JUDGMENT Rohit B. Deo, J. - The appellants who are the contesting defendants in Special Civil Suit 439/1986 are questioning the correctness of the judgment and decree dated 21.11.2005 rendered by the learned by the 5th Additional District Judge, Nagpur in Regular Civil Appeal 418/2000, by and under which the judgment and decree dated 22.10.1991 rendered by the 6th Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur decreeing Special Civil Suit 439/1986 filed for specific performance is affirmed. 2. The rival contentions before the trial Court : (i) Respondents Julfekar Ahmad and Ali Ahmad instituted Special Civil Suit 439/1986 seeking specific performance of agreement of sale dated 20.2.1985 (suit agreement) against fourteen members of the Dhopte family. During the pendency of the suit, defendants 1 to 7 agreed to perform their part of the contract and executed sale deed in favour of the respondents who shall be referred to as the plaintiffs hereinafter, pertaining to their %rd undivided share and interest in the suit property, with the result that the plaintiffs amended the plaint, deleted defendants 1 to 7 from the array of defendants and restricted the suit claim to the /rd undivided share of the appellants who shall be referred to as the contesting defendants hereinafter. The description of the suit property was amended. The suit property came to be described as /rd share in the two storied house bearing Corporation House 539 situated in Ward 2, Telipura, Sitabuldi, Nagpur, admeasuring 900 square feet in area. (ii) The plaint averments may now be looked into. The plaintiffs averred that defendants 1 to 14 jointly owned and possessed the suit property, which is joint family property and by the suit agreement the defendants agreed to sell the suit property to the plaintiffs for valuable consideration of Rs. 1,00,000/. The defendants accepted earnest amount of Rs. 15,000/and the balance consideration of Rs. 85,000/was agreed to be paid at the time of execution and registration of the sale deed which sale deed was to be executed on or before 20.11.1985. The defendants agreed to obtain the necessary permission from the Urban Land Ceiling Authority for sale of the suit property, if necessary. (iii) The plaintiffs further averred that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. The defendants agreed to obtain the necessary permission from the Urban Land Ceiling Authority for sale of the suit property, if necessary. (iii) The plaintiffs further averred that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. The defendants did not show inclination to execute the sale deed and the plaintiffs sent registered letter dated 18.10.1985 to the defendants asking them to attend the office of the Sub Registrar, Nagpur on 20.11.1985 for executing and registering the sale deed and for accepting the balance consideration of Rs. 85,000/. This letter evoked no response and the plaintiffs issued telegraphic notice to the defendants on 19.11.1985 asking them to execute and register the sale deed at 11:00 a.m. on 20.11.1985 in the office of the Sub Registrar of Documents, Collectorate Building, Nagpur. The plaintiffs averred that although they attended the said office and waited for the entire day, only defendants 1 to 3 and 5 turned up. Defendants 1 to 3 and 5 (who executed sale deed as regards their share in the suit property during the pendency of the suit) expressed inability to execute the sale deed since they did not have no objection and income tax clearance certificate and requested the plaintiffs to extend the period for execution and registration of sale deed. At the request of the said defendants the period was extended till 15.1.1986 and further amount of Rs. 600/was paid to the said defendants on 20.11.1985. (iv) The plaintiffs contend that neither defendants 1 to 3 and 5 nor the other defendants manifested any intention of performing their part of the contract and the plaintiffs were constrained to issue notice dated 04.4.1986 to all the defendants to attend the office of the Registrar, Collectorate Building, Nagpur on 30.4.1986 between 11:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. for executing and registering the sale deed. The plaintiffs attended the office of the Sub Registrar and waited from 11.00 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. None of the defendants attended the office and the plaintiffs were, therefore, constrained to institute the suit. (v) Defendants 1 to 6 filed their written statement Exhibit 37 denying each and every material averment in the plaint. A specific defence is set up that in the year 1986 defendant 6Kumud and defendant 7 Pradeep were to get married, the family did not have the funds to meet the expenses for the two marriages and borrowed Rs. (v) Defendants 1 to 6 filed their written statement Exhibit 37 denying each and every material averment in the plaint. A specific defence is set up that in the year 1986 defendant 6Kumud and defendant 7 Pradeep were to get married, the family did not have the funds to meet the expenses for the two marriages and borrowed Rs. 15,000/from the plaintiffs and the suit agreement came to be executed as a document of security. In paragraph 18 of the written statement, it is specifically contended that the suit agreement is not for the benefit of defendant 14 Rajesh who was minor at the time of execution of the suit agreement. Defendants 1 to 6 contended that the consideration is too inadequate and that the suit property is the only residential house of the members of the Dhopte family