JUDGMENT : 1. Vide this order above mentioned three appeals would be disposed of as they have arisen out of the same judgment/order dated 18.08.2015. 2. Vide Exhibit P-1, complainant Ramnarayan moved a complaint to the Station House Officer, Govindgarh for registration of case against the accused. It was the case of the complainant that his brother Sanwarmal had gone to the house of Mukesh Manawat on 02.12.2011 at about 6.00 p.m. and had stayed there up to 8.30 p.m. Thereafter, at about 9.30 p.m., his brother had gone with Mohan Lal. When his brother did not return home, he tried to contact him on his mobile-phone, but remained unsuccessful. During the night, at about 3.30 a.m., Mukesh Manawat and Ankit came to his residence and told him that dead body of Sanwarmal was lying near Badhala College, Govindgarh. On receipt of the information, he reached the spot and found that his brother had suffered injuries with sharp edged weapon and had been strangulated with the help of a rope. It had been projected that it was a case of an accident. 3. On the basis of the said complaint, formal FIR No.230 dated 03.12.2011 was registered at police station Govindgarh, District Jaipur Rural under Section 302, 201 Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as I.P.C.). 4. After completion of investigation and necessary formalities, challan was presented against accused Mohanlal, Santosh, Raju @ Rajendra and Dharmendra. 5. Charges were framed against the accused under Section 302/34, 201 and 120-B I.P.C. Accused did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 6. In order to prove its case, prosecution examined thirty two witnesses. After close of prosecution evidence, accused when examined under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C.’), prayed that they were innocent and had been falsely involved in this case. 7. Accused examined DW-1 Panchuram in their defence. 8. Trial court vide judgment/order dated 18.08.2015, convicted accused Mohanlal, Dharmendra and Raju @ Rajendra under Section 302/120-B and 201 I.P.C., whereas, accused Santosh was convicted qua offence punishable under Section 302/120-B I.P.C. Accused were sentenced to undergo life imprisonment under Section 302/120-B I.P.C. and were imposed a fine of Rupees two thousand each and in default of payment of fine, they were further ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. Accused Mohanlal, Raju @ Rajendra and Dharmendra were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years under Section 201 I.P.C. and were imposed fine to the tune of Rupees five hundred each and in default of payment of fine, they were ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for fifteen days. Hence, the present appeals by the convicts. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants have submitted that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove its case. Case rests on circumstantial evidence. Prosecution had failed to complete the chain of events leading to the guilt of the appellants. As per the FIR and the statement of the complainant recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., appellants were not attributed any motive to have committed the crime-in-question. There was no evidence to the effect that the deceased was last seen in the company of the appellants. Lot of padding had been done by the prosecution to strengthen its case. The circumstance of lifting of foot moulds from the spot had been falsely incorporated by the prosecution to strengthen its case. As per PW-15 Indraj Singh, the unpaved path was made up of sand which could shift its place. Hence, it could not be said that the foot moulds could have been lifted from the spot after three days of the occurrence, i.e., on 05.12.2011. Foot moulds were not lifted in the presence of the Magistrate. The call records produced on record were not admissible in evidence as there was no certificate obtained under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Circumstance to show that the murder had been committed at one place and thereafter, dead body had been shifted to another place in a pick-up van had also been falsely incorporated. The pick-up van-in-question had not been recovered on the basis of the disclosure statement suffered by any of the appellant, but had been recovered from its registered owner. Circumstance of recovery of one monogram from the pick-up van was also falsely introduced. On the day, the van was taken in possession, no recovery of any incriminating material was effected from the van. Van was parked in the police station. On the next day, recovery of monogram and lime was shown from the van to strengthen the prosecution case. Circumstance of recovery of one monogram from the pick-up van was also falsely introduced. On the day, the van was taken in possession, no recovery of any incriminating material was effected from the van. Van was parked in the police station. On the next day, recovery of monogram and lime was shown from the van to strengthen the prosecution case. On the day, shoes of the deceased were taken in police possession, no note was made that a monogram on one of the shoe of the deceased was missing. Recovery of currency notes had also been falsely foisted on the appellants. The call details alleged to have been made by the appellant Mohanlal to the deceased was also not established as the said mobile-phone was in the name of DW-1, father of the appellant Mohanlal. The said witness has deposed that the mobile-phone No. 9828041970 was in his name was being used by him. The iron angle alleged to have been recovered from appellant Raju @ Rajendra had been falsely foisted on him. There was no evidence on record that appellant Santosh had the money to pass on to her co-accused for committing the murder of her husband Sanwarmal. In-fact, complainant has falsely involved the appellants in this case as he was not having any land in his name. Land was in the name of the father of the complainant. Father of the complainant was residing with Sanwarmal and appellant Santosh. By involving appellant Santosh falsely in this case, complainant wants to take the share of Sanwarmal out of the property owned by his father. Thus, PW-1 can be said to benefit on account of false involvement of appellants Santosh as well as Mohanlal in this case. There was no evidence on record with regard to any conversation between appellants Raju @ Rajendra and Dharmendra with appellant Mohanlal to establish that there was any conspiracy amongst them. Appellant Santosh did not have any mobile-phone in her name. