JUDGMENT : Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.: Being aggrieved with the award dated 13.06.2017 passed by the District Judge-XIV-cum-Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Dhanbad in Title (M.V) Suit No. 61 of 2014, the appellant-Insurance Company has preferred the present appeal under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 2. The brief facts of the case is that on 31.01.2014, while Bhairav Lal Mahto (deceased) was returning home after performing his duty from Sendra Bansjora Colliery on his Moped bearing registration No. JH-10 AG-6371 and reached near Shakti Chowk at 3.30 p.m, a Hywa bearing registration No. JH-10 AG1285, being driven rashly and negligently and coming from Rajganj Side dashed the said Bhairav Lal Mahto, which caused serious injuries to him. Thereafter, said Bhairav Lal Mahto was taken to Patliputra Medical College and Hospital, Dhanbad, where he succumbed to his injuries. 3. The said Bhairav Lal Mahto was an employee of Bharat Coking Coal Limited working as Coal Dresser at Sendra Bansjora Colliery, Dhanbad with a monthly salary of Rs. 39,140.74 at that time. At the time of death, he was only 44 years old and left behind his widow wife, one son and two daughters, who were the original plaintiffs (respondent nos. 1 to 4 herein) and who had filed the suit being Title (M.V) Suit No. 61 of 2014 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Dhanbad claiming compensation to the tune of Rs. 63,52,199.96 with interest @ 9 % per annum from pendente lite and future cost from the defendants-owner and insurer of the said vehicle (Hywa) invoking provisions of Section 166 read with Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (herein after referred to as the ‘Act’). 4. Before the Tribunal, the defendants, owner and insurer of the offending vehicle, appeared and filed their separate written statements. 5. The owner of the Hywa admitting his ownership of Hywa bearing registration No. JH-10 AG-1285 submitted that vehicle was duly insured with the insurance company-Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company (herein after referred to as ‘appellant-insurance company’) having validity from 30.09.2013 to 29.09.2014 thereby covering the date of occurrence i.e. 31.01.2014, hence liability to indemnify lies upon the said insurer. The owner of the said vehicle further submitted that driver of the said vehicle, Santosh Sao was possessing a valid driving license. The owner of the said vehicle further submitted that driver of the said vehicle, Santosh Sao was possessing a valid driving license. He further submitted that the vehicle in question complied with all the terms and conditions of the policy under the Insurance Act. 6. The appellant-insurance company, in its written statement, has admitted that the said vehicle, TATA Tipper No. JH-10 AG1285 at the time of accident was insured with it. However, it was pointed out that the claim case is bad on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties, as the owner and insurer of the Moped No. JH-10 AG-6371, upon which the deceased was traveling, has not been made party in the claim case. The appellant-insurance company further submitted that the driver of the Hywa was not holding the valid driving license at the time of accident and further disputed the age, occupation and income of the deceased and submitted that claim, sought for, by the claimants is exorbitant. 7. The Tribunal, after framing the issues, examined the necessary documents brought on record by the parties and evidence adduced by them, and assessed the total compensation to be paid in favour of claimants to the tune of Rs. 52,34,893/-and directed the appellant-insurance company to pay the same along with interest @ 6 % per annum till its payment. 8. Here, it would be pertinent to note that the Tribunal, while deciding Issue Nos. IV and V together (Issue No. IV – Whether the driver of the offending truck had a valid and effective driving licence at the time of accident?; Issue No. V – Whether the offending vehicle had a valid permit at the time of accident?), which are the core issues before this Court, came to a finding that the driver of the said vehicle was possessing L.M.V Licence only as such the driver of the Hywa vehicle at the time of accident was not duly authorized to drive the said vehicle. So far permit of the offending truck is concerned, none of the parties has brought it on record. With the aforesaid findings, the Issue Nos. IV and V were decided giving recovery rights to the insurance company for the said violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance in respect of the said vehicle. 9. So far permit of the offending truck is concerned, none of the parties has brought it on record. With the aforesaid findings, the Issue Nos. IV and V were decided giving recovery rights to the insurance company for the said violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance in respect of the said vehicle. 9. This Court vide order dated 16.02.2018 issued notice upon all the respondents, which were validly served upon the respondents. Pursuant to that Vakalatnama has been filed on behalf of respondent nos. 1 to 4, 6 and 7. However, in spite of notice being validly served upon respondent no. 5 (the owner of the vehicle) neither he appeared in person nor any Vakalatnama has been filed on his behalf. 10. Heard Mr. A.N. Krishnaswami, learned counsel being assisted by Mr. Alok Lal, learned counsel for the appellant insurance company and Mr. Saibal Kumar Laik, learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 4, 6 and 7. 11. Mr. Krishnaswamy, learned counsel for the appellant-insurance company at the outset very fairly submitted that the appellant is not aggrieved with the quantum of compensation rather the appellant is aggrieved with the direction of the Tribunal for payment of the compensation to the claimants, which is to be recovered from the owner of the said Hywa. 12. On merit of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant first referred to Section 149 of the Act. For better appreciation, Section 149 of the Act is reproduced herein below: “149. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risk. 12. On merit of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant first referred to Section 149 of the Act. For better appreciation, Section 149 of the Act is reproduced herein below: “149. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risk. – (1) If, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (3) of section 147 in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment or award in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section 91) of section 147 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) “ or under the provision of Section 163A” is obtained against any person insured by the policy then, notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the person entitled, to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment debtor, any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments. (2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment or award unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment or award is given the insurer had notice through the Court or as the case may be, the Claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgment or award so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds namely. – (a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy being one of the following conditions, namely: – (i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle – (a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or (b) for organised racing and speed testing, or (c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or (d) without side-car being attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle; or (ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification; or (iii)a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed or by conditions of war, riot or civil commotion; or (b) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular. (3) Where any such judgment as is referred to in sub-section (1) is obtained from a Court in a reciprocating country and in the case of a foreign judgment is by virtue of the provisions of section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) conclusive as to any matter adjudicated upon by it the insurer (being an insurer registered under the Insurance Act, 1938 (4 of 1938) and whether or not he is registered under the corresponding law of the reciprocating country) shall be liable to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree in the manner and to the extent specified in sub-section (1), as if the judgment were given by a Court in India; Provided that no sum shall be payable by the insurer in respect of any such judgment unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment is given, the insurer had notice through the Court concerned of the bringing of the proceedings and the insurer to whom notice is to be made a party to the proceedings and to defend the action on grounds similar to those specified in sub-section (2); (4) Where a certificate of insurance has been issued under subsection (3) to section 147 to the person to whom a policy has been effected, so much of the policy as purports to restrict the insurance of the persons insured there by reference to any conditions other than those in clause (b) of sub-section (2) shall, as of sub-section (1) of section 147, be of no effect: Provided that any sum paid by the insurer in or towards the discharge of any liability of any person which is covered by the policy by virtue only of this sub-section shall be recoverable by the insurer from that person. (5) If the amount which an insurer becomes liable under this section to pay in respect of a liability incurred by a person insured by a policy exceeds the amount for which the insurer would apart from the provisions of this section be liable under the policy in respect of that liability, the insurer shall be entitled to recover the excess from that person (6) In this Section the expressions “material fact” and “material particular” means, respectively a fact or particular of such a nature as to influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in determining whether he will take the risk and, if so, at what premium and on what conditions, and the expression “liability covered by the terms of the policy' means a liability which is covered by the policy or which would be so covered but for the fact that the insurer is entitled to avoid or cancel or has avoided or cancelled the policy. (7) No insurer to whom the notice referred to in sub-section (2) or subsection (3) has been given shall be entitled to avoid his liability to any person entitled to the benefit of any such judgment or award as is referred to in sub-section (3) otherwise than in the manner provided for in sub-section (2) or in the corresponding law of the reciprocating country, as the case may be.” 13. Mr. Krishnaswamy submitted that Section 149 (1) of the Act requires insurer to satisfy the judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of 3rd party risks. He further submitted that the insurer is principally liable to pay the compensation in view of vicarious liability and such liability is covered by a policy, subject to the provisions of Section 149 is required to be paid to the person entitled to the benefit of decree. Learned counsel for the appellant referring to salient features of Section 149 (1) submitted that insurer is required to pay any such liability as is required to be covered by policy under clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 and Section 147 (1) (b) is in respect of 3rd Party claims. Further submission has been made that such liability to pay compensation is subject to provisions of the entire Section 149, which includes Sub-section (2) and Sub-section (7). Further, payment to be made to the 3rd Party who is entitled to the benefit of the decree. 14. Further submission has been made that such liability to pay compensation is subject to provisions of the entire Section 149, which includes Sub-section (2) and Sub-section (7). Further, payment to be made to the 3rd Party who is entitled to the benefit of the decree. 14. Mr. Krishnaswamy, further submitted that if the liability is on the Insurance Company, the Insurance Company is bound to satisfy the award, but, if the Insurance Company is not liable to pay then the direction of the Tribunal to pay and recover is bad in law, as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Captain Itbar Singh & Ors as reported in AIR 1959 SC 1331 , in particular, paragraphs 1, 5, 6, 7 and 8, which are quoted herein below: “1. These two appeals arise out of two suits and have been heard together. The suits had been filed against owners of motor cars for recovery of damages suffered by the plaintiffs as a result of the negligent driving of the cars. The owners of the cars were insured against third party risks and the insurers were subsequently added as defendants to the suits under the provisions of sub-s. (2) of S.96 of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939. The terms of that sub-section will have to be set out later, but it may now, be stated that it provided that an insurer added as a party to an action under it was entitled to defend on the grounds enumerated in it. 5. To start with it is necessary to remember that apart from the statute an insurer has no right to be made a party to the action by the injured person against the insured causing the injury. Sub-s. (2) of Section 96 however gives him the right to be made a party to the suit and to defent it. The right therefore is created by statute and its content necessarily depends on the provisions of the statute. The question then really is, what are the defences that sub-s.92). makes available to an insurer? That clearly is a question of interpretation of the sub-section. 6. Now the language of sub-s.(2) seems to us to be perfectly plain and to admit of no doubt or confusion. The question then really is, what are the defences that sub-s.92). makes available to an insurer? That clearly is a question of interpretation of the sub-section. 6. Now the language of sub-s.(2) seems to us to be perfectly plain and to admit of no doubt or confusion. It is that an insurer to whom the requisite notice of the action has been given "shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely", after which comes an enumeration of the grounds. It would follow that an insurer is entitled to defend on any of the grounds enumerated and no others. If it were not so, then of course no grounds need have been enumerated. When the grounds of defence have been specified, they cannot be added to. To do that would be adding words to the statute. 7. Sub-section (6) also indicates clearly how sub-s. (2) should be read. It says that no insurer to whom the notice of the action has been given shall be entitled to avoid his liability under sub-s. (1) "otherwise than in the manner provided for in sub-section (2)". Now the only manner of avoiding liability provided for in sub-s. (2) is by successfully raising any of the defences therein mentioned. It comes then to this that the insurer cannot avoid his liability except by establishing such defences. Therefore sub-s. (6) clearly contemplates that he cannot take any defence not mentioned in sub-s. (2). If he could, then he would have been in a position to avoid his liability in a manner other than that provided for in sub-s. (2). That is prohibited by sub-s. (6). 