JUDGMENT : 1. This is a bunch of five writ petitions almost involving an identical question of law. Hence, for the purposes of brevity the same are being decided together. Writ Petition No. 2936 of 2017 would be treated as to be the leading writ petition. 2. The petitioners in the present writ petitions had filed the writ petitions challenging the advertisement, which has been issued in Amar Ujala as back as on 27.09.2017 by the respondent to fill up the post of part time teacher from amongst the general category candidates, which has been issued by the District Project Officer, Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan, Chamoli. A prayer has further been made for quashing the impugned order dated 06.09.2017 passed by respondent no. 4, by virtue of which the contractual appointment of the petitioners was terminated and, lastly it has been prayed for that as a consequence of prayer no. 2 a writ of mandamus may be issued to the respondent to ignore the forcible resignation taken from the petitioners on 16.07.2017, which has been taken as to be the foundation for dispensing their services. 3. The brief backdrop of the writ petitions, which has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners, is that for the purposes of establishment of the Primary Schools under the Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan the predecessors of the petitioners had gifted their land for establishment of the institution. The conveyance of the land had being as a consequence of a registered gift deed, which was executed by the predecessors of the petitioners on 25.08.2005. Consequently, the school was established and is being running on the said land. The case of the petitioners is that at the time when the predecessors of the petitioners have gifted their land an understanding was arrived at between the land owner Sitab Singh and District Project Officer, District Chamoli, that in pursuance of the gifting of land they would be providing an appointment to one of the heirs of the owner of the land. But this fact of assurance of appointment has not been proved by any document on record, admittedly as per petitioners’ case also it was an understanding only, which is not referred in the gift deed. 4.
But this fact of assurance of appointment has not been proved by any document on record, admittedly as per petitioners’ case also it was an understanding only, which is not referred in the gift deed. 4. The case of the petitioners is that in pursuance of the said gift executed on 25.08.2005 and in terms of a promise, the promise to appoint in public employments cannot be a claim which could be pressed before writ courts, which was extended by the District Project Officer, the petitioners were granted a contractual appointment in the institution by the order dated 03.11.2007. Admittedly, as per the terms of the said appointment letter the appointment of the petitioners was as a part time teacher was exclusively on a contractual basis and it specifically provided that the terms of the appointment of the petitioners would be governed by the various clauses contained in the letter of appointment dated 03.11.2007. The petitioners have harped upon and laid stress on clause-11 of the said letter of appointment, which is quoted hereunder: ^^11- ;g rSukrh iw.kZ :Ik ls vLFkk;h lafonk mRrjkapy lHkh ds fy, f'k{kk ifj"kn ds v/khu dh tk jgh gSA jkT; esa loZ f'k{kk vfHk;ku dh lekfIr vFkok fo|ky; ds mn~ns'; iw.kZ gksus vFkok mDr vuqcU/k vkxs u c<+k;s tkus dh fLFkfr esa] tks Hkh igys gks ij mijksDr in ,oa lafonk rSukrh Lor% gh lekIr gks tk;sxhA^^ 5. On a simple interpretation of clause-11 according to the petitioners is that as if the petitioners have acquired an immunity and would be permitted to continue till infinity until and unless the conditions of removal as contemplated under clause-11 occasions. Admittedly, in the case at hand the removal which has taken place by virtue of the impugned order dated 06.09.2017 is based on the fact that it records a finding that the petitioners have been removed because of their non interest towards the work not performing work assigned to them, their attitude towards the students and it has been observed that the continuance of petitioners into the services as a part time teacher on a contractual basis would be against the interest of the institution itself. 6.
6. It has also been observed that the petitioners had been instrumental in not observing and adhering to the directions, which has been issued by the competent superior authority from time to time it was subordination and had shown his sadistic attitude towards compliance of the aforesaid directions of superior officers. 7. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is as if that since these conditions which are inscribed in the impugned order, which has been taken as to be the foundation for terminating the services of the petitioner since do not form part and parcel of the terms contained in clause-11, the services of the petitioners could not be dispensed with and have attained immunity and cannot be removed from services under any condition. 8. This Court is not in agreement with the argument extended by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The logic behind it is that for the purposes of removal of a contractual employee that will not eliminate and permit the employee appointed on a contractual basis to function and discharge his duties according to his own whims and fancies and by adopting an attitude of insubordination. It will also not provide an immunity to the petitioners to work dehors to the interest of the institutions even if these clauses are not covered by clause-11, which limits the grounds for removal, then too in the wider interest of the institutions and the students itself, this Court is of the view that still the authorities have got ample of power to dispense with the services of a contractual employee, who otherwise has no lien to continue in the service. As the prime concern is the efficient dispensation of duties and interest of the institution. 9. Another argument which has been extended by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the impugned order has been passed without providing any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners.
As the prime concern is the efficient dispensation of duties and interest of the institution. 9. Another argument which has been extended by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the impugned order has been passed without providing any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. This argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is not acceptable for the reason that as already observed above that petitioners’ appointment since happens to be as a part time teacher on a contractual basis, he will have no lien to continue into the services to govern their services under the service conditions governing the appointment of a regular teacher that would not apply to the petitioners and the disciplinary proceedings or any other proceedings to be drawn prior to the removal will not apply on the petitioner who are contractual employees. 10. In view of the aforesaid facts and also coupled with the fact that the petitioners have not been able to establish that there was a commitment extended through any authentic document at the time when the predecessors of the petitioners had gifted the land for establishment of the institution, the petitioners would not get an immunity to act dehors to the interest of the institution, merely because of the fact that the predecessors have gifted the land for establishment of the institution. 11. Under the administrative law irrespective of the nature of appointment, irrespective of the source from where the appointment has been made and irrespective of the terms and conditions of the appointment, it is settled law that any employee who is appointed in an establishment in any capacity is supposed to adhere to certain settled norms of discipline and has to work in the interest of the institution and is also bound to follow the instructions of his superiors. The adamant attitude of an employee contrary to the wider interest of the institution can never be excused so as to provide him continuity into the services, and in particular, when the appointment happens to be on the contractual basis. 12. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the view that the impugned order dated 06.09.2017 as passed by the respondent/District Project Officer, Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan, do not suffer from any apparent legally enforceable error. As such the writ petition is dismissed. 13. However, there would be no order as to cost.