JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. 1. Present appeal filed under Section 30 of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (in short "the Act") lays challenge to the judgment/award dated 8.1.2015 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-1, Mandi, exercising powers of the Commissioner under the Act in Case No. 223/13, whereby claim petition having been filed by the petitioner under Sections 4, 15 and 22 of the Act, seeking therein compensation, came to be dismissed. 2. Briefly stated facts, as emerge from the record are that claimant filed petition under Sections 4, 15 and 22 of the Act, seeking therein compensation to the tune of Rs. 5,50,000/- besides other reliefs on account of injury suffered by him during his employment as driver with taxi bearing No. HP-01K-0210 (maruti van), which allegedly met with an accident on 14.7.2007, while claimant was driving it and had reached at Siram Nala near Village Patron. In the aforesaid accident, allegedly claimant suffered multiple grievous injuries and remained admitted in Zonal Hospital Mandi, from where he was further referred to the IGMC Shimla. As per record, claimant remained indoor patient w.e.f. 16.7.2007 to 3.9.2007. Claimant further claimed that prior to the incident, he was earning sum of Rs. 7,000 pm, i.e. Rs. 4,000/- as salary and Rs. 1500 per month as diet money including daily expenses. He also averred that apart from above, he was earning Rs. 1500 p.m. from agriculture. 3. Respondents contested the aforesaid claim petition filed by the claimant on the ground of maintainability. Respondent No. 1, who happened to be owner of the vehicle, specifically denied the relationship of employer and employee between him and claimant and claimed that accident did not take place during the course of the employment. He also averred that in case, claimant is found entitled for compensation, respondent No. 2 may be held liable because the vehicle in question was insured with respondent No. 2 at the time of alleged incident vide policy No. 263202/2007/1991. Respondent No. 2-Insurance Company also opposed the aforesaid claim of the claimant on the ground that the petitioner was not holding effective and valid license to drive the category of vehicle. It also claimed that since there was no employer employee relationship between the claimant and respondent No. 1, respondent No. 2 is under no obligation to indemnify respondent No. 1. It also claimed that since there was no employer employee relationship between the claimant and respondent No. 1, respondent No. 2 is under no obligation to indemnify respondent No. 1. On the basis of pleadings adduced on record by the respective parties, court below framed following issues:- 1. Whether the petitioner is workman with respondent No. 1? OPP 2. Whether the petitioner is entitled for compensation? OPP 3. Whether the opposition party are liable to pay such compensation? OPP 4. Whether the petitioner was holding valid driving license to drive the category of vehicle insured at the time of the accident? OPP 5. Whether the accident has taken place during the course of employment? OPP 6. Relief. 4. Subsequently, vide judgment dated 8.1.2015, court below dismissed the claim petition filed by the claimant on the ground that claimant has been not able to prove that he was employed by respondent No. 1. Learned court below further held that it is not discernable from the evidence on record that accident took place while claimant had been driving taxi and he was employed as driver by the owner-respondent No. 1. In the aforesaid background, claimant has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, seeking therein compensation in terms of provisions contained under the Act after setting aside the impugned award. 5. This Court vide order dated 1.4.2015, admitted the instant appeal on following substantial questions of law:- (a) Whether claim of workmen/employee can be rejected on the ground that there existed no appointment letter, hence, presumption to the effect that there is no relationship of employer and employee? (b) Whether benefits of social welfare legislation could be denied on hyper technical grounds of appointment of workmen not governed by strict procedure of appointment in private sector? (c) Whether owner of a Taxi could be allowed to escape liability of his employee and to say that Taxi was being driven without his consent in the absence of any FIR or other overt and covert act against his employee? (d) Whether the person having driving licence to drive like motor vehicle can be said invalid to drive Maruti Van as Taxi. (e) Whether the persons sitting in the Taxi could be presumed as gratuitous passengers without any proof? 6. (d) Whether the person having driving licence to drive like motor vehicle can be said invalid to drive Maruti Van as Taxi. (e) Whether the persons sitting in the Taxi could be presumed as gratuitous passengers without any proof? 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record, be it oral or documentary, this Court finds that it is not in dispute that on account of injuries suffered by the petitioner-claimant in the alleged accident, he remained admitted, firstly at Zonal Hospital Mandi and thereafter at IGMC Shimla w.e.f. 16.7.2007 to 3.9.2007. PW-1 Dr. Baldev Kumar has specifically stated that he was a member of the Disability Board, wherein disability of the petitioner was assessed @ 75% permanent. He also proved disability certificate (Ext.PW-1/A) issued by the Board. Similarly, Dr. Jatin Sharma (PW-5), who examined claimant after the accident also proved the MLC Ext.PW-5/A. Factum with regard to lodging of FIR qua the alleged accident also stands duly proved. Suresh Kumar, VRK (PW-2) tendered in evidence copy of FIR No. 310 of 2007 dated 15.7.2007, under Sections 279 and 337 registered at PS Sadar (Ext.PW-2/A). 