JUDGMENT : ROHIT RANJAN AGARWAL, J. 1. The present appeal is against the judgment and order dated 26.09.2017 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/District Judge, Jaunpur in M.A.C.P. No.94 of 2008, whereby the claim petition filed by the claimants-appellants had been dismissed. 2. The pleadings relevant for disposal of this appeal are as under: 3. On 23.2.2016 Sri Shankar Ram (deceased) at around 8.00 a.m. in the morning was proceeding on duty to Kerakat, Irrigation Department, when he reached Purvanchal University, Police Station Sarai Khuwaja, District Jaunpur, a Tata Magic bearing Registration No. UP-62/AT 0632 which was being driven rashly and negligently and was coming from Jaunpur and going towards Shahganj, hit him. He sustained severe injuries and people standing nearby took him to Sadar Hospital, Jaunpur where he succumbed to injuries. 4. The claimants-appellants, who are the legal heirs and representatives of Shankar Ram (deceased) filed a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jaunpur claiming compensation of Rs.97,20,000/- along with interest from the date of institution of the petition on the ground that deceased was employed in Irrigation Department and was getting a salary of Rs.30,000/- per month and all the claimants were his dependents. 5. The opposite party nos.1 and 2 contested the claim petition and filed their written statement admitting themselves to be the driver and owner of vehicle No.UP-62/AT 0632, while denying the factum of the accident. Opposite party no.3, the Insurance Company, filed a separate written statement denying that the accident took place with the said vehicle as also due to rash and negligent driving. The Insurance Company in the alternative took a plea that it was a case of contributory negligence; that the vehicle at the relevant date did not hold fitness and permit; that the accident was never reported to the Company either by the claimants or by the owner of the vehicle; and that there was breach of conditions of the policy; and the claimants had filed a defective petition without filing F.I.R., charge-sheet, postmortem report and site plan. 6. The claimants along with the claim petition had filed a copy of the F.I.R., death certificate of Shankar Ram, postmortem report, family register of the deceased and identity proof of the claimant no.1. 6. The claimants along with the claim petition had filed a copy of the F.I.R., death certificate of Shankar Ram, postmortem report, family register of the deceased and identity proof of the claimant no.1. Further, the claimants on 6.1.2017 filed copy of the charge sheet, site plan, postmortem report, salary slip of the deceased and copy of the F.I.R. The opposite parties did not file any documentary evidence 7. Three witnesses were examined from the side of the claimants, namely, Saroja Devi-PW 1, Laxmi Shankar Yadav- PW 2 and Radhey Shayma Chaubey-PW-3. The opposite party nos.1 and 2 were examined as DW-1 and DW 2. 8. The Tribunal on 09.11.2016 framed four issues: (i) Whether on 23.02.2016 at about 8.00 a.m. in the morning any accident took place near Purvanchal University, Police Station Sarai Khuwaja, District Janupur in which vehicle No. UP-62/AT 0632 (Tata Magic), which was being driven rashly and negligently caused accident, due to which the husband of claimant No.1 Shankar Ram sustained severe injuries and succumbed to it in District Hospital, Jaunpur? (ii) Whether vehicle No. UP-62/AT 0632 (Tata Magic) was insured with opposite party No.3 Chola Mandalam General Insurance Company Ltd. and the vehicle was being run according to the conditions of the insurance policy; (iii) Whether the driver of the vehicle No. UP-62/AT 0632 (Tata Magic) was holding a valid licence at the time of the alleged accident; (iv) Whether the claimants are entitled to compensation and if yes, to what extent. 9. On Issue no.1, that is whether the accident had taken place on 23.2.2016 at 8 a.m. involving vehicle No.UP-62/AT 0632 (Tata Magic), which was being driven rashly and negligently by opposite party no.1, the finding returned by the Tribunal was that the accident took place on 23.2.2016 whereas the first information report was lodged by deceased's brother on 24.2.2016 at 12 p.m. without mentioning the registration number of the vehicle, while the claim petition was filed on 10.3.2016 disclosing that the accident involved vehicle no. UP-62/AT 0632. The Tribunal further recorded a finding that the charge sheet was filed on 9.4.2016 in which for the first time, after investigation, the vehicle number was disclosed, therefore, it was not possible that the claim petition, which was filed prior to completion of investigation could disclose the vehicle number. UP-62/AT 0632. The Tribunal further recorded a finding that the charge sheet was filed on 9.4.2016 in which for the first time, after investigation, the vehicle number was disclosed, therefore, it was not possible that the claim petition, which was filed prior to completion of investigation could disclose the vehicle number. The Tribunal proceeded to hold that it was a case of collusion between the claimants and the investigating officer and the claimants thus have failed to prove their case beyond doubt. While deciding issue no.1, the Tribunal further found, upon perusal of vehicle registration documents, fitness certificate and insurance cover note, that the vehicle was not Tata Magic but was Tata Ace. It observed that as Tata Magic and Tata Ace are used for different purposes and are of different categories, the claim petition was liable to be rejected. 10. The Tribunal observed that since the onus to prove that the vehicle used in the accident was Tata Ace was upon the claimants and they had given wrong description of the vehicle and the investigation had also wrongly found the vehicle to be Tata Magic, the claimants failed to establish the case beyond doubt that the accident took place with the vehicle concerned. 11. On the basis of finding returned on issue No.1, the rest of the issues were decided against the claimants and the claim petition was dismissed. 12. Feeling aggrieved, the claimants-appellants have filed the present appeal. 