JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of present civil writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioner-department to set aside award dated 20.12.2016 passed by the Presiding Judge, Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Kangra at Dharamshala (in short " the Tribunal") in reference No. 141 of 2015, whereby Tribunal below while answering the reference directed the petitioner department to regularize the services of the respondent workman (hereinafter referred to as the workman) w.e.f. 1.1.2004 as per policy framed by the State Government from time to time. The Tribunal below vide award impugned in the instant proceedings also held the workman to be in continuous service with all consequential benefits. 2. Briefly stated facts as emerge from the record are that the workman, who was initially engaged on daily wage basis as beldar on muster-roll basis in the month of August, 1995 and continued to work in that capacity till 20. 7.2003, raised an industrial Dispute against his illegal retrenchment by the petitioner-department vide notice dated 18.7.2003. Appropriate Government under Section 10 of the Act referred the dispute to the Tribunal for adjudication, which came to be registered as reference No. 35/2008. Tribunal while answering the aforesaid reference in favour of the workman set aside the retrenchment of workman vide award dated 16.2.2011 holding workman entitled for reinstatement with seniority and continuity in service. Workman after passing of aforesaid award though immediately made himself available for joining, but he came to be reengaged w.e.f. 13.7.2011 instead of 16.2.2011. It is not in dispute that aforesaid award dated 16.2.2011, passed by the Tribunal in reference No. 35/08 never came to be laid challenge on behalf of the petitioner department and as such, it has attained finality. Vide award dated 16.2.2011, Tribunal below held the workman to have completed eight years of continuous service with 240 days in a calendar year as on 31.12.2003 and as such, workman claimed that he is entitled for regularization w.e.f. 1.1.2004, under the regularization policy of the State Government, but since his such claim was ignored, he approached the appropriate Government for reference of dispute to the Tribunal. The appropriate Government referred the dispute to the Tribunal with following reference: "Whether the demand raised vide demand notice dated 12-10-2012 by Shri Duni Chand S/o Shri Mela Ram through the District Secretary, All India Trade Union Congress, Camp Office H.P.S.E.B. Colony Complex Salooni, District Chamba, H.P. regarding regularization of his daily wages services w.e.f. 01-01-2004 from the Deputy Director of Agriculture, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P., is legal and justified? If yes, to what relief, past service benefits seniority and other consequential services benefits the above workman is entitled to from the above employer?" 3. Learned Tribunal below vide impugned award dated 20.12.2016, answered the reference in favour of the workman and directed the petitioner department to regularize the service of the workman w.e.f. 1.1.2004 as per policy governing daily wagers so framed by the State Government. Tribunal also held the workman to be in continuous service of the respondent with all consequential benefits. In the aforesaid background, the petitioner department has approached this Court in the instant proceedings. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record vis-a-vis impugned award, this Court finds no force in the argument of learned Additional Advocate General that Tribunal below has mis-construed and mis-appreciated the evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, rather this Court finds that the Tribunal below has very meticulously dealt with each and every aspect of the matter while exploring the answer to the reference made to it. 5. Shri Sanjeev Sood, learned Additional Advocate General while referring to records made a serious attempt to persuade this Court to agree with his contention that since workman was engaged for a particular project being run by the petitioner department with the aid of Central Government under Center sponsored scheme, it is not possible to reinstate the workman as well as similarly situate persons after closure of the project-scheme and as such, Tribunal had no authority to issue direction for regularization of services of the workman. Mr. Sood further argued that services of the workman were dispensed w.e.f. July, 2003 by the Deputy Director Chamba on account of non-availability of funds and moreover workman has not completed seven years of continuous service with 240 days in each calendar year and as such, he is not entitled for regularization as per government policy. Mr. Mr. Sood further argued that services of the workman were dispensed w.e.f. July, 2003 by the Deputy Director Chamba on account of non-availability of funds and moreover workman has not completed seven years of continuous service with 240 days in each calendar year and as such, he is not entitled for regularization as per government policy. Mr. Sood contended that if award passed by the Tribunal is implemented and seniority is given to the workman, persons, who were seniors to him, would also claim the same benefit causing great burden on the public exchequer. He further argued that Department of Personnel has issued a new regularization policy on 28.6.2014, wherein seven years of continuous service as on 31.3.2014 is necessarily required for regularization. Mr. Sood further contended that case of workman is not covered under Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act as he has been working under different schemes for different purpose that too subject to availability of funds and he never worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year. Lastly, Mr. Sood contended that after retrenchment of service of respondent, workman filed reference No. 35 of 2008 before the Industrial Tribunal after lapse of 5 years without explaining the reasons for delay and as such, his reference being time barred ought to have been dismissed by the Tribunal on the score of delay and latches. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record, especially award dated 16.6.2011, passed by the Tribunal in reference 35/2008, this Court finds no force in the aforesaid arguments raised by Sh. Sanjeev Sood because all these arguments stand duly answered in the aforesaid award passed by the Tribunal below, which otherwise has attained finality because at no point of time, challenge, if any, ever came to be laid to such award in any proceedings. Since in reference No. 35 of 2008, workman has been held to be in continuous service w.e.f. August, 1995, till passing of award dated 16.2.2011, it cannot be said that workman has not completed more than seven years of continuous service as on 31.3.2014. Since in reference No. 35 of 2008, workman has been held to be in continuous service w.e.f. August, 1995, till passing of award dated 16.2.2011, it cannot be said that workman has not completed more than seven years of continuous service as on 31.3.2014. Specific finding returned by the Tribunal below qua the continuous service of the workman w.e.f. his initial engagement i.e. August, 1995 till passing of the award, has already attained finality and as such, petitioner department is estopped from raising the same plea in the subsequent dispute raised on behalf of the workman, where he on the strength of the earlier award made in his favour claimed regularization after completion of eight years of service. As per award dated 16.2.2011 passed in reference No. 35 of 2008 petitioner has completed eight years of continuous service with 240 days in each calendar year as on 31.12.2003 and as such, workman rightly claimed regularization w.e.f. 1.1.2004, as per regularization policy of HP Government. Though in view of the findings returned in previous award dated 16.2.2011 passed in reference No. 35/2008, this Court is not required to go into the merits of the instant case, but otherwise also, plea raised by learned Additional Advocate General that since workman was appointed in particular project, his service could not be retained after closure of the project is not sustainable because no document, if any, ever came to be placed on record on behalf of the petitioner department suggestive of the fact that workman was engaged against a particular project, rather as per own case of the petitioner department, workman was engaged as casual worker in the month of 1995 and he worked as such, till 2003 i.e. for eight years. Leaving everything aside, there is no document available on record suggestive of the fact that workman was made aware at the time of his initial appointment that he is being appointed against the particular project. 7. Leaving everything aside, there is no document available on record suggestive of the fact that workman was made aware at the time of his initial appointment that he is being appointed against the particular project. 7. Hon'Ble Apex Court inc case titled S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager, (2003) 4 SCC 27 has held that the termination of service of workman engaged with a scheme or project may not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied: (i) that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration; (ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily wager simplicitor, which provided inter alia that the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project; (iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and consistently with the terms of the contract; and (iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the abovesaid terms by the employer at the commencement of employment. In the case at hand, there is no evidence that workman was informed at the time of commencement of his employment that his services would come to an end after the closure of the project/scheme. 8. Argument advanced by Mr. Sood, that Tribunal while answering reference made to it by the appropriate Government under Section 10(2) could not have ordered for regularization is also rejected being untenable. In this regard reliance is placed upon judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in ONGC Ltd. v. Petroleum Coal Labour Union, (2015) 6 SCC 494 , relevant paragraphs whereof are reproduced herein below: "Whether jurisdiction of the Tribunal to direct the Corporation to regularise the services of the concerned workmen in the posts is valid and legal? 