by learned Single Judge, contended that as per agreed terms, inter-se seniority of the Clerks promoted on 1.6.1996, and merged Inspectors cadre is/was to be fixed on the basis of length of service of the concerned Clerks and Inspectors and as such, it cannot be said that judgment in question has been complied with, rather, respondents have willfully and intentionally violated the principle of length of service to benefit the Clerks and to the detriment of Inspectors upgraded as Inspector Grade-I, while framing seniority list. Mr Sharma, learned Senior Advocate argued that on the basis of the date of merger, promoted Clerks would have been junior to the merged inspectors that is why, formula of length of service with regard to their entry grade as Inspector Grade-II was devised instead of fixing seniority on the basis of dates of their merger/promotion, as such, plea of the Department that in the merit list of Sub Inspectors, Smt. Kiran Gurang was placed above the petitioners and her date of joining as Sub Inspector being later than that of the Clerks, hence, the petitioners have been pushed down in seniority, is contrary to judgment in question. Mr. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate further contended that the bare perusal of the supplementary affidavit by Mr. V.C. Katoch would reveal that the seniority of the petitioners i.e. merged Inspectors, who were Sub Inspectors before merger and were merged in the cadre of Inspectors with effect from 1.8.1995 and Clerks promoted, was to be fixed on the basis of length of service of the concerned Clerks and Inspectors and it was never the intent of the State that while fixing inter-se seniority of promoted Clerks and merged Inspectors, length of service of the promoted Clerks would only be taken into account and not of the merged Inspectors, as such, respondents by way of circulating seniority list placing petitioners below the Clerks, have attempted to re-write the judgment passed by learned Single Judge of this Court, which has been otherwise upheld till Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. 25. 25. Having carefully perused the working formula placed before the Court by the respondents at the time of passing of judgment dated 7.8.2009 in CWP(T) No. 2162 of 2008, this Court finds considerable force in the argument of Mr. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate representing the petitioners that there was no stipulation in affidavit dated 7.7.1997 that while fixing inter-se seniority of the promoted Clerks and merged Inspectors, only the length of service of the Clerks is to be taken into account and not of the merged Inspectors, rather, it stands duly mentioned in Clause 6(iii) of the supplementary affidavit that while determining inter-se seniority of the Clerks promoted on 1.6.1996 and the merged Inspectors cadre, length of service of the Clerks and Inspectors would be taken into consideration and such exercise would be done in relaxation of existing provisions of R&P Rules for the post of Inspector Grade-I. 26. In the case at hand, though the constant stand of the respondents has been that inter-se seniority of the petitioners (Inspectors) and Clerks promoted on 1.1.1996, has been fixed strictly in terms of the working formula suggested by the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation) but it clearly emerges from the record especially repeated affidavits filed by the respondents that inter-se seniority of promoted clerks and inspectors has been fixed as per length of service without disturbing intra seniority of their respective cadres, which action of the respondents is totally in conflict with the spirit of judgment dated 7.8.2009, which has attained finality. 27. It has been stated by the respondents in their affidavits that petitioners No. 1 to 3 had joined their duties in the cadre of sub inspectors on 21.1.1987 and 17.1.1987, whereas, Smt. Kiran Gurang, who had joined her duties on 20.2.1987, was placed above the petitioners in the final seniority list of the Inspector as it stood on 1.2.1991, on the basis of the merit determined by Public Service Commission. It has been further averred that the seniority of the inspectors as it stood on 1.2.1991 was finalized on the basis of general principles of seniority as contained in Para 13.4.3 of Hand Book on Personnel Matters, Vol. I, Second Edition. It has been further averred that the seniority of the inspectors as it stood on 1.2.1991 was finalized on the basis of general principles of seniority as contained in Para 13.4.3 of Hand Book on Personnel Matters, Vol. I, Second Edition. As per respondents, while fixing inter-se seniority of the cadre of Inspectors on the basis of judgment dated 7.8.2009 passed by learned Single Judge of this court, original seniority of the mergerist inspectors and promoted Clerks in their own feeder cadre was not disturbed. Respondents, with a view to justify their action, further claimed that though the petitioners had joined their duties in the feeder cadre i.e. Inspectors before mergerist Inspectors and promoted Clerks as shown in table given in para-6 of the contempt petition, but on the basis of merit, they were junior to Kiran Gurang and Kuldeep Kumar, who had joined their duties after promoted Clerks shown in the table, as such, petitioners were placed below these incumbents in the seniority list of the Inspectors. 