Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Hemendra Singh Solanki
2019-05-16
DINESH MEHTA
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Dinesh Mehta, J. - The present appeal is directed against the order dated 04.04.2019, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, No. 4, Udaipur (hereinafter referred to as 'the court below'), vide which application under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1996'), filed by the respondent has been allowed and the appellant-Corporation was directed to continue supply of petroleum products at the respondent's retail outlet. The operative portion of the order aforesaid reads thus: ^^ÁkFkhZ gsesUæ flag lksyadh dh vksj ls ÁLrqr ÁkFkZuk i= fnukad 01-04-2019 Lohdkj fd;k tkdj foi{khx.k bf.Mu vkW;y dkWiksZjs'ku oxSjg dks ikcUn fd;k tkrk gS fd gLrxr Ádj.k esa e/;LFk fu;qDr gksus o mlds }kjk iapkV tkjh djus rd ewy vuqcU/k ds vuq:i ÁkFkhZ }kjk fu;eksa o 'krksZ dh ikyuk djus ij isVªksy mRiknu dh vkiwfrZ tkjh j[ksaxsA ;g Hkh vkns'k fn;k tkrk gS fd e/;LFk }kjk Ádj.k ds vfUre fuLrkj.k esa tkjh iapkV ÁkFkhZ ds foi{k esa gksus ij foi{kh dks ;g vf/kdkj gksxk fd og nkSjkus fopkj.k ÁkFkhZ dks fn;s x;s deh'ku dks fu;ekuqlkj olwy dj ldsxkA** 2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the learned court below has allowed the respondent's application under Section 9 of the Act of 1996, without assigning any reasons. Having navigated the Court through the order impugned, learned counsel contended that the court below, instead of considering the prima facie case, was driven by the uncalled for equity for which a direction has been issued to the Corporation to continue the supply, ignoring the fact that respondent's dealership stood terminated for malpractices. He argued that the order of termination was passed strictly in terms of the guidelines and after following due process. The order impugned deserves to be quashed and set aside, was the counsel's natural prayer. 3. Mr. Joshi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent, could not support or justify the impugned order passed by the court below. 4. He however, submitted that pursuant to the request made by the dealer for appointment of Arbitrator, the appellant - Corporation has suggested three names vide their letter dated 13.05.2019, out of which, name of Mr. M.C. Bhagwati, Retired Judge, Rajasthan High Court, is acceptable to the dealer. 5.
4. He however, submitted that pursuant to the request made by the dealer for appointment of Arbitrator, the appellant - Corporation has suggested three names vide their letter dated 13.05.2019, out of which, name of Mr. M.C. Bhagwati, Retired Judge, Rajasthan High Court, is acceptable to the dealer. 5. Realising that effect and operation of the impugned order has already been stayed by this Court, vide its order dated 25.04.2019 and the dealer is not operating his retail outlet, instead of going back before the Court below to reagitate its application under Section 9 of the Act of 1996, he prayed in the alternative that the appellant be asked to appoint the Arbitrator as early as possible and it be left open for the respondent Dealer to move appropriate application seeking interim relief from the Arbitrator under Section 17 of the Act of 1996. 6. In the peculiar facts of the case, instead of simply setting aside the order at the askance of the respondent and relegating the dealer to approach the Arbitrator under Section 17 of the Act of 1996, I deem it apt to set out the reasons for which, the order impugned deserves to be set aside. 7. A bare look at the impugned order unravels that learned Court below has kept the principles of grant of injunction in abeyance. Though learned Judge noticed that application under Section 9 of the Act of 1996 is required to be decided on the anvil of principles of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and thus proceeded to ascertain the prima facie case. But, while doing so, he has discussed every thing, except the merit of the dealer's case under "prima facie case". Whatever has been noticed under this head may be relevant for fathoming balance of convenience, but they cannot be said to be germane, when it comes to prima facie case.