7. Claimant-Rajender Kumar (PW-3) while deposing as PW-3 categorically stated that he was employed by respondent No. 1 as a driver to drive his vehicle bearing HP-01K-0210. He stated that on 14.7.2007, while he was driving the vehicle in question from Manali to Samloun, being hired by one Dhameshwar, it met with an accident. He in his evidence tendered copy of matriculation certificate Ext.PW-3/B, driving licence Ext.PW-3/C and copy of Pariwar Register Ext.PW-3/D. He in his cross-examination admitted that respondent No. 1 had not issued any appointment letter to him, but specifically denied that he was not appointed as driver. In his cross-examination, he also stated that no receipt qua the salary ever came to be issued to him. He also stated that he cannot say as to in whose presence, he was appointed as driver, but everyone in Bazar knows it. He denied the suggestion that he had borrowed vehicle from respondent No. 1 and had come with person namely Dhameshwar and his fiance. 8. PW-4 Dhameshwar Ram, deposed that he had hired the aforesaid taxi from Manali to Samloun, which was being driven by the claimant. He also stated that claimant-Rajender suffered grievous injuries and as such, is entitled to receive compensation. 8. PW-4 Dhameshwar Ram, deposed that he had hired the aforesaid taxi from Manali to Samloun, which was being driven by the claimant. He also stated that claimant-Rajender suffered grievous injuries and as such, is entitled to receive compensation. In his cross-examination, he admitted that though he himself is a taxi driver, but feigned ignorance with regard to salary received by the petitioner stating that he was not employed by respondent No. 1 in his presence. He specifically denied the suggestion put to him that petitioner borrowed the vehicle for the purpose of his journey with his fiance. 9. Respondent No. 1 Shayam Lal, while deposing as RW2 categorically deposed that he is the registered owner of vehicle bearing No. HP-01K-0210 and had never employed petitioner as a driver. He stated that rather, person namely Dev Raj S/o Jeet Ram R/o Vashishat, was the driver employed on the vehicle. He stated that vehicle was duly insured with respondent No. 2 w.e.f. 13.8.2006 to 12.8.2007. In his cross-examination, he stated that factum with regard to accident came to his knowledge after 25 days of incident because at that time, he was at Leh. He also admitted that he did not make any complaint that the complainant Rajender Kumar was not his driver. He also admitted that he did not institute any suit or issue a notice to the petitioner qua his being not driver hired by him. Inder Singh, Jr. Assistant in the office of RLA, Mandi (RW1) deposed that petitioner was issued a driving license on 16.10.2006 vide No. D/L N 827/06, whereby he was authorized to drive M/C, S/C with gear, light motor vehicle non transport and the same was valid from 16.10.2006 to 15.10.2026. He specifically stated that claimant was not authorized to drive the transport vehicle. 10. Careful reading of impugned judgment reveals that the claim petition having been filed by the claimant came to be dismissed primarily on two grounds, firstly, petitioner failed to prove employer employee relationship inter-se him and respondent No. 1, secondly, petitioner was not having valid driving license to drive the category of vehicle allegedly met with accident. Since the petitioner failed to prove the employer and employee relationship, issue with regard to accident allegedly took place during the course of the employment also came to be decided against the claimant. Since the petitioner failed to prove the employer and employee relationship, issue with regard to accident allegedly took place during the course of the employment also came to be decided against the claimant. Learned court below solely on the statement of RW-1 Shayam Lal, who happened to be owner of the ill-fated vehicle proceeded to conclude that at no point of time, the petitioner claimant was employed as taxi driver in the ill fated vehicle, but having carefully perused evidence adduced on record by the petitioner workman, this Court finds aforesaid conclusion drawn by the court below to be erroneous. If the statement of claimant is read in its entirety, juxtaposing statement of RW-2, Shayam Lal (owner of the vehicle in question), it clearly emerges that the petitioner workman successfully proved on record that at the time of the alleged incident, he was engaged as a driver by respondent No. 1. 11. True, it is that petitioner claimant was unable to place on record appointment letter, if any, issued by the respondent No. 1 to prove his appointment, but this court cannot lose sight of the fact that normally, no written appointment letters are issued by the owners of the taxis to the drivers. The petitioner has very candidly admitted in her cross-examination that no appointment letter was issued, but he further qualified his aforesaid admission by stating that factum with regard to his being appointed as driver is very much in the knowledge of the people living in the bazaar area. Similarly, he has admitted that no receipt ever came to be issued to him on account of salary given by the owner (respondent No. 1), but factum with regard to his being appointed as driver in the vehicle in question by respondent No. 1 stands duly substantiated with the statement of Dhameshawr Ram PW-4, who himself is a taxi driver. He in his cross-examination categorically stated that he had hired taxi from Manali to Samloun and same was being driven by the claimant. He also stated that claimant suffered grievous injuries and is entitled to receive compensation. He in his cross-examination categorically stated that he had hired taxi from Manali to Samloun and same was being driven by the claimant. He also stated that claimant suffered grievous injuries and is entitled to receive compensation. He specifically denied suggestion put to him that the petitioner had borrowed the vehicle in question with a view to use it for the purpose of his journey with his fianc e. By putting aforesaid suggestion to the petitioner claimant as well as PW-4, stand taken by respondent No. 1 that vehicle in question was unauthorisedly used by the petitioner-claimant has virtually fallen to the ground because aforesaid suggestion itself suggest that vehicle in question was taken by the claimant with the consent of respondent No. 1, who otherwise at no point of time lodged FIR against the petitioner for unauthorized use of his vehicle by the claimant. 