8. We therefore think that sub-s. (2) clearly provides that an insurer made a defendant to the action is not entitled to take any defence which is not specified in it.” 15. Relying upon this judgment, he submits that sub-section (6) also indicates how sub-section (2) should be read, and says that no insurer to whom the notice of the action has been given shall be entitled to avoid his liability under sub-section (1) otherwise than in the manner provided in sub-section (2). Relying upon this judgment, he submits that sub-section (6) also indicates how sub-section (2) should be read, and says that no insurer to whom the notice of the action has been given shall be entitled to avoid his liability under sub-section (1) otherwise than in the manner provided in sub-section (2). He further submitted that the only manner of avoiding liability provided in sub-section (2) is by successfully raising any of the defences mentioned therein and the insurer cannot avoid his liability except by establishing such defences. As such, sub-section (2) clearly provides that an insurer made a defendant to the action is not entitled to take any defence which is not specified in it. 16. Mr. Krishnaswamy, learned counsel for the appellant-insurance company further submitted that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd Vs. Gian Chand & Ors as reported in (1997) 7 SCC 558 has clearly enunciated that wherein the Hon’ble Court has held that when the insured had handed over the vehicle for being driven by an unlicenced driver, the Insurance Company would get exonerated from its liability to meet the claims of third party who might have suffered on account of vehicular accident caused by such unlicensed driver. The relevant paragraph 13 and 14 of the said judgment is quoted herein below: “13. In the result, therefore, this appeal is allowed. The decision of the High Court under appeal to the extent it refused to exonerate the Insurance Company will stand set aside and it is held that the appellant-Insurance Company is not liable to meet the claim of the respondent-claimants. The claim petition will stand rejected against the appellant-Insurance Company. The respondent-claimants will however be entitled to recover the awarded amount of compensation from Respondents 1 and 9. 14. As there was already a stay in favour of the appellant pending these proceedings and consequently the claimants have not been paid any amount by the appellant, no further question arises insofar as the claim of the Insurance Company in the present appeal is concerned.” 17. In support of his case, learned counsel further referred to the decision rendered in the case of Kashiram Yadav & Anr Vs. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. & Ors as reported in (1989) 4 SCC 128 , in particular paragraph 6 and 7, which are quoted herein below: “6. In support of his case, learned counsel further referred to the decision rendered in the case of Kashiram Yadav & Anr Vs. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. & Ors as reported in (1989) 4 SCC 128 , in particular paragraph 6 and 7, which are quoted herein below: “6. We affirm and reiterate the statement of law laid down in the above case. We may also state that without the knowledge of the insured, if by driver’s acts or omission others meddle with the vehicle and cause an accident, the insurer would be liable to indemnify the insured. The insurer in such a case cannot take the defence of a breach of the condition in the certificate of insurance. 7. But in the present case, the onus of the insurer has been discharged from the evidence of the insured himself. The insured took a positive defence stating that he was not the owner of the vehicle since he had already sold the same to a third party. This has not been proved. Secondly, he took a defence stating that the vehicle at the relevant time was driven by a licensed driver, Gaya Prasad (PW 2). This was proved to be false. There is no other material even to indicate that the vehicle was entrusted to the licensed driver on the date of the fatal accident. With these distinguishing features in the present case, we do not think that the ratio of the decision in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. case could be called to aid the appellants.” 18. He further submitted that in the above-referred case the finding of the Tribunal that when the accident took place due to negligent driving of the driver, who has no licence to drive the vehicle, the owner of the vehicle alone is liable to pay the compensation has been affirmed up-to Hon’ble Apex Court. 19. Learned counsel further referred to the decision rendered in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd., Chandigarh Vs. Nicolletta Rohtagi & Ors as reported in (2002) 7 SCC 456 , in particular 14, 15 and 32, which are quoted herein below: “14. Sub-section (7) of Section 149 of the 1988 Act clearly indicates in what manner sub-section (2) of Section 149 has to be interpreted. Ltd., Chandigarh Vs. Nicolletta Rohtagi & Ors as reported in (2002) 7 SCC 456 , in particular 14, 15 and 32, which are quoted herein below: “14. Sub-section (7) of Section 149 of the 1988 Act clearly indicates in what manner sub-section (2) of Section 149 has to be interpreted. Sub-section (7) of Section 149 provides that no insurer to whom the notice referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) has been given shall be entitled to avoid his liability to any person entitled to the benefit of any such judgment or award as is referred to in subsection (1) or in such judgment as is referred to in sub-section (3) otherwise than in the manner provided for in sub-section (2) or in the corresponding law of the reciprocating country, as the case may be. The expression “manner” employed in sub-section (7) of Section 149 is very relevant which means an insurer can avoid its liability only in accordance with what has been provided for in sub-section (2) of Section 149. It, therefore, shows that the insurer can avoid its liability only on the statutory defences expressly provided in subsection (2) of Section 149 of the 1988 Act. We are, therefore, of the view that an insurer cannot avoid its liability on any other grounds except those mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the 1988 Act. 15. It is relevant to note that Parliament, while enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 only specified some of the defences which are based on conditions of the policy and, therefore, any other breach of conditions of the policy by the insured which does not find place in sub-section (2) of Section 149 cannot be taken as a defence by the insurer. If Parliament had intended to include the breach of other conditions of the policy as a defence, it could have easily provided any breach of conditions of insurance policy in sub-section (2) of Section 149. If we permit the insurer to take any other defence other than those specified in sub-section (2) of Section 149, it would mean we are adding more defences to the insurer in the statute which is neither found in the Act nor was intended to be included. 32. If we permit the insurer to take any other defence other than those specified in sub-section (2) of Section 149, it would mean we are adding more defences to the insurer in the statute which is neither found in the Act nor was intended to be included. 