ORDER : Heard the parties. 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing and setting aside the office order dated 16.12.2016, passed by respondent No. 3, whereby the services of the petitioner has been terminated. Further prayer has been made to direct the respondents to pay the salary of the petitioner from December, 2015 to 16.12.2016, as the petitioner was allowed to work and discharged his duties but the payment for the said period has not been made to the petitioner. Petitioner has also prayed for a direction upon the respondent to reinstate him in service with all consequential benefits including the back wages. 3. The factual exposition as has been delineated in the writ petition is that petitioner was appointed to the post of Assistant Teacher vide office order dated 25.01.2015, issued by respondent No. 3 and in pursuant to the said office order, the petitioner gave his joining on 04.02.2015. Thereafter, salary has been paid to the petitioner from February, 2015 to November, 2015. It is the further case of the petitioner that vide letter dated 23.12.2015, the petitioner was directed to produce the certificates before the respondent No. 3 and it was also ordered that the salary of the petitioner would remain suspended with immediate effect. Thereafter, again by letter dated 31.12.2015, the petitioner was directed to produce the certificates. In response to the aforesaid letters, the petitioner submitted all the certificates along with representation on 28.06.2016, before the respondent No. 3. Again by letter dated 28.10.2016, the petitioner was directed to submit an explanation as to why legal action be not taken against him to terminate his service. In response to the said letter, the petitioner submitted his representation on 31.10.2016. Thereafter, without holding a departmental proceeding, the services of the petitioner have been terminated vide office order dated 16.12.2016, passed by respondent No. 3. The petitioner throwing challenge to the said termination order has filed the instant writ application. 4. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is absolutely cryptic inasmuch as no reasons have been assigned by the respondent No. 3 as to why the services of the petitioner has been terminated. The termination from service is a major penalty under Rule 8(2) of the Bihar (now Jharkhand) State Nationalized Primary Teacher (Transfer and Disciplinary Proceeding) Rules, 1994. The termination from service is a major penalty under Rule 8(2) of the Bihar (now Jharkhand) State Nationalized Primary Teacher (Transfer and Disciplinary Proceeding) Rules, 1994. As per proviso to Rule 8(2), before imposing the penalty of “termination from service”, initiation of a departmental proceeding is sina qua non. However, the facts remains that the impugned order has been passed without holding a departmental proceeding against the petitioner. Learned counsel further argues that no memo of charge was ever framed against the petitioner. Even the copy of alleged complaint, as referred to in the letter dated 23.12.2015 was never served upon the petitioner and neither any Enquiry Officer was appointed nor any enquiry report was ever submitted against him to prove the charge. The petitioner was allowed to work upto 16.12.2016, however, arbitrarily the payment of salary from December, 2015 to 16.12.2016 has not been made to the petitioner. Learned counsel submits that for the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order dated 16.12.2016 is absolutely cryptic as the same has been passed without disclosing any reason of termination of petitioner and as such, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. Learned counsel further submits that the impugned order is also violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 5. Per contra, counter-affidavit has been filed. Mr. Shadab Bin Haque, learned counsel appearing for the respondent State, vehemently opposes the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that on receipt of complaint against the petitioner, the respondent No. 3 conducted an enquiry and issued letter dated 14.11.2015 to the petitioner, directing him to produce all his certificates. The respondent No. 3 by his letter dated 23.12.2015 also directed the Block Education Extension Officer-cum-Drawing & Disbursing Officer, Middle School Chainpur, Chandil to stop the salary of the petitioner till further orders. When the petitioner had not submitted his certificates, the respondent No. 3 by his letter dated 31.12.2015 sent a reminder to the petitioner and directed him to submit his certificates. Thereafter, on 28.06.2016, the petitioner has submitted his certificates. Learned counsel further argues that thereafter vide letter dated 28.10.2016 the petitioner was asked to submit his explanation as to why legal action be not taken against him to terminate his service. On receipt of such show-cause, the petitioner submitted his explanation dated 31.10.2016. Thereafter, on 28.06.2016, the petitioner has submitted his certificates. Learned counsel further argues that thereafter vide letter dated 28.10.2016 the petitioner was asked to submit his explanation as to why legal action be not taken against him to terminate his service. On receipt of such show-cause, the petitioner submitted his explanation dated 31.10.2016. Learned counsel further argues that during the enquiry it was found that on 01.08.2013, the petitioner was aged more than 42 years being his date of birth as 05.01.1971 and as such, not eligible for appointment. The matter was put-up before the District Education Establishment Committee, Saraikela-Kharsawan and the Committee in its meeting held on 14.12.2016 has properly considered the same and