But, while doing so, he has discussed every thing, except the merit of the dealer's case under "prima facie case". Whatever has been noticed under this head may be relevant for fathoming balance of convenience, but they cannot be said to be germane, when it comes to prima facie case. It will not be out of place to reproduce the relevant part of the order, which I hereby do:- ^^ÁFke n`"V;k Ádj.k dk voyksdu djus ij Árhr gksrk gS fd Lohd`r :i ls ÁkFkhZ foxr 10 o"kksZ ls Hkh vf/kd le; ls mn;iqj 'kgj esa isVªksy iEi dk lapkyu dj jgk gSA ;g Hkh Lohd`r rF; gS fd ÁkFkhZ ,oa foi{kh nksuksa }kjk feydj isVªksy iEi ftl txg ij cuk;k x;k gS] ml ckcr~ fdjk;k Hkh fn;k tkrk gSA ;g Hkh Lohd`r rF; gS fd isVªksy iEi lapkyu gsrq LVkQ Hkh j[kk x;k gS] ftls Hkh Hkqxrku fd;k tk jgk gSA nkSjkus fopkj.k U;k;ky; bl ckr ls foeq[k ugha gks ldrk gS fd isVªksy iEi lapkyu esa O;kolkf;d :i ls tfVyrk,sa gS rFkk dkQh /ku dk Hkh O;; gksrk gSA ;g Lohd`r fLFkfr gS fd gLrxr Ádj.k dk fuLrkj.k e/;LFkrk ,oa lqyg vf/kfu;e] 1996 ds v/khu fd;k tkuk gSA vr% ÁFke n`"V;k Ádj.k ds rF;ksa o ifjfLFkfr;ksa rFkk bu rF;ksa ds vkyksd esa fd ÁkFkhZ vkSj foi{kh ftl LFkku ij isVªksy iEi dk lapkyu dj jgs gS] mldk fdjk;k ns jgs gS o LVkQ dk osru Hkh fn;k tkuk gSA Ádj.k ds leLr rF;ksa] ifjfLFkfr;ksa o mijksDr rF;ksa dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq, ÁkFkhZ dh vksj ls ÁLrqr mDr ÁkFkZuk i= Lohdkj fd;k tkuk U;k;ksfpr Árhr gksrk gS] fdUrq bu rF;ksa ds vkyksd esa fd ÁkFkhZ ij ekdsZfVax xkbZM ykbZu ds vkKkid Áko/kkuksa ds mYya?ku dk vkjksi gS] ,sls esa ;g vkns'k fn;k tkrk gS fd %& ^^ÁkFkhZ gsesUæ flag lksyadh dh vksj ls ÁLrqr ÁkFkZuk i= fnukad 01-04-2019 Lohdkj fd;k tkdj foi{khx.k bf.Mu vkW;y dkWiksZjs'ku oxSjg dks ikcUn fd;k tkrk gS fd gLrxr Ádj.k esa e/;LFk fu;qDr gksus o mlds }kjk iapkV tkjh djus rd ewy vuqcU/k ds vuq:i ÁkFkhZ }kjk fu;eksa o 'krksZ dh ikyuk djus ij isVªksy mRiknu dh vkiwfrZ tkjh j[ksaxsA ;g Hkh vkns'k fn;k tkrk gS fd e/;LFk }kjk Ádj.k ds vfUre fuLrkj.k esa tkjh iapkV ÁkFkhZ ds foi{k esa gksus ij foi{kh dks ;g vf/kdkj gksxk fd og nkSjkus fopkj.k ÁkFkhZ dks fn;s x;s deh'ku dks fu;ekuqlkj olwy dj ldsxkA** 8.
The irony is, having purportedly found the prima facie case in dealer's favour, learned Court below went ahead to pass the injunction, completely ignoring the other two aspects, viz. balance of convenience and equity, perhaps thinking that whatever he has recorded in above captioned para is sufficient for all the consideration. 9. The temporary injunction granted by the Court below virtually amounts to final relief. Such type of approach and order(s) passed by the Court below cannot be countenanced. The order impugned is per se against the settled cannons of law and liable to be quashed and set aside. Which I hereby do. 10. The appellant-Corporation may however appoint Arbitrator within two weeks from today. Once the Arbitrator enters into reference, the respondent Dealer may move an application for grant of interim relief in accordance with law. 11. Needless to observe that as and when such application under Section 17 of the Act of 1996 is filed, the learned Arbitrator will be free to decide the same, without being influenced by the fact that the order dated 04.04.2019 passed in dealer's application seeking temporary injunction has been set at naught by this Court. The appeal stands allowed in the above terms. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned Presiding Officer.