JUDGMENT : Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J. Whether seniority of the petitioner absorbed in respondent No.1-State Election Commission, is required to be re-drawn by counting the service rendered by him in the equivalent grade in his parent department, in light of decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in (2000) 1 SCC 644 , titled as Sub-Inspector Roop Lal and another vs. Lt. Governor through Chief Secretary, Delhi and others, is the primary question involved in this bunch of Letter Patent Appeals. Learned Single Judge, allowed the writ petition and directed the Commission to prepare a fresh seniority list by taking into account the service period of the petitioner in the equivalent grade in his parent department. Hence, LPA No. 148 of 2011 has been preferred by the employer-State Election Commission and LPA No. 104 of 2013, has been preferred by original respondent No.2. 2. The facts may be noticed, thus:- (parties hereinafter are referred to as they were before the learned Writ Court) 2(i) Petitioner joined as an Accountant in H.P. Agro Packaging Company, Gumma on 01.10.1990 in the pay scale of Rs. 570-1080. This post was re-designated as Senior Assistant (Accounts), as a result of revision of pay scales w.e.f. 01.01.1986. Resultantly, petitioner on 26.12.1990 (Annexure A-13), was designated as Senior Assistant (Accounts) w.e.f. 01.10.1990, in the pay scale of Rs. 1800-3200. 2(ii) Petitioner, on deputation came to respondent No.1-State Election Commission on 31.08.1996 as Senior Assistant. 2(iii) On 18.12.1999, written option was sought from the petitioner for appointment by transfer as Senior Assistant in respondent No.1-State Election Commission on or before 26.12.1999. The option was accordingly tendered by the petitioner. Office order dated 20.05.2000 (Annexure A-2), was issued in respect of absorption of petitioner in respondent No.1-State Election Commission. Two relevant conditions of this office order in respect of determination of petitioner's seniority are reproduced hereinafter:- ?6. Seniority of the official would be fixed from the date of absorption.? ?9. The absorption would be on clear understanding that in case the above terms and conditions are acceptable to him, he would submit his joining report to the Head of Department within a week time from the issue of the orders failing which the absorption will be treated as cancelled.? Thus, as per this office order, the seniority of the absorbed official (petitioner) was to be fixed from the date of his absorption. Thus, as per this office order, the seniority of the absorbed official (petitioner) was to be fixed from the date of his absorption. Further, the official to be absorbed (petitioner), was to submit his joining report only in case the terms and conditions were acceptable to him, failing which, the absorption was to be treated as cancelled. 2(iv) The above conditions were acceptable to the petitioner, therefore, he submitted his acceptance report on 22.05.2000 (Annexure A-3). 2(v) Respondent No.2, joined as Clerk in the Directorate of Panchayati Raj Department, H.P. on 26.07.1988. He was promoted there as an Auditor on 28.08.1993 in the revised pay scale of Rs. 1500-2640. The scale was revised to Rs. 1800-3200 w.e.f. 01.01.1986. On 16.09.1994, respondent No.2, was deputed in respondent No.1-State Election Commission, as Senior Assistant in the pay scale of Rs. 1800-3200. He was absorbed as Senior Assistant in respondent No.1-State Election Commission, on 17.05.2000. 2(vi) Respondent No.3 was deputed as Senior Assistant in respondent No.1-State Election Commission on 01.11.1995 in the pay scale of Rs. 1800-3200. He was absorbed in respondent No.1-State Election Commission on 19.05.2000. 2(vii) Thus, respondents No. 2 & 3, were deputed as Senior Assistants in respondent No.1-State Election Commission and had joined as such, prior in time to the petitioner. Also, respondents No. 2 & 3, were absorbed in respondent No.1-State Election Commission, prior in time to the absorption of the petitioner. 2(viii) After the absorption of petitioner and respondents No. 2 & 3 as Senior Assistants in respondent No.1-State Election Commission, tentative seniority list of Senior Assistants as on 20.06.2000, was circulated on 22.06.2000 (Annexure A-4). Seniority list was prepared on following two principles as laid out in the memo:- ?(b) The continuous-length of period for which the officials concerned have served as Sr. Assistants in the Commission's Establishment as well as in the pre-absorption department/organizations shall be the main criterion so that the official with the longer period of such service shall rank senior to the officials with shorter period of such service, subject to the conditions specified in clause(c) below.? ?(c) An official absorbed/appointed by transfer from a later date shall not be senior to an official absorbed/appointed by transfer from the earlier date.? The combined effect of above two principles was that condition at Sr. No. (c), was to override condition No.(b), in case of conflict. ?(c) An official absorbed/appointed by transfer from a later date shall not be senior to an official absorbed/appointed by transfer from the earlier date.? The combined effect of above two principles was that condition at Sr. No. (c), was to override condition No.(b), in case of conflict. Resultantly, an official absorbed/appointed by transfer in respondent No.1-State Election Commission later in point of time, had to rank junior to the one absorbed/appointed on an earlier date. In accordance with these instructions, name of the petitioner figured in the tentative seniority list below respondents No. 2 & 3, who were absorbed/appointed in respondent No.1-State Election Commission earlier to the petitioner. 