S. Jebamalai v. Khader Meera @ Muthalif, rep. by its Power Agent H. Zakkir Hussayn
2019-01-11
T.RAVINDRAN
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Challenge in this second appeal is made to the Judgment and Decree, dated 07.11.2014, passed in A.S.No.47 of 2012, on the file of the V Additional District Court, Madurai, confirming the Judgment and Decree, dated 13.08.2012, passed in O.S.No.1005 of 2010, on the file of the II Additional Subordinate Court, Madurai. 2. The second appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law : “(1) When the vendor had agreed, after the receipt of the entire sale consideration from the purchaser, and agreed to execute the sale deed as and when the purchaser demanded it, whether, the suit for specific performance filed within three years from the date of refusal to execute the sale sale deed is barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act. (2) When the plaintiff had agreed to take a lesser extent of the land than one stipulated under the Original Agreement of Sale, whether the purchaser is not entitled to the benefits of Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act? (3) When the earlier suit is for permanent injunction, for a different relief, and when the later suit is for specific performance on a different cause of action, whether the later suit filed for specific performance is hit under the bar in Order II Rule 2 of Code of Civil Procedure. (4) When the subsequent purchaser himself had admitted that he knew the existence of the contract of sale, between his vendor and the agreement holder, and when, the purchaser adopted several tactics to deprive the agreement holder from getting the benefit of the sale is he is not disentitled to get the suit for specific performance filed by the agreement holder, on any ground, and by his conduct. (5) When the vendor admittedly had not returned the advance amount after adjusting the sale consideration for the part of the sale transaction, whether, a decree of lower Appellate Court, dismissing the suit without directing the refund of the advance amount, as alternative relief is illegal.” 3. Considering the scope of the issues involved between the parties as regards the subject matter lying in a narrow compass, it is unnecessary to dwell into the facts of the case in detail. 4. The parties are referred to as per their rankings in the Trial Court for the sake of convenience. 5.
Considering the scope of the issues involved between the parties as regards the subject matter lying in a narrow compass, it is unnecessary to dwell into the facts of the case in detail. 4. The parties are referred to as per their rankings in the Trial Court for the sake of convenience. 5. Suffice to state that the plaintiff has laid the suit against the defendants seeking the relief of specific performance for enforcing the sale agreement, dated 28.01.2001. It is found that the property comprised in the sale agreement – Ex.A1 belonged to Kadar Meera alias Muthalif and based on the power of attorney deed executed by him in favour of one A.K.Annadurai, it is seen that Ex.A1 – sale agreement had been entered into by the said A.K.Annaduai as the power of attorney agent of Kadar Meera alias Muthalif with the plaintiff in respect of the property comprised therein. It is not in dispute that A.K.Annadurai had the competency to enter into the sale agreement marked as Ex.A1 with the plaintiff and thus, it is found that the power of attorney agent has validly entered into the abovesaid sale agreement with the plaintiff and on a perusal of the terms contained in Ex.A1 – sale agreement, it is evident that the abovesaid sale agreement has been entered into between the parties concerned in respect of the property situated in Tallakulam Village, comprised in R.S.Nos.173/11 and 174/1B2, an extent of 1 Acre and 11 Cents, on the southern side, out of the total extent of 1 Acre 21 Cents.
Furthermore, it is also found that the parties thereto had agreed to that the sale consideration should be fixed at Rs.2,20,000/- per Cent and it is noted that on the date of the sale agreement – Ex.A1, the plaintiff had tendered a sum of Rs.30,00,000/- to the power agent and furthermore, the sale agreement recites that the plaintiff should pay the balance sale consideration within a period of three months and on the plaintiff completing the above part of the terms of the contract, the parties further agreed to that the power agent should execute the sale deed in respect of the entire property comprised in the sale agreement or in parts either to the plaintiff or to her nominees as named by the plaintiff and accordingly, it is found that the parties are very definite and determined that the sale transaction should be completed within a particular point of time and accordingly, with the abovesaid intention, had fixed the time limit of three months for completing the sale transaction. The sale agreement further recites that out of the advance amount of Rs.30,00,000/-, the sum of Rs.10,00,000/- should be retained as permanent advance and the balance sum of Rs.20,00,000/- should be adjusted at the time of the registration of the sale transaction and accordingly, the sale agreement – Ex.A1 had come to be executed between the abovesaid parties. 6. Admittedly, the plaintiff had failed to pay the balance sale consideration within the time stipulated as per the terms of Ex.A1 – sale agreement. Furthermore, though the sale agreement had come to be executed in respect of 1 Acre and 11 Cents in the suit survey number, however, it is found that the plaintiff has come forward with the suit only for seeking the relief of specific performance as regards the extent of 4 Cents lying on the south-eastern side in the suit survey number.