taken its decision. In view of the decision of the Committee, the respondent No. 3 has issued the office order dated 16.12.2016, whereby he has terminated the services of the petitioner. Learned counsel further argues that in view of the aforesaid facts, initiation of departmental proceeding to terminate a teacher is not required in law and the question of punishment does not arise. It is further submitted that due to some error, the material facts have been overlooked and the petitioner was appointed on 25.01.2015 but the condition No. 1 of this appointment letter clearly stipulates that his appointment was purely provisional and the period of his probation is 2 years from the date of appointment and as such, rightly his services have been terminated when the aforesaid mistake came to the light of the respondents, after due enquiry and affording reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to defend his case. Learned counsel accordingly submits that in the light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed. 6. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of the parties, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made out for interference. The contention of the petitioner that no opportunity was given to the petitioner to defend his case is not tenable in the eyes of law since before issuance of termination order, the petitioner was asked to submit his reply to the show-cause and upon not being satisfied with reasons given in the reply submitted by the petitioner, rightly the order of termination has been issued by the respondent-authorities. Further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that provisions of principles of natural justice has not followed is also not acceptable to this Court. In the instant case, decision has been taken by the Establishment Committee, soon after the appointment of the petitioner and on verification of the documents, it was found that the petitioner does not fulfill the eligibility criteria laid down in the advertisement inasmuch as he has crossed the maximum age limit on the cut-off date, as prescribed for being appointed to the post of Assistant Teacher. Since the petitioner did not fulfill the requisite criteria on the date of consideration, he is not entitled for being afforded with any opportunity of hearing, as from documents itself it is clear that the age of the petitioner was more than 42 years being his date of birth as 05.01.1971. In the instant case though a show-cause was given no regular departmental proceeding or any opportunity of hearing is required since it is the petitioner who has violated the terms and conditions of the appointment. 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Yogesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. Govt. of NCT, Delhi & Ors., reported in (2003) 3 SCC 548 has held as under:- “Recruitment to public services should be made strictly in accordance with the terms of advertisement and recruitment rules. Deviation from the rules allows entry to ineligible persons and deprives many others who could have competed for the post.” The Hon'ble Apex Court in para 14 in case of State of Gujarat Vs. Arvindkumar T. Tiwari, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 545 has held, as under:- “14. A person who does not possess the requisite qualification cannot even apply for recruitment for the reason that his appointment would be contrary to the statutory rules, and would therefore, be void in law. Lacking eligibility for the post cannot be cured at any stage and appointing such a person would amount to serious illegality and not mere irregularity. Such a person cannot approach the Court for any relief for the reason that he does not have a right which can be enforced through Court.” The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Rakesh Kumar Sharma Vs. Such a person cannot approach the Court for any relief for the reason that he does not have a right which can be enforced through Court.” The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Rakesh Kumar Sharma Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., reported in (2013) 11 SCC 58 has held:- “There could be a large number of candidates, who were not eligible as per the requirement of rules/advertisement since they did not possess the required eligibility on the last date of submission of the application forms. Granting any benefit to the petitioner would be violative of the doctrine of equality, a backbone of the fundamental rights under our Constitution. A large number of such candidates may not have applied considering themselves to be ineligible adhering to the statutory rules and the terms of the advertisement. Usurpation of a post by an ineligible candidate in any circumstance is impermissible.” 8. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, no interference is warranted in the instant writ petition and hence, it is dismissed. 9. It goes without saying that since the petitioner has admittedly worked for the period between December, 2015 to 16.12.2016 but has been denied the salary of the said period, he is entitled for the same and as such, I hereby direct the petitioner to file a fresh representation before the respondent No. 3 for consideration of his case for payment of the salary of the aforesaid period, within a period two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and upon receipt of the same along with a copy of this order, the respondent No. 3 is directed to take a decision, in accordance with law and if the petitioner has actually worked for that period, the salary of the said period shall be extended to him within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of representation of the petitioner.