JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of instant criminal revision petitions filed under S.397 read with S.401 CrPC, challenge has been laid to a common judgment dated 15.9.2018 passed by learned Sessions Judge (Forests) Shimla, Circuit Court at Theog, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh in Cr. Appeal No. 5-T/10 of 2016, whereby appeal filed by the respondent-complainant (hereinafter, 'complainant') has been allowed and judgment/order of conviction and sentence dated 7.12.2015/15.12.2015 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Theog, in Case No. 79/3 of 2015 has been modified to the extent that instead of Rs.7.00 Lakh, petitioner-accused (hereinafter, 'accused') has been directed to pay Rs.8,50,000/- as compensation to the complainant, and, appeal filed by the accused for his acquittal has been dismissed. 2. Briefly stated the facts as emerge from the record are that the complainant instituted a complaint under S.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter, 'Act') alleging therein that in the month of August/September, 2014, he sold 750 apple boxes to the accused who initially made payment of Rs.3.00 Lakh to the complainant, but for payment of balance amount, issued two cheques bearing Nos. 736046 dated 3.9.2014 amounting to Rs.3.00 Lakh and 736047 dated 8.9.2014 amounting to Rs.3,37,500/-, (Exts. CW-1/B and CW-1/D) drawn on State Bank of India, Theog, however, the fact remains that the aforesaid cheques on presentation to the Bank concerned were dishonoured on account of insufficient funds in the account of the accused. Immediately after receipt of memo from the Bank concerned, complainant served a demand notice (Ext. CW-1/F) to the accused calling upon him to make payment of the amount covered by cheques within the time stipulated in the notice. Since the accused failed to make the payment within the time prescribed in the legal notice, complainant was compelled to institute proceedings under S.138 of the Act against the accused. Learned trial Court, in the totality of evidence led on record by the parties, held accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for two months and to pay a compensation of Rs.7.00 Lakh to the complainant. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment/order of conviction and sentence passed by learned trial Court, accused preferred an appeal i.e. Cr. Appeal No. 5- T/10 of 2016, whereas, complainant also filed Cr. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment/order of conviction and sentence passed by learned trial Court, accused preferred an appeal i.e. Cr. Appeal No. 5- T/10 of 2016, whereas, complainant also filed Cr. Appeal No. 2- T/10 of 2016, for enhancement of the amount of compensation in the court of learned Sessions Judge, Shimla circuit court at Theog, who vide common judgment dated 15.9.2018, dismissed the appeal filed by the accused and allowed the appeal of the complainant, thereby enhancing the amount of compensation to Rs.8,50,000/- instead of Rs.7.00 Lakh and upheld rest of the judgment. In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this Court against the common judgment passed by learned lower appellate Court, seeking his acquittal. 4. Before adverting to the factual matrix of the case, it may be noticed that during the pendency of these petitions, learned counsel for the petitioner expressed willingness of the accused to settle the matter amicably and accordingly, on the request of accused, matter came to be repeatedly adjourned enabling him to make complete payment in terms of the judgment/order passed by learned trial Court. Bare perusal of order dated 1.8.2019 suggests that a sum of Rs.3.00 lakh came to be paid to the complainant during the pendency of the petitions, but thereafter, despite repeated adjournments, no amount ever came to be paid. 5. Today, during the proceedings of the case, learned senior counsel for the accused stated that he has no instructions, whatsoever, with regard to balance payment of the amount to be made by accused. He further stated that since the accused is not coming forward to impart instructions, this Court may proceed to decide the present petitions on their own merit. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record, this court finds no force in the submissions having been made by learned senior counsel appearing for the accused that impugned judgment/order of conviction and sentence passed by learned Courts below are not based upon proper appreciation of the evidence, rather, this Court finds that both the learned Courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously and there is no scope of interference by this Court with the judgments passed by learned Courts below, which otherwise are based upon proper appreciation of evidence. 7. 7. Bare perusal of the material available on record, especially statement of accused under S.313 CrPC, clearly establishes on record that cheques in question were issued by accused in discharge of lawful liability. He has nowhere denied the factum with regard to issuance of cheque rather, he has categorically admitted the case of the complainant that he had sold 750 boxes of apple to him(accused) in lieu of which liability, accused issued cheques in question. Complainant, by way of cogent and convincing evidence led on record has successfully proved all the ingredients of S.138 of the Act. Interestingly, though the accused was duly represented by a counsel but complainant never came to be cross-examined, as such, stand taken by him (complainant) remained unrebutted. 