Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Labour Commissioner, U. P. Kanpur
2019-03-05
N.S.DHANIK, RAMESH RANGANATHAN
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J. 1. The application, seeking condonation of the delay in preferring Special Appeal No. 79 of 2019, is not opposed by Mr. D.S. Patni, learned counsel for the private respondents; and the delay is, therefore, condoned. 2. Against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 3732 of 2001 dated 22.03.2018, the appellants herein filed Special Appeal No. 416 of 2018, and a Division Bench of this Court, by its order dated 09.07.2018, dismissed the appeal without prejudice to the appellant-Corporation’s right to seek review/recall before the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench made it clear that this would be without prejudice to the right of the appellant-Corporation to challenge the judgment, impugned in the appeal, if need arises. On a review petition being filed by the appellant-Corporation, the learned Single Judge, by his order in Review Application No. 1125 of 2018 dated 17.12.2018, dismissed the review application holding that there was no error apparent on the face of record justifying invocation of the review jurisdiction. Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 3732 of 2001 dated 23.02.2018, the appellant-Corporation filed Special Appeal No. 79 of 2019; and, against the order passed in Review Application No. 1125 of 2018 dated 17.12.2018, the appellant-Corporation filed Special Appeal No. 80 of 2019. Both these appeals are now being disposed of by a common judgment. 3. Facts, to the limited extent necessary, are that the appellant-Corporation engaged certain workmen on daily wages. Apprehending that their services would be terminated, they filed Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 23588 of 1987 before the Allahabad High Court seeking regularization of their services, and for payment of wages equal to that of regular employees of the ONGC. In said writ petition, which was allowed by order dated 11.10.1990, the Allahabad High Court observed that the workmen should continue to work as daily-wage/contingent labour of the Corporation; and they cannot be replaced by contract labour. On the claim of these workmen, for regularization of their services, the Allahabad High Court opined that factual aspects could not be examined and, since the facts in controversy were required to be determined, the Labour Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh should be directed to determine the questions within six months after hearing both the parties.
On the claim of these workmen, for regularization of their services, the Allahabad High Court opined that factual aspects could not be examined and, since the facts in controversy were required to be determined, the Labour Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh should be directed to determine the questions within six months after hearing both the parties. On the Labour Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh submitting a detailed report on 23.10.1991, the Appellant-Corporation filed Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 4095 of 1992 before the Allahabad High Court. After the State of Uttarakhand was created on 09.11.2000, the aforesaid writ petition, pending on the file of the Allahabad High Court, was transferred to this High Court, and was renumbered as Writ Petition (M/S) No. 3732 of 2001 which came to be, eventually, dismissed by the order under appeal. 4. In the order under appeal dated 22.03.2018, the learned Single Judge held that the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated 11.10.1990 was not challenged by the appellant-Corporation, and it had attained finality; the appellant-Corporation had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Labour Commissioner by making a reference as directed by the Allahabad High Court; the appellant-Corporation had also filed a detailed written statement, before the Labour Commissioner, running into 82 pages; it could, therefore, not be permitted to question the competence of the Labour Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh to enter into the factual controversy; and, in the exercise of the powers conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court could not disturb the findings of fact recorded by subordinate Courts/authorities/tribunals; it was not the case of the appellant-Corporation that the findings, recorded by the Labour Commissioner in his report, were perverse; and, in such view of the matter, there was no scope for interference with the report submitted by the Labour Commissioner pursuant to the judgment of the Allahabad High Court. 5. Before us Mr.
5. Before us Mr. Piyush Garg, learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation, would submit that the Allahabad High Court had erred in directing the Labour Commissioner to adjudicate factual disputes; the Labour Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to determine the questions referred to it by the Allahabad High Court; the Allahabad High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in seeking to confer jurisdiction on the Labour Commissioner who has not been statutorily empowered to determine such disputes; the remedy, available to these workmen, was to seek a reference to the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act; even otherwise, the Labour Commissioner had failed to consider that the disparity in pay-scales, between the respondent-workmen and regular employees of the appellant-Corporation, was on the basis of their initial recruitment; while regular appointments in the appellant-Corporation is made through an open and transparent selection process, commencing with an advertisement being issued, and applications being called for, none of the respondent-workmen were appointed in such a manner; they could not, therefore, have been granted pay-scales on par with regular employees; even the functions discharged by regular employees are distinct from those discharged by the respondent-workmen; the appellant-Corporation has entrusted the keys of the office-sheds only to regular employees, and not to the respondent-workmen; persons appointed through the backdoor cannot claim parity in pay-scales with that of regularly appointed employees; the learned Single Judge had erred in treating a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, thereby depriving the appellant-Corporation of their right, under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, to prefer an intra-Court appeal; and findings of fact recorded by the Labour Commissioner could have been subjected to scrutiny both before the learned Single Judge, and before the Division Bench in an intra-Court appeal, if only the order passed by the learned Single Judge is held to be an order passed under Article 226, and not under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6.