27. The Central Government in exercise of its powers under Section 10 of the Act referred the existing Industrial Dispute between the concerned workmen and the Corporation to the Tribunal which rightly adjudicated point (i) of the dispute (supra) on the basis of the facts, circumstances and evidence on record and passed an award dated 26.5.1999 directing the Corporation that the services of the concerned workmen should be regularised with effect from the date on which all of them completed 480 days, subsequent to their appointment by the memorandum of appointment. The contention urged on behalf of the Corporation that the Tribunal has no power to pass such an award compelling the Corporation to regularise the services of the concerned workmen is wholly untenable in law. Even if we consider the same, the said contention is contrary to the legal principles laid down by this Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad & Anr. v. Employer I/R To Management of Food Corporation of India & Anr., wherein the decisions in U.P. Power Corporation v. Bijli Mazdoor Sangh & Ors. and Maharashtra Road Transport Corporation v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karamchari Sanghathana and Uma Devi (all referred to supra) were discussed in detail. 28. The relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder: (Hari Nandan Prasad v. Food Corpn. Of India, (2014) 7 SCC 190 , (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 408, SCC pp. 207-08, 210-11 & 212, paras 25, 30 and 33) "25. While accepting the submission of the appellant therein viz. U.P. Power Corpn., the Court gave the following reasons: (U.P. Power Corpn. Case, SCC pp. 758-59, paras 6- 8) '6. It is true as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the question as regards the effect of the industrial adjudicators' powers was not directly in issue in Umadevi case. But the foundational logic in Umadevi case is based on Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Though the industrial adjudicator can vary the terms of the contract of the employment, it cannot do something which is violative of Article 14. If the case is one which is covered by the concept of regularisation, the same cannot be viewed differently. 7. The plea of the learned counsel for the respondent that at the time the High Court decided the matter, decision in Umadevi case was not rendered is really of no consequence. There cannot be a case of [pic]regularisation without there being employee-employer relationship. As noted above the concept of regularisation is clearly linked with Article 14 of the Constitution. However, if in a case the fact situation is covered by what is stated in para 45 of Umadevi case the industrial adjudicator can modify the relief, but that does not dilute the observations made by this Court in Umadevi case about the regularisation. 8. However, if in a case the fact situation is covered by what is stated in para 45 of Umadevi case the industrial adjudicator can modify the relief, but that does not dilute the observations made by this Court in Umadevi case about the regularisation. 8. On facts it is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that Respondent 2 himself admitted that he never worked as a pump operator, but was engaged as daily labourer on daily-wage basis. He also did not possess the requisite qualification. Looked at from any angle, the direction for regularisation, as given, could not have been given in view of what has been stated in Umadevi case." It is clear from the above that the Court recognized the underlying message contained in Umadevi case to the effect that regularisation of a daily- wager, who has not been appointed after undergoing the proper selection procedure, etc. is impermissible as it was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and this principle predicated on Article 14 would apply to the Industrial Tribunal as well inasmuch as there cannot be any direction to regularise the services of a workman in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. As we would explain hereinafter, this would mean that the Industrial Court would not issue a direction for regularising the services of a daily-wage worker in those cases where such regularisation would tantamount to infringing the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. But for that, it would not deter the Industrial Tribunals/Labour Courts from issuing such direction, which the industrial adjudicators otherwise possess, having regard to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act specifically conferring such powers. This is 24recognized by the Court even in the aforesaid judgment. XXX XXX XXX 30. Detailed reasons are given in support of the conclusion stating that the MRTU and PULP Act provides for and empowers the Industrial/Labour Courts to decide about the unfair labour practice committed/being committed by any person and to declare a particular practice to be unfair labour practice if it so found and also to direct such person to cease and desist from unfair labour practice. The provisions contained in Section 30 of the MRTU and PULP Act giving such a power to the Industrial and Labour Courts vis-a-vis the ratio of Umadevi are explained by the Court in the following terms: (Maharashtra SRTC case, SCC pp. The provisions contained in Section 30 of the MRTU and PULP Act giving such a power to the Industrial and Labour Courts vis-a-vis the ratio of Umadevi are explained by the Court in the following terms: (Maharashtra SRTC case, SCC pp. 573- 74, paras 32-33 & 36) '32. The power given to the Industrial and Labour Courts under Section 30 is very wide and the affirmative action mentioned therein is inclusive and not exhaustive. Employing badlis, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent employees is an unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV. Once such unfair labour practice on the part of the employer is established in the complaint, the Industrial and Labour Courts are empowered to issue preventive as well as positive direction to an erring employer. 