who would be thrown on the street and put to hardship if the claim of specific performance is granted. (vi) Defendants 8 to 14 adopted the written statement of defendants 1 to 6 by praecipe dated 03.3.1987. The praecipe is signed only by the learned Counsel. However, the written statement originally filed by defendants 1 to 6 Exhibit 37 came to be treated by the plaintiffs, the defendants and the trial Court as the written statement of defendants 8 to 14. It may be noted that after defendants 1 to 7 settled the dispute with the plaintiffs and were deleted from the array of defendants, defendants 8 to 14 were permitted to amend the written statement Exhibit 37, by order dated 28.6.2005. Defendants 8 to 14 contended, by amending the written statement Exhibit 37, that the plaintiffs in collusion with defendants 1 to 7 had played fraud on the defendants 8 to 14 and obtained the signature of the minor on the alleged agreement. 3. The trial Court framed the following issues (Exhibit 44) : 1) Whether defendants prove that on 20.4.1985 they executed agreement in favour of plaintiffs as a security of loan ? 2) Whether defendants prove that said transaction is of loan and it is not an agreement to sale ? 3) Whether defendants prove that plaintiff is taking undue advantage of the situation and trying to grab property worth Rs. 2,00,000/? 4) Whether defendants prove that by passing decree for specific performance greater hardship will be caused to them ? 2) Whether defendants prove that said transaction is of loan and it is not an agreement to sale ? 3) Whether defendants prove that plaintiff is taking undue advantage of the situation and trying to grab property worth Rs. 2,00,000/? 4) Whether defendants prove that by passing decree for specific performance greater hardship will be caused to them ? 5) Whether defendant 14 proves that he was minor when agreement to sale dated 20.2.1985 was executed ? 6) Whether plaintiff proves that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract ? 7) Whether plaintiff is entitled to the decree of specific performance ? 8) Whether plaintiff is alternatively entitled to the decree for return of the amount paid ? 9) Whether plaintiff is entitled to damages ? If yes, what is the quantum ? 10) What order and decree ? 4. Plaintiff 1 Julfekar Ahmad stepped into the witness box and deposed in consonance with the plaint averments. The suggestion that the suit agreement was executed as collateral security for repayment of hand loan of Rs. 15,000/is denied. P.W.2Waman is the witness to the suit agreement. On behalf of the contesting defendants, defendant 8 Vishnu Dhopte and defendant 9-Kamalabai Dhopte were examined to prove that the suit agreement was a nominal document and was executed as collateral security for the loan obtained by defendants 1 to 7 to the expenses of the marriages of defendants 6 & 7. 5. The suit agreement is Exhibit 58. The suit agreement records that defendant 14 Rajesh Vishnu Dhopte was minor and in the description of the parties Rajesh is shown to be represented by natural guardian father Visnu Narayan Dhopte. 6. It is established in view of the proved birth certificate that defendant 14 Rajesh was a minor at the time of execution of the suit agreement. This position is not in serious dispute. 7. In view of the admitted position that defendant 14 Rajesh was a minor at the time of the execution of the suit agreement, the issue which ought to have been framed and answered was whether the suit transaction was for legal necessity or for the benefit of the family or the estate. The only issue framed by the trial Court was whether defendant 14 Rajesh was a minor. The only issue framed by the trial Court was whether defendant 14 Rajesh was a minor. Both the Courts below have not considered whether in view of the admitted position that defendant 14 Rajesh was a minor, whether the suit transaction was for legal necessity or the benefit of the family or estate. The question, who is to discharge the burden or proving the nature of the suit transaction is not addressed. Both the Courts below have held that since Rajesh was represented by natural guardian in the proceedings, he is properly represented. 8. The position of law is settled. Since the minor had only undivided share in the suit property, permission of the District Judge under section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act was not a prerequisite. The suit agreement was entered into by the father as karta of the joint family. Alienation of joint family property by the fatherkarta would bind the minor Rajesh provided that the transaction is proved to be for legal necessity or for the benefit of the family or estate. In K. P. L. S. Palaniappa Chetty and another vs. Sreenath Devasikamony Pandara Sannadhi reported in AIR 1917 Privy Council 33 Lord Atkinson quoted with approval the following observations of Lord Justice L.J. Knight Bruce in Hunooman Persaud v. Babooee Munraj. "The power of the manager for an infant heir to charge an estate not his own, is under the Hindu Law a limited and qualified power. It can only be exercised rightly in a case of need or for the benefit of the estate. But where, in the particular instance, the charge is one that a prudent owner would make in order to benefit the estate the bona fide lender is not affected by the precedent mismanagement of the estate. The actual presence on the estate, the danger to be averted, or the benefit to be conferred upon it in the particular instance, is the thing to be regarded. Their Lordship think that the