12. Interestingly, in the case at hand, respondent No. 1, who happened to be owner claimed that factum with regard to accident came to his knowledge after 25 days, but evidence available on record clearly reveals that immediately after accident, father of the respondent No. 1-owner, got the vehicle released. But interestingly, respondent No. 1, who claimed that he had never employed the claimant as driver, never lodged a report against the claimant for driving vehicle in question unauthorisedly without there being any permission from the respondent. He categorically admitted in his cross-examination that he did not institute any suit or issue notice to the petitioner for his illegal act. Aforesaid omission, if any, on the part of the respondent certainly compels this Court to agree with contention of Mr. Pathak, learned Senior Counsel that the petitioner claimant was employed as driver in the ill-fated vehicle by respondent No. 1, but he apprehending fastening of liability on him, took a false stand. Moreover, person namely Dev Raj, who allegedly was appointed as driver by respondent No. 2, never came to be examined by respondent No. 1. Factum with regard to petitioner-claimant holding Driving License at the time of alleged incident is not in dispute, rather dispute, if any, is with regard to competence, if any, of the petitioner-claimant to drive transport vehicle on the strength of driving license possessed by him, which was admittedly meant for plying light motor vehicle (non-transport). 13. Factum with regard to petitioner-claimant holding Driving License at the time of alleged incident is not in dispute, rather dispute, if any, is with regard to competence, if any, of the petitioner-claimant to drive transport vehicle on the strength of driving license possessed by him, which was admittedly meant for plying light motor vehicle (non-transport). 13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 5826 of 2011 titled Mukund Dewangan vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, which has been further followed by this Court while delivering judgment titled Kamal Dev vs. Tulsi Ram and Others in FAO No. 153 of 2014 decided on 12.9.2017 has categorically held that Section 10 of the Motor Vehicle Act requires a driver to hold driving licence with respect to type of vehicle and not with respect to a class of vehicle. While interpreting Section 10 of the Act, Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that in one class of vehicles, there may be different types of vehicles but if they fall in the same class of vehicles, no separate endorsement is required to drive such vehicles. Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that a holder of light motor vehicle licence can drive all the vehicles of the class including transport vehicles and any other interpretation would be repugnant to the definition of "light motor vehicle" in Section 2(21) and the provisions of Section 10(2)(d), Rule 8 of the Rules of 1989. In view of the aforesaid categorical finding returned by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court, finding returned by the learned court below qua issue No. 4, whereby it held that petitioner was not competent to drive the taxi, is wholly untenable and deserves to be set-aside. 14. In view of the detailed discussion made herein above, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that Tribunal below has fallen in grave error while rejecting the claim petition filed by the claimant. It stands duly proved on record that at the time of the alleged incident claimant was employed as a taxi driver by respondent No. 1 and as such, this Court is of the definite view that the petitioner claimant is entitled to compensation on account of injuries allegedly suffered by him in the accident in question. 15. In the case at hand, though petitioner-claimant claimed that he was earning Rs. 7,500/- (i.e. Rs. 4,000/- as salary and Rs. 15. In the case at hand, though petitioner-claimant claimed that he was earning Rs. 7,500/- (i.e. Rs. 4,000/- as salary and Rs. 1500 per month as diet money including daily expenses as well as Rs. 1500/- pm from agriculture, but since he has not been able to prove income as claimed by him by leading cogent and convincing evidence, this court is in agreement with Mr. Deepak Bhasin, learned counsel for the Insurance company that aforesaid amount claimed by him cannot be taken into consideration while determining the compensation. 16. Question, which needs to be examined at this stage is that on what basis monthly income of workman is required to be assessed and next question which needs to be examined is that in the absence of specific proof with regard to income what should be the criteria for this court to determine the compensation. 17. Before exploring the answers to aforesaid questions, it would be apt to take note of Section 41(1) of the Act:- "Section 4(1): Subject to the provisions of this Act, the amount of compensation shall be as follows, namely:- (a) Where death results from the injury. an amount equal to (fifty per cent) of the monthly wages of the deceased (employee) multiplied by the relevant factor. an amount of eighty thousand rupees, whichever is more. (b) Where permanent total disablement results from the injury. an amount equal to sixty per cent of the monthly wages of the injured workman multiplied by the relevant factor. an amount of ninety thousand rupees, whichever is more. Provided that the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time, enhance the amount of compensation mentioned in clauses (a) and (b). Explanation I - For the purposes of clause (a) and clause (b) "relevant factor" in relation to a workman means the factor