6. On the question of maintainability of an intra-Court appeal, it is necessary to note that the appellant-Corporation had filed Writ Petition (M/S) No. 3732 of 2001 wherein a writ of certiorari was sought to quash the order passed by the Labour Commissioner; and for a writ of mandamus to direct the respondents not to implement the order of the Labour Commissioner. While refusing to sit in judgment over the findings recorded by the Labour Commissioner, and in holding that interference would only be called for if such findings were perverse, the learned Single Judge has, no doubt, referred to his having exercised jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The parameters of judicial review, in the exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not much wider. As held by the Supreme Court, in Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan & Others : 1964 AIR 477, it is only if the order, impugned in the writ petition, suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of record, would interference be called for. In the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, the High Court would neither sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the statutory authorities/tribunals, nor would it substitute its views for theirs. It is only if the findings of fact, recorded by statutory tribunals or other authorities, are held to be perverse or as based on no evidence, would interference be justified. It is wholly unnecessary for us to examine whether the order passed by the learned Single Judge is under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, for the appellant-Corporation has, in fact, availed its remedy of an intra-Court appeal before us; and since Mr. D.S. Patni, learned counsel for the respondent-workmen, has not raised any objection to the maintainability of these appeals, we are not non-suiting the appellant-Corporation on the ground that the appeals are not maintainable. The observations aforementioned were made only to indicate that this Court, even in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would still not re-appreciate findings of fact unlike an appellate Court. 7. On the contention urged by Mr.
The observations aforementioned were made only to indicate that this Court, even in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would still not re-appreciate findings of fact unlike an appellate Court. 7. On the contention urged by Mr. Piyush Garg, learned counsel on behalf of the appellant-Corporation, that the Allahabad High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the Labour Commissioner to determine the questions referred to in its order, it is necessary to note that the order of the Allahabad High Court, in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 23588 of 1987 dated 11.10.1990, has attained finality as no appeal was preferred there against by the appellant-Corporation. The judgment of a competent Court is binding inter-parties and cannot be re-agitated in collateral proceedings. An order or judgment of a Court/Tribunal, even if erroneous, is binding inter-parties. The binding character of judgments, of Courts of competent jurisdiction, is in essence a part of the rule of law on which administration of justice is founded. (The Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers’ Association and others vs. State of Maharashtra and others : (1990) 2 SCC 715 ; U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. State of U.P. and Anr. : (2005) 1 SCC 444 ). Matters in controversy, in writ proceedings under Article 226, decided after full contest, after affording fair opportunity to the parties to prove their case, by a Court competent to decide it and which proceedings have attained finality, is binding inter-parties. (Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh vs. State of Bombay (Now Gujarat) : AIR 1965 SC 1153 ; State of Punjab vs. Bua Das Kaushal : AIR 1971 SC 1676 ). Once a matter, which was the subject-matter of a lis, stood determined by a competent Court, no party can thereafter be permitted to reopen it in a subsequent litigation. (Swamy Atmananda and Ors. vs. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam and Ors. : AIR 2005 SC 2392 ; Ishwar Dutt vs. Land Acquisition Collector and Anr. : (2005) 7 SCC 190 ). Issues which have been concluded inter-parties cannot be raised again in proceedings inter-parties. (State of Haryana vs. State of Punjab and Anr. : (2004) 12 SCC 673 ). Having permitted the said judgment of the Allahabad High Court to attain finality, the appellant-Corporation cannot, in collateral proceedings, be permitted to contend that the order of the Allahabad High Court is a nullity. 8.