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of John Pandian Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, (2010) 14 SCC 129 , wherein, it has been held as under:- “The only other witness posed against Kareem is PW-38, K. Veerasamy who acted as the mahazar witness. State represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, (2010) 14 SCC 129 , wherein, it has been held as under:- “The only other witness posed against Kareem is PW-38, K. Veerasamy who acted as the mahazar witness. According to this witness, this accused had discovered Rs.18,000/-, two sovereigns gold chain and a scooter. He proved Exhibit P-45. The seizure memo is Exhibit P-48. In our opinion, this discovery would be of no consequence whatsoever unless material objects discovered are connected to the crime in any manner. Nobody deposed as to who had paid money to this witness nor has it been brought on record that it was he who purchased the so-called gold chain and the scooter and even if he has, the prosecution has miserably failed to show that the money passed to him was only from Venkatraman (A-1) via Sivakumar (A-2). Therefore, on the basis of discovery, it will be extremely risky to book this accused and hold him a member of the conspiracy. It must be said that all these aspects were viewed by the trial and the appellate Court with jaundiced eyes. Merely because there are some discoveries they do not in any manner connect the accused and there is no presumption that merely because the accused has some things in his possession, which he fails to explain, therefore, all this money and the gold chain must have come only on account of the money that he had allegedly received as a member of the conspiracy from Sivakumar (A-2). In our opinion, this evidence would fall short to hold that he was a member of the conspiracy. This may, at the most, raise suspicion against him but that would be completely without any justification. This accused would, therefore, has to be given the benefit of doubt. X--------X--------X-------X-------X------X-----X He is said to have discovered a Titan watch vide M.O. 11 and cash vide M.O. 12. We do not see as to how any of these material objects can be connected with the conspiracy. No evidence has been brought on record to suggest that he could not have Rs.23,000/-. The evidence of discovery is again a weak kind of evidence and this Court, on a number of occasions, has refused to rely solely on the discovery evidence. No evidence has been brought on record to suggest that he could not have Rs.23,000/-. The evidence of discovery is again a weak kind of evidence and this Court, on a number of occasions, has refused to rely solely on the discovery evidence. There is nothing brought on record suggesting that these 23,000 of rupees were paid to him by Venkatraman (A-1) via Sivakumar (A-2). There is no connection established in between him and John Pandian (A-7) or for that matter, Kumar s/o Vellaichami (A-9), Pavunraj @ Pavun (A-10) and Prince Kumar @ Prince (A-11). X--------X--------X-------X------X------X------X Mere recovery of money would be of no consequence unless the prosecution comes out with a case and give some prima facie evidence that this cash was a part of the money that he had received after encashing the cheque. In fact, there is nothing to suggest that he had not given back the cash. X-------X-------X------X------X------X---------X Further, even if it is presumed that from these accused persons money was discovered there is nothing on record that the money was given by Venkatraman (A-1) to accused No.2, Sivakumar and through him to all the other accused persons.” 10. Learned counsel has next placed reliance on the decision of Punjab And Haryana High Court in case of Niranjan Lal Vs. State of Haryana, 1995 CriLJ 248, wherein, it has been held as under:- “The next piece of evidence on which the prosecution based reliance was the lifting of fooot moulds from the scence of occurrence and comparison of the same with the specimen foot moulds of the appellants. This piece of evidence is also suspicious. It has come in the statements of prosecution witnesses that before the arrival of the police about 50-60 persons from the village had visited the place of occurrence which was a ploughed field. Although two persons were left to guard the spot, there is nothing to suggest that any foot prints were preserved by them. It was only when the investigating officer reached the spot that he noticed only four foot prints of which the moulds were prepared. This lifting of four foot moulds, when no mention of the same is made in the inquest report, is highly doubtful. Shankar Pal PW 11 was examined by the prosecution regarding the lifting of foot moulds from the spot. This lifting of four foot moulds, when no mention of the same is made in the inquest report, is highly doubtful. Shankar Pal PW 11 was examined by the prosecution regarding the lifting of foot moulds from the spot. He stated that police took into possession Gulla, blood stained earth and a harrow from the spot and also lifted four foot prints from the scene of occurrence after moulds were prepared. But this statement regarding moulds is an addition made by the witness in his statement in Court. The statement of the witness was recorded in the inquest report Ex.PX wherein he did not make any mention about the lifting of foot moulds from the spot though he was specific regarding the other recoveries made by the police at the time the inquest was prepared. It has also come in evidence that as soon as the appellants were arrested their foot-wears were seized vide separate recovery memos. There is, however, nothing on record to show that when specimen moulds were prepared by Khalil Ahmad those very shoes were returned to the appellants and they were asked to wear the same. Statement of PW 6 Tehsildar, Rewari who took specimen foot moulds is silent about that fact. Rather in his cross-examination, he deposed that the appellants were never provided any shoes or Chappals in his presence. All these circumstances show that in fact no crime moulds were prepared at the spot and all the moulds were prepared after the arrest of the appellants. This contention is further fortified from the fact that crime moulds were not sent immediately to the Director, Forensic Science Laboratory. The appellants' version was that they were arrested much before the time their actual arrest was shown and some telegrams were also sent to the senior police officers regarding their apprehension by the police. It is too good a co-incident to be believed that the investigating officer only noticed four foot prints near the place of occurrence which spot had been visited by numerous persons before his arrival and then those foot prints tallied with one specimen foot mould of each of the appellants. The evidence regarding foot moulds was procured evidence and that is why some interpolation had to be made in the register Malkhana maintained in the police station. The evidence regarding foot moulds was procured evidence and that is why some interpolation had to be made in the register Malkhana maintained in the police station. PW 7 Babu Lal head constable admitted in his cross-examination that in the register of Malkhana there was cutting regarding the number of moulds of shoes and chappals and numbers were altered. Even otherwise the science of identification of foot prints is a rudimentary science and much reliance cannot be placed on the result of such identification. In the case of Chandran @ Surendran & Anr. vs. State of Kerala 1990 (3) Recent Criminal Reports 644 where robbery and murder were committed and the case was based on circumstanial evidence; Finger prints found on two glass pieces at the place of occurrence tallied with finger prints of the accused and some recovery was also made at the instance of the accused, it was held by the Apex Court that these were scanty pieces of circumstantial evidence highly hazardous to rely for conviction of the accused. Considering the evidence regarding comparison of crime moulds with specimen moulds as discussed above, we find that no reliance can be placed on the same in order to connect the appellants with the commission of the crime.” 