JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner by way of this writ petition assails the order dated 17.2.2001 passed by the Additional Collector-II, Jaipur under the Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,1964 whereby he has closed the proceedings under the Act on the ground of there being civil suit pending between the parties regarding title of the property and has allowed to open the proceedings only after a decision is arrived in the civil suit. 2. On the last date i.e. 9.5.2019 , State was directed to inform this court as to what is the result of the civil proceedings which were initiated in the year 1995 and pending before Civil Judge(Jr. Division) Jaipur West. It is informed that the case is still pending for disposal. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that even if the civil suit is pending, the authority under the Act was required to pass an order on the notice issued under 4(1) of the Act to the respondent. It is also submitted that respondent no.6 was a tenant and so far as the respondent no.1 is concerned, he has no further right to sale the property under the garb of the order passed by the Additional Collector-II, Jaipur and the property has been further disposed of by them wrongfully while the property actually belonged to the State. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has relied on 1982(2) SCC134 "Govt. of Andhra Pradesh Vs Thummala Rao & Anr.", to submit that where there is bonafide dispute regarding the title of the property, the provisions of Unauthorized Occupation Act cannot be brought in operation and the order passed by the Collector, Jaipur does not call for any interference. 5. I have considered the submission and find that the property in question was granted as State Grant in favour of Raja Govind Das and after death of Raja Govind Das, Matmi was sanctioned in favour of Devi Singh. After death of Devi Singh, Matmi was sanctioned in the name of Sh. Roop Singh. It is stated that subsequently the State Grant property was resumed to the State from him in the year 1914 and thereafter was sanctioned in favour of one Raja Moti Singh. After death of Devi Singh, Matmi was sanctioned in the name of Sh. Roop Singh. It is stated that subsequently the State Grant property was resumed to the State from him in the year 1914 and thereafter was sanctioned in favour of one Raja Moti Singh. Thereafter upon Raja Moti Singh being involved in murder case, his Jagir including said Nohra and Haveli were taken under the Management of Court of Wards Department of the then Jaipur State and property was thereafter again resumed to the State. After release of Raja Moti Singh right of residence was given to Raja moti Singh. Thus, it is contended that the property in question as submitted belonging to State of Rajasthan and would be treated Nazul property. After merger of Jaipur State in State of Rajasthan aforesiad respondent no.1 to 5 claimed themselves to inherit proposition of Raja Moti Singh and have claimed their ownership on the said property thus in view of this court, dispute regarding the ownership and title is required to be examined by competent civil court. In 1982 (2)SCC134 (supra) Apex Court has held as under: "8.It seems to us clear from these provisions that the summary remedy for eviction which is provided for by section 6 of the Act can be resorted to by the Government only against persons who are in unauthorized occupation of any land which is "the property of Government". In regard to properly described in subsections (I) and (2) of section 2, there can be no doubt, difficulty or dispute as to the title of the Government and, therefore, in respect of such property, the Government would be free to take recourse to the summary remedy of eviction provided for in section 6. A person who occupies a part of a public road, street, bridge, the bed of the sea and the like, is in unauthorised occupation of property which is declared by section 2 to be the property of the Government and, therefore, it is in public interest to evict him expeditiously which can only be done by resorting to the summary remedy provided by the Act. But section 6 (1) which confers the power of summary eviction on the Government limits that power to cases in which a person is in unauthorised occupation of a land "for which he is liable to pay assessment under section 3". But section 6 (1) which confers the power of summary eviction on the Government limits that power to cases in which a person is in unauthorised occupation of a land "for which he is liable to pay assessment under section 3". Section 3, in turn, refers to unauthorised occupation of any land "which is the property of Government" If there is a bond dispute regarding the title of the Government to any property the Government cannot take a unilateral decision in its own favour that the property belongs to it, and on the basis of such decision take recourse to the summary remedy provided by section 6 for evicting the person who is in possession of the property under a bona fide claim or title. In the instant case, there is unquestionably a genuine dispute between The State Government and the respondents as to whether The three plots of land were the subject-matter of acquisition proceedings taken by the then Government of Hyderabad and whether the osmania University, for whose benefit the plots are alleged to have been acquired, had lost title to the property by operation of the law of limitation. The suit filed by the University was dismissed on the ground of limitation, inter alia, since Nawab Habibuddin was found to have encroached on the properly more than twelve years before the date of the suit and the University was not in possession of the property at any time within that period. Having tailed in the suit, the University activated the Government to evict the Nawab and his transferees summarily, which seems to us impermissible. The respondents have a bona fide claim to litigate and they cannot be evicted save by the due process of law. The summary remedy prescribed by section 6 is not the kind of legal process which is suited to an adjudication of complicated questions of title. That procedure is, therefore, not the due process of law for evicting the respondents. 