13. We have heard Sri Pramod Bharadwaj, learned counsel for the claimants-appellants. No one has appeared on behalf of the opposite parties despite service was held sufficient upon them by court's order dated 13.04.2018. 14. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Tribunal has wrongly discarded the oral testimony of PW-2 Laxmi Shankar Yadav who was present at the time of the accident and had given the vehicle number to the investigation officer. Further, his house is situated on the opposite side of the road. 14. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Tribunal has wrongly discarded the oral testimony of PW-2 Laxmi Shankar Yadav who was present at the time of the accident and had given the vehicle number to the investigation officer. Further, his house is situated on the opposite side of the road. Further, the claimant no.1 Saroja Devi had filed a reply to the application 33-Ga, filed by the Insurance Company, which was numbered as Paper no.35-Ga, dated 30.8.2017, in which she had denied the allegations of the Insurance Company that how could number of offending vehicle be given in claim petition, which was filed before the charge sheet, when the F.I.R. had not disclosed its number, by stating that after the last rites of her husband, she gathered information from the place of accident and had got the vehicle number. 15. Sri Bharadwaj, further contended that the Triubnal had omitted to consider the oral testimony of PW 1 - Saroja Devi, PW2- Laxmi Shankar Yadav and PW 3 Radhey Shyam Chaubey in its entirety and had adopted a hyper technical approach as if it was dealing with a criminal trial. 16. Learned counsel also raised plea that the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece of legislation and the proceedings there under ought to be held keeping in mind the interest of the claimant and a hyper technical approach is not to be adopted while dealing with the oral as well as documentary evidence and therefore it should not have disbelieved the factum of accident only on the ground that the vehicle involved was Tata Ace and not Tata Magic as both the vehicles are of the same manufacturer and the only difference is that Tata Ace is a goods delivery van while Tata Magic is a passenger vehicle but in appearance both the vehicles are more or less the same. 17. Submission made by counsel for the appellant has some force in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bimla Devi and others versus Himachal Road Transport Corporation and others, (2009) 13 SCC 530 , where the Apex Court has held as under: "11. 17. Submission made by counsel for the appellant has some force in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bimla Devi and others versus Himachal Road Transport Corporation and others, (2009) 13 SCC 530 , where the Apex Court has held as under: "11. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair compensation in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It is true that occurrence of an accident having regard to the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that would not mean that despite evidence to the effect that death of the claimant's predecessor had taken place by reason of an accident caused by a motor vehicle, the same would be ignored only on the basis of a post mortem report vis-a-vis the averments made in a claim petition." 18. Following the decision of Bimla Devi (supra) in the case of Dulcina Fernandes and others versus Joaquim Xavier Cruz and another, (2013) 10 SCC 646 the Apex Court held as under : "7. It would hardly need a mention that the plea of negligence on the part of the first respondent who was driving the pick-up van as set up by the claimants was requird to be decided by the learned Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities and certainly not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. (Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC) 8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Shila Datta while considering the nature of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a three-Judge Bench of this Court has culled out certain propositions of which Propositions (ii), (v) and (vi) would be relevant to the acts of the present case and, therefore, may be extracted herein below: (SCC p.518, para 10) "10. ( ii) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the Tribunal. ( ii) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the Tribunal. * * * (v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation... (vi)The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry." 19. Both the judgments of Bimla Devi (supra) and Dulcina Fernandes (supra) clarifies that the Tribunal while deciding a claim petition under Section 166 has to decide on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities and not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 20. That in case of National Insurance Company Ltd. versus Bala Devi and others,2006 3 TAC 781 (P&H) had held that F.I.R. is not an encyclopedia of all the facts. The court held as under : "14. In fact, the material obtaining on the file completely falsifies the plea of collusion. It may be noticed that the deceased and also the injured had sustained multiplier and grievous injuries on different parts of their bodies. Deceased Ved Parkash died as a result thereof, while Suraj Kumar remained hospitalized for a considerable period. It is also in evidence that the F.I.R. was recorded on the basis of statement of Malkiat Singh, a relation of the deceased and also the injured, who happened to be available by the side of the injured when the Investigating Officer visited the Lok Naik Jai Parkash Hospital, KuruKshetra. It was at that point of time that the Medical Officer attending upon the injured had declared that the latter injured was unfit to make a statement. In the course of the F.I.R., the first information neither gave the registration number of the offending vehicle nor did he give any idea about the identity of the driver of the offending vehicle. Even when Suraj Kumar-injured was examined by the Investigating Officer on 22nd February, 2001 at the latter's residence, all that he indicated was that the impugned accident had been caused by a red coloured 325 Escorts Tractor with a tractor-trolly. Even when Suraj Kumar-injured was examined by the Investigating Officer on 22nd February, 2001 at the latter's residence, all that he indicated was that the impugned accident had been caused by a red coloured 325 Escorts Tractor with a tractor-trolly. It was only in the course of the investigation by the police that it transpired that the impugned accident was caused by the offending vehicle which was being driven in a rash manner at that point of time. By the very nature of things, an F.I.R. is only aimed at intimating an occurrence to the police. It cannot and does not purport to be a complete encyclopedia of all the attending facts. There is nothing unnatural if the registration number of the offending vehicle and the name of the driver thereof at the relevant point of time transpires in the course of investigation of the matter by the Investigating Officer." 21. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in case of Harbans Lal and others versus Harvinder Pal and others, 2015 SCC OnLine(P&H) 9926 has held as under: "26. No doubt, findings of fact, unless found to be perverse, should not be upset by an appellate court; however, in cases of compensation claims by the next kin of deceased or by victims who are severely injured in motor vehicle accidents, Courts, including the Hon'ble Supreme Court, have generally adopted a view that latitude should be given to claimants and prima-facie evidence pointing towards negligence of persons driving an "offending vehicle" should be generally accepted, in order to ensure that the next kin of those deceased, or victim who are severely injured, are not made to suffer when there is no negligence on their own part. 27. In this regard, what the Apex Court held in N.K.V. Bros. P. Ltd. (supra) needs to be cited:- "3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the Courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other case, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipse loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The Court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasizing this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their "neighbour". Indeed, the State must seriously consider no fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parcimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for state relief against accidental disbalement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is horrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Court should insist upon quick disposals s that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard. 4. We have been taken through a few intricate legal submissions by counsel but we decline to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution especially where human misery is pitted against operational negligence." 30. Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard. 4. We have been taken through a few intricate legal submissions by counsel but we decline to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution especially where human misery is pitted against operational negligence." 30. However, as already said earlier, strict liability, in the opinion of this Court, need not be proved in such like cases, and once the investigating agency had pointed towards the negligence of respondent no.2 by filing a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. against him, this court would rather err in favour of the claimants appellants to hold hat it is very possible that it took sometime for the claimants and their kin specifically PW-2 Umesh Kumar, to determine by their own enquiries, as to the identity of the vehicle and the driver of the said vehicle that had caused the motor vehicle accident, before they lodged a formal complaint against the said driver with the police. It is not unknown that police very often refuse to register FIRs, without pointers to the identity of the culprits, by the complainant. Even if that was not so in the present case, to again repeat, this Court would rather err in believing that after the complainant had made his own enquiries and had lodged the complaint, and the police also, at least prima-face, found respondent no.2 negligent in driving the offending vehicle and established in its investigation that it was indeed truck bearing registration No. HR-37-6195 which had hit scooter bearing registration No. HR-01-H-0725, driven by deceased Narinder Kumar, which eventually led to the latters' death. In such a case, the liability to pay compensation, in this Courts' opinion, would fall on the respondents. That respondent no. 2 was eventually acquitted in the criminal trial, where the parameters of establishing guilt are far more stringent, would not, in my opinion, detract from the liability of the respondents to pay compensation to the appellants, in a motor accident claims case, in the afore detailed circumstances. 22. That further in the case of Parmeshwari versus Amir Chand and others, (2011) 11 SCC 635 , the Supreme court has held as under: "13. The other so-called reason in the High Court's order was that as the claim petition was filed after four months of the accident, the same is "a devise to grab money from the insurance company". That further in the case of Parmeshwari versus Amir Chand and others, (2011) 11 SCC 635 , the Supreme court has held as under: "13. The other so-called reason in the High Court's order was that as the claim petition was filed after four months of the accident, the same is "a devise to grab money from the insurance company". This finding in the absence of any material is certainly perverse. The High Court appears to be not cognizant of the principle that in a road accident claim, the strict principles of proof in a criminal case are not attracted. The following observations of this Court in Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC are very pertinent: (SCC p.534, para 15). "15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view f the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied." 23. That taking note of the judgment of Bimla Devi (supra), Dulcina fernandes (supra), Parmeshwari (supra) and United India Insurance Company Ltd (supra) in case of Mangla Ram versus Oriental Insurance Company Ltd and others, (2018) 5 SCC 656 , the Apex Court held as under: "22. The question is: Whether this approach of the High Court can be sustained in law? While dealing with a similar situation, this Court in Bimla Devi noted the defence of the driver and conductor of the bus which inter alia was to cast a doubt on the police record indicating that the person standing at the near side of the bus, suffered head injury when the bus was being reversed without blowing any horn. This Court observed that while dealing with the claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Tribunal strict sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties, its function is to determine the amount of fair compensation. In paras 11-15, the Court observed thus: (SCC pp.533-34) "11. This Court observed that while dealing with the claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Tribunal strict sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties, its function is to determine the amount of fair compensation. In paras 11-15, the Court observed thus: (SCC pp.533-34) "11. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a tribunal strict sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function be89ing to determine the amount of fair compensation in the even an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It is true that occurrence of an accident having regard to the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that would not mean that despite evidence to the effect that death of the claimant's predecessor had taken place by reason of an accident caused by a motor vehicle, the same would be ignored only on the basis of a post mortem report vis-a-vis the averments made in a claim petition. 12. The deceased was a constable. Death took place near a police station. The post mortem report clearly suggests that the deceased died of a brain injury. The place of accident is not far from the police station. It is, therefore, difficult to believe the story of the driver of the bus that he slept in the bus and in the morning found a dead body wrapped in a blanket. If the death of the constable had taken place earlier, it is wholly unlikely that his dead body in a small town like Dharampur would remain undetected throughout the night particularly when it was lying at a bus-stand and near a police station. In such an event, the Court can presume that the police officers themselves should have taken possession of the dead body. 13. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, has rightly proceeded on the basis that apparently there was absolutely no reason to falsely implicate respondents 2 and 3. The claimant was not at the place of occurrence. In such an event, the Court can presume that the police officers themselves should have taken possession of the dead body. 13. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, has rightly proceeded on the basis that apparently there was absolutely no reason to falsely implicate respondents 2 and 3. The claimant was not at the place of occurrence. She, therefore, might not be aware of the details as to how the accident took place but the fact that the first information report had been lodged in relation to an accident could not have been ignored. 14. Some discrepancies in the evidence of the claimant's witnesses might have occurred but the core question before the Tribunal and consequently before the High Court was as to whether the bus in question was involved in the accident or not. For the purpose of determining the said issue, the Court was required to apply the principle underlying the burden of proof in terms of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 as to whether a dead body wrapped in a blanket had been found at the spot at such an early hour, which was required to be proved by Respondents 2 and 3. 15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties." The court restated the legal position that the claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied by the Tribunal while dealing with the motor accident cases. Even in that case, the view taken by the High Court to reverse similar findings, recorded by the Tribunal was set aside. 24. That while dealing with the judgment in Mangla Ram (supra), Hon'ble Justice A.M. Khanwilkar further observed : "It will be useful to advert to the dictum in N.K.V. Bros. P. Ltd. Vs. Even in that case, the view taken by the High Court to reverse similar findings, recorded by the Tribunal was set aside. 24. That while dealing with the judgment in Mangla Ram (supra), Hon'ble Justice A.M. Khanwilkar further observed : "It will be useful to advert to the dictum in N.K.V. Bros. P. Ltd. Vs. M. Karumai Ammal and Ors. 16, wherein it was contended by the vehicle owner that the criminal case in relation to the accident had ended in acquittal and for which reason the claim under the Motor Vehicles Act ought to be rejected. This Court negatived the said argument by observing that the nature of proof required to establish culpable rashness, punishable under the IPC is more stringent than negligence sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. The observation made in paragraph 3 of the judgment would throw some light as to what should be the approach of the Tribunal in motor accident cases. The same reads thus: "3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasizing this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their neighbour. Indeed, the State must seriously consider no fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parsimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for State relief against accidental disablement of citizens. Indeed, the State must seriously consider no fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parsimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for State relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Courts should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard." 19. In Dulcina Fernandes (supra), this Court examined similar situation where the evidence of claimant's eye witness was discarded by the Tribunal and that the respondent in that case was acquitted in the criminal case concerning the accident. This Court, however, opined that it cannot be overlooked that upon investigation of the case registered against the