Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 1541 (HP)

Manish Choudhary v. State Of H. P.

2019-10-18

JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

body2019
JUDGMENT : Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J. In the instant petition preferred under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, petitioner is praying for quashing of FIR No. 134/19, dated 09.06.2019, under Sections 279, 337 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, registered at Police Station Haroli, District Una, H.P. and consequent proceedings, if any. 2. The facts may be noticed hereinafter:- 2(i) An accident took place on 09.06.2019, involving Motor Cycle No. HP 19D-6996, driven by the present petitioner allegedly injuring Ms. Bhawana minor daughter of Sh. Ravinder Kumar Verma (father) and Smt. Monika Verma (mother). This eventually led to registration of FIR No. 134/19 ( Annexure P-1) by Smt. Monika Verma under Sections 279, 337 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, at Police Haroli, District Una, H.P. 2(ii) The parties, i.e. the petitioner and the minor girl Ms. Bhawana through her mother & natural guardian Smt. Monika Verma, effected a compromise amongst themselves on 23.09.2019 to the effect that matter has been amicably settled between them; complainant/Smt. Monika Verma, does not want to proceed further with the above FIR; therefore she has no objection in case the same is quashed. 2(iii) The petitioner in this petition has placed on record the above-mentioned compromise dated 23.09.2019 (Annexure P-2). The petitioner Sh. Manish Choudhary, Ms. Bhawana daughter of Sh. Ravinder Kumar Verma & her mother-natural guardian Smt. Monika Verma, are present in the Court today and have been identified by their respective learned counsels. Smt. Monika Verma, has stated that compromise has been effected between the parties out of their own free will and without any pressure, fear, influence or coercion whatsoever. It is further stated that the parties are maintaining cordial relationship amongst themselves and that they do not want to pursue further with FIR No. 134/19. 3. Smt. Monika Verma, has stated that compromise has been effected between the parties out of their own free will and without any pressure, fear, influence or coercion whatsoever. It is further stated that the parties are maintaining cordial relationship amongst themselves and that they do not want to pursue further with FIR No. 134/19. 3. The law laid down in respect of exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing or for refusing to quash the FIR and resultant proceedings on the basis of compromise effected by the parties laid down in titled Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 ; titled Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 ; titled as Parbatbhai Aahir vs. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641 has been noticed again by Hon'ble Apex Court in titled as State of Madhaya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688 with following observations:- "15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under: 15.1 That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; 15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society; 15.3 Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender; 15.4 Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove; 15.5 While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc." 4. Applying the above guidelines to the instant case, I am of the considered view that the offences for which, the petitioner has been accused in FIR No. 134/19, cannot be stricto-sensu said to be the offences against the State or involving social impact. In view of the amicable settlement arrived at between the parties, no fruitful purpose will be served in continuing the proceedings in question; the present case does not fall within the exceptions carved out by the Hon'ble Apex Court when amicable settlement arrived at between the parties cannot be acted upon for quashing the FIR and the consequent proceedings; the possibility of conviction in such circumstances would be very very remote. The continuation of the proceedings will be to the great detriment of the petitioner causing him unnecessary harassment and injustice. When the private respondents do not want to hold the petitioner responsible, then quashing of such FIR would certainly be in the interest of justice. 5. Consequently, the present petition is allowed and the FIR No. 134/19, dated 09.06.2019, under Sections 279, 337 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, registered at Police Station Haroli, District Una, H.P. along with consequent proceedings, if any, is quashed. The petition stands disposed of accordingly.