JUDGMENT : A.K. Mishra, J. 1. In this LIS U/s. 482 Cr.P.C. prayer has been made to quash the order dated 01.06.2015 of learned J.M.F.C. Betnoti in G.R. Case No. 588 of 2014 in taking cognizance of offences U/ss.394, 397 of the Indian Penal Code (in short the I.P.C.) and U/s. 9(B)(i)(b) of The Explosives Act, 1884 and the criminal proceeding culminated thereof. 2. The case of the petitioner, simply said, is that informant Gurupada Pal was the owner of a Jewellery shop situated at Betnoti Bus Stand. On 21.12.2014 at about 10 P.M. he closed his shop and returned with bag containing silver ornaments weighing 2.5 kilograms, gold ornaments weighing 170 grams and cash of Rs. 1,27,000/- by his scooter. While he reached near his house, three unknown culprits threw chili powder and captured him. They snatched away the bag containing cash and ornaments. In course of scuffle, one of them dealt a blow to his back by means of a sharp cutting weapon and all the culprits exploded bomb to take escape route. The informant was immediately shifted to hospital. On lodging of F.I.R. on the next day morning at about 8.30 A.M. vide annexure-1, Betnoti P.S. Case No. 225 dated 22.12.2014 was registered. Investigation was ensued. Two accused persons were arrested and test identification parade was conducted. Recovered articles were left in zima of informant. Charge-sheet was submitted, basing upon which impugned order was passed on 01.06.2015 taking cognizance U/ss. 394, 397 of I.P.C. and U/s. 9(B)(i)(b) of Explosives Act, 1884. Sufficient ground U/s. 204 Cr.P.C. was found to proceed against four accused persons. Two accused persons, namely, Bapun @ Gopinath Moharana and Abhi @ Abhiram Dalei were in jail custody by then. Other two accused persons, namely Deba @ Debendra Jena and Banguru @ Ganeswar Behera (present petitioner) were found absconding, hence NBW was issued against them. As two absconders were not apprehended, the case against them was split up and for rest two UTPs commitment was made to the Court of Sessions. Trial was taken up. Twenty witnesses were examined. Learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Baripada vide his judgment dtd.22.02.2017 under Annexure-4 in S.T. Case No. 223 of 2015, acquitted both the accused persons extending the benefit of doubt and did not pass any order regarding disposal of seized properties as the case was pending against the absconding accused persons including present petitioner. 3. Twenty witnesses were examined. Learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Baripada vide his judgment dtd.22.02.2017 under Annexure-4 in S.T. Case No. 223 of 2015, acquitted both the accused persons extending the benefit of doubt and did not pass any order regarding disposal of seized properties as the case was pending against the absconding accused persons including present petitioner. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and diligently perused the evidence and the judgment annexure-4 in respect of two co-accused persons who faced trial. 4. Amongst several grounds taken by the petitioner in assailing the cognizance order, one of the grounds does not depict any relevancy to the facts of this case and for that the same is extracted below:- "(E) For that it appears from the Annexure-4 that the P.W.6 and 7 are the mother and father of the deceased, categorically stated that due to the accidental fire, her daughter died and she was living happily in her matrimonial house and there was no demand of dowry from the side of the petitioners? Family, So in view of such matter, the interference of this Hon'ble Court is highly required to quash the criminal proceeding against the petitioners." On this score, suffice to note that, for the paradox in the petition, the petitioner should not be deprived of justice if he is otherwise entitled to. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Satya Ranjan Mulia submitted that as the evidence recorded in course of trial in S.T. Case No. 223 of 2015 has not implicated the present petitioner and two accused persons who faced trial were already acquitted of the charges by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Baripada, continuance of the split up proceeding against the present petitioner will be an abuse of process of law, as such the same should be quashed. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following decisions:- (i) Kanhu Behera vs. State of Orissa, (2005) 2 OLR 386 (ii) Santosh Kumar Maity vs. State of Orissa, (2006) 2 OLR 308 (iii) Ramananda @ Ram Mandal @ Rupsingh Naik vs. State of Orissa, (2007) 37 OCR 159 5-A. Per contra, learned Additional Standing Counsel Mr. S. Dash submitted that the trial court has acquitted the two accused persons giving benefit of doubt and thereby the incident has not been disbelieved. S. Dash submitted that the trial court has acquitted the two accused persons giving benefit of doubt and thereby the incident has not been disbelieved. Further one of the absconding accused, namely Deba @ Debendra Jena is yet to be apprehended and the present petitioner who has not yet appeared in the court should not be allowed to reap dividend out of his own fault. 6. In the Ramananda case (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, both the decisions of Kanhu Behera (supra) and Santosh Kumar Maity (supra) have been referred to. In that case though 1000 unnamed persons were implicated in the F.I.R. neither any specific overt act was attributed nor was any nexus of the petitioners found for which the Court found no prima-facie case and accordingly held that continuance of criminal proceeding would amount an abuse of the process of the Court. In the Kanhu Behera case, no prima-facie case was found against the petitioner for which the proceeding was quashed. Similarly, in Santosh Kumar Maity case, the Court found that from the materials of U.D. case and other materials, no specific allegation against the petitioners was revealed: 6-A. In the above three cited decisions, no ratio devidendi has been laid down to the effect that basing upon the acquittal of accused in a trial, the split up proceeding in respect of co-accused who has not faced trial, can be quashed, it is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding Law under Article 141 of the Constitution. The cited decisions are of no help to the petitioner. 