28. In the petition at hand, this court is only concerned with the implementation of judgment passed by learned Single Judge, which has been affirmed upto Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, as such, this Court is only required to see whether mandate given in the judgment has been complied with in its letter and spirit or not? As per judgment admittedly, inter-se seniority of the clerks promoted on 1.6.1996 and the mergerist inspectors is/was to be based on the length of service of the Clerks/Inspectors, as such, stand taken by the respondents that, while fixing inter-se seniority of the clerks and Mergerist Inspectors only length of service of promoted Clerks was required to be taken into consideration, is totally contradictory to the working formula placed by it before learned Single Judge, because, as per agreed formula, inter-se seniority of the Clerks promoted on 1.6.1996 and mergerist Inspectors was to be determined on the basis of length of service of the concerned Clerks and Inspectors as such, it is not understood that how respondents can take a stand that while undertaking aforesaid exercise, only length of service of the Clerks is/was required to be taken into consideration. 29. 29. During pendency of the contempt petition, respondents by way of supplementary affidavit have made an attempt to justify their action by stating that original proposal to resolve the impasse between Inspector Grade-II and Clerks vis-a-vis their seniority was sent by the Registrar to the State Government and import and intent of the formula proposed by the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation) on 7.7.1997 in OA No. 879 of 1995 can be gathered from letter of the Registrar dated 29.11.1997, written to the Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Cooperation), wherein it is observed that, "In order to ensure that all these objections are met, the date of merger of both grades of Inspectors can be any date after 24-07-1995 (preferably 01-08-1995) and the D.P.C. of 01-06-1996 with respect to Clerks should be allowed and the Clerks promoted on that date should be placed in the seniority list of Inspector as per their length of service. " 30. No doubt, if aforesaid proposal is taken into consideration, respondents are right in stating that intent and mandate of aforesaid proposal is/was that original seniority of the mergerist Inspectors and promoted Clerks in their own feeder cadre would not be disturbed while fixing their inter-se seniority, which would be based on length of service of the Clerks, but the fact remains that Para 6(iii) of the affidavit of Mr. V.C. Katoch, the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation), clearly provides that the inter-se seniority of the applicants (Clerks) promoted on 1.6.1996, and mergerist Inspectors cadre would be based on length of service of the Clerks and Inspectors. On the basis of aforesaid affidavit, judgment dated 7.8.2009, came to be passed with the consent of the parties, as such, petitioners herein are right in contending that principle of length of service has been violated by the respondents to benefit the Clerks and to the detriment of the petitioners i.e. Sub Inspectors upgraded as Inspector Grade-I, while framing seniority list. 31. It is not in dispute that a Review Petition was filed against aforesaid judgment passed by learned Single Judge, but the same was dismissed, whereafter, directly recruited Inspector Grade-I claiming seniority over merged Inspector Grade-I, filed LPA No. 108 of 2010, which was dismissed. 31. It is not in dispute that a Review Petition was filed against aforesaid judgment passed by learned Single Judge, but the same was dismissed, whereafter, directly recruited Inspector Grade-I claiming seniority over merged Inspector Grade-I, filed LPA No. 108 of 2010, which was dismissed. Directly recruited Inspector Grade-I also laid challenged to judgment dated 8.12.2016 passed in LPA No. 108 of 2010, titled Rajesh Jaswal and others vs. Stsate of Himachal Pradesh before Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, but the same was dismissed as withdrawn, as having been rendered infructuous. 32. Learned Advocate General, while advancing argument that, in fact, there is no contempt on the part of the respondents, pressed into service law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Avishek Raja and others vs. Sanjay Gupta, (2017) 8 SCC 435 , whereby it has been held that a wrong understanding of the award would not amount to willful default so as to attract the liability of civil contempt as defined under S.2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. However, aforesaid argument advanced by learned Advocate General is totally misplaced in as much as that here the question is not with regard to understanding of the judgment stated to have been violated, rather question is whether the respondents have honoured the undertaking given by them by way of supplementary affidavit of the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation), at the time of passing of the judgment in question, which undertaking in fact, is the basis of said judgment. Whatever the import or insinuation of the undertaking be, respondents ought to have stuck to the same and honoured it and, act of the respondents in deviating from the stand taken by them in the undertaking/supplementary affidavit is sufficient to persuade this Court to infer that there is a willful disobedience on the part of the respondents. Moreover, it has never been the case of the respondents that they failed to understand the judgment in question rather consistent stand of the respondents has been that they have, in fact, complied with the judgment in question. Yet another aspect of the matter is that the respondents laid challenge to the judgment in question, by way of review petition, LPA etc. which were dismissed, hence, respondents cannot say that through all these years, they could not understand the judgment. 