lender is bound to enquire into the necessities for the loan, and to satisfy himself, as well as he can, with reference to the parties with whom his dealing, that the manager, is acting in the particular instance for the benefit of the estate. Their Lordship think that the lender is bound to enquire into the necessities for the loan, and to satisfy himself, as well as he can, with reference to the parties with whom his dealing, that the manager, is acting in the particular instance for the benefit of the estate. But they think that, if he does so enquire and acts honestly, the real existence of an alleged sufficient and reasonably credited necessity, is not a condition precedent to the validity of his charge, and they do not think that under such circumstances, he is bound to see the application of the money." In Ganpat Rao and others vs. Ishwar Sing and another reported in A.I.R. 1938 Nagpur 476 the Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court observes thus: "This has been the most criticized part of the judgment. It was rightly urged that a mortgage and a sale transaction stand on a different footing. A sale is either wholly good or bad; a mortgage can be good in parts, or capable of being supported as to part and if it should appear that part of the consideration is for necessity, that part would be binding. It was accordingly said that if the payment of land revenue amounts to necessity, this mortgage is binding to that extent. We are of the opinion however that what has to be shown is that the loan is for legal necessity, not that the money is wanted, or is stated to be wanted, and inquiries confirm that want, for a necessary purpose. The difference is improvement. The manager may have, to the knowledge of the lender large available resources, he may have actual cash at hand. Can he still bind the estate if he borrows ostensibly to pay land revenue ? Clearly not. The purpose is necessity, but there is no necessity for the loan, where, as here, there are apparently large resources, a large income and an unencumbered estated (to being with). The lender must show not merely a necessary purpose but a necessity for the loan. Clearly not. The purpose is necessity, but there is no necessity for the loan, where, as here, there are apparently large resources, a large income and an unencumbered estated (to being with). The lender must show not merely a necessary purpose but a necessity for the loan. If, after reasonable inquiries, he, as a reasonable man, is satisfied of that necessity, that in sufficient; he is not concerned with a misapplication of the money lent, but it must be the necessity for the loan that he must satisfy himself about were it otherwise, minors (whose power to claim partition is limited) would be at the mercy of spendthrifts who spent the family income on themselves and borrowed money for necessary family expenses." In Koutarapu Venkata Chenchayya vs. Koutarapu Ramalingam and others reported in AIR 1957 Andhra Pradesh 744 the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh Court articulates thus: "(10) We now proceed to the main question whether the alienation under Exhibits B24 and B34 are binding on the plaintiff. It is well settled that a father''s alienations of joint family property are binding on the sons, provided that they were effected for legal necessity or for the benefit of the family for satisfying antecedent debts which were not incurred for immoral or illegal purposes. Antecedent debts mean debts which originated independently of and were contracted prior in time to the alienation impeached. As the power of alienation is a limited and qualified one, the burden of proof is on the alienee to show that the transaction came within that power. But in discharging the burden, he alienee is entitled to the benefit of equitable principle protecting bona fide purchasers for value. The impact of these principles was explained in Hunooman Perhaud Pande vs. Mt. Babooee Mundray Kunweree, 6 Moo Ind App 393 (PC) (c) and has become a statutory presumption under section 38 of the Transfer of Property Act. The alienee is bound to inquire into the purpose of the alienation. He is entitled to succeed if he proves: (1) either that there was in fact legal necessity or benefit to the family or discharge of antecedent debts justifying the alienation. (2) or that he honestly satisfied himself after proper and bona fide inquiries as to their existence. The alienee is bound to inquire into the purpose of the alienation. He is entitled to succeed if he proves: (1) either that there was in fact legal necessity or benefit to the family or discharge of antecedent debts justifying the alienation. (2) or that he honestly satisfied himself after proper and bona fide inquiries as to their existence. (11) Sri K. Kotayya, contended that the test for upholding an alienation is whether the bulk of the consideration was for a binding purpose. In this connection he cited a number of cases to which such alienations by managers were upheld, Krishnan vs. Govindan, 41 Mad LJ 381: (AIR 1921 Mad 677) (D) : Mrs. N. Johnstone vs. Gopal Singh, AIR 1931 Lab 419 (E) Gobinda Kar vs. Mohan Maharana, AIR 1949 Oriss 18 (F); Niamat Rai v. Din Dayal, 54 Ind App it necessary to explain how the principle followed in these decisions was entirely different from that adumbrated by the learned counsel, because the point of view for which he stands has been expressed by Sadasiva Iyer J., in Rukmani Sundarammal vs. Mutha Ammal, 1915 Mad WN 8 at p. 10: (AIR 1916 Mad 239 at p. 240) (H), another