11. Learned counsel has next placed reliance on the decision of the this Court in case of Sunder & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2015 (2) RCC (Raj.) 699, wherein, it has been held as under:- “Thus, Rule 6.26 (3) requires that prior to taking the impression of the footprints and before making a mould, the footprints found on scene of the crime must be pointed out to reliable witnesses. However, in the present case neither Prahlad Singh (P.W.22), nor Jagdish (P.W.13) states that the footprints of the alleged accused persons were pointed out to them. According to Rule 6.26 (3)(c), the moulds of the footprints should be made either in front of Magistrate, or in front of witnesses. The said moulds have to be signed either by the Magistrate, or the witnesses. According to Rule 6.26 (3) (d), during the course of trial the mould should be produced in the court for identification by the witnesses and comparison by the court. However, in the present case, according to Prahlad (P.W.22), the footprints were not lifted from the place of the occurrence in front of a magistrate. According to Rule 6.26 (3) (d), during the course of trial the mould should be produced in the court for identification by the witnesses and comparison by the court. However, in the present case, according to Prahlad (P.W.22), the footprints were not lifted from the place of the occurrence in front of a magistrate. They were, in fact, lifted in front of Jagdish. But Jagdish is not an independent witness as he is one of the sons of the deceased. Furthermore, according to Jagdish (P.W.13), the moulds of the footprints were not produced before the trial court during his testimony for his identification and for comparison by the court. Therefore, the procedure established by the rules has not been followed. Moreover, the second recovery witness, Kunwar Singh, has not been produced by the prosecution. Thus, a material witness has been withheld by the prosecution. Therefore, considering the contradictions between the witnesses, considering the contradiction between the testimonies of the witnesses and the site plan, considering the fact that the procedure prescribed by law has not been followed, considering the conduct of the prosecution in withholding an independent witness of recovery from the court, the recovery of the footprints from the scene of the crime cannot be believed.” 12. Learned counsel has next placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Anvar P.V. Vs. P.K. Basheer & Ors., (2014) 10 SCC 473 , wherein, it has been held as under:- “Any documentary evidence by way of an electronic record under the Evidence Act, in view of Sections 59 and 65A, can be proved only in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 65B.Section 65B deals with the admissibility of the electronic record. The purpose of these provisions is to sanctify secondary evidence in electronic form, generated by a computer. It may be noted that the Section starts with a non obstante clause. Thus, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a document only if the conditions mentioned under sub- Section (2) are satisfied, without further proof or production of the original. Thus, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a document only if the conditions mentioned under sub- Section (2) are satisfied, without further proof or production of the original. The very admissibility of such a document, i.e., electronic record which is called as computer output, depends on the satisfaction of the four conditions under Section 65B(2). Following are the specified conditions under Section 65B(2) of the Evidence Act: (i) The electronic record containing the information should have been produced by the computer during the period over which the same was regularly used to store or process information for the purpose of any activity regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of that computer; (ii) The information of the kind contained in electronic record or of the kind from which the information is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activity; (iii) During the material part of the said period, the computer was operating properly and that even if it was not operating properly for some time, the break or breaks had not affected either the record or the accuracy of its contents; and (iv) The information contained in the record should be a reproduction or derivation from the information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activity. Under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, if it is desired to give a statement in any proceedings pertaining to an electronic record, it is permissible provided the following conditions are satisfied: (a) There must be a certificate which identifies the electronic record containing the statement; (b) The certificate must describe the manner in which the electronic record was produced; (c) The certificate must furnish the particulars of the device involved in the production of that record; (d) The certificate must deal with the applicable conditions mentioned under Section 65B(2) of the Evidence Act; and (e) The certificate must be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device. It is further clarified that the person need only to state in the certificate that the same is to the best of his knowledge and belief. Most importantly, such a certificate must accompany the electronic record like computer printout, Compact Disc (CD), Video Compact Disc (VCD), pen drive, etc., pertaining to which a statement is sought to be given in evidence, when the same is produced in evidence. All these safeguards are taken to ensure the source and authenticity, which are the two hallmarks pertaining to electronic record sought to be used as evidence. Electronic records being more susceptible to tampering, alteration, transposition, excision, etc. without such safeguards, the whole trial based on proof of electronic records can lead to travesty of