With reference to the same, according to the plaintiff, though she had been always ready and willing to perform her part of the contract by tendering the balance sale consideration, according to the plaintiff, as per her request to the power agent to execute a sale deed for 20 ¼ Cents out of the total extent of 1 Acre and 11 Cents to her nominee S.Selvaraj, it is stated that the power agent had executed the sale deed in favour of the abovesaid S.Selvaraj on 06.06.2002 only in respect of 16 ¼ Cents instead of 20 ¼ Cents, though he had received the consideration for 20 ¼ Cents from the plaintiff and it is further pleaded by the plaintiff that she had paid the additional advance of Rs.20,00,000/- to the power agent by way of cash and in all, it is stated that the power agent had received a sum of Rs.50,00,000/- as advance from the plaintiff. Accordingly, putting forth the case that instead of executing the sale deed in favour of her nominee as abovestated to the extent of 20 ¼ Cents, out of the total extent of 1 Acre and 11 Cents, contending that the power agent is attempting to sell the subject matter to the third parties, it is stated that the plaintiff had been necessitated to lay the suit, in O.S.No.826 of 2002, on the file of the Subordinate Court, Madurai, (subsequently, renumbered as O.S.No.105 of 2005 on transfer to the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Madurai) for permanent injunction restraining the power agent from transferring the property measuring 94 ¾ Cents in the suit survey number and accordingly, further contending that the power agent is bound to execute the sale deed in respect of 4 Cents of property being the balance extent out of the total extent of 20 ¼ Cents, with reference to which he had agreed to execute the sale deed in favour of her nominee S.Selvaraj and further putting forth the case that despite the issuance of notice on 18.04.2007 requesting the power agent to execute the sale deed in respect of the 4 Cents as abovestated, inasmuch as the power agent had evaded to receive the said notice one way or the other, according to the plaintiff, she has been necessitated to lay the suit for the appropriate reliefs. 7.
7. From the abovesaid case projected by the plaintiff, it is evident that the plaintiff though would putforth the case that she has entered into the sale agreement with the power agent for an extent of 1 Acre and 11 Cents, however, seeks to enforce the sale agreement only in respect of 4 Cents of land in the suit survey number lying on the south-eastern side and thus, it is noted that the plaintiff has preferred the suit only to enforce the sale agreement in part and not completely. 8. The defence has been taken mainly that the suit laid by the plaintiff is barred by limitation and that the plaintiff has never been ready and willing to perform her part of the contract to ensure the completion of the sale transaction as per the terms of the sale agreement – Ex.A1 and furthermore, also disputed having admitted to execute the sale deed in respect of 20 ¼ Cents in the suit survey number to plaintiff's nominee S.Selvaraj as putforth in the plaint and also contended that the 4 Cents of land with reference to which the plaintiff has laid the suit, has been earmarked for road purpose and hence, cannot be alienated and the plaintiff had agreed to take the other extent of 4 Cents on the western side and also further contended that the suit laid by the plaintiff for enforcing the sale agreement in part is legally unsustainable and accordingly, prayed for the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit. 9. As regards the point of limitation putforth by the defendants, it is found that as per the terms of Ex.A1 – sale agreement, the parties had fixed a particular time limit for the completion of the sale transaction i.e. three months from the date of the sale agreement. Ex.A1 – sale agreement had been entered into between the parties on 28.01.2001. So viewed, it is found that the period of three months fixed under Ex.A1 – sale agreement expired on 28.04.2001. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it is evident that the plaintiff had not paid the balance sale consideration within the abovesaid period of time. Accordingly, computing the period of limitation from 28.04.2001, as rightly determined by the Courts below, the period of three years fixed for enforcing the sale agreement as per law expired on 28.04.2004.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it is evident that the plaintiff had not paid the balance sale consideration within the abovesaid period of time. Accordingly, computing the period of limitation from 28.04.2001, as rightly determined by the Courts below, the period of three years fixed for enforcing the sale agreement as per law expired on 28.04.2004. However, it is found that the plaintiff has laid the suit only on 23.08.2007. Thus, it is found that the plaintiff has come forward with the suit beyond the period of limitation and obviously, as putforth by the defendants, the plaintiff's suit is barred by time. However, countering the same, it is contended by the plaintiff's counsel that considering the terms of the sale agreement, as the power agent had agreed to execute the sale deed either wholly or in part in favour of the plaintiff or her nominee as and when demanded by the plaintiff, accordingly, it is his argument that the period of limitation for enforcing the abovesaid sale agreement would commence only on the plaintiff having or put on notice that the performance had been refused and