2(ix) Representations were invited against the tentative seniority list from the aggrieved persons. Petitioner submitted his representation against his placement in the tentative seniority list below respondents No. 2 & 3 and sought to count his service rendered in the pay scale of Rs. 1800-3200 in the parent department. His representation was rejected by respondent No.1-State Election Commission on 20.07.2000 (Annexure A-6). Final seniority list of Senior Assistants as on 20.06.2000, was circulated on 21.07.2000 (Annexure A-7), reiterating the seniority positions of the tentative seniority list. 2(x) Though, the representation of the petitioner against tentative seniority list stood rejected by a specific order and final seniority list stood issued, yet petitioner once again submitted his representation on 20.09.2000 (Annexure A-8), followed by reminders dated 27.06.2002 (Annexure A-9) dated 27.06.2003 (Annexure A-10). Respondent No.1- Commission having already turned down the claim of the petitioner, did not respond to these repeated representations. 2(xi) Feeling aggrieved against his seniority position assigned to him, the petitioner preferred OA No. 180 of 2004 on 11.01.2004 before the erstwhile H.P. State Administrative Tribunal, praying for quashing of (i) tentative seniority list dated 22.06.2000 (Annexure A-4) as well as (ii) final seniority list dated 21.07.2000 (Annexure A-7). Direction was also sought for redrawing the seniority list of senior assistants after counting the entire service of the petitioner as senior assistant w.e.f. 01.10.1990 on the principle of length of service along with consequential benefits of promotion etc. 2(xii) The writ petition was allowed by learned Single Judge, relying upon the judgment in (2000) 1 SCC 644 , titled as Sub-Inspector Roop Lal and another vs. Lt. Governor through Chief Secretary, Delhi and others. 2(xii) The writ petition was allowed by learned Single Judge, relying upon the judgment in (2000) 1 SCC 644 , titled as Sub-Inspector Roop Lal and another vs. Lt. Governor through Chief Secretary, Delhi and others. Directions were given to the respondent No.1-Commission to redraw the seniority list after considering equivalent service rendered by the petitioner in his parent department. Hence, present appeals have been preferred. 3. We have heard the rival contentions of the parties and gone through the record. 3(i) The background of the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Roop Lal’s case (supra), may be noticed first. 3(i)(a) Government of India in OM No. 20020/7/80-Estt.(D), dated 29.05.1986, stipulated that in case of a person who is initially taken on deputation and absorbed later (i.e. where the relevant recruitment rules provide for ?transfer on deputation/transfer?), his seniority in the grade in which he is absorbed will normally be counted from the date of absorption. If he has, however, been holding already (on the date of absorption) the same for equivalent grade on regular basis in his parent department, such regular service in the grade shall also be taken into account in fixing his seniority, subject to the condition that he will be given seniority from the date he has been holding the post of deputation or the date from which he has been appointed on a regular basis to same or equivalent grade in his parent department, whichever is later. 3(i)(b) In Roop Lal's case (Supra), Hon'ble Apex Court held that the use of words ?whichever is later?is violative of Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution and quashed this text in the impugned memorandum. It was held thereunder:- ?23. It is clear from the ratio laid down in the above case that any Rule, Regulation or Executive Instruction which has the effect of taking away the service rendered by a deputationist in an equivalent cadre in the parent department while counting his seniority in the deputed post would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Hence, liable to be struck down. Hence, liable to be struck down. Since the impugned Memorandum in its entirety does not take away the above right of the deputationists and by striking down the offending part of the Memorandum, as has been prayed in the writ petition, the rights of the appellants could be preserved, we agree with the prayer of the petitioners/ appellants and the offending words in the Memorandum "whichever is later" are held to be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, hence, those words are quashed from the text of the impugned Memorandum. Consequently, the right of the petitioners/appellants to count their service from the date of their regular appointment in the post of Sub-Inspector in BSF, while computing their seniority in the cadre of Sub- Inspector (Executive) in the Delhi Police, is restored.? 3(i)(c) Above decision was implemented vide Office Memorandum dated 27.03.2001 (Annexure A-14), where-under, it was decided by the Government to substitute the term ?whichever is later? in the Office Memorandum dated 29.05.1986 by the term ?whichever is earlier?. Fresh instructions dated 27.03.2001 were to take effect from 14.12.1999, which was the date of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Points Involved:- 3(ii) Primarily, two points arise for adjudication in the instant case:- (i) Whether the judgment in Roop Lal's case (supra) is applicable to the facts of the instant case? (ii) Whether the relief prayed for by the writ petitioner was barred by limitation or not? 3(iii) In the case in hand, at the time of transfer, deputation and absorption of the petitioner, respondents No. 2 & 3, admittedly, there were no Recruitment & Promotion Rules in respondent No.1-State Election