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2019 DIGILAW 1526 (SC)

Prakash Jain v. State Of Karnataka

2019-07-03

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, DEEPAK GUPTA, RANJAN GOGOI

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ORDER 1. Leave granted. 2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. The accused-appellants have been convicted under Section 379 IPC and Section 21 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, by the learned Trial Court. The sentence imposed in respect of both the offences is one of fine. The appeal of the accused-appellants before the learned Sessions Judge was dismissed. Against the same a revision was filed before the High Court. The High Court while affirming and upholding the conviction, enhanced the sentence to one of rigorous imprisonment of three months for the offence under Section 379 IPC and rigorous imprisonment of six months for the offence under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, This was done bythe High Court in the appeal filed by the accused-appellants against the conviction and sentence of fine and in the absence of any appeal by the State. 4. It is a well settled principle of law that though the High Court has the power to enhance the sentence sou motu, such power should be exercised sparingly and in exceptional circumstances and furthermore this power should not be exercised without issuing notice to the accused. This notice cannot be an illusory notice. As far as the present case is concerned, it appears that during the course of hearing notice was given. However, it is not clear whether such a notice was an oral notice or a notice in writing. In our view, such a notice would not satisfy the legal requirements. Any notice for enhancement must indicate why the Court wants to enhance the sentence and it must give reasonable time to the accused to answer the notice. This did not happen in the present case. 5. In the above facts, we are inclined to take the view that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction under the law to order imposition of sentence of imprisonment on the accused-appellants. The appeal of the accused-appellants is, therefore, allowed to the extent that the sentence of imprisonment by the High Court, in so far as two offences are concerned, is set aside. 6. The appeal is allowed and all pending applications stand disposed of.