accordingly, pleaded that inasmuch as the plaintiff had issued the legal notice, on 18.04.2007, calling upon the power agent to enforce the sale agreement and the same having been evaded to be received by the power agent one way or the other, thereby, contended that the suit laid by the plaintiff is not hit by the law of limitation. However, the abovesaid plea has been rightly discountenanced by the Courts below holding that the latter part of Article 54 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable to the facts and circumstance of the case, particularly, when the parties had determined that the sale transaction should be completed within the period of three months from the date of the sale agreement as putforth in Ex.A1 – sale agreement and in such view of the matter, the latter part of Article 54 of the Limitation Act would not apply to the case and as determined by the Courts below, the plaintiff's suit having been laid on 23.08.2007 is found to be patently barred by limitation and accordingly, the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit by the Courts below on the point of limitation does not warrant any interference. 10.
10. As regards the readiness and willingness aspect, as abovenoted, the sale agreement – Ex.A1 stipulates the performance of the contract by the respective parties on or before three months from the date of the sale agreement. There is no material placed on the part of the plaintiff to hold that she had been always ready and willing to pay the balance sale consideration and complete the sale transaction. On the other hand, even as per the case projected by the plaintiff, as abovenoted, she had only requested the power agent to execute the sale deed in respect of 20 ¼ Cents in the suit survey number to her nominee and also pleaded that only for the abovesaid extent, she has paid the sale consideration. From the materials placed on record, it is found that the plaintiff has handed over various cheques to the power agent representing that the same form part of the sale consideration. However, it is found that the abovesaid cheques handed over by the plaintiff, on presentation, had come to be dis-honoured and in connection with the same, it is also noted that the first defendant had preferred the complaints against the plaintiff and the same are pending on the file of the Judicial Magistrate Court, Madurai. Following the same, it is found that the plaintiff has laid the suit against the defendants and others seeking the relief of permanent injunction, in O.S.No.826 of 2002 (renumbered as O.S.No.105 of 2005), in respect of the extent of 94 ¾ Cents in the suit survey number. Thus, it is found that the plaintiff has laid the abovesaid suit in respect of the balance extent of 94 ¾ Cents in the suit survey number, after deducting 16 ¼ Cents, with reference to which, the sale deed had been executed in favour of her nominee by the first defendant on 06.06.2002. As abovenoted, the present suit has been laid by the plaintiff not in respect of the extent of 94 ¾ Cents and on the other hand, only with reference to the extent of 4 Cents lying on the south-eastern side.
As abovenoted, the present suit has been laid by the plaintiff not in respect of the extent of 94 ¾ Cents and on the other hand, only with reference to the extent of 4 Cents lying on the south-eastern side. Therefore, it is found that there is absolutely no material on the part of the plaintiff to exhibit her readiness and willingness in paying the balance sale consideration within the time stipulated under Ex.A1 – sale agreement and even on the date of the execution of the sale deed, dated 06.06.2002, the plaintiff had not paid the balance sale consideration as agreed to between the parties under Ex.A1 - sale agreement and not paid the balance sale consideration on the date of the institution of the suit in O.S.No.826 of 2002 (renumbered as O.S.No.105 of 2005) and even thereafter, not endeavoured to pay the balance sale consideration and also not evinced interest to pay the balance sale consideration, after the issuance of notice or after the institution of the present suit and all these facts in toto would only go to expose that inasmuch as the plaintiff has no capacity to pay the balance sale consideration and complete the sale transaction, it is found that she has been unable to place acceptable and adequate materials evidencing her readiness and willingness to perform her part of the contract as per the terms of the sale agreement and accordingly, had been only endeavouring to obtain the sale deed from the first defendant only in respect of 4 Cents of land and though she had laid the suit in O.S.No.826 of 2002 (renumbered as O.S.No. 105 of 2005) for the extent of 94 ¾ Cents, her present case for enforcing the sale agreement only as regards the 4 Cents of land, all would to go to show that as determined by the Courts below, the plaintiff had never been ready and willing to perform her part of the contract as agreed to between the parties and the relief of specific performance being an equitable and discretionary relief and should be extended only in favour of the parties, who are at no fault and when as abovenoted, the plaintiff is found to have completely disowned the sale agreement one way or the other and also found to have laid the suit beyond the period of time stipulated under law, in all, the determination of the First Appellate Court that the plaintiff has never been ready and willing to perform her part of the contract does not warrant any interference and the same is confirmed.