33. Yet another aspect of the matter is that the respondents laid challenge to the judgment in question, by way of review petition, LPA etc. which were dismissed, hence, respondents cannot say that through all these years, they could not understand the judgment. 33. Otherwise also, in contempt proceedings, court is only concerned with the implementation of the judgment said to have been violated, and definitely, it cannot go into the question of intent or import of decision taken by the Government, which ultimately came to be placed by way of affidavit filed by Mr. V.C. Katoch, the then Joint Secretary (Co-operation). Principal Secretary (Cooperation) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, in his supplementary affidavit dated 29.5.2018 filed in terms of order dated 17.5.2018, has clearly admitted that while placing Clerks in the seniority list of Inspectors, only length of service of the promoted Clerks and not of merged Inspectors has been taken into account, which action of the respondents is definitely not in consonance with judgment dated 7.8.2009, whereby interse seniority of the Clerks and merged Inspectors is to be determined on the basis of length of service of the Clerks and Inspectors. It has been further averred in the affidavit referred to herein above that while determining seniority of Inspector Grade-I, Clerks having longer length of service than the merged Inspectors have been placed higher in seniority as per their length of service whereas, merit assessed by the Commission or other selecting authority has been kept intact as per instruction of the Personnel Department, because it was never the intent and spirit of the supplementary affidavit to reshuffle the seniority of the merged Inspectors inter se them, as per length of service. 34. But, as has been taken note herein above, aforesaid action of the respondents is not in consonance with the mandate given by this Court, while passing judgment dated 7.8.2009, hence, this Court, prima facie, is of the view that the respondents are in contempt. 35. 34. But, as has been taken note herein above, aforesaid action of the respondents is not in consonance with the mandate given by this Court, while passing judgment dated 7.8.2009, hence, this Court, prima facie, is of the view that the respondents are in contempt. 35. Though, in the case at hand, respondents, by way of affidavit, as referred to above, have tendered unconditional and unqualified apology for not obeying the directions issued by learned Single Judge, but at the same time, by filing repeated affidavits to justify their conduct, an attempt has been made by respondents to hoodwink this Court by stating something which was never part of the original formula, on the basis of which, judgment in question came to be passed. 36. Having carefully perused the material available on record, this Court is of the view that every attempt has been made by the respondents to complicate the issue by taking pleas/stand, which cannot be permitted to be taken at this stage. Since this Court having carefully perused material available on record vis-a-vis mandate given by learned Single Judge, while passing judgment in question, is of the view that there is clear cut violation of judgment stated to have been violated, submission made by Mr. Ashok Sharma, learned Advocate General that since respondents in their wisdom have implemented the judgment, remedy available to the petitioners is to file a substantive writ petition, is wholly misconceived and warrants outright rejection. 37. The word "consideration" has been examined by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. and another vs. National Textile Corpn. (Maharashtra North) Ltd. and others, (2002) 8 SCC 182 , wherein it was held as follows: "14. In view of the aforesaid requirements, before obtaining the assent of the President, the State Government has to point out that the law made by the State Legislature is in respect of one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List by mentioning entry/entries of the Concurrent List and that it contains provision or provisions repugnant to the law made by Parliament or existing law. Further, the words "reserved for consideration" would definitely indicate that there should be active application of mind by the President to the repugnancy pointed out between the proposed State law and the earlier law made by Parliament and the necessity of having such a law, in the facts and circumstances of the matter, which is repugnant to a law enacted by Parliament prevailing in a State. The word "consideration" would manifest that after careful thinking over and due application of mind regarding the necessity of having State law which is repugnant to the law made by Parliament, the President may grant assent....." (p.197) 38. The word "consider" was scrutinized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and others vs. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 and it was held: "19. The word "consider" is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of the same is, "to think over", "to regard as", or "deem to be". Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term "consider" postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority and proceed to affirm its order." (p-537) 39. Order passed by the competent Court, whether ad-interim or final, is required to be complied with without any reservation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prestige Lights Ltd. vs. State Bank of India, (2007) 8 SCC 449 held that if order passed by the Court is disobeyed/not complied with, it may refuse the party violating the order to hear him on merits. In this regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "24. An order passed by a competent court - interim or final - has to be obeyed without any reservation. If such order is disobeyed or not complied with, the court may refuse the party violating such order to hear him on merits. In this regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "24. An order passed by a competent court - interim or final - has to be obeyed without any reservation. If such order is disobeyed or not complied with, the court may refuse the party violating such order to hear him on merits. We are not unmindful of the situation that refusal to hear a party to the proceeding on merits is a "drastic step" and such a serious penalty should not be imposed on him except in grave and extraordinary situations, but sometimes such an action is needed in the larger interest of justice when a party obtaining interim relief intentionally and deliberately flouts such order by not abiding by the terms and conditions on which a relief is granted by the court in his favour." (p.549) 40. Though the respondents in their reply have tendered unconditional and unqualified apology for not obeying the directions issued by this Court, but subsequently an attempt has been made by filing detailed reply affidavit to the Contempt Petition to justify their conduct. Rather an attempt has been made to hoodwink this Court. 41. Black's Law Dictionary (8th Edn., 1999) defines "contempt" as "Conduct that defies the authority or dignity of a Court or legislature." It also adds that "Because such conduct interferes with the administration of justice, it is punishable." 42. Salmon L.J. in Jennison vs. Baker, (1972) 1 AllER 997, observed: "...........The inherent power of the judges of the High Court to commit for contempt of court has existed from time immemorial. The power exists to ensure justice shall be done. And solely to this end, it prohibits acts and words tending to obstruct the administration of justice. The public at large no less than the individual litigant have an interest and a very real interest in justice being effectively administered". (p.1001) 43. In the celebrated decision of Attorney General vs. Times Newspaper Ltd., (1974) AC 273, Lord Diplock stated: (AC p.308 A) ".....There is an element of public policy in punishing civil contempt, since the administration of justice would be undermined if the order of any court of law could be disregarded with impunity...." While Lord Morris, summarized the purpose of contempt jurisdiction as follows: "In an ordered community courts are established for the pacific settlement of disputes and for the maintenance of law and order. In the general interests of the community it is imperative that the authority of the courts should not be imperiled and that recourse to them should not be subject to unjustifiable interference. When such unjustifiable interference is suppressed it is not because those charged with the responsibilities of administering justice are concerned for their own dignity: it is because the very structure of ordered life is at risk if the recognised courts of the land are so flouted that their authority wanes and is supplanted." 44. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chandra Shashi vs. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421 observed that it is necessary for the Courts to exercise its contempt jurisdiction in order to ward off unjustified interference in their working, those who indulge in immoral acts like perjury, prevarication and motivated falsehoods have to be appropriately dealt with, without which it would not be possible for any court to administer justice in the true sense and to the satisfaction of those who approach it in the hope that truth would ultimately prevail. It was held as under: "8. To enable the courts to ward off unjustified interference in their working, those who indulge in immoral acts like perjury, prevarication and motivated falsehoods have to be appropriately dealt with, without which it would not be possible for any court to administer justice in the true sense and to the satisfaction of those who approach it in the hope that truth would ultimately prevail. People would have faith in courts when they would find that truth alone triumphs is an achievable aim there; or it is virtue which ends in victory is not only inscribed in emblem but really happens in the portals of Courts." (p-425) 45. Likewise, there cannot be any dispute that the Rule of law has to be maintained, whatever be the consequences. This was so observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kalyaneshwari vs. Union of India, (2012) 12 SCC 599 wherein it was held as under: "10. The rule of law has to be maintained whatever be the consequences. The 'welfare of people' is the supreme law and this enunciates adequately the ideal of 'law'. This could only be achieved when justice is administered lawfully, judiciously, without any fear and without being hampered or throttled by