justice.” X------X-------X------X-------X------X--------X The evidence relating to electronic record, as noted herein before, being a special provision, the general law on secondary evidence under Section 63 read with Section 65 of the Evidence Act shall yield to the same. Generalia specialibus non derogant, special law will always prevail over the general law. It appears, the court omitted to take note of Sections 59 and 65A dealing with the admissibility of electronic record. Sections 63 and 65 have no application in the case of secondary evidence by way of electronic record; the same is wholly governed by Sections 65A and 65B. To that extent, the statement of law on admissibility of secondary evidence pertaining to electronic record, as stated by this court in Navjot Sandhu case (supra), does not lay down the correct legal position. It requires to be overruled and we do so. An electronic record by way of secondary evidence shall not be admitted in evidence unless the requirements under Section 65B are satisfied. Thus, in the case of CD, VCD, chip, etc., the same shall be accompanied by the certificate in terms of Section 65B obtained at the time of taking the document, without which, the secondary evidence pertaining to that electronic record, is inadmissible.” 13. Learned counsel has next placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Babubhai Bhimabhai Bokhiria & Another Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., AIR 2014 SC 2228 , wherein, it has been held as under:- “The other evidence sought to be relied for summoning the appellant is the alleged conversation between the appellant and the accused on and immediately after the day of the occurrence. State of Gujarat & Ors., AIR 2014 SC 2228 , wherein, it has been held as under:- “The other evidence sought to be relied for summoning the appellant is the alleged conversation between the appellant and the accused on and immediately after the day of the occurrence. But, nothing has come during the course of trial regarding the content of the conversation and from call records alone, the appellant’s complicity in the crime does not surface at all.” 14. Learned counsel has next placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Digamber Vaishnav & Another Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, JT 2019 (2) SC 602, wherein, it has been held as under:- “The prosecution has relied upon the evidence of PW-8 to show that the accused and victims were last seen together. It is settled that the circumstance of last seen together cannot by itself form the basis of holding accused guilty of offence. If there is any credible evidence that just before or immediately prior to the death of the victims, they were last seen along with the accused at or near about the place of occurrence, the needle of suspicion would certainly point to the accused being the culprits and this would be one of the strong factors or circumstances inculpating them with the alleged crime purported on the victims. However, if the last seen evidence does not inspire the confidence or is not trust worthy, there can be no conviction. To constitute the last seen together factor as an incriminating circumstance, there must be close proximity between the time of seeing and recovery of dead body. X------X------X------X------X-------X--------X PW-8 in her evidence has stated that the accused had come one day before in the night, and next day, Amrika, Mala, Badi Amma, Amma and Kondi Didi had died. She is a child witness. We have already noticed that she has not witnessed the incident. PW- 1 in his evidence says that PW-8 had come to his house at 2.00 to 2.30 P.M. and informed him about the death of the deceased persons. PW-8 has not disclosed the identity of the appellants to PW-1. That is why the FIR was registered against unknown persons. We have also noticed the inconsistencies in her evidence apart from the fact that the other children present in the house on that day were not examined. PW-8 has not disclosed the identity of the appellants to PW-1. That is why the FIR was registered against unknown persons. We have also noticed the inconsistencies in her evidence apart from the fact that the other children present in the house on that day were not examined. There is a substantial loss of time from when PW-8 saw the deceased and the appellants together on 16.12.2012 and when the deceased were found on 17.12.2012. In such circumstances, it is difficult to draw an inference that the appellants had committed the crime.” 15. Learned counsel has next placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Vijender etc. Vs. State of Delhi, 1997 (1) Crimes 158 (SC), wherein, it has been held as under:- “Another elementary statutory breach which we notice in recording the evidence of the above witnesses is that of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Evidence was led through the above three police witnesses that in consequence of information received from the three appellants on June 30, 1992 they discovered the place where the dead body of Khurshid was thrown. As already noticed, the dead body of Khurshid was recovered on June 27, 1992 and therefore the question of discovery of the place where it was thrown thereafter could not arise. Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act if an information given by the accused leads to the discovery of a fact which is the direct outcome of such information then only it would be evidence but when the fact has already been discovered as in the instant case the evidence could not be led in respect thereof.” 16. Learned state counsel who is assisted by the counsel for the complainant, has opposed the appeals and has submitted that the prosecution has been successful in proving its case. In-fact, appellant Santosh was having illicit relations with appellant Mohanlal and in connivance with each other they hired the services of appellants Dharmendra and Raju @ Rajendra and committed the murder of Sanwarmal. After committing the murder of Sanwarmal at point-X of Exhibit P-10 they had thrown the dead body at point-X of Exhibit P-11. The dead body was thrown at point-X (as shown in Exhibit-11) to given a colour of an accidental death, although, it was a case of murder. After committing the murder of Sanwarmal at point-X of Exhibit P-10 they had thrown the dead body at point-X of Exhibit P-11. The dead body was thrown at point-X (as shown in Exhibit-11) to given a colour of an accidental death, although, it was a case of murder. All the chain of circumstances proved on record by the prosecution lead to the inference that the appellants had committed the murder of Sanwarmal. Recovery of currency notes has been effected from the appellants Mohanlal, Dharmendra and Raju @ Rajendra. From appellant Dharmendra, weapon used at the time of commission of crime has been recovered and as per the Forensic Science Laboratory report, the said weapon was smeared with human blood. Sanwarmal had received a phone-call from appellant Mohanlal at about 8.00 p.m. and had told PW-8 at about 8.30. p.m. that he was going to meet Mohanlal. Thus, it was established that the deceased was in the company of Mohanlal at the time of commission of crime. From the call details proved on record, it was established that the accused were in conversation with each other and had hatched a conspiracy to commit the murder of Sanwarmal. 