11. As abovenoted, though the sale agreement is in respect of the property measuring an extent of 1 Acre and 11 Cents and as admitted by the parties, the first defendant had executed sale conveyance in favour of the plaintiff's nominee of an extent of 16 ¼ Cents in the suit survey number, still, the plaintiff should have come forward with the suit seeking the relief of specific performance for the remaining extent of 94 ¾ Cents of land. On the other hand, the plaintiff has laid the suit for the enforcement of the sale agreement, not in respect of 94 ¾ Cents, but only for the extent of 4 Cents of land lying in the south-eastern side of the suit survey number. Thus, it is found that the plaintiff has come forward with the suit for seeking the specific performance of part of the contract and not the entire contract as such. With reference to the same, the plaintiff's counsel placed reliance upon Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act (hereinafter, referred to as “Act”) and contended that the plaintiff would be entitled to seek the specific performance of part of the contract as adumbrated therein. Considering the conditions stipulated under Section 12 of the Act, for seeking the specific performance of part of the contract, it is noted that with reference to the same, at the most, the plaintiff should relinquish all claims to the performance of the remaining part of the contract and all rights to compensation, either for the deficiency or for the loss or damage sustained by her through the default of the defendant. When with reference to the abovesaid position, when there is no plea putforth by the plaintiff in the plaint that she has relinquished all her claims to the performance of the remaining part of the contract and the rights to compensation etc., as stipulated under Section 12 of the Act, as putforth by the second defendant's counsel, the plaintiff would not be entitled to maintain the suit for the specific performance of part of the contract as projected. In this connection, the counsel for the second defendant placed reliance upon the decision in M.Jayaprakash Narayanan v. Santhammal, reported in 2018 (1) CTC 701 .
In this connection, the counsel for the second defendant placed reliance upon the decision in M.Jayaprakash Narayanan v. Santhammal, reported in 2018 (1) CTC 701 . Furthermore, in the order dated 08.12.2017, passed in S.A.Nos.837 and 838 of 2001 and reported in MANU/TN/4211/2017 [Thangaraj and others vs. Chandrasekaran and others] also, I had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 12 of the Act and from the position of law outlined in the abovesaid decisions, it could be seen that the plaintiff, before seeking to resort the benefit of Section 12 of the Act, should have come forward and pleaded in specific that she has relinquished all her claims to the performance of the remaining part of the contract and all rights to compensation etc., with reference to the same and when with reference to the said conditions, the plaintiff having not averred anything in the plaint, as rightly putforth, on the abovesaid ground alone, it is evident that the plaintiff is not entitled to seek the specific performance of part of the contract. However, the counsel appearing for the plaintiff would contend that by way of the plaintiff seeking the relief of specific performance only as regards the extent of 4 Cents, by implication the Court could infer that the plaintiff has relinquished all her claims to the performance of the remaining part of the contract as adumbrated under Section 12 of the Act. However, when considering the facts and circumstances of the case, when it is seen that the plaintiff has laid the suit for permanent injunction in O.S.No.105 of 2005 against the defendants and others to restrain them from alienating the extent of 94 ¾ Cents in the suit survey number on the strength of Ex.A1 – sale agreement and in such view of the matter, it is seen that the plaintiff has not given up her case as regards the abovesaid extent of the land in the suit survey number and the mere fact that she has in the present suit sought the relief as regards 4 Cents of land, that by itself, cannot be construed that she has relinquished all her rights to the performance of the remaining part of the contract as argued and in such view of the matter, the abovesaid argument putforth by the plaintiff's counsel does not merit acceptance. 12.