unscrupulous elements. The rule of law has to be maintained whatever be the consequences. The 'welfare of people' is the supreme law and this enunciates adequately the ideal of 'law'. This could only be achieved when justice is administered lawfully, judiciously, without any fear and without being hampered or throttled by unscrupulous elements. The administration of justice is dependent upon obedience or execution of the orders of the Court. The contemptuous act which interfered with administration of justice on one hand and impinge upon the dignity of institution of justice on the other, bringing down its respect in the eye of the commoner, are acts which may not fall in the category of cases where the Court can accept the apology of the contemnor even if it is tendered at the threshold of the proceedings." (p-604) 46. In this background, the next question that arises for consideration is as to how a contemnor can purge himself for contempt. In Pravin C. Shah vs. K.A. Mohd. Ali and another, (2001) 8 SCC 650 , one of the question which came up for consideration was as to how a contemnor can purge himself for the contempt, although the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case was dealing with a criminal contempt. However, the relevant portion of the judgment reads as under: "23. Now we have to consider the crucial question how can a contemnor purge himself of the contempt? According to the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India, purging oneself of contempt can be done by apologising to the court. The said opinion of the Bar Council of India can be seen from the following portion of the impugned order: "Purging oneself of contempt can be only by regretting or apologising in the case of a completed action of criminal contempt. If it is a case of civil contempt, by subsequent compliance with the orders or directions the contempt can be purged off. There is no procedural provision in law to get purged of contempt by an order of an appropriate court. 24. Purging is a process by which an undesirable element is expelled either from ones own self or from a society. It is a cleansing process. Purge is a word which acquired implications first in theological connotations. There is no procedural provision in law to get purged of contempt by an order of an appropriate court. 24. Purging is a process by which an undesirable element is expelled either from ones own self or from a society. It is a cleansing process. Purge is a word which acquired implications first in theological connotations. In the case of a sin, purging of such sin is made through the expression of sincere remorse coupled with doing the penance required. In the case of a guilt, purging means to get himself cleared of the guilt. The concept of purgatory was evolved from the word "purge", which is a state of suffering after this life in which those souls, who depart this life with their deadly sins, are purified and render fit to enter into heaven where nothing defiled enters. (vide Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn., Vol.35A, page 307). In Blacks Law Dictionary the word "purge" is given the following meaning: "To cleanse; to clear. To clear or exonerate from some charge or imputation of guilt, or from a contempt." It is preposterous to suggest that if the convicted person undergoes punishment or if he tenders the fine amount imposed on him the purge would be completed. 25. We are told that a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court has expressed a view that purging process would be completed when the contemnor undergoes the penalty (vide Madan Gopal Gupta (Dr.) vs. Agra University, (1974) AIR Allahabad 39). This is what the learned Single Judge said about it: (AIR p.43, para-13) "In my opinion a party in contempt purged its contempt by obeying the orders of the court or by undergoing the penalty imposed by the court." 26. Obeying the orders of the court would be a mode by which one can make the purging process in a substantial manner when it is a civil contempt. Even for such a civil contempt the purging process would not be treated as completed merely by the contemnor undergoing the penalty imposed on him unless he has obeyed the order of the court or he has undone the wrong. If that is the position in regard to civil contempt the position regarding criminal contempt must be stronger. Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act categorises contempt of court into two categories. If that is the position in regard to civil contempt the position regarding criminal contempt must be stronger. Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act categorises contempt of court into two categories. The first category is "civil contempt" which is the willful disobedience of the order of the court including breach of an undertaking given to the court. But "criminal contempt" includes doing any act whatsoever which tends to scandalise or lowers the authority of any court, or tends to interfere with the due course of a judicial proceeding or interferes with, or obstructs the administration of justice in any other manner. 