17. Present case relates to murder of Sanwarmal. Case rests of circumstantial evidence. 18. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Brajendrasingh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2012 SC 1552 , as under:- “There is no doubt that it is not a case of direct evidence but the conviction of the accused is founded on circumstantial evidence. It is a settled principle of law that the prosecution has to satisfy certain conditions before a conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established and should also be consistent with only one hypothesis, i.e. the guilt of the accused. The circumstances should be conclusive and proved by the prosecution. There must be a chain of events so complete so as not to leave any substantial doubt in the mind of the Court. Irresistibly, the evidence should lead to the conclusion inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and the only possibility that the accused has committed the crime. To put it simply, the circumstances forming the chain of events should be proved and they should cumulatively point towards the guilt of the accused alone. Irresistibly, the evidence should lead to the conclusion inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and the only possibility that the accused has committed the crime. To put it simply, the circumstances forming the chain of events should be proved and they should cumulatively point towards the guilt of the accused alone. In such circumstances, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. Furthermore, the rule which needs to be observed by the Court while dealing with the cases of circumstantial evidence is that the best evidence must be adduced which the nature of the case admits. The circumstances have to be examined cumulatively. The Court has to examine the complete chain of events and then see whether all the material facts sought to be established by the prosecution to bring home the guilt of the accused, have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It has to be kept in mind that all these principles are based upon one basic cannon of our criminal jurisprudence that the accused is innocent till proven guilty and that the accused is entitled to a just and fair trial.” 19. It has also been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab 1980 (2) SCC 684 , as under:- “In the light of the above conspectus, we will now consider the effect of the aforesaid legislative changes on the authority and efficacy of the propositions laid down by this Court in Jagmohan's case. These propositions may be summed up as under: (i) The general legislative policy that underlies the structure of our criminal law, principally contained in the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, is to define an offence with sufficient clarity and to prescribe only the maximum punishment therefore, and to allow a very wide discretion to the Judge in the matter of fixing the degree of punishment. With the solitary exception of Section 303, the same policy permeates Section 302 and some other sections of the Penal Code, where me maximum punishment is the death penalty. (ii) (a) No exhaustive enumeration of aggravating or mitigating circumstances which should be considered when sentencing an offender, is possible. With the solitary exception of Section 303, the same policy permeates Section 302 and some other sections of the Penal Code, where me maximum punishment is the death penalty. (ii) (a) No exhaustive enumeration of aggravating or mitigating circumstances which should be considered when sentencing an offender, is possible. "The infinite variety of cases and facets to each case would make general standards either meaningless 'boiler plate' or a statement of the obvious that no Jury (Judge) would need." (Referred to McGantha v. California (1971) 402 US 183 (b) The impossibility of laying down standards is at the very core of the criminal law as administered in India which invests the Judges with a very wide discretion in the matter of fixing the degree of punishment. (iii) The view taken by the plurality in Furman v. Georgia decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, to the effect, that a law which gives uncontrolled and un-guided discretion to the Jury (or the Judge) to choose arbitrarily between a sentence of death and imprisonment for a capital offence, violates the Eighth Amendment, is not applicable in India. We do not have in out Constitution any provision like the Eighth Amendment, nor are we at liberty to apply the test of reasonableness with the freedom with which the Judges of the Supreme Court of America are accustomed to apply "the due process" clause. There are grave doubts about the expediency of transplanting western experience in our country. Social conditions are different and so also the general intellectual level. Arguments which would be valid in respect of one area of the world may not hold good in respect of another area. (iv) (a) This discretion in the matter of sentence is to be exercised by the Judge judicially, after balancing all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime. (b) The discretion is liable to be corrected by superior courts. The exercise of judicial discretion on well-recognised principles is, in the final analysis, the safest possible safeguard for the accused. (iv) (a) This discretion in the matter of sentence is to be exercised by the Judge judicially, after balancing all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime. (b) The discretion is liable to be corrected by superior courts. The exercise of judicial discretion on well-recognised principles is, in the final analysis, the safest possible safeguard for the accused. In view of the above, it will be impossible to say that there would be at all any discrimination, since crime as crime may appear to be superficially the same but the facts and circumstances of a crime are widely different Thus considered, the provision in Section 302, Penal Code is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground that it confers on the Judges an un-guided and uncontrolled discretion in the matter of awarding capital punishment or imprisonment for life. (v) (a) Relevant facto and circumstances Impinging on the nature and circumstances of the crime can be brought before the Court at the pre-conviction stage, notwithstanding the fact that no formal procedure for producing evidence regarding such facto and