specified in the second column of the Schedule IV against the entry in the first column of that Schedule specifying the number of years which are the same as the completed years of the age of the workman on his last birthday immediately preceding the date on which the compensation fell due. Explanation II - Where the monthly wages of a workman exceed four thousand rupees, his monthly wages for the purposes of clause (a) and clause (b) shall be deemed to be four thousand rupees only." 18. Explanation II - Where the monthly wages of a workman exceed four thousand rupees, his monthly wages for the purposes of clause (a) and clause (b) shall be deemed to be four thousand rupees only." 18. From the reading of the above, it is clear that the compensation for the death of the workman, is an amount equal to 50% of the monthly wages of the deceased or an amount of eighty thousand rupees, whichever is more. However, Explanation-II clearly specifies and restricts the monthly wages of a workman to be four thousand rupees only even if it exceeds rupees four thousand. 19. Subsequently, by Notification, dated 21.5.2010, by Act 45 of 2009, the above Section has been amended (w.e.f. 18.1.2010) as follows:- (a) Where death results from the injury. an amount equal to (fifty per cent) of the monthly wages of the deceased (employee) multiplied by the relevant factor. an amount of one lakh and twenty thousand rupees, whichever is more. (b) Where permanent total disablement results from the injury. an amount equal to sixty per cent of the monthly wages of the injured workman multiplied by the relevant factor. an amount of one lakh and forty thousand rupees, whichever is more. Explanation I - For the purposes of clause (a) and clause (b) "relevant factor" in relation to a employee means the factor specified in the second column of the Schedule IV against the entry in the first column of that Schedule specifying the number of years which are the same as the completed years of the age of the employee on his last birthday immediately preceding the date on which the compensation fell due. Explanation II - Omitted by Act 45 of 2009, S.7 (w.e.f. 18.1.2010)." 20. It is also not in dispute that vide Notification dated 31.05.2010 S.O. 1258(E), in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1b) of Section 4 of the Employees Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), the Central Government has specified Rs. 8,000/- as minimum wages for the purpose of sub-section (1) of Section 4. 21. From the bare perusal of aforesaid provisions of law as well as subsequent Notification dated 31.05.2010, it is explicit that for the death of the employee, an amount equal to 50% of his monthly wages multiplied by relevant factor or Rs. 1,20,000/- (Rs. 8,000/- as minimum wages for the purpose of sub-section (1) of Section 4. 21. From the bare perusal of aforesaid provisions of law as well as subsequent Notification dated 31.05.2010, it is explicit that for the death of the employee, an amount equal to 50% of his monthly wages multiplied by relevant factor or Rs. 1,20,000/- (Rs. one lakh and twenty thousand) whichever is more, has to be awarded towards compensation and for the purpose of computing such compensation, monthly wages at a sum of Rs. 8,000/- has to be considered. It is pertinent to mention here that prior to aforesaid amendment, the said wages were fixed at a sum of Rs. 4,000/- and Explanation-II specifically restricted the amount to be Rs. 4,000/- only even if it exceeds. However, by virtue of Act 45 of 2009, the restriction as referred above came to be omitted and in its place, a sum of Rs. 8,000/- has been substituted by way of Notification taken note hereinabove. It is not in dispute that while amending the said clause, no restriction has been attached or specified that if the monthly wages of the deceased employee exceeds Rs. 8,000/- whether it should be considered at Rs. 8,000/- only and, as such, there appears to be considerable force in the arguments of learned counsel appearing for the claimants that since no restriction is imposed in case the monthly wages of the deceased employee exceeds to Rs. 8,000/- liberal interpretation has to be made especially when the Act itself is a beneficial legislation. 22. At this stage it would be appropriate to refer para-4 of the "Statement of Objects and Reasons" mentioned in the Bill for amending the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (22nd December, 2009), as follows:- "Statement of Objects and Reasons:- 4. 8,000/- liberal interpretation has to be made especially when the Act itself is a beneficial legislation. 22. At this stage it would be appropriate to refer para-4 of the "Statement of Objects and Reasons" mentioned in the Bill for amending the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (22nd December, 2009), as follows:- "Statement of Objects and Reasons:- 4. The Central Government has decided to introduce the Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Bill, 2009, on the lines of the Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Bill, 2008 introduced in the 14th Lok Sabha incorporating therein certain recommendation of the Standing Committee proposing to amend the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 which inter alia, makes provision:- (a) for amendment in long title and the provisions of the aforesaid Act so as to substitute "Workman" by the "employee." (b) for enhancement of the minimum rates of compensation payable to a worker from eighty thousand rupees to one lakh twenty thousand rupees for death and from ninety thousand rupees to one lakh forty thousand rupees for permanent disability and to empower the Central Government to enhance the minimum rates of the said compensation from time to time. (c) to confer power upon the Central Government to specify the monthly wages in relation to an employee for the purpose of the aforesaid compensation." 