12. In the light of the above discussions, the First Appellate Court is justified in holding that the plaintiff's suit for enforcing the sale agreement – Ex.A1 in part is not legally sustainable. 13. As abovenoted, the parties have entered into the sale agreement in respect of the extent of 1 Acre and 11 Cents in the suit survey number. Now, according to the plaintiff, the parties had agreed to go for the sale deed of an extent of 20 ¼ Cents and accordingly, it is found that the sale deed, dated 06.06.2002, had come into existence only for an extent of 16 ¼ Cents.
Now, according to the plaintiff, the parties had agreed to go for the sale deed of an extent of 20 ¼ Cents and accordingly, it is found that the sale deed, dated 06.06.2002, had come into existence only for an extent of 16 ¼ Cents. However, with reference to the abovesaid case of the plaintiff, with reference to the alleged agreement or understanding entered into between the parties as regards the conveyance of 20 ¼ Cents of land in the suit survey number, there is no clear cut case projected by the plaintiff as to where the abovesaid extent lies in the suit survey number and within what boundaries the same lies and what is the nature of the agreement or understanding entered into between the parties with reference to the same following Ex.A1 and in such view of the matter, when the parties are at issue as regards the lie of the abovesaid land, particularly, the first defendant disputing that 4 Cents of land in respect of which, the plaintiff has come forward with the suit, forms part of the road portion and he had agreed to convey only the 4 Cents of land on the western side and on the other hand, the plaintiff would claim that the parties had agreed as regards the conveyance of 4 Cents of land on the south-eastern side and with reference to the abovesaid alleged agreement between the parties, there is no acceptable and reliable material putforth by the plaintiff one way or the other either by way of pleadings or by way of the convincing evidence, in such view of the matter, the case of the plaintiff that the first defendant had agreed to convey the extent of 20 ¼ Cents of land in favour of the plaintiff's nominee, inclusive of 4 Cents of land, as described in the plaint, as such, cannot be countenanced and in such view of the matter, it could be seen that the plaintiff has failed to establish the consensus ad idem between the parties with reference to the conveyance of 4 Cents of land described in the plaint following Ex.A1 – sale agreement. On the above score also, the plaintiff's suit has to fail. 14.
On the above score also, the plaintiff's suit has to fail. 14. The First Appellate Court has also discountenanced the plaintiff's case on the footing that the suit laid by the plaintiff for specific performance is barred under Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. With reference to the same, according to the First Appellate Court, the plaintiff having laid the suit for the relief of permanent injunction as regards the extent of 94 ¾ Cents against the defendants and others on the basis of Ex.A1 – sale agreement, had the cause of action, when the abovesaid suit was filed, to include the relief of specific performance at that point of time. However, the plaintiff has not included the relief of specific performance at the time of laying the abovesaid suit. Furthermore, the plaintiff had not reserved her right to lay the suit for specific performance, later when she had preferred the suit for permanent injunction. So holding, the First Appellate Court held that the plaintiff's present suit for specific performance is barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the abovesaid determination of the First Appellate Court also cannot be held to be erroneous and accordingly, the same is also upheld. 15. The counsel for the second defendant contended that as per the materials placed on record, the total extent of 46 ¼ Cents of land in the suit survey number had been conveyed to the second defendant, as could be seen from the documents marked as Exs.B1, B5 and B6 and thereby, contended that when the abovesaid extent also forms part of the subject matter comprised in Ex.A1 – sale agreement, the plaintiff without seeking the relief of cancellation of the abovesaid sale transactions in the manner known to law, is not entitled to maintain the suit for specific performance and accordingly, on that footing also, prayed for the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit.