27. We cannot therefore approve the view that merely undergoing the penalty imposed on a contemnor is sufficient to complete the process of purging himself of the contempt, particularly in a case where the contemnor is convicted of criminal contempt. The danger in giving accord to the said view of the learned Single Judge in the aforecited decision is that if a contemnor is sentenced to a fine he can immediately pay it and continue to commit contempt in the same court, and then again pay the fine and persist with his contemptuous conduct. There must be something more to be done to get oneself purged of the contempt when it is a case of criminal contempt." (pp-660-661) 47. This is the duty of this Court to ensure that the majesty, sacrosanctity and dignity of the Institution should not be allowed to be crucified. The purpose of public law is to protect the Constitutional mechanism. The law is required to be implemented in dynamic manner, which may not cause a sense of insecurity or helplessness in the mind of a single individual, as has been stated by Frank Futer.J in Jeennison case supra: "The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope." 48. Hon'ble Apex Court in Subrata Roy Sahara vs. Union of India and Others, (2014) 8 SCC 470 , has categorically held that disobedience of orders of a Court strikes at the very root of the rule of law on which the judicial system rests. Judicial orders are bound to be obeyed at all costs. Howsoever grave the effect may be, is no answer for non-compliance with a judicial order. Judicial orders are bound to be obeyed at all costs. Howsoever grave the effect may be, is no answer for non-compliance with a judicial order. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that judicial orders cannot be permitted to be circumvented. 49. In the instant proceedings, this Court cannot go beyond the mandate given in the judgment, alleged to have been violated, rather in contempt jurisdiction Court is only required to see whether judgment passed by Court has been complied with in its letter and spirit and it is not permissible for Court in its contempt jurisdiction to go beyond the mandate of the judgment alleged to have been violated. 50. Their lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman and Managing Director, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited and Others vs. M. George Ravishekaran and Others, (2014) 3 SCC 373 have held as under:- "19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare power available both under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, could even curb the liberty of the individual charged with commission of contempt. The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty in the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect of which disobedience is alleged. Courts must not, therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience or willful violation of the same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor the plea of equities can be considered. Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the power available to the Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor the plea of equities can be considered. Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the power available to the Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above. The above principles would appear to be the cumulative outcome of the precedents cited at the bar, namely, Jhareswar Prasad Paul and Another vs. Tarak Nath Ganguly and Others, V.M.Manohar Prasad vs. N. Ratnam Raju and Another, Bihar Finance Service House Construction Cooperative Society Ltd. vs. Gautam Goswami and Others and Union of India and Others vs. Subedar Devassy PV. 20. Applying the above settled principles to the case before us, it is clear that the direction of the High Court for creation of supernumerary posts of Marine Assistant Radio Operator cannot be countenanced. Not only the Courts must act with utmost restraint before compelling the executive to create additional posts, the impugned direction virtually amounts to supplementing the directions contained in the order of the High Court dated 02.8.2006. The alterative direction i.e. to grant parity of pay could very well have been occasioned by the stand taken by the Corporation with regard to the necessity of keeping in existence the cadre itself in view of the operational needs of the Corporation. If despite the specific stand taken by the Corporation in this regard the High Court was of the view that the respondents should be absorbed as Marine Assistant Radio Operator nothing prevented the High Court from issuing a specific direction to create supernumerary posts of Marine Assistant Radio Operator. The same was not done. If that be so, the direction to create supernumerary posts at the stage of exercise of the contempt jurisdiction has to be understood to be an addition to the initial order passed in the Writ Petition. The argument that such a direction is implicit in the order dated 02.08.2006 is self defeating. Neither, is such a course of action open to balance the equities, i.e. not to foreclose the promotional avenues of the petitioners, as vehemently urged by Shri Rao. The argument that such a direction is implicit in the order dated 02.08.2006 is self defeating. Neither, is such a course of action open to balance the equities, i.e. not to foreclose the promotional avenues of the petitioners, as vehemently urged by Shri Rao. The issue is one of jurisdiction and not of justification. Whether the direction issued would be justified by way of review or in exercise of any other jurisdiction is an aspect that does not concern us in the present case. Of relevance is the fact that an alternative direction had been issued by the High Court by its order dated 02.08.2006 and the appellants, as officers of the Corporation, have complied with the same. They cannot be, therefore, understood to have acted in willful disobedience of the said order of the Court. All that was required in terms of the second direction having been complied with by the appellants, we are of the view that the order dated 02.08.2006 passed in W.P. No. 21518 of 2000 stands duly implemented. Consequently, we set aside the Order dated 19.01.2012 passed in Contempt Petition No. 161 of 2010, as well as the impugned order dated 11.07.2012 passed in Contempt Appeal No.2 of 2012 and allow the present appeal." 