32. For the aforesaid reasons, our answer to the question is that even if no appeal is preferred under Section 173 of the 1988 Act by an insured against the award of a Tribunal, it is not permissible for an insurer to file an appeal questioning the quantum of compensation as well as findings as regards negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle.” 20. Relying upon this judgment, he submits that the insurer can avoid its liability only on the statutory defences expressly provided in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act. He further argued that the insured, if aggrieved with the award, can file appeal as prescribed under Section 149(2) of the Act. In the case at hand, the Tribunal having held that the driver of the vehicle was not having the valid licence had driven the said vehicle-Hywa, directed the insurance company to satisfy the award and recover, is bad in law as per Section 149(2) of the Act. 21. Learned counsel for the appellant further relied upon the case rendered in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd Vs. C.M. Jaya & Ors as reported in (2002) 2 SCC 278 , in particular paragraphs 14, 16 and 17, which are quoted herein below: 14. In the premise, we hold that the view expressed by the Bench of three learned Judges in the case of Shanti Bai is correct and answer the question set out in the order of reference in the beginning as under: In the case of the Insurance Company not taking any higher liability by accepting a higher premium for payment of compensation to a third party, the insurer would be liable to the extent limited under Section 95(2) of the Act and would not be liable to pay the entire amount. 16. It is not in dispute from the admitted copy of the insurance policy produced before the Court that the liability of the appellant is limited to Rs 50,000 in regard to the claim in question. 16. It is not in dispute from the admitted copy of the insurance policy produced before the Court that the liability of the appellant is limited to Rs 50,000 in regard to the claim in question. The relevant clause in the policy relating to limits of liability reads: Limits of liability: Limit of the amount of the Company’s liability under Section II(1)(i) in respect of any one accident Rs 50,000 Limit of the amount of the Company’s liability under Section II(1)(ii) in respect of any claim or series of claims arising out of one event Rs 50,000. It is also not the case that any additional or higher premium was paid to cover unlimited or higher liability than the statutory liability fixed as found in the term of the policy extracted above. In the light of the law stated above, it necessarily follows that the liability of the appellant is limited to Rs 50,000, as was rightly held by the Tribunal. The High Court committed an error in taking the contrary view that the liability of the appellant was unlimited merely on the ground that the insured had taken a comprehensive policy. In Shanti Bai case this Court has clearly expressed the opinion that a comprehensive policy issued on the basis of the estimated value of the vehicle does not automatically result in covering the liability with regard to the third-party risk for an amount higher than the statutory limit in the absence of specific agreement and payment of separate premium to cover third-party risk for an amount higher than the statutory limit. This position is accepted in Amrit Lal Sood case as well though no reference is made to this case. As already stated above, in Amrit Lal Sood case the Court found an express term in the policy for covering wider risk and to meet the higher liability unlike in the case of Shanti Bai. Therefore, the High Court was not right in holding that the liability of the appellant-Insurance Company was unlimited merely on the ground that the vehicle in question i.e. the truck, was covered by a comprehensive insurance policy. 17. In the circumstances, we hold that the liability of the appellant-Insurance Company is limited to Rs 50,000, as held by the Tribunal. Therefore, the High Court was not right in holding that the liability of the appellant-Insurance Company was unlimited merely on the ground that the vehicle in question i.e. the truck, was covered by a comprehensive insurance policy. 17. In the circumstances, we hold that the liability of the appellant-Insurance Company is limited to Rs 50,000, as held by the Tribunal. In the view we have taken, it is unnecessary to go into the question relating to either maintainability of cross-objections before the High Court against the appellant alone or as to the enhancement of compensation when the owner and driver have not filed appeal against the impugned judgment.” 22. Relying upon this judgment, he submits that the Hon’ble Court unequivocally held that the liability of the Insurance Company is not unlimited on the ground that the vehicle in question was covered by a comprehensive Insurance Policy and submitted that accordingly direction of the Tribunal in the present case, to pay and recover, is fit to be interfered by this Court. 23. Learned counsel for the appellant further referred to decision rendered in the case of Sardari & Ors Vs. Sushil Kumar & Ors as reported in (2008) 17 SCC 208 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the insurance company is not liable to pay compensation in case of breach of condition of contract rather the driver, who had no valid licence and owner of the vehicle was held liable to pay compensation. 24. Learned counsel for the appellant further relied upon a case rendered in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd Vs. Swaran Singh & Ors as reported in (2004) 3 SCC 297 , in particular paragraph 11, which is quoted herein below: “11. Section 147 of the Act provides for requirements of policies and limits of liability. Section 149 provides for the duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and award against persons insured in respect of third-party risks. Ltd Vs. Swaran Singh & Ors as reported in (2004) 3 SCC 297 , in particular paragraph 11, which is quoted herein below: “11. Section 147 of the Act provides for requirements of policies and limits of liability. Section 149 provides for the duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and award against persons insured in respect of third-party risks. Sub-section (1) of Section 149 postulates that in the event a certificate of insurance has been issued in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 147, a judgment or award in respect of any such liability is obtained by the insured, the insurer notwithstanding its entitlement to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment-debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments. Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, however, seeks to make an exception thereto. Sub-sections (4), (5) and (7) of Section 149 read thus: “149. (4) Where a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (3) of Section 147 to the person by whom a policy has been effected, so much of the policy as purports to restrict the insurance of the persons insured thereby by reference to any conditions other than those in clause (b) of sub-section (2) shall, as respects such liabilities as are required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 147, be of no effect: Provided that any sum paid by the insurer in or towards the discharge of any liability of any person which is covered by the policy by virtue only of this sub-section shall be recoverable by the insurer from that person. (5) If the amount which an insurer becomes liable under this section to pay in respect of a liability incurred by a person insured by a policy exceeds the amount for which the insurer would apart from the provisions of this section be liable under the policy in respect of that liability, the insurer shall be entitled to recover the excess from that person. ** * (7) No insurer to whom the notice referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) has been given shall be entitled to avoid his liability to any person entitled to the benefit of any such judgment or award as is referred to in sub-section (1) or in such judgment as is referred to in sub-section (3) otherwise than in the manner provided for in sub-section (2) or in the corresponding law of the reciprocating country, as the case may be.” 25. Relying upon this decision, he submitted that the Court cannot lay down any criteria as to how said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 