23. Bare perusal of aforesaid 'Statement of Objects and Reasons' suggests that the amendment came into force while empowering the Central Government to enhance the minimum rates of the said compensation from time to time as well as to specify the monthly wages in relation to an employee for the purpose of the aforesaid compensation, meaning thereby fixing the minimum wages by way of amendment at Rs. 8000/- is only for the purpose of determining the compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and there is scope of further enhancement from time to time. Although, the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implement the legislative intent, but, it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute. 24. Although, the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implement the legislative intent, but, it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute. 24. In the case at hand, since the intent of the legislature is clear while amending the Act to enhance the minimum rates of the compensation from time to time as well as to specify the monthly wages in relation to an employee for the purpose of the said compensation, liberal interpretation beyond the prescription made in the Act, is not at all required. It is pertinent to note here that while amending the Act, the legislature has consciously in its wisdom, omitted the Explanation-II of Section 4-A of the Act only with a view to enhance the minimum rates of compensation. 25. Though by way of amendment as has been taken note herein above, Central Government has specified Rs. 8,000/- as minimum wages for the purpose of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act, but since such amendment came into force w.e.f. 31.5.2010, this Court in agreement with Mr. Bhasin, learned counsel for the Insurance Company that sum of Rs. 4,000/- which was fixed by the Central Government prior to aforesaid amendment, is required to be taken into consideration while assessing the amount of compensation. It is not in dispute that prior to aforesaid amendment, explanation-II, which came to be omitted vide Act 45 of 2009, S.7 w.e.f. 18.1.2010, restricted the monthly wages of a workman to be Rs. 4,000/- only. Hence, for all intents and purposes, wages of workman in the case at hand, who has allegedly suffered permanent disability on account of injuries suffered by him in the accident happened on 14.7.2007, i.e. prior to amendment, (came into force w.e.f. 31.5.2010), can be considered to be Rs. 4,000/- for determining the compensation. 26. From the bare reading of Section 4 (1) (b) (un-amended), it is quite apparent that workman allegedly suffered permanent disablement on account of injuries suffered by him in the accident, is entitled to amount equal to 60 percent of the monthly wages multiplied by the relevant factor or an amount of Rs. 90,000/- whichever is more. 26. From the bare reading of Section 4 (1) (b) (un-amended), it is quite apparent that workman allegedly suffered permanent disablement on account of injuries suffered by him in the accident, is entitled to amount equal to 60 percent of the monthly wages multiplied by the relevant factor or an amount of Rs. 90,000/- whichever is more. Since in the case at hand, accident took place prior to the amendment, compensation is required to be determined on the basis of un-amended provisions. As per Section 4A of the Act, compensation was required to be paid/deposited as soon as it fell due. In the present case, the accident occurred on 14.7.2007, meaning thereby, amount in terms of Section 4 of the Act, was to be deposited by the employer/insurer on or before 13.8.2007, but admittedly, neither amount qua the compensation, if any, in terms of Section 4 of the Act came to be deposited by the owner nor by the insurance company being insurer of the vehicle owned by respondent No. 1 and as such, claimant is also entitled to interest qua the delayed deposit. 27. However, at this stage, Sh. Deepak Bhasin, learned counsel representing the insurance company, while placing reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Mubasir Ahmed and Another, (2007) 2 SCC 349 , contended that interest, if any, qua the delayed deposit would only reckon from the date of adjudication of the claim, not from the date of the accident. Careful perusal of aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court (supra) suggests that Hon'ble Apex Court while interpreting expression "falls due" as provided under Section 2 of Section 4A held that legislature has not used the expression 'from the date of accident' and as such, unless there is an adjudication, question of an amount falling due, does not arise. Relevant para of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein below: "9. Interest is payable under Section 4A(3) if there is default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date it fell due. The question of liability under Section 4A was dealt with by this Court in Maghar Singh vs. Jashwant Singh. By Amending Act, 14 of 1995, Section 4A of the Act was amended, inter alia, fixing the minimum rate of interest to be simple interest @ 12%. The question of liability under Section 4A was dealt with by this Court in Maghar Singh vs. Jashwant Singh. By Amending Act, 14 of 1995, Section 4A of the Act was amended, inter alia, fixing the minimum rate of interest to be simple interest @ 12%. In the instant case, the accident took place after the amendment and, therefore, the rate of 12% as fixed by the High Court cannot be faulted. But the period as fixed by it is wrong. The starting point is on completion of one month from the date on which it fell due. Obviously it cannot be the date of accident. Since no indication is there as when it becomes due, it has to be taken to be the date of adjudication of the claim. This appears to be so because Section 4A(1) prescribes that compensation under Section 4 shall be paid as soon as it falls due. The compensation becomes due on the basis of adjudication of the claim made. The adjudication under Section 4 in some cases involves the assessment of loss of earning capacity by a qualified medical practitioner. Unless adjudication is done, question of compensation becoming due does not arise. The position becomes clearer on a reading of sub-section (2) of Section 4A. It provides that provisional payment to the extent of admitted liability has to be made when employer does not accept the liability for compensation to the extent claimed. The crucial expression is falls due. Significantly, legislature has not used the expression from the date of accident. Unless there is an adjudication, the question of an amount falling due does not arise." 