decision cited by him, as follows: "Where a substantial portion of the purchase money was not required for the plaintiff''s interest or benefit, then the whole sale is set aside on condition of the plaintiffs paying to the purchaser the remaining portion; where, however, a very substantial portion of the purchase money was utilised for purposes binding on the plaintiff, the sale is upheld, but the plaintiff is given a decree for recovery of the small portion of the purchase money not utilised for his benefit". (12) This was precisely the point which was elaborately considered and negatived by the Judicial Committee in Sri Krishnan Das vs. Nathu Ram, 54 Ind Appl 79: ( AIR 1927 PC 37 ) (I). The Judicial Committee said: "In their decision the learned Judges of the High Court rely on the authority of the case of Girdharee Lall vs. Kantoo Lall, 1 Ind APP 321 (PC) (J) decided in 1874, and especially on the head note which contains this passage. The Judicial Committee said: "In their decision the learned Judges of the High Court rely on the authority of the case of Girdharee Lall vs. Kantoo Lall, 1 Ind APP 321 (PC) (J) decided in 1874, and especially on the head note which contains this passage. ''Where a father has sold ancestral property for the discharge of his debts, if the application of the bulk of the proceeds is accounted for the fact that a small part is not accounted for will not invalidate the sale.'' While this is in itself a correct statement of the law so far as it goes, it does not by any means follow, as the learned High Court Judges seem to have though, that it is a complete statement of the law or that the sale will be invalidated wherever the part of the consideration not accounted for cannot be described as small. If this were sound the question would in each case be a matter of arithmetical calculation, and opinions would necessarily vary as to what constituted the ''bulk of the proceeds'' or ''a small part'' of the same in each particular case. The learned Judges seem to be answered in such cases, viz., whether the sale itself was one which was justified by legal necessity. This is the point of view from which the matter is approached in the earliest case cited at the Bar of 6 Moo Ind App 396 (PC) (C) decided by the Board in 1856". (13) Sri K. Kotayya urged that the criterion "whether the sale itself was one which was justified by legal necessity" is satisfied when it is shown that the sale by a father was necessary for the discharge of antecedent debts, in other words, that the antecedent debts could not be discharged otherwise than by the sale. This argument is misconceived because it would construe the words "justified by legal necessity" as equivalent to "caused or occasioned by legal necessity". What the Judicial Committee was emphasing in 54 Ind App 79: ( AIR 1927 PC 37 ) (I), was that the application of the consideration for the alienation was a minor matter. The alienee could rarely control the actual application of the consideration which he paid to the manager or the father. What the Judicial Committee was emphasing in 54 Ind App 79: ( AIR 1927 PC 37 ) (I), was that the application of the consideration for the alienation was a minor matter. The alienee could rarely control the actual application of the consideration which he paid to the manager or the father. Nor can he be reasonably expected to see that the manager or father alienated only so much of the property as would meet the necessity, because that would mean that the alienee should undertake what was property the function of the manager or the father in managing the affairs of the family. So far as the application of the consideration is concerned, in the absence of evidence a bona fide alienee who made due enquiry could invoke a presumption of law that it has been expended for proper purposes and for the benefit of the family. The question in such cases is not whether the receipt of the consideration, for the alienation was justified by legal necessity but is whether the sale was justified by presumption legal necessity. (14) The principles deducible from 54 Ind App 79: ( AIR 1927 PC 37 ) (I), which followed 6 Moo Ind App 393 (PC) (C) are these. The alienee must address himself the question whether the alienation is one which a prudent owner would enter into, in order to meet the legal necessity or antecedent debts or for the benefit of the estate. He should make reasonable inquiries for this purpose. If, after making such inquiries, he is satisfied that the father or manager is acting within his powers and he himself acts honestly in the transaction the question whether he was deceived and the legal necessity or benefit or antecedent debts really did not exist and the further question whether the consideration was applied for them are immaterial, and it is a case of the sale itself being justified by legal necessity or benefit. No general rule can be laid down as to the extent to which an alienee should pursue his inquiries or as to the evidence necessary to prove that he acted in good faith. No general rule can be laid down as to the extent to which an alienee should pursue his inquiries or as to the evidence necessary to prove that he acted in good faith. These are questions of fact to be determined on the circumstances of each case including the previous relationship or dealing between the alienee and the alienor, the obliterations of evidence owing to lapse of time and the like." In Kumaraswami Mudaliar and others vs. Rajamanikkam Udayar and others reported in AIR 1966 Kerala 266 a