respondent, prima facie, materials showing negligence were found to put him on trial. The Court restated the settled principle that the evidence of the claimants ought to be examined by the Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied as noted in Bimla Devi (supra). In paragraphs 8 & 9, of the reported decision, the dictum in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shila Datta17, has been adverted to as under: "8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta while considering the nature of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a three Judge Bench of this Court has culled out certain propositions of which Propositions (ii),(v) and (vi) would be relevant to the facts of the present case and, therefore, may be extracted herein below: (SCC p. 518, para 10) ''10. (ii) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the Tribunal. (ii) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the Tribunal. * * * (v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation.... (vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry.' 9. The following further observation available in para 10 of the Report would require specific note: (Shila Datta case, SCC p. 519). 10. We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that an award by the Tribunal cannot be seen as an adversarial adjudication between the litigating parties to a dispute, but a statutory determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry, in accordance with the statute. " (2011) 10 SCC 509 In paragraph 10 of the reported decision [Dulcina Fernandes and Ors. (supra)], the Court opined that non examination of witness per se cannot be treated as fatal to the claim set up before the Tribunal. In other words, the approach of the Tribunal should be holistic analysis of the entire pleadings and evidence by applying the principles of preponderance of probability." 25. Thus from the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bimla Devi (supra), Dulcina Fernandes (supra), Parmeshwari (supra) and Mangla Ram (supra) the view of the Apex Court is clear that the claim petition cannot be thrown out on hyper technical ground. 26. In the instant case, without there being a cogent evidence to hold that the claimants, the investigating officer and the driver of the offending vehicle had colluded with each other, the Tribunal recorded finding that they were in collusion with each other. If the Tribunal was of the opinion that there was collusion between the parties it should have recorded finding on the basis of evidence on record. 27. Further, the Tribunal wrongly drew adverse inference against the claimants merely because the claim petition disclosed vehicle number when it was filed before submission of charge sheet and the FIR had not disclosed vehicle number. 27. Further, the Tribunal wrongly drew adverse inference against the claimants merely because the claim petition disclosed vehicle number when it was filed before submission of charge sheet and the FIR had not disclosed vehicle number. Because it is always possible that in a span of about 15 days the claimants could have gathered about the vehicle number. The Tribunal did not consider the oral testimony of Saroja Devi in entirety and the reply 35-Ga, which is on record, where she had categorically stated that after the last rites of her husband she had gathered information and also the vehicle number. The Tribunal ought to have taken note of this aspect also while deciding issue no.1. 28. As far as the model of vehicle involved in the accident is concerned, the Tribunal had taken a hyper technical view because there can always be confusion on similar types of vehicle particularly when both are of same manufacturer and are more or less similar except that one is a goods delivery vehicle, and the other is a passenger vehicle. For a common man standing on the road side to distinguish between the two at the time of accident is not possible and there may be judgmental error in regard to the vehicle. Even otherwise, once the vehicle number of the vehicle involved in the accident had been proved by oral evidence, that difference was not so material to non suit the claimants. 29. Further, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. (supra) had held that there is nothing unnatural if the registration number of the offending vehicle and the name of the driver thereof, is ascertained later in the course of investigation by the investigating officer. 30. In the present case, the Tribunal had erred in not taking note of the fact that the claimant no.1 stated on oath as well as in her rely to the application of the Insurance Company that she had gathered the information from the accident site after the last rites of her husband. This fact, ought to have been considered by the Tribunal while deciding issue no.1. 31. In Dulcina Fernandes (supra), the Hon'ble the Supreme Court held that the claim petition was to be decided by the Tribunal on the touch stone of preponderance of probabilities and certainly not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 32. This fact, ought to have been considered by the Tribunal while deciding issue no.1. 31. In Dulcina Fernandes (supra), the Hon'ble the Supreme Court held that the claim petition was to be decided by the Tribunal on the touch stone of preponderance of probabilities and certainly not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 32. In view of the discussion made above, we are of the view that the finding returned by the Tribunal on issue no.1 is vitiated by a hyper technical approach and therefore calls for fresh consideration in the light of the decision noticed above. Further, as there is no consideration of the other issues, we deem it appropriate to remand the matter to the Tribunal. 33. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed. The judgment and order dated 26.9.2017 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jaunpur is hereby set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jaunpur to decide the claim petition afresh on the basis of the material available on record and in the light of the observation made herein above. There is no order as to costs. 34. The record of the court below shall be sent back forthwith.