(State of Haryana vs. State of Punjab and Anr. : (2004) 12 SCC 673 ). Having permitted the said judgment of the Allahabad High Court to attain finality, the appellant-Corporation cannot, in collateral proceedings, be permitted to contend that the order of the Allahabad High Court is a nullity. 8. The only other contention, which remains to be examined, is the contention that the Labour Commissioner had erred in not determining the question as to whether or not the mode of recruitment justified disparity in the scales of pay between regular employees and the respondent-workmen. The submission, urged on behalf of the appellant-Corporation, is that, since regular employees were appointed through a fair and transparent mode of selection and the respondent-workmen were not, the latter could not claim parity in pay-scales with the former. In its order in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 23588 of 1987 dated 11.10.1990, the Allahabad High Court held that, in so far as the question of regularization and payment of wages to equate the petitioners with regularly employed Class IV employees of the appellant-Corporation is concerned, it could not be decided on the basis of facts which were available on record; the petitioners’ claim to get equal pay for equal work, and to seek parity with regular Class IV employees of the appellant-Corporation, required a factual basis to be laid; such a claim was dependent on facts, which were yet to be ascertained; and there had to be a factual foundation on the following aspects : (a) Whether the petitioners’ nature of duty is the same which is assigned to regularly appointed class IV employees of the company? (b) Whether the services rendered by the petitioners to the company are similar to the services which are being rendered by class IV employees of the company, who are working on regular basis? (c) Whether the qualification and merit for being eligible to be appointed as class IV employees on regular basis is possessed by the petitioners if at all any qualification or merit is a criterion for appointing class IV employees on regular basis in the company? (d) On what basis there is a disparity in emoluments between the class IV employees, who are regularly appointed in the company and the petitioners who are casual/contingent labour? 9.
(d) On what basis there is a disparity in emoluments between the class IV employees, who are regularly appointed in the company and the petitioners who are casual/contingent labour? 9. The Allahabad High Court, thereafter, observed that, for determining the aforesaid questions, it was necessary that some more facts were to be gathered; and as it could not enter into the factual field, and become a fact finding Court, for determining the aforesaid questions, it was necessary that there was some enquiry with regard to these questions; and in case these questions were proved in favour of the workmen, they may get all allowances which were being paid to regularly employed Class IV employees of the appellant-Corporation, and they may achieve parity with the said employees in respect of payment of emoluments; and in case these questions were not proved in favour of the workmen, their contention to get equal pay for equal work were not to be accepted; their regularization, as Class IV employees, would also depend on facts which were to be ascertained by some fact finding body in terms of the directions which may be given by it. 10. While the petitioners/workmen therein were declared, by the Allahabad High Court, to be daily wage/contingent labourers, and were held to be entitled to continue with the appellant-Corporation as such labourers until their services were retrenched in accordance with law, the appellant-Corporation was directed to refer the matter to the Labour Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh for determining the question of the workmen’ similarity or otherwise with Class IV employees of the appellant-Corporation, who were regularly appointed. The Labour Commissioner was directed, after affording a reasonable opportunity to the rival contenders, to ascertain the nature of duties of the workmen, and that of regularly appointed Class IV employees of the appellant-Corporation; whether the services rendered by these workmen were similar in nature to the services which were being rendered by the regular Class IV employees of the appellant-Corporation; whether there was any qualification or merit required for being appointed as Class IV employees; whether these workmen, and Class IV employees of the appellant-Corporation appointed on a regular basis, had any similarity in their merit and qualification; and what was the basis for the disparity in their emoluments. 11.
11. The Allahabad High Court directed the appellant-Corporation to refer the matter to the Labour Commissioner within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. The Labour Commissioner was directed to determine the said questions within a period of six months after giving reasonable opportunity to both the parties of being heard, and of placing their respective cases before him. The Allahabad High Court made it clear that in case, on facts, the workmen succeeded in establishing that they were similarly circumstanced with regularly appointed Class IV employees of the appellant-Corporation, the appellant-Corporation should pay them equal pay for equal work i.e. the same pay and allowances, which were being paid to the regularly appointed Class IV, within two months from the date of receipt of the report of the Labour Commissioner; and to consider them for regular appointment as Class IV employees. 12. In his elaborate report dated 23.04.1991, the Labour Commissioner noted the questions to be determined by him which were : 1. Whether the services rendered by the petitioners are similar in nature to the services which are being rendered by the regular Class IV employees of the company. 2. Whether there is any qualification or merit required for being appointed as Class IV employees. 3. Whether the petitioners and Class IV employees of the respondent company appointed on regular basis have any similarity in their merit and qualification and what is the basis for disparity in their appointments. 13. The Labour Commissioner, thereafter, observed that the services rendered by the workmen in all three categories were similar in nature to the services being rendered by their counterpart regular Class IV employees.