28. After passing of aforesaid judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court on 2.11.2018, in Civil Appeal No. 7470 of 2009, in case titled North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation v. Smt. Sujatha, while taking note of judgment rendered by four Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled Pratap Narain Singh Deo vs. Srinivas Sabata and Another, (1976) 1 SCC 289 , has held that employer becomes liable to pay compensation as soon as the personal injury is caused to the workman in the accident. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated that it is the date of the accident and not date of adjudication of the claim, which is material while determining the interest, if any, payable on account of delayed payment. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated that it is the date of the accident and not date of adjudication of the claim, which is material while determining the interest, if any, payable on account of delayed payment. It would be apt to reproduce relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment herein below:- "19. The question relates to grant of interest on the awarded amount and further, from which date, it is to be awarded to the claimant (respondent). 20. The grant of interest on the awarded sum is governed by Section 4A of the Act. The question as to when does the payment of compensation under the Act "becomes due" and consequently what is the point of time from which interest on such amount is payable as provided under Section 4A (3) of the Act remains no more res integra and is settled by the two decisions of this Court. 21. As early as in 1975, a four Judge Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo vs. Srinivas Sabata and Another, (1976) 1 SCC 289 : AIR 1976 SC 222 speaking through Singhal, J. has held that an employer becomes liable to pay compensation as soon as the personal injury is caused to the workman in the accident which arose out of and in the course of employment. It was accordingly held that it is the date of the accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim, which is material. 22. Another question analogues to the main question arose before the Three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board and Another vs. Valsala K. and Another, (1999) 8 SCC 254 : AIR 1999 SC 3502 as to whether increased amount of compensation and enhanced rate of interest brought on statute by amending Act 30/1995 with effect from 15.09.1995 would also apply to cases in which the accident took place before 15.09.1995. Their lordships, placing reliance on the law laid down in Pratap Narain's case (supra) held that since the relevant date for determination of the rate of compensation is the date of accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim by the Commissioner and hence if the accident has taken place prior to 15.09.1995, the rate applicable on the date of accident would govern the subject. 23. 23. After these two decisions, this Court in two cases (both by the Two Judge Bench) viz. National Insurance Company Ltd vs. Mubasir Ahmed and Another, (2007) 2 SCC 349 and Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Mohmad Nasir and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 280 without noticing the law laid down in Pratap Narain and Valsala cases (supra) took a contrary view and held that payment of compensation would fall due only after the Commissioner's order or with reference to the date on which the claim application is made. 24. This conflict of view in the decisions on the question was noticed by this Court (Two Judge Bench) in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd vs. Siby George and Others, (2012) 12 SCC 540 . Justice Aftab Alam speaking for the Bench referred to aforementioned decisions and explaining the ratio of each decision held that since the two later decisions rendered in the cases of Mubasir and Mohmad Nasir (supra) which took contrary view without noticing the earlier two decisions of this Court rendered in Pratap Narain and Valsala cases (supra) by the larger Benches (combination of four and three Judges respectively) and hence later decisions rendered in Mubasir and Mohmad Nasir cases (supra) cannot be held to have laid down the correct principles of law on the question and nor can, therefore, be treated as binding precedent on the question. 25. In other words, the law laid down in Pratap Narain and Valsala cases (supra) was held to hold the field through out as laying down the correct principle of law on the subject. The Two Judge Bench in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd vs. Siby George and others (supra) accordingly followed the principle of law laid down in Pratap Narain and Valsala cases (supra) and decided the case instead of following the law laid down in Mubasir and Mohmad Nasir cases (supra) which was held per incuriam." 29. The Two Judge Bench in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd vs. Siby George and others (supra) accordingly followed the principle of law laid down in Pratap Narain and Valsala cases (supra) and decided the case instead of following the law laid down in Mubasir and Mohmad Nasir cases (supra) which was held per incuriam." 29. Aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court clearly reveals that Hon'ble Apex Court while rendering judgment in Mubasir Ahmed's case (supra) inadvertently failed to take note of its earlier decision rendered by four Judges Bench in case titled Pratap Narain Singh Deo vs. Srinivas Sabata and Another, (1976) 1 SCC 289 and Kerala State Electricity Board and Another vs. Valsala K. and Another, (1999) 8 SCC 254 and as such, in case titled Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Siby George and Others, (2012) 12 SCC 540 , two Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court having noticed aforesaid conflicting view, held that since court in cases titled Mubasir Ahmed and Mohmad Nasir's cases (supra), took contrary view without noticing earlier decisions of this Court rendered in Pratap Narain and Valasala's cases supra, passed by the larger Benches (combination of three or four judges respectively), later decisions rendered in Mubasir and Mohamad Nasir's cases cannot be held to have laid down the correct principles of law in question and nor therefore, can be treated as binding precedent on the question. 30. It is quite apparent from the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. Smt. Sujatha's case (supra) that interest in terms of Section 4-A of the Act becomes due from the date of accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mubasir Ahmed's case (supra). Hence in view of the aforesaid judgment, claimant is also entitled to interest under Section 4A(3)(a) on account of delay in deposit of amount payable by the owner of the offending vehicle from the date of accident. 31. Since this Court has held the claimant entitled for compensation on account of accident, next question, which needs to be determined is with regard to quantum of compensation. 31. Since this Court has held the claimant entitled for compensation on account of accident, next question, which needs to be determined is with regard to quantum of compensation. Before ascertaining quantum as referred herein above, it would be apt to take note of judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled Raj Kumar vs. Ajay Kumar and Another, (2011) 1 SCC 343 , wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has prescribed factors to be taken into consideration before awarding compensation. Para Nos. 12 to 15 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under: 12. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is any permanent disability and if so the extent of such permanent disability. This means that the tribunal should consider and decide with reference to the evidence: (i) whether the disablement is permanent or temporary. (ii) if the disablement is permanent, whether it is permanent total disablement or permanent partial disablement. (iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed with reference to any specific limb, then the effect of such disablement of the limb on the functioning of the entire body, that is the permanent disability suffered by the person. If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent disability then there is no question of proceeding further and determining the loss of future earning capacity. But if the Tribunal concludes that there is permanent disability then it will proceed to ascertain its extent. After the Tribunal ascertains the actual extent of permanent disability of the claimant based on the medical evidence, it has to determine whether such permanent disability has affected or will affect his earning capacity. 13. Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent disability on the actual earning capacity involves three steps. The Tribunal has to first ascertain what activities the claimant could carry on in spite of the permanent disability and what he could not do as a result of the permanent ability (this is also relevant for awarding compensation under the head of loss of amenities of life). The second step is to ascertain his avocation, profession and nature of work before the accident, as also his age. The second step is to ascertain his avocation, profession and nature of work before the accident, as also his age. The third step is to find out whether (i) the claimant is totally disabled from earning any kind of livelihood, or (ii) whether in spite of the permanent disability, the claimant could still effectively carry on the activities and functions, which he was earlier carrying on, or (iii) whether he was prevented or restricted from discharging his previous activities and functions, but could carry on some other or lesser scale of activities and functions so that he continues to earn or can continue to earn his livelihood. 14. For example, if the left hand of a claimant is amputated, the permanent physical or functional disablement may be assessed around 60%. If the claimant was a driver or a carpenter, the actual loss of earning capacity may virtually be hundred percent, if he is neither able to drive or do carpentry. On the other hand, if the claimant was a clerk in government service, the loss of his left hand may not result in loss of employment and he may still be continued as a clerk as he could perform his clerical functions; and in that event the loss of earning capacity will not be 100% as in the case of a driver or carpenter, nor 60% which is the actual physical disability, but far less. In fact, there may not be any need to award any compensation under the head of 'loss of future earnings', if the claimant continues in government service, though he may be awarded compensation under the head of loss of amenities as a consequence of losing his hand. Sometimes the injured claimant may be continued in service, but may not found suitable for discharging the duties attached to the post or job which he was earlier holding, on account of his disability, and may therefore be shifted to some other suitable but lesser post with lesser emoluments, in which case there should be a limited award under the head of loss of future earning capacity, taking note of the reduced earning capacity. 15. 