circumstances had been specifically provided. When counsel addresses the Court with regard to the character and standing of the accused, they are duly considered by the Court unless there is something in the evidence itself which belies him or the Public Prosecutor challenges the facts. (b) It is to be emphasised that in exercising its discretion to choose either of the two alternative sentences provided in Section 302, Penal Code, "the Court is principally concerned with the facts and circumstances Whether aggravating or mitigating, which are connected with the particular crime under inquiry. All such facts and circumstances are capable of being proved in accordance With the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act in a trial regulated by the Cr. P. C. The trial does not come to an end until all the relevant facts are proved and the counsel on both sides have an opportunity to address the Court. The only thing that remains is for the Judge to decide on the guilt and punishment and that is what Sections 306(2) and 309(2), Cr. P. C. purport to provide for. These provisions are part of the procedure established by law and unless it is shown that they are invalid for any other reasons they must be regarded as valid. The only thing that remains is for the Judge to decide on the guilt and punishment and that is what Sections 306(2) and 309(2), Cr. P. C. purport to provide for. These provisions are part of the procedure established by law and unless it is shown that they are invalid for any other reasons they must be regarded as valid. No reasons are offered to show that they are constitutionally invalid and hence the death sentence imposed after trial in accordance with the procedure established by law is not tin-constitutional under Article 21.” 20. Thus, it is a settled preposition of law that where a case rests on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution is required to complete the chain of events which should be consistent only with the hypotheses of the guilt of the accused. All the circumstance have to be conclusive in nature and should negate the possibility of having someone else committed the offence and should also negate the innocence of the accused. 21. Let us examine the circumstances proved on record by the prosecution in order to come to the conclusion as to whether chain of the circumstances brought on record by the prosecution lead to the inference of the guilt of the accused and negate the possibility of having someone else committed the murder of the deceased Sanwarmal. 22. One circumstance brought on record by the prosecution is with regard to call details of appellants Mohanlal, Santosh and Dharmendra. However, admittedly, certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act is not available on record with regard to the said call details. PW-28 Investigating Officer has stated in his cross-examination that he had not obtained the certificates of the call details collected during investigation of the appellants under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act. PW-25 Rajesh, Nodal Officer and PW-26 Prabhat Kumar, official of the mobile-phone company, had also deposed in their cross-examination that they had not issued the certificates under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act. Thus, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anvar P.V. case (supra), the call details placed on record are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the circumstance of call details relied upon by the prosecution fails to advance the prosecution case. Thus, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anvar P.V. case (supra), the call details placed on record are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the circumstance of call details relied upon by the prosecution fails to advance the prosecution case. The mobile( phone allegedly used by appellant Mohanlal is in the name of his father Panchu Ram and Panchu Ram while appearing in the witness-box as DW-1 has stated that the mobile-phone which was in his name was being used by him. 23. The next circumstance brought on record by the prosecution is with regard to foot moulds lifted from the spot where the murder had been allegedly committed by the appellants. In this regard, testimony of PW-15 Indraj Singh would be relevant. Murder in the present case was committed on the night of 02.12.2011, whereas, as per PW-15 foot moulds were lifted on 05.12.2011. The said witness has also deposed in his cross-examination that the soil at the place from where the foot moulds were lifted was dry sand in nature and shifts its place on account of wind. Thus, it becomes doubtful whether the foot moulds were available for being lifted after three days of the occurrence as the soil at the place of incident might have shifted its place within three days. Hence, the circumstance brought on record by the prosecution with regard to lifting of the foot moulds from the spot to connect the same with the Chappal of the appellant Mohanlal and shoe of appellant Dharmendra is rendered doubtful. 24. The next circumstance brought on record by the prosecution is that murder of the Sanwarmal was committed at one place and thereafter, the dead body was shifted in a pick-up van to another place to give the crime a colour of roadside accident. The owner of the pick-up van (Jagdish) was examined as PW-10. The said witness has not supported the prosecution case, during trial and has stated that on the day of occurrence, the vehicle-in-question had remained in his possession. Moreover, the pick-up van was taken in possession by the police vide Exhibit P-23 on 06.12.2011 and on the said date no incriminating substance was recovered from the pick-up van. Admittedly, there were no blood stains in the pick-up van or any other evidence to show that it has been used at the time of commission of crime. Moreover, the pick-up van was taken in possession by the police vide Exhibit P-23 on 06.12.2011 and on the said date no incriminating substance was recovered from the pick-up van. Admittedly, there were no blood stains in the pick-up van or any other evidence to show that it has been used at the time of commission of crime. As per Exhibit P-24 on 07.12.2011 broken monogram of the shoe of the deceased was allegedly recovered from the pick-up van. It is not understandable as to how the said monogram was recovered from the pick-up van on the next day. Moreover, as per Exhibit P-6 vide which the articles belonging to the deceased were taken in police possession, there was no mention that monogram was missing on one of the shoe of the deceased. Hence, it appears that the story that one monogram was lifted from the pick-up van on 07.12.2011 was later incorporated with a view to connect the appellants with the crime. Thus, the circumstance that the pick-up van was used by the appellants to shift the dead body of the deceased from one place to another place (from where it was recovered) cannot be said to be duly established by the prosecution. 