Special Bench of three learned Judges has emphasized that if the alienation of family property by father is in the issue, the burden is on the buyer to establish that the sale was supported by legal necessity or benefit of the family or that the buyer had made bona fide and reasonable inquiry which made him believe that the necessity exists even though no such necessity did in fact exist. In Balmukand vs. Kamla Wati and others reported in AIR 1964 SC 1385 the Hon''ble Apex Court held that for a transaction to be recorded as benefit to the family it need not be of defensive character and in each case the Court must be satisfied from the material before it that such benefit was in fact conferred or was reasonably expected to confer on the family when the transaction was entered into. In Smt. Rani and another vs. Smt. Santa Bala Debnath and others reported in AIR 1971 SC 1028 the Hon''ble Apex Court enunciates the law thus: "10. Legal necessity to support the sale must however be established by the alienees. Sarala owned the land in dispute as a limited owner. She was competent to dispose of the whole estate in the property of the legal necessity or benefit to the estate. In adjudging whether the sale conveys the whole state, the actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted, and the benefit to be conferred upon the estate in the particular insistence must be considered. Legal necessity does not mean actual compulsion: it means pressure upon the estate which in law may be regarded as serious and sufficient. In adjudging whether the sale conveys the whole state, the actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted, and the benefit to be conferred upon the estate in the particular insistence must be considered. Legal necessity does not mean actual compulsion: it means pressure upon the estate which in law may be regarded as serious and sufficient. The onus of proving legal necessity may be discharged by the alienee by proof of actual necessity or by proof that he made proper and bona fide enquiries about the existence of the necessity and that he did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of the necessity. 11. Recitals in a deed of legal necessity do not by themselves prove legal necessity. The recitals are, however, admissible in evidence their value varying according to the circumstances in which the transaction was entered into. The recitals may be used to corroborate other evidence of the existence of legal necessity. The weight to be attached to the recitals varies according to the circumstances. Where the evidence which could be brought before the Court and is within the special knowledge of the person who seeks to set aside the sale is withheld, such evidence being normally not available to the alienee, the recitals go to his aid with greater force and the Court may be justified in appropriate cases in raising an inference against the party seeking to set aside the sale on the ground of absence of legal necessity wholly or partially, when he withholds evidence in his possession. The decision of the Hon''ble Apex Court referred supra is relied upon by the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Surendranath Das Adhikari (dead) and after him Harendra Kumar Das and others vs. Sudhir Kumar Behera and others reported AIR 1982 Orissa 30. In Smt. Manohari Devi and others vs. Choudhury Sibanava Das and others reported in AIR 1983 Orissa 135 the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court has inter alia held that since it is not proved that the purchasers made bona fide inquiry as to the existence of legal necessity or family benefit the agreement by the karta is not binding on the other members of the family. In Rangammal vs. Kuppuswami and another reported in (2011) 12 SCC 220 the Hon''ble Apex Court inter alia considered the provisions of section 101 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and held that the burden lies on the person who upholds-asserts the purchase not only to show that the guardian had the power to sell but further that the whole transaction was bona fide. The relevant observations are thus: 21. section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 defines "burden of proof" which clearly lays down that: "101. Burden of proof.- Whosoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or law dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. Thus, the Evidence Act has clearly laid down that the burden of proving fact always lies upon the person who asserts. Until such burden is discharged, the other party is not required to be called upon to prove his case. The court has to examine as to whether the person upon whom burden lies has been able to discharge his burden. Until he arrives at such conclusion, he cannot proceed on the basis of weakness of the other party. 