26. Learned counsel for the appellant-insurance company further relied upon the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd Vs. Asha Rani & Ors as reported in (2003) 2 SCC 223 , in particular, paragraph 29, which is reproduced herein below: “29.We may consider the matter from another angle. Section 149(2) of the 1988 Act enables the insurers to raise defences against the claim of the claimants. In terms of clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act one of the defences which is available to the insurer is that the vehicle in question has been used for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle was used. Such a statutory defence available to the insurer would be obliterated in view of the decision of this Court in Satpal Singh case.” 27. Learned counsel for the appellant-insurance company further referred to the decision rendered in the case of M.S. Middle High School Vs. HDFC ERGO General Insurance Co. Ltd & Ors, passed in S.L.P (C) No. 31406/2017 wherein the Hon’ble Court referred to the case laws rendered in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd vs. Chala Bharathamma & Ors as reported in (2004) 8 SCC 517 , Asha Rani (supra) and Nicolleta Rohtagi (supra) and has affirmed the view of Hon’ble High Court that once there is breach of condition of policy, the liability cannot be fastened on this insurer. For ready reference, the entire order is reproduced herein below: “Heard. We do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order. The High court rightly held that once there is breach of condition of policy, the liability cannot be fastened on the insurer. For ready reference, the entire order is reproduced herein below: “Heard. We do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order. The High court rightly held that once there is breach of condition of policy, the liability cannot be fastened on the insurer. The High Court had relied upon decisions o this Court in National Insurance Company Limited V. Challa Bharathamma and Others, (2004) 8 SCC 517 , New India Assurance Company Limited V. Asha Rani & Ors., (2003) 2 SCC and National Insurance Company Limited V. Nicolleta Rohtagi & Ors., (2002) 7 SCC 456 . The contrary view in Augustine, V.M. v. Ayyappankutty and Ors., 2015 (1) TN MAC 740 (FB) (Ker.) cannot thus be held to be liable even if there was breach of conditions of policy. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.” 28. Learned counsel further referred to the order passed in Civil Appeal No. 841/2008 in the case of M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Rambha Devi & Ors, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court referring to the case rendered in the case of Mukund Dewangan Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd as reported in (2017) 14 SCC 663 , referred the matter to larger Bench of three Judges. 29. Mr. A.K. Krishnaswami, learned counsel further referred the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Parvathneni & Anr reported in (2009) 8 SCC 785 , which was referred to the larger Bench by the two-Judge Bench which doubted the correctness of the decision of pay and recover. He further submits that reference in Parvathneni case has been disposed of by the three-Judge Bench keeping the questions of law open to be decided in an appropriate case. 30. On the strength of the aforesaid case laws, as referred by counsel for the appellant-insurance company, it has been submitted that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Swaran Singh (supra) has not in absolute terms has held that in all the cases the insurer has to pay and recover the compensation and further held that pay and recover order by the Apex Court in Swarn Singh Case where driver had no licence need not be treated as a precedent. The order of pay and recover passed in such cases must be treated as one passed under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The order of pay and recover passed in such cases must be treated as one passed under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. He further submitted that in the case of C.M. Jaya (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court had specifically answered the question regarding the liability of insurer in respect of third-party risk, that in such case the insurer held liable only to the extend limited under Section 95(2) and not liable to pay the entire amount of compensation. 31. He further submitted that various High Courts have passed subsequent order after the order passed in Swaran Singh Case, wherein direction was issued to the owner of the offending vehicle to pay the award in violation of Permit. He further submitted that similar matters have come before the Hon’ble Apex Court, as referred to above, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that pay and recovery order is bad in law, as such the impugned order needs to be interfered with by this Court. 32. Per contra, Mr. Laik, learned counsel appearing on behalf of claimants submitted that owner of the offending vehicle appeared before the Tribunal and has in unequivocal term has stated that vehicle was duly insured with the appellant-insurance company having validity from 30.09.2013 to 29.09.2014, hence liability to indemnify lies upon the said insurer. Learned counsel for the claimants further submitted that maintainability of claim case and cause of action decided in favour of claimants and further the Tribunal held that the cause of death of late Bhairav Lal Mahato (deceased) was due to accident occurred by rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. It has further been submitted that it is true that the Tribunal came to a finding that the driver of the offending vehicle was not duly authorized to drive the offending vehicle, as such right of recovery was given to the insurance company, for the alleged violation of terms and conditions of Insurance Policy. So far the quantum of compensation is concerned, the learned Tribunal after considering each aspect of the matter viz. age, income, number of dependants, deduction towards personal expense and future prospect of deceased has assessed the compensation, as per the provisions of Act, hence, there is no illegality in the impugned order. The appellant-insurance company is only aggrieved with only that part of order whereby direction has been issued for making payment and to recover. 33. age, income, number of dependants, deduction towards personal expense and future prospect of deceased has assessed the compensation, as per the provisions of Act, hence, there is no illegality in the impugned order. The appellant-insurance company is only aggrieved with only that part of order whereby direction has been issued for making payment and to recover. 33. Learned counsel for the claimants further submitted that the Hon’ble Apex Court in number of cases has held that the pay and recover order good in law, as such it has a binding effect. He further submitted that if the insurance is valid, on any technical ground(s) of violation of any term(s) and condition(s) of the Insurance Policy, the Insurance Company cannot deny to make payment, though in the case at hand right of recovery is there. 34. In support of his submission, he referred to the decision rendered in the case of Manuara Khatun & Ors vs Rajesh Kumar Singh & Ors as reported in (2017) 4 SCC 796 , in particular paragraphs 12, 13 and 14, which are quoted herein below: “12. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants (claimants). 13. The only question, which arises for consideration in these appeals, is whether the appellants are entitled for an order against the insurer of the offending vehicle i.e. (Respondent 3) to pay the awarded sum to the appellants and then to recover the said amount from the insured (owner of the offending vehicle Tata Sumo) Respondent 1 in the same proceedings. 