Commission. The offer of deputation/absorption in respondent No.1-State Election Commission was thus, not under any provisions of Recruitment & Promotion Rules, but was in exercise of executive powers of the State. Therefore, State was within its bounds to impose conditions it deemed fit in deputing and absorbing the staff. Such staff had the right to accept or reject the conditions so imposed by the State. This was held so in (2006) 8 SCC 129 , titled as Indu Shekhar Singh and Others vs. State of U.P. and others, which has been further relied upon in (2017) 8 SCC 256 titled as Mrigank Johri vs. Union of India. Such staff had the right to accept or reject the conditions so imposed by the State. This was held so in (2006) 8 SCC 129 , titled as Indu Shekhar Singh and Others vs. State of U.P. and others, which has been further relied upon in (2017) 8 SCC 256 titled as Mrigank Johri vs. Union of India. Point involved in present case was also dealt with by Hon'ble Apex Court in Mrigank Johri's case (supra). The question as framed therein in paragraph-29 is reproduced hereunder:- “29. The contentions may be elaborate but the crux of the issue is whether the OMs referred to aforesaid which generally provide for the benefit of service rendered in the previous cadre in an equivalent post on being absorbed in another department would apply to a case where the absorption is on specified terms and conditions with the benefit of such past service in the previous cadre as well as the period of service rendered on deputation being denied ?? This question was answered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in following paras:- ?31. It is no doubt true that the OM dated 29.5.1986 as modified by OM dated 27.3.2001 did provide for the benefit of the previous service rendered in the cadre. This is in effect also the ratio of the judgment in SI Rooplal case (supra). This would also be inconformity with the normal service jurisprudential view. However, it would be a different position if the absorbing department clearly stipulates a condition of giving willingness to sacrifice the seniority while preserving all other benefits for the absorbee (which are accepted) failing which the option was available to the absorbee to get himself repatriated to the parent department. The terms and conditions are categorical in their wording that the absorbees would be ?deemed to be new recruits? and the previous service would be counted for all purposes ?except his/her seniority in the cadre?. The appellant accepted this with open eyes and never even challenged the same. Their representations to give them the benefit of their past seniority was also turned down and thereafter also they did not agitate the matter in any judicial forum. The controversy was thus not alive and it was not open for them to challenge the same after a long lapse of period of time. Their representations to give them the benefit of their past seniority was also turned down and thereafter also they did not agitate the matter in any judicial forum. The controversy was thus not alive and it was not open for them to challenge the same after a long lapse of period of time. In fact on the day of filing of the OM, any prayer to set aside the terms and conditions of absorption would have been clearly barred by time under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. 34. We are in agreement with the submission of the respondents that this issue has been squarely dealt with in Indu Shekhar Singh's case (supra) where almost identical issues have been dealt with by holding that the State was within its right to impose conditions where the employees had the option to exercise their right of election. The entitlement was not under any rules but under what was called the residuary power.? 3(iv) In the instant case, Recruitment & Promotion, Rules, were not in existence at the time of transfer/deputation/absorption of petitioner and respondents No. 2 & 3 in respondent No.1-State Election Commission. State, in exercise of its executive powers laid down the conditions for determining the seniority of the staff absorbed in it, as per which, seniority was to rank from the date of absorption with clear rider that those who were absorbed earlier in point of time, will rank senior to those who were absorbed later in point of time. Petitioner consciously accepted this condition and gave his acceptance report on 22.05.2000. It is thereafter that he was absorbed in respondent No.1-State Election Commission w.e.f. 20.05.2000. The petitioner is estopped from taking a U-turn to include his earlier service in the equivalent grade in his parent department rendered by him w.e.f. .1.12.1990 towards determination of seniority. The judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Roop Lal's case (supra) will not be applicable to the case of the petitioner as in that case absorption was under Recruitment & Promotion Rules, whereas, in the instant case, the absorption was under the residual power i.e. executive power of the State. Hon'ble Apex Court in Mrigank Johri's case (supra) has held that while exercising its executive power, State Government can frame terms and conditions, which if accepted by the employee without any demur will be binding on him. Hon'ble Apex Court in Mrigank Johri's case (supra) has held that while exercising its executive power, State Government can frame terms and conditions, which if accepted by the employee without any demur will be binding on him. 3(v) It is also noticeable that there is no challenge by the petitioner to the terms and conditions of his absorption where-under, his seniority was to rank from the date of his absorption in respondent No.1-State Election Commission. It is apt to quote following