33. The provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act and the powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts provided therein were not at all under consideration in Umadevi. As a matter of fact, the issue like the present one pertaining to unfair labour practice was not at all referred to, considered or decided in Umadevi. Unfair labour practice on the part of the employer in engaging employees as badlis, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent employees as provided in Item 6 of Schedule IV and the power of the Industrial and [pic]Labour Courts under Section 30 of the Act did not fall for adjudication or consideration before the Constitution Bench. XXX XXX XXX 36. Umadevi does not denude the Industrial and Labour Courts of their statutory power under Section 30 read with Section 32 of the MRTU and PULP Act to order permanency of the workers who have been victims of unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV where the posts on which they have been working exist. Umadevi cannot be held to have overridden the powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts in passing appropriate order under Section 30 of the MRTU and the PULP Act, once unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV is established." XXX XXX XXX 33. Umadevi cannot be held to have overridden the powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts in passing appropriate order under Section 30 of the MRTU and the PULP Act, once unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV is established." XXX XXX XXX 33. In this backdrop, the Court in Maharashtra SRTC case was of the opinion that the direction of the Industrial Court to accord permanency to these employees against the posts which were available, was clearly permissible and within the powers, statutorily conferred upon the Industrial/Labour Courts under Section 30(1)(b) of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 which enables the industrial adjudicator to take affirmative action against the erring employer and as those powers are of wide amplitude abrogating (sic including) within their fold a direction to accord permanency."(emphasis supplied) 29. Further, it is very clear from the facts that all the concerned workmen have got the qualifications required for their regularisation, except one of them and have been employed by the Corporation even prior to 1985 in the posts through various irregular means. The Tribunal has got every power to adjudicate an industrial dispute and impose upon the employer new obligations to strike a balance and secure industrial peace and harmony between the employer and workmen and ultimately deliver social justice which is the constitutional mandate as held by the Constitution Bench of this Court in a catena of cases. This above said legal principle has been laid down succinctly by this Court in the case of The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. The Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi & the Bharat Bank Employee's Union, Delhi, the relevant paragraph of the said case is extracted hereunder: "61.We would not examine the process by which an Industrial Tribunal comes to its decisions and I have no hesitation in holding that the process employed is not judicial process at all. In settling the disputes between the employers and the workmen, the function of the Tribunal is not confined to administration of justice in accordance with law. It can confer rights and privileges on either party which it considers reasonable and proper, though they may not be within the terms of any existing agreement. It has not merely to interpret or give effect to the contractual rights and obligations of the parties. It can confer rights and privileges on either party which it considers reasonable and proper, though they may not be within the terms of any existing agreement. It has not merely to interpret or give effect to the contractual rights and obligations of the parties. It can create new rights and obligations between them which it considers essential for keeping industrial peace. An industrial dispute as has been said on many occasions is nothing but a trial of strength between the employers on the one hand and the workmen's organization on the other and the Industrial Tribunal has got to arrive at some equitable arrangement for averting strikes and lockouts which impede production of goods and the industrial development of the country. The Tribunal is not bound by the rigid rules of law. The process it employees is rather an extended form of the process of collective bargaining and is more akin to administrative than to judicial function. In describing the true position of an Industrial Tribunal in dealing with labour disputes, this Court in Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, and others,1949 FCR 321 quoted with approval a passage from Ludwig Teller's well known work on the subject, where the learned author observes that ".industrial arbitration may involve the extension of an existing agreement or the making of a new one or in general the creation of new obligations or modification of old ones, while commercial arbitration generally concerns itself with interpretation of existing obligations and disputes relating to existing agreements." The views expressed in these observations were adopted in its entirety by this Court. Our conclusion, therefore, is that an Industrial Tribunal formed under the Industrial Disputes Act is not a judicial tribunal and its determination is not a judicial determination in the proper sense of these expressions." It has been further held by this Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation Of India v. D. J. Bahadur & Ors., as follows: "22. The Industrial Disputes Act is a benign measure, which seeks to pre- empt industrial tensions, provide the mechanics of dispute resolutions and set up the necessary infrastructure, so that the energies of the partners in production may not be dissipated in counter-productive battles and the assurance of industrial justice may create a climate of goodwill...." 