14. The aforesaid question, in our opinion, remains no more res integra. As we notice, it was the subject-matter of several decisions of this Court rendered by three-Judge Bench and two-Judge Bench in the past viz. National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur, National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Challa Upendra Rao, National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kaushalaya Devi, National Insurance Co. v. Roshan Lal and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Parvathneni.” 35. Learned counsel for the claimants further relied upon the case of Parminder Singh Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd & Ors as reported in 2019 SCC OnLine SC 802, in particular paragraph 12, which is quoted herein below: 12. Ltd. v. Kaushalaya Devi, National Insurance Co. v. Roshan Lal and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Parvathneni.” 35. Learned counsel for the claimants further relied upon the case of Parminder Singh Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd & Ors as reported in 2019 SCC OnLine SC 802, in particular paragraph 12, which is quoted herein below: 12. On the issue of liability to pay the compensation awarded, we affirm the view taken by the High Court that the Respondent-Insurance Company is absolved of the liability to bear the compensation, as evidence has been produced from the office of the Regional Transport Office to prove that the drivers of the two offending trucks were driving on the basis of invalid driving licenses. It is also relevant to note that the owners and drivers of the offending trucks have not appeared at any stage of the proceedings, including this Court. 12.1. This Court in Shamanna v. The Divisional Manager, The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., held that if the driver of the offending vehicle does not possess a valid driving license, the principle of 'pay and recover' can be ordered to direct the insurance company to the pay the victim, and then recover the amount from the owner of the offending vehicle. 12.2. We deem it just and fair to direct the Respondent-Insurance Company to pay the enhanced amount of compensation as indicated in Para. 6 above, to the Appellant within a period of 12 weeks from the date of this judgment. The Respondent-Insurance Company is entitled to recover the amount from the owners and drivers of the two offending trucks.” 36. On the extent of Parminder Singh (Supra) judgment, it has been submitted that the Hon’ble Apex Court while deciding the issue of pay and recover has directed the Insurance Company to pay the enhanced amount of compensation to claimant reserving right of recovery of the amount from owner and driver. 37. He further relying upon the case rendered in the case of Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd., Dhanbad through its Manager Vs. 37. He further relying upon the case rendered in the case of Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd., Dhanbad through its Manager Vs. Sundhia Devi & Ors as reported in 2018 (1) JCR 718 (Jhr) in particular paragraphs 7 and 8 submits that Coordinate Bench of this Court relying upon various case laws laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in particular Manaura Khatun (supra) has held that liability to pay compensation has rightly been fixed on the insurer, however, the appellant-Insurance company was given liberty to take steps for recovery of the said amount from the owner of the offending vehicle. For ready reference, paragraph nos. 7 and 8 of the decision is quoted herein below: “7. Having heard learned counsels for the parties, I am of the considered view that the facts of the case is fully covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Manuara Khatun's case (supra). Since the vehicle was insured with the appellant Insurance Company on the date of accident, the responsibility of making the payment of compensation has rightly been fixed upon the Insurance Company. The appellant Insurance Company is accordingly, directed to make the payment of remaining amount of compensation, awarded to the claimants without any further delay. The appellant Insurance Company shall be free to take steps in accordance with law for recovery of the amount from the owner of the truck, if they so desire, in view of the principle 'pay and recover' as per the law laid down in the decision cited above. 8. Pursuant to the order dated 21.7.2017 passed in I.A. No.5892 of 2017, the appellant Insurance Company has already deposited 50% of the awarded compensation in the Court below. The claimants shall be free to withdraw the deposited amount from the Court below. The claimants shall also be entitled to withdraw the statutory amount deposited at the time of filing of the appeal.” 38. Lastly, learned counsel for the claimants referred to the decision rendered in the case of Shamanna & Anr Vs. Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd & Ors as reported in (2018) 9 SCC 650 in particular paragraph no. 5,6, 7, 13, 14 and 15, which are reproduced herein below: “5. In the case of third-party risks, as per the decision in National Insurance Co. Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd & Ors as reported in (2018) 9 SCC 650 in particular paragraph no. 5,6, 7, 13, 14 and 15, which are reproduced herein below: “5. In the case of third-party risks, as per the decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, the insurer had to indemnify the compensation amount payable to the third-party and the insurance company may recover the same from the insured. Doctrine of “pay and recover” was considered by the Supreme Court in Swaran Singh case wherein the Supreme Court examined the liability of the insurance company in cases of breach of policy condition due to disqualifications of the driver or invalid driving licence of the driver and held that in case of third-party risks, the insurer has to indemnify the compensation amount to the third-party and the insurance company may recover the same from the insured. Elaborately considering the insurer’s contractual liability as well as statutory liability vis-à-vis the claims of third parties, the Supreme Court issued detailed guidelines as to how and in what circumstances, “pay and recover” can be ordered. In para 110, the Supreme Court summarised its conclusions as under: (SCC pp. 341-42) “110. The summary of our findings to the various issues as raised in these petitions is as follows: (i) Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 providing compulsory insurance of vehicles against third-party risks is a social welfare legislation to extend relief by compensation to victims of accidents caused by use of motor vehicles. The provisions of compulsory insurance coverage of all vehicles are with this paramount object and the provisions of the Act have to be so interpreted as to effectuate the said object. (ii) An insurer is entitled to raise a defence in a claim petition filed under Section 163-A or Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, inter alia, in terms of Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the said Act. (iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of the driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, has to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards the insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. (iv) Insurance companies, however, with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available defence(s) raised in the said proceedings but must also establish “breach” on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof wherefore would be on them. (v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how the said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act. (vii) The question, as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver (a fake one or otherwise), does not fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case. (viii) If a vehicle at the time of accident was driven by a person having a learner’s licence, the insurance companies would be liable to satisfy the decree. (ix) The Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 read with Section 168 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in respect of the accidents involving death or of bodily injury or damage to property of third-party arising in use of motor vehicle. (ix) The Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 read with Section 168 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in respect of the accidents involving death or of bodily injury or damage to property of third-party arising in use of motor vehicle. The said power of the Tribunal is not restricted to decide the claims inter se between claimant or claimants on one side and insured, insurer and driver on the other. In the course of adjudicating the claim for compensation and to decide the availability of defence or defences to the insurer, the Tribunal has necessarily the power and jurisdiction to decide disputes inter se between the insurer and the insured. The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication of claim for compensation by the claimants and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the same manner as provided in Section 174 of the Act for enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the claimants. (x) Where on adjudication of the claim under the Act the Tribunal arrives at a conclusion that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the provisions of Section 149(2) read with sub-section (7), as interpreted by this Court above, the Tribunal can direct that the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to pay to the third-party under the award of the Tribunal. Such determination of claim by the Tribunal will be enforceable and the money found due to the insurer from the insured will be recoverable on a certificate issued by the Tribunal to the Collector in the same manner under Section 174 of the Act as arrears of land revenue. The certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by sub-section (3) of Section 168 of the Act the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the Tribunal. The certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by sub-section (3) of Section 168 of the Act the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the Tribunal. (xi) The provisions contained in sub-section (4) with the proviso thereunder and sub-section (5) which are intended to cover specified contingencies mentioned therein to enable the insurer to recover the amount paid under the contract of insurance on behalf of the insured can be taken recourse to by the Tribunal and be extended to claims and defences of the insurer against the insured by relegating them to the remedy before regular court in cases where on given facts and circumstances adjudication of their claims inter se might delay the adjudication of the claims of the victims.” (emphasis supplied) 6. As per the decision in Swaran Singh case, onus is always upon the insurance company to prove that the driver had no valid driving licence and that there was breach of policy conditions. Where the driver did not possess the valid driving licence and there are breach of policy conditions, “pay and recover” can be ordered in case of third-party risks. The Tribunal is required to consider “as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver … does not fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case”. 7. The Supreme Court considered the decision of Swaran Singh case in subsequent decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut, wherein this Court held that: (SCC p. 705, para 5) “5. The decision in Swaran Singh case has no application to cases other than third-party risks and in case of third-party risks the insurer has to indemnify the amojunt and if so advised, to recover the same from the insured.” 13. Since the reference to the larger Bench in Parvathneni case has been disposed of by keeping the questions of law open to be decided in an appropriate case, presently the decision in Swaran Singh case followed in Laxmi Narain Dhut and other cases hold the field. Since the reference to the larger Bench in Parvathneni case has been disposed of by keeping the questions of law open to be decided in an appropriate case, presently the decision in Swaran Singh case followed in Laxmi Narain Dhut and other cases hold the field. The award passed by the Tribunal directing the insurance company to pay the compensation amount awarded to the claimants and thereafter, recover the same from the owner of the vehicle in question, is in accordance with the judgment passed by this Court in Swaran Singh and Laxmi Narain Dhut cases. While so, in our view, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the award passed by the Tribunal directing the first respondent to pay and recover from the owner of the vehicle. The impugned judgment of the High Court exonerating the insurance company from its liability and directing the claimants to recover the compensation from the owner of the vehicle is set aside and the award passed by the Tribunal is restored. 14. So far as the recovery of the amount from the owner of the vehicle, the insurance company shall recover as held in the decision in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanjappan wherein this Court held that: (SCC p. 226, para 8) “8.… For the purpose of recovering the same from the insured, the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject-matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer.” 15. In the result, the impugned judgment1 of the High Court insofar as enhancement of the compensation to Rs 4,94,700 is concerned is affirmed. Insofar as direction of the impugned judgment directing the appellant claimants to recover the compensation from the owner of the vehicle is concerned, is set aside and the appeal is partly allowed. The first respondent insurance company shall pay the enhanced compensation to the appellant claimants along with the accrued interest and the insurance company shall recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. No costs.” 39. Learned counsel for the claimants further relied upon the decision rendered in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. The first respondent insurance company shall pay the enhanced compensation to the appellant claimants along with the accrued interest and the insurance company shall recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. No costs.” 39. Learned counsel for the claimants further relied upon the decision rendered in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Laxmi Narain Dutt as reported in (2007) 3 SCC 700 , in particular parag raph 9, 10 and 11, which are quoted herein below: “9.Swaran Singh case on which learned counsel for the parties have placed reliance undisputedly related to a case under Section 149 of the Act. This Court elaborately dealt with the scope and ambit of Sections 147 and 149 of the Act and after tracing the history of compulsory insurance and the rights of the third parties, held that the cases concerned were mainly concerned with third-party rights under the policy. It was held in that context that any condition in the policy whereby the right of the third party is taken away would be void, as noted in para 23 of the judgment. 