22. In view of this legal position of the Evidence Act, it is clear that in the instant matter, when the plaintiff/respondent No.1 pleaded that the disputed property fell into the share of the plaintiff by virtue of the sale deed dated 24.2.1951, then it was clearly for the plaintiff/respondent No.1 to prove that it was executed for legal necessity of the appellant while she was a minor. But, the High Court clearly took an erroneous view while holding that it is the defendant/appellant who should have challenged the sale deed after attaining majority as she had no reason to do so since the plaintiff /respondent No.1 failed to first of all discharge the burden that the sale deed in fact had been executed for legal necessity of the minor''s predecessor mother was without permission of the court. It was not the defendant/respondent who first of all claimed benefit of the sale deed or asserted its genuineness, hence the burden of challenging the sale deed specifically when she had not even been dispossessed from the disputed share, did not arise at all. 23. Plethora of commentaries emerging from series of case laws on burden of proof which are too numerous to cite, lay down that when a person after attaining majority, questions any sale of his property by his guardian during his minority, the burden lies on the person who upholds/asserts the purchase not only to show that the guardian had the power to sell but further that the whole transaction was bona fide. This was held in the case of Roop Narain Singh v. Gugadhur Pershad, as also in Anna Malay v. Na U Ma2." The settled legal position is that while the karta of the family can enter into an agreement as regards the undivided share and interest of his minor children, the suit agreement must be for legal necessity or the benefit of the family or estate and that the burden to so establish would be that of the alienee or the person who seeks to enforce the agreement. It may be possible for the alienee or such person to contend that he did make every reasonable and bona fide inquiry to ascertain that the suit agreement was indeed for legal necessity or the benefit of the family or estate and if the contention is accepted by the Court on the basis of evidence on record the suit agreement would be enforceable against the minor members of the family notwithstanding that as a fact such legal necessity or benefit did not exist. It is not necessary to delve deep in the question whether such reasonable and bona fide inquiries were made since it is not even the case of the respondent that he did make reasonable and bona fide inquiry to ascertain that the defendants intended to execute the suit agreement for legal necessity or benefit of the family or the estate. 9. This Court framed the following substantial questions of law while admitting the appeal. 1. 9. This Court framed the following substantial questions of law while admitting the appeal. 1. Whether the appellate Court was justified in rejecting the contention of the appellants that they would be put to hardship, if the specific performance was granted as they have no other house for residence, on an erroneous assumption that there was no pleading to the aforesaid effect ? 2. Whether the agreement of sale dated 20th February, 1985 could be said to be valid when it was executed by a minor through his guardian without seeking specific permission in that regard as provided under section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act ? 10. In view of the course which I have proposed to adopt, it would not be necessary to record any finding on substantial question of law (1). In so far as substantial question of law (2), it must be held that while permission under section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act was not a prerequisite, the suit agreement would be valid only if it is proved that the proposed alienation was for legal necessity or the benefit of the family or estate. 11. Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants have led evidence to prove or disprove that the suit transaction was actuated by legal necessity or was for the benefit of the family or estate. The burden to prove that the suit transaction was for legal necessity or the benefit of the family or estate or that the plaintiffs made every reasonable enquiry to satisfy themselves that there did exist a legal necessity for the suit transaction or that the suit transaction was for the benefit of the family or estate, was on the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs made no effort to discharge the burden. However, this Court considers it appropriate to remit the matter to the trial Court for framing an appropriate issue and then permitting the parties to adduce evidence to prove or disprove that the suit agreement binds the minor defendant. The matter is remitted since the failure of the trial Court to frame an appropriate issue is likely to have prejudiced the parties who did not adduce evidence on the nature of the transaction and the circumstances in which the suit agreement was executed by the natural guardian father karta on behalf of the minor defendant. The matter is remitted since the failure of the trial Court to frame an appropriate issue is likely to have prejudiced the parties who did not adduce evidence on the nature of the transaction and the circumstances in which the suit agreement was executed by the natural guardian father karta on behalf of the minor defendant. Both the Courts below have concurrently held that the suit agreement is not an agreement executed as security. The findings concurrently recorded by the Courts are not disturbed. The only issue which the trial Court is directed to frame and answer is ''whether the suit agreement was executed for legal necessity or for the benefit of the family or estate''. Needless to state, the trial Court shall permit the parties to amend the pleadings and to adduce further evidence if the parties so deem fit. The trial Court shall finally dispose of the suit within twelve months. 12. The judgments and decree impugned are set aside and the matter is remitted to the trial Court for fresh decision in accordance with the observations and directions in paragraph 11 supra. 13. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.