JUDGMENT : D.K. Upadhyaya, J. 1. Heard Sri Dinesh Kumar Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel representing the State-respondents and Dr. Ram Surat Pande, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Virendra Bhatt, learned Counsel representing the respondent Nos. 3 and 7. 2. Under challenge in this petition is an order dated 2.2.2019, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ayodhya, whereby the revision petition preferred by the petitioner against the order passed way back on 22.9.1962 by the Consolidation Officer, has been rejected. 3. When asked as to why the order dated 22.9.1962, passed by the Consolidation Officer was challenged by the petitioner on 30.1.2019 after lapse of a period of about 56-57 years, learned Counsel for the petitioner has attempted to offer an explanation to the effect that even the petitioner has been relying upon the revenue entries based on said order dated 22.9.1962 in a Suit instituted under section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and when he was advised to obtain certified copy of the order dated 22.9.1962, it was revealed that the said order was never passed. His submission is, thus, that when he came to know about the order dated 22.9.1962 passed by the Consolidation Officer being fictitious that he preferred a revision petition challenging the same under section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 4. I have perused the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, dated 2.2.2019, which is under challenge herein. Learned Deputy Director of Consolidation has dismissed the revision petition filed by the petitioner not only on the ground of delay but while passing the impugned order he has observed that though the first round of consolidation proceedings concluded in the year 1963 and thereafter second round of consolidation proceedings commenced on 30.8.1980 and concluded in the year 1997, however, the petitioner did not raise any objection in respect of the entries in the revenue record which were based on the order dated 22.9.1962 during the second round of consolidation proceedings. Learned Deputy Director of Consolidation has, thus, concluded, and rightly so that the conduct of the petitioner by not taking any objection during second round of consolidation operations in respect of the revenue entries based on the order dated 22.9.1962, is such that the revision petition challenging the order passed by the Consolidation Officer after 56-57 years cannot be permitted to be preferred.
5. Learned Deputy Director of Consolidation has also placed reliance of certain judgments of this Court wherein it has been clearly laid down that finality of the consolidation proceedings has a purpose and some sanctity needs to be attached to such proceedings and in case the appellate or revisional jurisdictions are permitted to be invoked after a such long gap (which in this case is 56 years), the same would not be lawful. 6. So far as the reasons given by the learned Deputy Director of Consolidation in the impugned order are concerned, I am in complete agreement with the same. In view of the conduct of the petitioner that he did not raise any objection to the entries based on the order dated 22.9.1962 passed by the Consolidation Officer during course of second round of consolidation operations, in my considered opinion, he could not have been permitted to challenge the said order after a lapse of period of 56-57 years by filing revision petition. It is further noticeable mat the consolidation proceedings are conducted in terms of the statutory mandate contained in the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act which are drawn for the purposes of making the village free of disputes in relation to the rights and title over the holdings amongst the parties. If interference in the orders passed in consolidation proceedings is permitted even after lapse of a period of about 56-57 long years, that will be clearly in derogation of the Legislative mandate as contained in the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. This cannot be intention of the Legislature. Finality attached to the orders passed under any statutory mechanism has to be respected and given sanctity, otherwise any statutory judicial mechanism for providing grievance redressal will be rendered unworkable which will not be in public interest; rather will be against public-policy. 7. In respect of the submission made by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that if the order dated 22.9.1962 is a fraudulent order, the limitation will have no bearing in challenging the same, I am only to indicate that the said plea was open for the petitioner during second round of consolidation operations where he failed to file any objection. 8.
8. In respect of the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order dated 22.9.1962 is said to have been passed under section 38 (3) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, which provision on the relevant date i.e. 22.9.1962 stood repealed and, thus, the order dated 22.9.1962 is manifestly a fraudulent order, it may only be observed that while repealing the provision contained under section 38 (2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, another provision in the form of section 42-A was inserted by U.P. Act No. 38 of 1958. Section 38(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act which existed in the Statute Book prior to its repeal runs as under: "38(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, of the Consolidation Officer is satisfied that a clerical or arithmetical mistake or error apparent on the face of the record exists in any document prepared under any provisions of this Act, he shall, either on his own motion or on the application of any person interested, correct the same." 9. Section 42-A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as inserted in the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act by U.P. Act No. 38 of 1958 runs as under: "42A. Correction of clerical or arithmetical errors.--Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if the Consolidation Officer or the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, is satisfied that a clerical or arithmetical error apparent on the face of the record exists in any document prepared under any provision of this Act, he shall, either on his own motion, or on the application of any person interested, correct the same." 10. If the provisions contained in section 42-A and section 38(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act are compared, both are found almost to be in pari materia to each other and accordingly, if while passing the order dated 22.9.1962 instead of section 42-A, section 38(2) has been mentioned by the Consolidation Officer, the petitioner cannot be permitted to take any exception of the same. 11. At this juncture, learned Counsel for the petitioner, to buttress his submission that in case of fraud, limitation will have no bearing on any proceedings, has cited a judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu. (1994) 1 SCC 1 .
11. At this juncture, learned Counsel for the petitioner, to buttress his submission that in case of fraud, limitation will have no bearing on any proceedings, has cited a judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu. (1994) 1 SCC 1 . He has cited the said judgment also in opposition to the principle relied upon by Dr. Ram Surat Pandey, learned Counsel representing the respondents of "finality of litigation'. 12. So far as the judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the aforesaid case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (supra) is concerned, there cannot be dispute or quarrel about the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court. However, what is noticeable in this case is the statutory bar created by section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act which clearly prescribes that during course of consolidation operations, if any objection could have been or ought to have been raised, but was not raised such objection, no revenue or civil Court shall entertain any claim subsequently after issuance of notification under section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. For the said reason, the judgment cited by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, in my opinion, does not have any application to the facts of the case. 13. For the reasons aforesaid, I am not inclined to interfere in this petition, which is hereby dismissed.