30. The Industrial Disputes Act is a benign measure, which seeks to pre- empt industrial tensions, provide the mechanics of dispute resolutions and set up the necessary infrastructure, so that the energies of the partners in production may not be dissipated in counter-productive battles and the assurance of industrial justice may create a climate of goodwill...." 30. Thus, the powers of an Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court to adjudicate the industrial dispute on the points of dispute referred to it by the appropriate government have been well established by the legal principles laid down by this Court in a catena of cases referred to supra. Therefore, the Tribunal has rightly passed an award directing the Corporation to regularise the services of the workmen concerned." 9. It is quite apparent from the aforesaid exposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court that Tribunal/Labour Court while answering the dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government can also issue direction to regularize the services of the workman, if it is convinced and satisfied that services of the workman have been terminated in violation of the provisions contained under the Industrial Disputes Act and workman is entitled to regularization in terms of the policy , if any, framed by the government concerned. 10. Another contention raised by learned Additional Advocate General that since there was considerable delay in raising demand by the workman, learned Tribunal below ought to have dismissed his claim on the ground of delay and laches, has no substance. Though, material available on record reveals that workman had raised dispute after a considerable time, but definitely that could not be a ground for learned Tribunal below to reject the claim, specifically in view of the fact that it was bound to answer the specific term of reference, made to it by the appropriate Government, under Section 10(2) of the Act, Objections, if any, with regard to raising of demand after considerable delay, could be taken by the employer before framing of term of reference. Term of reference framed in the instant case for adjudication nowhere suggests that the learned Tribunal below was required to decide issue of delay in raising demand. Rather, learned Tribunal below was called upon to answer reference that "whether demand raised vide demand notice dated 12.10.2012 by Sh. Duni Chand regarding regularization of his daily wage services is legal and justified". 11. Rather, learned Tribunal below was called upon to answer reference that "whether demand raised vide demand notice dated 12.10.2012 by Sh. Duni Chand regarding regularization of his daily wage services is legal and justified". 11. In Mukand Ltd. v. Mukand Staff & Officers Assn, (2004) 10 SCC 460, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under: "22. We shall now analyse the submissions made by the learned senior counsel appearing on either side with reference to the pleadings, documents, records and also with reference to the judgments cited. The Reference is limited to the dispute between the Appellant-Company and the 'workmen' employed by it. 23. We have already referred to the order of Reference dated 17.2.1993 in paragraph supra. The dispute referred to by the order of Reference is only in respect of workmen employed by the appellant-Company. It is, therefore, clear that the Tribunal, being a creature of the Reference, cannot adjudicate matters not within the purview of the dispute actually referred to it by the order of Reference. In the facts and circumstance of the present case, the Tribunal could not have adjudicated the issues of the salaries of the employees who are not workmen under the Act nor could it have covered such employees by its award. Even assuming, without admitting, that the Reference covered the non-workmen, the Tribunal, acting within its jurisdiction under the Act, could not have adjudicated the dispute insofar as it related to the 'nonworkmen'. 95. The Industrial Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the present dispute inasmuch as it pertains to the conditions of service of non-workmen. The learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court failed to appreciate that parties cannot by their conduct create or confer jurisdiction on an adjudicating authority when no such jurisdiction exists. We have already noticed that the Division Bench has erred in holding that there is community of interest between the workmen and the non-workmen and holding further that the workmen could raise a dispute regarding the service conditions of non-workmen." 12. The Hon' ble Apex Court in Karan Singh Vs. Executive Engineer, Haryana State Marketing Board, (2007) 14 SCC 291 , has held that Industrial Tribunal cannot invalidate the reference on the ground of delay. The Hon' ble Apex Court in Karan Singh Vs. Executive Engineer, Haryana State Marketing Board, (2007) 14 SCC 291 , has held that Industrial Tribunal cannot invalidate the reference on the ground of delay. If the employer claims that the workman has made stale claim then the employer must challenge the reference by way of writ petition and say that since claim is belated there was no industrial dispute. It would be profitable to reproduce paras No.11 and 12 of the aforesaid judgment herein:- "11. In Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. Vs. Workers, (1963) AIR SC 569, it has been held that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in dealing with industrial disputes is limited to the points mentioned in Section 10(4). 