13. The Labour Commissioner, thereafter, observed that the services rendered by the workmen in all three categories were similar in nature to the services being rendered by their counterpart regular Class IV employees. The contention regarding entrustment of keys was dealt with by the Labour Commissioner who held that the work, that was required to be performed by these workers, was not technical in nature; it was a simple routine type of work, that any person with ordinary intelligence can pick-up easily, and become useful to the organization after gaining some experience; these workmen were working, with the appellant-Corporation, as contingent workers for the last five to eight years or even more; they appeared to have gained sufficient experience in their work; on several occasions, they had worked side by side with the regular employees of the appellant-Corporation; the appellant-Corporation could not explain how the services rendered by these workmen were different, in nature from the services being rendered by regular attendants, sanitary cleaners or malis; the appellant-Corporation had, all through, laid emphasis on the difference in the mode of recruitment of their regular employees, and that contingent workers’ services were not required since they were surplus to the requirements of the appellant-Corporation; nowhere could they explain any difference between the functions of the regular and contingent attendants, sanitary cleaners and malis; the fact that the keys of the shed remained in the custody of regular employees, and not with contingent workers, did not show that the work performed by these two type of workers was in any way different; it only showed a difference in the degree of responsibility entrusted to them; and it was only natural that the keys of the shed, as a whole, was entrusted to the regular workers. 14. Thereafter the Labour Commissioner examined the prescribed qualifications for appointment as attendants, sanitary cleaners and malis. He noted that, while the qualification prescribed for appointment to the post of Attendant was Class 8pass, no qualification was prescribed for appointment to the post of Sanitary Cleaners except that the candidate should be willing to wash bathrooms and clean lavatories etc in addition to the general sweeping job; and, with respect to Malis, all that was required was that he should be literate with five years’ experience in mali work.
The Labour Commissioner noted that all the 14 workmen, who were working as Attendants, had passed their 8class, some of them were graduates and one of them was a post-graduate in Commerce; though no educational qualifications were prescribed for Sanitary Cleaners, one among them had passed his 8class; the only person, working as a Mali since 1984, has also passed his 8class though no educational qualifications were prescribed for the said post; since the claim of these workmen, regarding the length of service or education qualification, had not been challenged or refuted by the appellant-Corporation, there appeared to be no reason why their claim should not be relied upon; these workers had submitted certificates, obtained from senior officers of the appellant-Corporation, regarding the good work done by them; and these workmen, who were employed as poor menial workers, need not be asked to produce specific evidence regarding their educational qualification or their actual period of work. 15. The Labour Commissioner held that these workmen appeared to be similar in merit and qualifications to that of the regular Class IV employees; the disparity in their emoluments, and the emoluments of the regular employees, was apparently due to the fact that, while regular employees were recruited in accordance with the departmental rules, after notifying vacancies, inviting applications and making selection etc., the workmen were engaged in short-term casual vacancies in the beginning according to exigencies of work without observing the appellant-Corporation’s rules for regular employment; the fact, however, remained that the services of these employees were acceptable to the appellant-Corporation and, at times, they were also appreciated and admired by officers of the appellant-Corporation; and the fact that they had been working as contingent labourers for five to eight years, or even more, required consideration. 16. The submission of Mr. Piyush Garg, learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation, that the disparity in pay-scales was on account of the difference in the mode of recruitment, and this aspect was not noticed by the Labour Commissioner, needs only to be noted to be rejected. The question referred to the Labour Commissioner by the Allahabad High Court, itself recognizes the fact that these workmen were not appointed on a regular basis; and their entitlement for parity in pay scales, with regularly appointed Class IV employees, was required to be examined (Question No. ‘D’).
The question referred to the Labour Commissioner by the Allahabad High Court, itself recognizes the fact that these workmen were not appointed on a regular basis; and their entitlement for parity in pay scales, with regularly appointed Class IV employees, was required to be examined (Question No. ‘D’). That the Allahabad High Court, despite being aware that these workmen were not appointed on a regular basis, had nonetheless directed the Labour Commissioner to determine the basis, if any, for the disparity would show that the mere fact that certain employees were appointed on a regular basis did not justify denying others of parity in pay-scales provided, of course, that they discharged similar duties. As has been held by the Labour Commissioner, the work discharged both by the respondent-workmen, and by regular Class-IV employees, were similar; and the duties they discharged did not require a high degree of skill, and were such as could be effectively discharged with a little experience. 17. The findings, recorded by the Labour Commissioner in his elaborate report, cannot be said to suffer from perversity. We see no reason, therefore, to substitute the conclusions of the Labour Commissioner with another, as that is not the province of the High Court in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction. Viewed from any angle, we see no reason to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge. Suffice it to make it clear that, since the Labour Commissioner does not appear to have called upon the respondent-workmen, who were working as Attendants, to produce proof of their educational qualifications, the appellant-Corporation would be entitled to ascertain whether such of the respondent-workmen, who were engaged as attendants, had, in fact, passed their 8class; and, only if they had, to then extend them the benefit of parity in pay-scales with regularly employed Class-IV Attendants of the appellant-Corporation. The direction of the Allahabad High Court, and that of the Labour Commissioner, to consider the case of these workmen for regularization should, undoubtedly, be in accordance with law. 18. The appeals fail and are, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.