25. The next circumstance brought on record by the prosecution is that Sanwarmal had gone to the house of PW-8 Mukesh Manawat at about 6.00 p.m. and had left his house at about 8.30 p.m. after telling him that he was going to meet appellant Mohanlal. PW-1 Ramnarayan (complainant) has also stated that he had been told by Mukesh Manawat that Sanwarmal had left his house after telling him that he was going to meet Mohanlal. PW-8 has stated that Sanwarmal had received a phone-call at about 8.00 p.m. and had thereafter told him while living his house that he was going to meet Mohanlal. However, the said witness in his cross-examination deposed that as and when Sanwarmal used to receive a phone-call, he would not tell him as to who had called him. He had not heard the conversation of Sanwarmal on his phone. However, the said witness in his cross-examination deposed that as and when Sanwarmal used to receive a phone-call, he would not tell him as to who had called him. He had not heard the conversation of Sanwarmal on his phone. He could not tell about the calls received by Sanwarmal on 02.12.2011 from 6.00 p.m. till 8.00 p.m. Moreover, in the absence of cogent evidence with regard to the call details between appellant Mohanlal and deceased prior to the accident, the circumstance that the deceased had actually met appellant Mohanlal after leaving the house of PW-8 is rendered doubtful. 26. The next circumstance brought on record by the prosecution is with regard to recovery of currency notes from the appellants Mohanlal, Raju @ Rajendra and Dharmendra. It is the case of the prosecution that appellant Santosh had received money on account of sale of some property. Appellant Santosh handed over money to appellant Mohanlal to be paid to appellant Raju @ Rajendra and Dharmendra to commit the murder of Sanwarmal. Thus, as per the prosecution story, appellants Raju @ Rajendra and Dharmendra had been hired to commit the murder of Sanwarmal, thus, it was a case of contract killing. It is the prosecution case that out of the money handed over by appellant Santosh to appellant Mohanlal, he kept some money with himself and handed over some amount to appellants Raju @ Rajendra and Dharmendra. During investigation, Rupees one lac was recovered from appellant Mohanlal on the basis of his disclosure statement. From appellant Dharmendra Rupees ninety thousand were recovered, whereas, from appellant Raju @ Rajendra Rupees twenty two thousand were recovered, during investigation on the basis of their disclosure statements. Although, it is the prosecution case that money had been handed over by appellant Santosh to appellant Mohanlal for committing the murder of Sanwarmal, but the question that requires consideration is as to whether appellant Santosh had the money in hand to pass on the same to appellant Mohanlal. In this regard, statement of Investigating Officer is relevant as none of the material witnesses have deposed with regard to handing over of money by appellant Santosh to appellant Mohanlal for committing the crime. In this regard, statement of Investigating Officer is relevant as none of the material witnesses have deposed with regard to handing over of money by appellant Santosh to appellant Mohanlal for committing the crime. Although, it is the prosecution story that appellant Santosh had got money on account of sale of property, but PW-28 Investigating Officer has deposed in his cross-examination that he had investigated with regard to receipt of cash by the accused on account of sale of property, but no such document was available on record. There was no material on record to the effect that who was the owner of the property and who had sold the same or when it was sold and when money was received by whom. Nothing had transpired during investigation as to when appellants Mohanlal and Santosh had conspired to commit the murder or had given money to the killers. Thus, although, currency notes had been recovered from the accused, but in the absence of any material on record to show that appellant Santosh was in a position to give money for contract killing, the circumstance of recovery of currency notes from appellants Mohanlal, Raju @ Rejendra and Dharmendra fails to advance the prosecution case. 27. Another circumstance brought on record by the prosecution is that the deceased had been strangulated with the help of a scarf. The scarf has been recovered on the basis of disclosure statement suffered by appellant Mohanlal. However, PW-12 Dr. R.K. Vijayvargiya deposed in his cross-examination that the marks present on the neck of the deceased could be result of wire or rope, but could not be a result of a muffler, scarf or saree. Hence, the circumstance of recovery of scarf from the appellant Mohanlal has been rightly discarded by the trial court as the said recovery fails to advance the prosecution case. 28. The next circumstance that requires consideration is as to whether appellant Mohanlal and appellant Santosh were having illicit relations. Complaint was moved by the complainant Ramnarayan PW-1 on 03.12.2011. In the said complaint, it has not been mentioned that the murder had been committed by appellant Mohanlal in connivance with appellant Santosh on account of their illicit relations. Consequently, the said fact is not mentioned in the FIR. Complaint was moved by the complainant Ramnarayan PW-1 on 03.12.2011. In the said complaint, it has not been mentioned that the murder had been committed by appellant Mohanlal in connivance with appellant Santosh on account of their illicit relations. Consequently, the said fact is not mentioned in the FIR. Even in the statement of the complainant recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., it has not been stated by him that the murder had been committed by appellant Mohanlal and appellant Santosh on account of their illicit relations. It is for the first time, during trial, PW-1 has stated that appellant Santosh and appellant Mohanlal were having illicit relations and due to this reason they had committed the murder of Sanwarmal by conspiring with each other with the help of Dharmendra and Raju @ Rajendra. PW-1 is none other than the brother of the deceased. He has admitted in his cross-examination that he knew about illicit relations of the appellants Mohanlal and appellant Santosh prior to the incident and other family member also knew about the same and had been asking them to mend their ways. However, PW-1 for the reasons best known to him did not incorporate in the FIR that appellant Mohanlal and appellant Santosh were having illicit relations and due to this reason, murder of Sanwarmal had been committed. Thus, motive attributed to appellants Mohanlal and appellant Santosh, during trial, did not form part of the FIR. In a murder case resting on circumstantial evidence motive gains significance. However, no motive was attributed to appellant Mohanlal or any other accused in the FIR. In-fact, in the FIR, it was only alleged that the deceased had gone to meet Mohanlal and had not returned home thereafter. 