12. In National Engg. Industries Ltd. V. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 1 SCC 371 , it has been held vide para 24 that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is an allegation that there is no industrial dispute which could be the subject-matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10. This is because existence of the industrial dispute is a jurisdictional fact. Absence of such jurisdictional fact results in the invalidation of the reference. For example, even under the Income Tax Act, 1961 as it stood earlier, the Income Tax Officer must have reason to believe escapement of income. Thus "reason to believe" is a jurisdictional fact, therefore, writ petitions were maintainable in cases where the High Court found absence of basic facts for reopening the assessment. The Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 gets its jurisdiction to decide an industrial dispute only upon a reference by the appropriate Government. The Industrial Tribunal cannot invalidate the reference on the ground of delay. If the employer says that the workman has made a stale claim then the employer must challenge the reference by way of writ petition and say that since the claim, is belated, there was no industrial dispute. The Industrial Tribunal cannot strike down the reference on this ground." 13. Learned Additional Advocate General was unable to dispute that no proceedings, if any, ever came to be initiated on behalf of the employer-Department qua the term of reference framed by the appropriate Government under Section 10(2) of the Act and as such, it is now estopped from raising the issue of delay and latches. 14. Learned Additional Advocate General was unable to dispute that no proceedings, if any, ever came to be initiated on behalf of the employer-Department qua the term of reference framed by the appropriate Government under Section 10(2) of the Act and as such, it is now estopped from raising the issue of delay and latches. 14. Having carefully perused the impugned award, which is based upon the correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that there is no illegality and infirmity in the same. 15. This Court is in agreement with the arguments having been made by the learned counsel representing the workman that this Court has very limited jurisdiction to re-appreciate findings of fact returned by the learned Tribunal below, while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and it has a limited scope to re-appreciate the findings of fact recorded by the Court below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon judgment passed in case Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. M/s Hindalco Industries Ltd, (2014) AIRSCW 3157. 16. As far as judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. M/s Hindalco Industries Ltd. is concerned, there cannot be any quarrel with the settled proposition of law that the Courts while examining correctness and genuineness of the Award passed by Tribunal has very limited powers to appreciate the evidence adduced before the Tribunal below, especially the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal below and same cannot be questioned in writ proceedings and writ court cannot act as an appellate Court. Careful perusal of aforesaid judgment having been relied upon by the learned counsel representing the workmen, clearly suggests that error of law, which is apparent on the face of record, can be corrected by writ Court but not an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. Hon'ble Apex Court has further held in the aforesaid judgment that if finding of fact is based upon no evidence that would be regarded as error of law, which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Hon'ble Apex Court has further held in the aforesaid judgment that if finding of fact is based upon no evidence that would be regarded as error of law, which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that in regard to findings of fact recorded by Tribunal, writ of certiorari can be issued, if it is shown that in recording said findings, tribunal erroneously refused to admit admissible evidence or erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence, which influenced impugned findings. It would be profitable to reproduce following paras of the judgment: "16. .......... The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is no entitled to act as an Appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened for questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the interference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. 17. In the instant case, learned Additional Advocate General was unable to point out any illegality committed by the learned Tribunal below, while recording findings of fact, as such, this Court sees no perversity or illegality in the award passed by the learned Tribunal below. 18. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion as well as law referred herein above, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned award passed by the Tribunal below and as such, same is allowed. The present writ petition is dismissed being devoid of any merits.