9. The summary remedy prescribed by section 6 is not the kind of legal process which is suited to an adjudication of complicated questions of title. That procedure is, therefore, not the due process of law for evicting the respondents. 9. The view of the Division Bench that the summary remedy provided for by section 6 cannot be resorted to unless the alleged encroachment is of "a very recent origin", cannot be stretched too far That was also the view taken by the learned single Judge him self in another case which is reported in Meherunnissa Begum v. State of A.P. which was affirmed by a Division Bench.(2) It is not the duration, short or long, of encroachment that is conclusive of the question whether the summary remedy prescribed by the Act can be put into operation for evicting a person. What is relevant for the decision of that question is more the nature of the property on which the encroachment is alleged to have been committed and the consideration whether the claim of the occupant is bona fide. Facts " which raise a bond fide dispute of title between the Government and the occupant must be adjudicated upon by the Ordinary courts of law. The Government cannot decide such questions unilaterally in its own favour and evict any person summarily on the basis of such decision. But duration of occupation is relevant in the sense that a person who is hi occupation of a property openly for an appreciable length of time can be taken, prima facie, to have a bonafide claim to the property requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law. " 6. Taking into consideration the aforesaid three judges Bench judgment, the Division Bench of this court in "Raja Fateh Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan" reported in 1986 RLR966 has held the Estate Officer to be not competent to decide complicated and substantial question in summary manner under the Act of 1964. The five Judges Bench in AIR (91) SCC 855 "Ashoka Marketing Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan" reported in 1986 RLR966 has held the Estate Officer to be not competent to decide complicated and substantial question in summary manner under the Act of 1964. The five Judges Bench in AIR (91) SCC 855 "Ashoka Marketing Ltd. Vs. Punjab National Bank" while holding that Public Premises Act are over and above rights ensuing under Delhi Rent Control Act and a person is unauthorised occupant and cannot be protected of Rent Control Act held as under: "Rule 5(2) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)Rules, 1971, requires the estate officer to record the summary of evidence tendered before him. Moreover Section 9 confers a right of appeal against as order of the estate officer and the said appeal has to be heard and either by the District Judge of the District in which the public premises are situate or such other judicial officer in that district of not less than ten years' standing as the district judge may designate in that behalf. It shows that the final order that is passed is by a judicial officer in the rank of a district judge." Further it proceeded to held as under:- "50. On such principle of statutory interpretation which is applied to be is contained in the latin maxim:leges posteriores priores conterarias abrogant(later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws). This principle is subject to the exception embodied in the maxim: generalia special bus non derogant(a general one). This means that where the literal meaning of the general enactment covers enactment covers a situation for which specific provision is made by another enactment contained in an earlier Act, it is presumed that the situation was intended to continue to be dealt with by the specific provision rather than the later general one ." 7. However, the view taken in case of of "Govt. of Andhra Pradesh Vs Thummala Rao & Anr(supra) has remained consistent and where there is a bonafide dispute raised regarding the property in question, it would be best left for the concerned civil court to decide the said issue. 8. Having notice aforesaid, this court is of the view that considering the dispute as noticed above, the State is left free to take up the civil proceedings if it so decides for eviction or for ownership and declaration of the title of the aforesaid property. 8. Having notice aforesaid, this court is of the view that considering the dispute as noticed above, the State is left free to take up the civil proceedings if it so decides for eviction or for ownership and declaration of the title of the aforesaid property. It is noticed that civil case filed by the respondent has been pending before the trial court since 1995. The state is left free to move an appropriate application for disposal of the said suit also. 9. The order passed by the Collector is found to be in order and does not warrant interference. 10. The writ petition is dismissed.