29. PW-8 Mukesh Manawat deposed that he was a friend of Sanwarmal. In his cross-examination, he deposed that Sanwarmal had never talked to him about illicit relations of his wife with Mohanlal. PW-9 Ankit Pareek is the friend of the deceased and he had deposed that the fact that appellants Sanwarmal and Mohanlal were having illicit relations was disclosed to him by PW-1. He admitted that Sanwarmal had never disclosed to him that his wife was having illicit relations with any person. PW-28 Investigating Officer has stated in his cross-examination that during investigation none of the witnesses had made the statement with regard to illicit relations of appellants Santosh and Mohanlal. 30. He admitted that Sanwarmal had never disclosed to him that his wife was having illicit relations with any person. PW-28 Investigating Officer has stated in his cross-examination that during investigation none of the witnesses had made the statement with regard to illicit relations of appellants Santosh and Mohanlal. 30. Exhibit P-4 is the fard panchayatnama prepared on 03.12.2011 under Section 174 Cr.P.C. A perusal of the same reveals that it is mentioned therein that death of Sanwarmal had occurred on account of injuries suffered by him in an unknown roadside accident. The said document is duly signed by the complainant. The said document was prepared at 9.00 a.m. Thereafter, postmortem examination was conducted at 11.00 a.m. on 03.12.2011, wherein, it was opined by the Board of Doctors that the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation with cumulative effect of associated injuries. In the postmortem report also, it has been mentioned that the dead body had been brought with a history of injuries suffered in an unknown road accident. Thereafter, complaint was moved by the complainant at 1.55 p.m. on 03.12.2011 alleging that his brother Sanwarmal had been murdered. As per FIR, it has been stated by the complainant that when he saw the dead body of his brother, he found that he had suffered injuries with sharp edged weapons. Thus, it appears that after the postmortem examination report, complainant lodged the report with the police involving appellant Mohanlal. 31. As per the FIR, complainant had alleged that he had been told by Mukesh Manawat that Sanwarmal had gone to meet their neighbor Mohanlal at about 9.30 p.m. While appearing in the witness-box, complainant has made material improvement in his statement and has alleged that he had seen Sanwarmal with Mohanlal (son of his uncle) in Chomu at 9.30 p.m. The said fact is not mentioned in the FIR. The fact that appellants Mohanal and Santosh were having illicit relations is also not mentioned in the FIR, but has been stated by the complainant in his statement for the first time, during trial. The possibility that appellants Mohanlal and Santosh have been falsely involved in this case by the complainant by giving an improved version, during trial, cannot be ruled out. 32. The possibility that appellants Mohanlal and Santosh have been falsely involved in this case by the complainant by giving an improved version, during trial, cannot be ruled out. 32. PW-9 Ankit Pareek deposed that he later came to know that wife of Sanwarmal was having illicit relations with her brother-in-law Mohanlal and they had got the murder committed with the help of contract killers. In his cross-examination, he deposed that he had come to know about the said fact after two/three days of the murder. The fact that Mohanlal and Santosh were having illicit relations was disclosed to him by the complainant. Thus, the statement of PW-9 can be said to be hearsay and fails to advance the prosecution case. 33. Thus, keeping in view the above discussion, it can be said that prosecution has miserably failed to establish that appellants Mohanlal and Santosh had the motive to kill Sanwarmal. Appellant Mohanlal and appellant Santosh are closely related to the complainant. In case, complainant suspected that his brother had been murdered by appellants Mohanlal and Santosh, he should have incorporated the said fact at the time of lodging of the FIR. However, as per the FIR, no motive was attributed to appellant Mohanlal or any other appellant with regard to the commission of crime. Since, the motive alleged by the prosecution is doubtful, as it was introduced at a later stage, the other circumstances introduced by the prosecution lead to the inference that they had been later set up by way of padding to strengthen the prosecution case. 34. Thus, in the present case, prosecution has failed to complete the chain of circumstances which lead to the conclusion of guilt of the appellants and to conclusion inconsistent with their innocence. Rather all the circumstances put together, fail to point towards guilt of the appellants and prosecution story is rendered doubtful. 35. It is a settled preposition of law that an accused presumed to be innocent till proved guilty. Prosecution is required to lead cogent and convincing evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt. Whenever, there is doubt in the prosecution story, benefit of the same has to be extended to the accused. 36. Since, in the present case, prosecution story is doubtful, appellants are liable to be acquitted of the charges framed against them. 37. Accordingly, appeals are allowed. Whenever, there is doubt in the prosecution story, benefit of the same has to be extended to the accused. 36. Since, in the present case, prosecution story is doubtful, appellants are liable to be acquitted of the charges framed against them. 37. Accordingly, appeals are allowed. Judgment/order dated 18.08.2015 of the trial court are set aside. Consequently, appellants are acquitted of the charges framed against them. Appellants-accused Mohan Lal S/o Shri Panchu Ram, Smt. Santosh W/o Late Shri Sanwar Mal Saini and Dharmendra S/o Lila Ram are in custody, they are serving the sentence, therefore, they be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 38. Appellant-accused Raju @ Rajendra Kumar S/o Shri Bajrang Lal is on bail, therefore, his bail bonds are discharged. 39. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A Cr.P.C., appellants namely Mohan Lal S/o Shri Panchu Ram, Smt. Santosh W/o Late Shri Sanwar Mal Saini, Dharmendra S/o Lila Ram and Raju @ Rajendra Kumar S/o Shri Bajrang Lal are directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- each, and a surety in the like amount, before the Registrar(Judicial) of this Court, which shall be effective for a period of six months, with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of leave, the appellants aforesaid, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Supreme Court.