When it is noted that the plaintiff has laid the suit based on Ex.A1 – sale agreement and when Ex.A1 – sale agreement is found to be in respect of 1 Acre and 11 Cents and out of the abovesaid extent of 1 Acre and 11 Cents, when from the materials placed on record, it is noted that an extent of 46 ¼ Cents of land had been conveyed to the second defendant one way or the other, as rightly putforth, the plaintiff should have asked for the cancellation of the abovesaid sale transactions as per law and in the absence of the same, as rightly putforth, the plaintiff would not be entitled to maintain the present suit even though the present suit is laid for the specific performance of the extent of 4 Cents of land as described in the plaint. As abovenoted, when with reference to the conveyance of the abovesaid 4 Cents of land, the plaintiff has failed to establish the further agreement entered into between the parties in a clear and vivid manner and also failed to substantiate the same with acceptable materials, the plaintiff's suit is found to be legally unsustainable. 16. Lastly, it is putforth by the plaintiff's counsel, in any event, considering the materials placed on record, when the plaintiff is found to have paid the sale consideration for the extent of 20 ¼ Cents, even in the case of the refusal of the relief of specific performance sought for by the plaintiff, the Courts below should have endeavoured to refund the sum payable to the plaintiff as per the terms of the contract and accordingly, contended that the Court has got the power to grant the said relief even though the plaintiff has not specifically prayed for the same. On the other hand, the counsel appearing for the second defendant contended that as per Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, in the absence of the plaintiff specifically claiming the relief of refund of the advance amount, the said relief should not be extended in favour of the plaintiff and accordingly, contended that considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff should not be extended the said relief and accordingly, prayed for the rejection of the same. 17.
17. On a perusal of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, it is found that the relief of refund of any earnest money or deposit etc. paid by a party, while seeking the relief of specific performance, should ask for the refund of the same and when he has failed to specifically claim the said relief, he would be dis-entitled to obtain the same from the Court. However, as could be seen from the decisions relied upon by the plaintiff's counsel, the said relief could also be granted by the Court, even without praying for the same, considering the facts and circumstance of the case. However, insofar as this case is concerned, when with reference to the alleged agreement entered into between the parties as regards the conveyance of 20 ¼ Cents of land and the lie of the abovesaid land, as above discussed, no clear case has been projected by the plaintiff, and also the disentitlement of the plaintiff to enforce the sale agreement as regards the extent of 4 Cents of land out of 20 ¼ Cents of land, on various grounds as abovenoted, in all, I am unable to grant the discretionary relief with reference to the refund of the advance amount, now sought for by the plaintiff, particularly, when the plaintiff having laid the suit for permanent injunction for the extent of 94 ¾ Cents of land, despite the same, having come forward with the suit for part performance of the contract, without clear pleas and proof, in all, it is found that the relief sought for by the plaintiff for the refund of the advance amount, as such, cannot be readily acceded to at the stage of the arguments of the second appeal. Therefore, the Courts below cannot be faulted in not granting the relief of the refund of the advance amount paid by the plaintiff. 18.
Therefore, the Courts below cannot be faulted in not granting the relief of the refund of the advance amount paid by the plaintiff. 18. The counsel for the plaintiff, in support of his various contentions, placed reliance upon the decisions in Shanker Singh vs. Narinder Singh and others, reported in 2012 (1) TNCJ 673 (SC); Rachakonda Narayana vs. Ponthala Parvathamma and another, reported in (2001) 8 SCC 173 ; Hindalco Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India and others, reported in (1994) 2 SCC 594 ; Saradamani Kandappan vs. S.Rajalakshmi and three others, reported in 2002 (3) CTC 277 : 2011 (4) CTC 640; Sekaran and another vs. C.Rajendran, reported in 2017 (3) MWN (Civil) 716 and Delhi Development Authority vs. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. and others, reported in 2000 (I) CTC 507. Similarly, the counsel for the second defendant, in support of his various contentions, placed reliance upon the decisions in Balwant Vithal Kadam vs. Sunil Baburaoi Kadam, reported in (2018) 2 SCC 82 ; Balakrishnan and others vs. B.Veni and others, reported in 2017 (5) CTC 249 ; B.V.Subramanian vs. Vasantha, reported in 2018 (3) MWN (Civil) 591 and B.Vijaya Bharathi vs. P.Savitri & others, reported in 2018 (1) MWN (Civil) 105. The principles of law outlined in the abovecited decisions are taken into consideration and followed as applicable to the case at hand. 19. In the light of the above discussions, the substantial questions of law formulated in this second appeal are accordingly answered in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff. 20. Resultantly, the second appeal is found to be devoid of merits and the same is dismissed with costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.