15. It may be noted that when compensation is awarded by treating the loss of future earning capacity as 100% (or even anything more than 50%), the need to award compensation separately under the head of loss of amenities or loss of expectation of life may disappear and as a result, only a token or nominal amount may have to be awarded under the head of loss of amenities or loss of expectation of life, as otherwise there may be a duplication in the award of compensation. Be that as it may." 32. In the case at hand, careful perusal of Ext.PW-1/A, which has been duly proved by PW-1 Dr. Baldev Kumar, BMO, Specialist Orthopedic Surgeon at Regional Hospital, Kullu, H.P., clearly reveals that in the alleged accident, claimant suffered disability to the extent of 75%. In the disability certificate, it has been categorically mentioned that the claimant has suffered traumatic para-paresis (partial paralysis) affecting his both legs and arms. Certificate, as referred herein above, further reveals that disability suffered by the claimant is not likely to improve and same is non progressive. PW-1 doctor in his examination in chief has categorically stated that disability described in the certificate Ext.PW-1/A will affect the walking of the claimant. Aforesaid version put forth by PW-1 has remained un-rebutted in the cross-examination conducted by the respondents. Similarly, PW-5 Dr. Jatin Sharma, who had an occasion to examine the claimant at the first instance, has also proved on record MLC Ext.PW-5/A, perusal whereof also reveals that in preliminary investigation, aforesaid doctor also found the complainant to have suffered traumatic para-paresis in the alleged incident. It stands duly proved on record that claimant, who is/was driver by profession suffered 75% disability on account of alleged accident. As per medical evidence available on record, both legs and arms of the claimant have been affected, as a result of which, he would not be able to carry out aforesaid profession any more. PW-1, who issued disability certificate has categorically stated that on account of type of injury suffered by the claimant i.e. traumatic para-paresis, walking of the claimant would be affected. 33. Having regard to the nature of job being performed by the claimant prior to the alleged incident, it can be safely concluded that claimant is totally disabled from earning any kind of livelihood. 33. Having regard to the nature of job being performed by the claimant prior to the alleged incident, it can be safely concluded that claimant is totally disabled from earning any kind of livelihood. Hence, 75% disability as assessed by the medical board is required to be considered as total incapacitation of claimant to earn his livelihood, especially, in view of the nature of injury and work to be done as a driver. 34. In the aforesaid background, now compensation is determined as under:- 1. Completed year of age on the last birthday of the claimant immediately proceeding the date on which the compensation fell due 26 years 2. Relevant factor to calculate Compensation. 215.28 3. Wages of Workman Rs. 2400/- (i.e. 60% of Rs. 4,000/-) 4. Compensation amount due 215.28 x 2400 = Rs. 5,16,672/- 5. Interest @12% p.a. on account of delay in making the payment in terms of Section 4-A(3) (a). To be calculated by the Commissioner below. 6. Interest @ 12% per annum On the total compensation amount from the date of filing of claim petition till its payment. 35. Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled Ved Prakash Garg vs. Premi Devi and Others, (1998) 1 ACJ 1, has held that payment of interest and penalty are two distinct liabilities arising under the Workman Compensation Act; penalty is not a part and parcel of the legal liability of the employer to compensate his employee and since the insurer is under contractual obligation to indemnify the employer for his legal liability, the insurer is not liable to pay the penalty. So far as the amount of penalty imposed on the inured employer under contingencies contemplated by Sections 4A(3) (a) and (b) of the Act is concerned, same is payable by the employer, not by the insurer. However, in the case at hand, neither specific prayer, if any, was made for grant of penalty nor ground, if any, has been set out in the present appeal. Moreover, careful perusal of order dated 24.9.2019, passed by this Court reveals that learned counsel on the instructions of the claimant has virtually abandoned/ waived aforesaid claim by stating that claimant has not raised any claim with regard to penalty and as such, there is no occasion for this court to issue show-cause to the respondent-owner before imposition of penalty in terms of Section 4(3)(a) (ii) of the Act. In view of the aforesaid statement made by the learned counsel for the claimant, this Court sees no reason to award penalty, if any, under Section 4(3)(a) (ii) of the Act. 36. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above as well as law relied upon, present appeal is allowed and judgment dated 8.1.2015 passed by the learned court below is quashed and set aside. Though respondent-insurance Company and respondent-owner are jointly held liable to pay the compensation to the claimant as quantified herein above alongwith interest @ 12% p.a. from the date of filing of the petition till its realization, but total amount of compensation would be paid by the respondent-insurance company. It may be observed that interest awarded @ 12% on account of delay in making the payment under Section 4-A (3) (a) is separate from the interest awarded @ 12% on the total amount of compensation. Commissioner is directed to work out the total amount payable to the claimant in terms of instant judgment. Learned counsel for the parties undertake to cause presence of their respective clients before the Commissioner concerned on 5.11.2019, on which date, the Commissioner will proceed to calculate the total amount payable to the claimant in terms of instant judgment enabling the respondent-insurance company to deposit the same within a period of one month for being paid to the claimant after due verification. Accordingly, the present appeal is disposed of alongwith pending applications, if any.