observations from Mrigank Johri's case, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: ?32. The appellants sought to rake up the issue only when the seniority list was finalized. This was preceded by the draft seniority list. Whatever may be the dispute of seniority qua other persons, insofar as the appellants were concerned, their seniority was based on the terms and conditions of their absorption. The position of the appellants in the seniority list was thus a sequitur to the terms and conditions of their absorption. We are of the view that it is precisely for this reason, anticipating that their claim would be time barred, that a challenge was laid only to the seniority list without challenging the terms and conditions of absorption though in the grounds, a plea was raised against the terms and conditions of absorption. Unless the terms and conditions of absorption were to be set aside, the seniority list prepared was inconformity with the same.? 3(vi) Limitation:- Representation of the petitioner against the tentative seniority list of Sr. Assistant, seeking to include his service rendered in equivalent grade in parent department, was rejected by respondent No.1-State Election Commission on 20.07.2000 (Annexure A-6). Final seniority list was issued on 21.07.2000 (Annexure A-7). It is settled law that repeated representation do not revive the cause of action. In (2013) 12 SCC 179 , titled as State of Uttaranchal and Another v. Shiv Charan Bhandari, Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:- ? 19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time.? The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time.? Original application filed by the petitioner before the erstwhile H.P. Administrative Tribunal on 11.01.2004, was clearly barred by limitation prescribed under Section 21 of the H.P. State Administrative Tribunal's Act. No prayer was made for condonation of delay. The original application was admitted by the erstwhile H.P. State Administrative Tribunal on 31.10.2007 subject to objection of limitation. In (1999) 8 SCC 304 titled as Ramesh Chand Sharma v. Udham Singh Kamal and Others, Hon'ble Apex Court, held thus: ?7. On perusal of the materials on record and after hearing counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the explanation sought to be given before us cannot be entertained as no foundation thereof was laid before the Tribunal. It was open to the first respondent to make proper application under Section 21(3) of the Act for condonation of delay and having not done so, he cannot be permitted to take up such contention at this late stage. In our opinion, the O.A. filed before the Tribunal after the expiry of three years could not have been admitted and disposed of on merits in view of the statutory provision contained in Section 21(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The law in this behalf is now settled (see Secy. to Govt. of India v. Shivam Mahadu Gaik-wad).? In Special Leave to Appeal (C) 7956/2011, titled as D.C.S. Negi vs. Union of India & Ors. decided on 07.03.2011, it was held as under: ? A reading of the plain language of the above reproduce section makes it clear that the Tribunal cannot admit an application unless the same is made within time specified in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(1) or Section 21(2) or an order is passed in terms of sub-section (3) for entertaining the application after the prescribed period. Since Section 21(1) is couched in negative form, it is the duty of the Tribunal to first consider whether the application is within limitation. An application can be admitted only if the same is found to have been made within the prescribed period or sufficient cause is shown for not doing so within the prescribed period and an order is passed under Section 21(3). An application can be admitted only if the same is found to have been made within the prescribed period or sufficient cause is shown for not doing so within the prescribed period and an order is passed under Section 21(3). In the present case, the Tribunal entertained and decided the application without even adverting to the issue of limitation. Learned counsel for the petitioner tried to explain this omission by pointing out that in the reply filed on behalf of the respondents, no such objection was raised but we have not felt impressed. In our view, the Tribunal cannot abdicate its duty to act in accordance with the statute under which it is established and the fact that an objection of limitation is not raised by the respondent/non-applicant is not at all relevant.? Judgments relied upon by learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner in (2001) 2 SCC 259 , titled as K.Thimmapa and others v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, State Bank of India and another and (1995) 5 SCC 680 , for not holding delay and laches against the petitioner in case of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, are not applicable to facts of the instant case. 4. In view of the above discussion, the belated claim of the petitioner could not be entertained being barred by Section 21 of H.P. Administrative Tribunals Act, it even otherwise was barred by principles of acquiescence and estoppel. On merits also, judgment in Roop Lal's case could not be applied to the facts of instant case in view of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Mrigank Johri's case. Resultantly, LPA No. 148/2011 and LPA No. 104/2011 are allowed. The judgment passed by learned Single Judge on 22.12.2010 in CWP(T) No.10202/2008, titled as Sh. Ram Kumar Negi vs. State Election Commission & others, is quashed and set aside, the writ petition is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.