Bajranglal Vyankatlal Malu v. Secretary to the Govt. of India
2019-07-01
Z.A.HAQ
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Z.A. Haq, J. 1. None for respondent No. 1, though served. Heard Shri Y.R. Kinkhede, Advocate for the petitioners, Ms. Kalyani Deshpande, A.G.P. for respondent Nos. 2 and 4 and Shri A.A. Kathane, Advocate for respondent No. 3. 2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. 3. The petitioners are the persons whose lands are acquired for construction of National Highway No. 7. The Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) had passed an award on 31st October, 2012 and had determined the amount of compensation payable to the petitioners. On 21st July 2014, the Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) issued notice to the petitioners and called them to his office on 4th August, 2014 to receive the amount of compensation. On 1st March 2017, the petitioners moved an application under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act before respondent No. 4 and prayed for re-determination of the amount of compensation receivable by them. This application is dismissed by the impugned order. The respondent No. 4 - Additional Collector has recorded that the application under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act should have been moved within 90 days of receipt of notice from the competent Authority calling upon the petitioners to receive the amount of compensation as per Section 3H of the National Highways Act, 1956 (for short the Act of 1956). 4. Shri Y.R. Kinkhede, Advocate for the petitioners/claimants argued that in view of Section 3G(6) of the Act of 1956, the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are applicable to every arbitration under the Act of 1956 and in view of Section 43 of the Act of 1996, Limitation Act, 1963 applies to arbitrations as it applies to proceedings in Courts. It is argued that the provisions of Section 43 of the Act of 1996, however, are not applicable to arbitration under any other Enactment including the Act of 1956. To support the submission, reliance is placed on the judgment given by Division Bench of High Court of Madras in Writ Appeal No. 308/2016 and other connected matters on 25th April, 2018.
To support the submission, reliance is placed on the judgment given by Division Bench of High Court of Madras in Writ Appeal No. 308/2016 and other connected matters on 25th April, 2018. In paragraph No. 9 of the judgment, Division Bench has framed the question for consideration as follows: "Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, particularly Article 137 would apply to an application seeking Arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956?" After discussing the relevant provisions and considering the legal position, Division Bench has summed up its conclusions in paragraph No. 34 as follows: "34. We therefore make the position clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act and more particularly Article 137 would not apply to an application for reference to arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the National Highway Act, 1956." Though learned Advocate for respondent No. 3 tried to argue that the above view taken by Division Bench requires re-consideration by this Court, I am not able to convince myself to take a different view. I am in agreement with the conclusions of Division Bench on the point, and adopting the same view, I hold that the provisions of Limitation Act and more particularly Article 137 of Limitation Act would not apply to an application for reference to arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956. 5. Learned Advocate for respondent No. 3, however, submitted that if the claimants are permitted to move applications under Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 at any time without there being any limitation for moving the application, it will open floodgates and the claimants would start moving such applications after 8 or 10 years and the liability of paying interest on the amount of award would be unnecessarily fastened on the Acquiring Body/Authority. It is submitted that even if the claimants are permitted to move application at such belated stage, as a matter of rule, they should not be granted interest on the amount of enhanced compensation, if any, for the period of delay. To support the submission, Advocate for respondent No. 3 has relied on the following judgments: (i) Judgment given in the case of Imratlal and Others vs. Land Acquisition Collector and Others, (2014) 14 SCC 133 . (ii) Judgment given in the case of Dhiraj Singh (dead) through Legal Rep.
To support the submission, Advocate for respondent No. 3 has relied on the following judgments: (i) Judgment given in the case of Imratlal and Others vs. Land Acquisition Collector and Others, (2014) 14 SCC 133 . (ii) Judgment given in the case of Dhiraj Singh (dead) through Legal Rep. and Others vs. State of Haryana and Others, (2014) 14 SCC 127 . 6. In my view, this is not the stage to consider the issue of entitlement of the claimants for the interest on the enhanced amount of compensation, as at this stage it cannot be ascertained whether the amount of compensation would be enhanced. The respondents will be at liberty to agitate this issue before the learned arbitrator at appropriate stage. 7. In view of the above, following order is passed: (i) The impugned order is set aside. (ii) The respondent No. 4 - Additional Commissioner is directed to consider the application filed by the petitioners under Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 on merits and decide it according to law within six months. (iii) The petitioners shall appear before respondent No. 4 - Additional Commissioner on 2nd August, 2019 at 11 a.m. (iv) The point raised by respondent No. 3 that the petitioners will not be entitled for interest on the enhanced amount of compensation, if any, for the period of delay shall be considered by respondent No. 4 - Additional Commissioner at appropriate stage. 8. Rule is made absolute accordingly. 9. In the circumstances, the parties to bear their own costs.