51. Their lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bihar State Government Secondary School, Teachers Association vs. Ashok Kumar Sinha and Others, (2014) 7 SCC 416 , have held as under: "24. At the outset, we may observe that we are conscious of the limits within which we can undertake the scrutiny of the steps taken by the respondents, in these Contempt proceedings. The Court is supposed to adopt cautionary approach which would mean that if there is a substantial compliance of the directions given in the judgment, this Court is not supposed to go into the nitty gritty of the various measures taken by the Respondents. It is also correct that only if there is willful and contumacious disobedience of the orders, that the Court would take cognizance. Even when there are two equally consistent possibilities open to the Court, case of contempt is not made out. It is also correct that only if there is willful and contumacious disobedience of the orders, that the Court would take cognizance. Even when there are two equally consistent possibilities open to the Court, case of contempt is not made out. At the same time, it is permissible for the Court to examine as to whether the steps taken to purportedly comply with the directions of the judgment are in furtherance of its compliance or they tend to defeat the very purpose for which the directions were issued. We can certainly go into the issue as to whether the Government took certain steps in order to implement the directions of this Court and thereafter withdrew those measures and whether it amounts to non-implementation. Limited inquiry from the aforesaid perspective, into the provisions of 2014 Rules can also be undertaken to find out as to whether those provisions amount to nullifying the effect of the very merger of BSES with BES. As all these aspects have a direct co-relation with the issue as to whether the directions are implemented or not. We are, thus, of the opinion that this Court can indulge in this limited scrutiny as to whether provisions made in 2014 Rules frustrate the effect of the judgment and attempt is to achieve those results which were the arguments raised by the respondents at the time of hearing of C.A. No. 8226-8227 of 2012 but rejected by this Court. To put it otherwise, we can certainly examine as to whether 2014 Rules are made to implement the judgment or these Rules in effect nullify the result of merger of the two cadres." 52. Hence, in view of the narration of facts as well as law discussed above, this Court deems it not proper case where unconditional and unqualified apology tendered on behalf of the respondents can be accepted. Rather, in given facts and circumstances of the case they are required to be dealt with strictly in accordance with Contempt of Courts Act because apology cannot be allowed to be used as a weapon of defence. In the instant case where despite repeated orders, respondents failed to comply with the directions contained in judgment dated 7.8.2009, any such apology at this belated stage cannot be accepted. In the instant case where despite repeated orders, respondents failed to comply with the directions contained in judgment dated 7.8.2009, any such apology at this belated stage cannot be accepted. This Court would have considered the apology tendered by the respondents, had they offered it in good grace, rather attempt has been made by the respondents to justify their conduct by way of filing written reply to the Contempt Petition that too stating wrong facts. Unless apology is offered in good grace same deserves to be rejected. 53. As was noted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in L.D. Jaikwal vs. State of U.P., (1984) 3 SCC 405 . "We are sorry to say we cannot subscribe to the "slap-say sorry-and forget" school of thought in administration of contempt jurisprudence. Saying 'sorry' does not make the slapper poorer. Nor does the cheek which has taken the slap smart less upon the said hypocritical word being uttered through the very lips which not long ago slandered a judicial officer without the slightest compunction. Apology shall not be paper apology and expression of sorrow should come from the heart and not from the pen. For, it is one thing to 'say' sorry - it is another to "feel" sorry." (P-406) 54. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussions, this Court deems it a fit case, where show cause notices are required to be issued to the respondents for non-compliance of the judgment dated 7.8.2009. 55. Accordingly show cause notices be issued to respondents in Form-I of the Contempt of Court (Himachal Pradesh Rules, 1996) calling upon them to show cause why contempt proceedings against them be not initiated for having knowingly, deliberately and willfully violated the judgment dated 7.8.2009 passed in CWP(T) No. 2162 of 2008 titled as HP Cooperative Department Inspector Grade-II Union vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and another and two other connected petitions, returnable on 25.11.2019.