8. Once signatures on the cheque are not disputed, plea with regard to cheque having not been issued towards discharge of lawful liability, rightly came to be rejected by learned Courts below. Reliance is placed upon Hiten P. Dalal v. Bartender Nath Bannerji, (2001) 6 SCC 16 , wherein it has been held as under: "The words 'unless the contrary is proved' which occur in this provision make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by 'proof' and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible. A fact is said to be proved when its existence is directly established or when upon the material before it the Court finds its existence to be so probable that a reasonable man would act on the supposition that it exists. Unless, therefore, the explanation is supported by proof, the presumption created by the provision cannot be said to be rebutted......" 9. S.139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. 10. True it is that to rebut aforesaid presumption, accused can always raise probable defence either by leading positive evidence or by referring to material, if any, adduced, on the record by the complainant, but, in the case at hand, accused has miserably failed to raise probable defence, much less sufficient defence to rebut the presumption available in favour of the complainant under Ss. 118 and 139 of the Act. 118 and 139 of the Act. Close scrutiny of material available on record compels this Court to agree with learned counsel for the complainant, that there is absolutely no evidence available on record to rebut the presumption available in favour of the complainant that the cheques in question were issued by the accused to the complainant towards discharge of his lawful liability. In the case at hand, accused even during his statement under S.313 CrPC, has not denied the factum with regard to issuance of cheque. 11. Hon'ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem vs. State of Gujarat, 2013 (1) RCR (Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely upon the material submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor is able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under S.139 of the Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be apt to reproduce following paras of judgment (supra) herein below: "23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof". In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof". The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy." 12. Recently, Hon'ble Apex Court, having noticed various judgments passed on earlier occasions, reiterated the principles to be kept in mind while extending benefit of presumption under Ss. 118 and 139 of the Act ibid, in Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa, Cr. Appeal No. 636 of 2019 decided on 4.9.2019. Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "23. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139, we now summarise the principles enumerated by this Court in following manner:- (i) Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability. 27 (ii) The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. (iii) To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely. (iv) That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 28 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. (v) It is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box to support his defence. 24. Applying the preposition of law as noted above, in facts of the present case, it is clear that signature on cheque having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability. The question to be looked into is as to whether any probable defence was raised by the accused." 13. This court finds no force in the argument of Mr. The question to be looked into is as to whether any probable defence was raised by the accused." 13. This court finds no force in the argument of Mr. V.S. Chauhan, learned senior counsel for the accused that learned Court below, while upholding judgment/order of conviction and sentence passed by learned trial Court, has erred in enhancing the amount of compensation because, since total amount of both the cheques was Rs.6,37,500/-, learned trial Court erred in awarding Rs.7.00 Lakh, especially when complainant was unnecessarily compelled to initiate proceedings in competent Court of law for realisation of his own money. Cheques in question were issued in August/September, 2014, whereas, order awarding compensation to the tune of Rs.7.00 Lakh came to be passed on 18.9.2018, i.e. after four years of issuance of cheques, as such, learned lower appellate Court rightly held amount of compensation awarded by learned trial Court to be inadequate. Needless to say, law provides for compensation to the extent of double of the amount of cheque but in the case at hand, learned lower appellate Court has enhanced the compensation to Rs.8,50,000/-, which appears to be totally justifiable and adequate in the attending facts and circumstances. 14. In view of detailed discussion made above and the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court (supra), the petitions at hand are dismissed being devoid of merit. Judgments passed by learned Courts below are upheld. Accused is directed to surrender before the learned trial Court to serve the sentence imposed upon her, forthwith. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused in both the petitions stand cancelled.