10. In paras 69 and 70 the principles were culled out in the following terms: (Swaran Singh case, SCC pp. 330-31) The insurance company is required to prove the breach of the condition of the contract of insurance by cogent evidence. In the event the insurance company fails to prove that there has been breach of conditions of the policy on the part of the insured, the insurance company cannot be absolved of its liability. This Court did not lay down a degree of proof, but held that the parties alleging the breach must be held to have succeeded in establishing the breach of the condition of the contract of insurance, on the part of the insurance company by discharging its burden of proof. The Tribunal, must arrive at a finding on the basis of the materials available on the records. 11. In para 110 also the summary of the findings were recorded which reads as follows: (Swaran Singh case, SCC pp. 341-42) “(i) Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 providing compulsory insurance of vehicles against third-party risks is a social welfare legislation to extend relief by compensation to victims of accidents caused by use of motor vehicles. 11. In para 110 also the summary of the findings were recorded which reads as follows: (Swaran Singh case, SCC pp. 341-42) “(i) Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 providing compulsory insurance of vehicles against third-party risks is a social welfare legislation to extend relief by compensation to victims of accidents caused by use of motor vehicles. The provisions of compulsory insurance coverage of all vehicles are with this paramount object and the provisions of the Act have to be so interpreted as to effectuate the said object. (ii) An insurer is entitled to raise a defence in a claim petition filed under Section 163-A or Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, inter alia, in terms of Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the said Act. (iii)The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of the driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in subsection (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, has to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards the insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. (iv) Insurance companies, however, with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available defence(s) raised in the said proceedings but must also establish ‘breach’ on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof wherefore would be on them. (v)The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how the said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (v)The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how the said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply ‘the rule of main purpose’ and the concept of ‘fundamental breach’ to allow defences available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act. (vii) The question, as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver (a fake one or otherwise), does not fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case. (viii) If a vehicle at the time of accident was driven by a person having a learner’s licence, the insurance companies would be liable to satisfy the decree. (ix) The Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 read with Section 168 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in respect of the accidents involving death or of bodily injury or damage to property of third party arising in use of motor vehicle. The said power of the Tribunal is not restricted to decide the claims inter se between claimant or claimants on one side and insured, insurer and driver on the other. In the course of adjudicating the claim for compensation and to decide the availability of defence or defences to the insurer, the Tribunal has necessarily the power and jurisdiction to decide disputes inter se between the insurer and the insured. The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication of claim for compensation by the claimants and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the same manner as provided in Section 174 of the Act for enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the claimants. The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication of claim for compensation by the claimants and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the same manner as provided in Section 174 of the Act for enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the claimants. (x) Where on adjudication of the claim under the Act the Tribunal arrives at a conclusion that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the provisions of Section 149(2) read with sub-section (7), as interpreted by this Court above, the Tribunal can direct that the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to pay to the third party under the award of the Tribunal. Such determination of claim by the Tribunal will be enforceable and the money found due to the insurer from the insured will be recoverable on a certificate issued by the Tribunal to the Collector in the same manner under Section 174 of the Act as arrears of land revenue. The certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by subsection (3) of Section 168 of the Act the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the Tribunal. (xi)The provisions contained in sub-section (4) with the proviso thereunder and sub-section (5) which are intended to cover specified contingencies mentioned therein to enable the insurer to recover the amount paid under the contract of insurance on behalf of the insured can be taken recourse to by the Tribunal and be extended to claims and defences of the insurer against the insured by relegating them to the remedy before regular court in cases where on given facts and circumstances adjudication of their claims inter se might delay the adjudication of the claims of the victims.” 40. On the strength of above judgment, Mr. Laik submits that in particular law laid down in Swaran Singh Case, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that it is the duty of the insurer to satisfy the award in case of violation of terms of policy and hold the principle of pay and recover good in law. On the strength of above judgment, Mr. Laik submits that in particular law laid down in Swaran Singh Case, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that it is the duty of the insurer to satisfy the award in case of violation of terms of policy and hold the principle of pay and recover good in law. As such, the award passed by the Tribunal needs no interference by this Court. 41. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length, this Court is of the considered view that the facts of the case of fully covered by the decision rendered in the case of Shamanna (Supra) wherein the Hon’ble Court after taking into account the law laid down in the case of Swaran Singh (Supra) and Laxmi Narain Dhut (Supra) in the concluding paragraphs hold that “…… the insurance company shall pay the enhanced compensation to the appellant claimants along with the accrued interest and the insurance company shall recover the same from the owner of the vehicle.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of National Insurance Company vs. Parvathneni & Anr as reported in (2009) 8 SCC 785 has placed the matter to be listed before larger Bench to decide the issue and the reference to the larger Bench in Parvathneni case has been disposed of by keeping the questions of law open to be decided in an appropriate case. Hence, the law laid down in the case of Swaran Singh (Supra) and Laxmi Narain Dhut (Supra) still hold the field. Hence, the award passed by the Tribunal directing the Insurance Company to satisfy the award giving recovery right to the alleged violation of terms and conditions of the insurance in respect of said vehicle, needs no interference by this Court. 42. In the result, the impugned award passed by the Tribunal so far order to pay and recovery is concerned, needs no interference by this Court, as such it is affirmed. 43. Resultantly, the appeal stands dismissed. 44. Consequent upon the dismissal of the Misc. Appeal, I.A. No. 363 of 2018 stands disposed of.