7. On the other hand, in the decision, Nirmal Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2000) AIR SC 1416 their Lordships of Hon'ble Apex Court have held as follows:- "........Section 299 of the Code of Criminal Procedure consists of two parts. The first part speaks of the circumstances under which witnesses produced by the prosecution could be examined in the absence of the accused and the second part speaks of the circumstances, when such deposition can be given in evidence against the accused in any inquiry or trial for the offence with which he is charged. The first part speaks of the circumstances under which witnesses produced by the prosecution could be examined in the absence of the accused and the second part speaks of the circumstances, when such deposition can be given in evidence against the accused in any inquiry or trial for the offence with which he is charged. This procedure contemplated under Section 299 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is thus an exception to the principle embodied in Section 33 of the Evidence Act inasmuch as under Section 33, the evidence of a witness, which a party has no right or opportunity to cross-examine is not legally admissible. Being an exception, it is necessary, therefore, that all the conditions prescribed, must be strictly complied with. In other words, before recording the statement of the witnesses, produced by the prosecution, the Court must be satisfied that the accused has absconded or that there is no immediate prospect of arresting him, as provided under first part of Section 299(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the case in hand, there is no grievance about non-compliance of any of the requirements of the first part of sub-section (1) of Section 299 Cr.P.C. When the accused is arrested and put up for trial, if any, such deposition of any witness is intended to be used as an evidence against the accused in any trial, then the Court must be satisfied that either the deponent is dead or incapable of giving evidence or cannot be found or his presence cannot be procured without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience, which would be unreasonable..........." 7-A. Apropos the facts at hand, it is profitable to refer a decision of the Court reported in Smt. Urmila Sahu vs. State of Orissa, (1997) 2 OLR 426 wherein it is held authoritatively that:- "6. Section 299, Cr.P.C. (Section 512 of the Old Code) has a limited application inasmuch as if it is proved that an accused person has absconded and there is no immediate prospect of arresting him or that it appears that an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life has been committed by some person or persons unknown and there is no immediate prospect of arrest of such offenders, the Court competent to try or commit for trial may examine the witnesses produced on behalf of the prosecution and record their depositions. After apprehension of the accused or when the accused is available to the Court for trial at that stage if any of such witnesses examined under Section 299, Cr.P.C. is not available being dead or incapable of giving evidence or cannot be found or if his presence cannot be procured without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience, then circumstances should be taken into consideration and the evidence recorded under Section 299, Cr.P.C. may be accepted in evidence to be used against such accused persons. In that sense, Section 299, Cr.P.C. is an exception to the general rules and criminal jurisprudence regarding recording of evidence in presence of the accused. It thus, follows that even if evidence is recorded under Section 299, Cr.P.C. but if after the apprehension of the accused if such witnesses are available and are capable of giving evidence, then the evidence recorded under Section 299, Cr.P.C. cannot be utilised as substantive evidence. The aforesaid legal proposition is apparent on a bare reading of Section 299, Cr.P.C. (i.e. Section 512 of the Old Code). In the case of State of Hyderabad vs. Bhimaraya, (1953) AIR Hyderabad 63 a Munsif-Magistrate, recording statement of witnesses under Section 512 of the Old Code with respect to certain absconding accused, passed order to delete the name of such absconding accused persons on the ground that no sufficient proof of their participation was available. On the reference being made by the Sessions Judge, Gulbarga, a Division Bench of the Hyderabad High Court had examined the legality of the aforesaid order of the Munsif. Magistrate and have held that Section 512of the Code does not authorise the Magistrate to delete the name of an absconding accused on the basis of evidence so recorded. This Court respectfully agree with the above view and for that reason the prayer to quash or drop the proceeding is accordingly rejected." 8. From the Law authoritatively enunciated in the above two decisions, the requirement of Section 299 Cr.P.C. for use of evidence in subsequent trial cannot be over-looked. This Court respectfully agree with the above view and for that reason the prayer to quash or drop the proceeding is accordingly rejected." 8. From the Law authoritatively enunciated in the above two decisions, the requirement of Section 299 Cr.P.C. for use of evidence in subsequent trial cannot be over-looked. At the same breath, it can be said that if the judgment recording acquittal of accused persons, has disproved the substratum of the prosecution case and the co-accused who had not faced trial is found to have acted bona fide to honour the judicial process, the said factum can be considered as one of the aspects to quash the criminal proceeding because in that event the continuance of criminal proceeding may amount to an abuse of the process of Law and there is bleak chance of conviction. 9. Tested in the touchstone of above principle, in the case at hand the acquittal of two accused persons in the trial has not disproved the alleged incident at all. The requirements to use the evidence recorded in that trial U/s. 299 Cr.P.C. and Section 33 of The Indian Evidence Act are wanting. The acquittal of co-accused cannot be a fact finding point for cognizance order igniting the process of the Court qua accused. 10. The materials available on record, reveals prima-facie case against the petitioner. The acquittal of co-accused persons in separate trial has not disproved the substratum of the prosecution case. Ergo the petitioner cannot derive any benefit of that acquittal judgment to quash this proceeding. Further the petitioner was found to have absconded and thereby allowed the judicial proceeding delayed. For these reasons, this court is not inclined to invoke the inherent jurisdiction U/s. 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceeding in question. 11. Accordingly the Crl. MC stands dismissed.