JUDGMENT : Surya Prakash Kesarwani, J. Heard Sri K.K. Arora learned counsel for the judgment debtor-revisionist and Sri Rakesh Pande, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Prashant Rai, learned counsel for the decree holder - respondent. 2. Briefly stated facts of the present case are that undisputedly the decree holder-respondent is the owner and landlord of House No. C-106, Gangapur Awas Vikas Colony, Civil Lines, Rampur. The decree holder-respondent is residing in that house. She had let out the First Floor portion of the aforesaid house on 1.1.2009 to the revisionist-judgment debtor for 11 months on a monthly rent of Rs.7,100/-, under an unregistered rent agreement dated 1.1.2009. The aforesaid house was constructed in the year 1985 and as such the provision of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 are not applicable. 3. After expiry of 11 months the tenancy was continued to be renewed after 11 months. According to the decree holder-respondent, the judgment debtor-revisionist lastly paid the rent for the month of April 2016 and thereafter when the rent became due he did not pay it. Therefore, by notice dated 5.5.2017 under Section 106 of the Transfer of the Property Act 1882, sent by registered post by decree holder-respondent determined the tenancy of the judgment debtor-revisionist and the arrears of rent were demanded. According to the decree holder-respondent the notice was not complied with by the judgment debtor-revisionist despite service, therefore, she filed JSCC Case No.05 of 2017, before the Judge Small Cause Court, Rampur. Several times summons were sent by registered post and also through process server to the judgment debtor-revisionist but he had not appeared. Therefore, the Court below proceeded ex parte after holding the service of notice upon the judgment debtor-revisionist to be sufficient. The ex-parte judgment and decree was passed on 12.2.2018. 4. According to the judgment debtor-revisionist, he came to know about the aforesaid judgment and decree on 30.06.2018 and immediately thereafter he filed an application for inspection of record through his counsel and the records were inspected on 3.7.2018. An application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. was filed on 3.7.2018 which was registered as Civil Misc. 4. According to the judgment debtor-revisionist, he came to know about the aforesaid judgment and decree on 30.06.2018 and immediately thereafter he filed an application for inspection of record through his counsel and the records were inspected on 3.7.2018. An application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. was filed on 3.7.2018 which was registered as Civil Misc. Case No.43 of 2018, without depositing the amount under the proviso to Section 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act 1887") and instead an application was moved for deposit on the next day i.e. on 4.7.2018 and the deposit was made on 12.7.2018. The application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. was rejected by Order dated 18.03.2019, passed by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Rampur, against which the judgment debtor-revisionist has filed the present revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. 5. Sri K.K. Arora, learned counsel for the judgment debtor-revisionist submits that summons were not served upon the revisionist and thus he was having no knowledge of the aforesaid S.C.C. Case No.05 of 2017. The sufficiency of service of notice upon the revisionist was incorrectly recorded by the court below. The decree was suffering from error inasmuch as the suit was decreed for rent from January 2009 whereas the admitted claim of the decree holder-respondent was for arrears of rent from May 2016. Subsequently, on the application of the revisionist, the decree was modified by the court below by order dated 26.9.2018. Therefore, in any case the limitation for filing an application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. shall start from 26.9.2018. Mere deposit of the amount of decree by little delay can not be said to be non compliance of the proviso of Section 17(1) of the Act 1887. In support of his submissions he relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 8.8.2018 in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 20195 of 2017 (M/s Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons Vs. Union of India). 6. Sri Rakesh Pande, learned Senior Advocate submits that several summons were sent to the judgment debtor-revisionist which were served as evident from reports of officer server and report of post man. The proviso to Section 17(1) of the Act 1887 is mandatory and non compliance thereof would render the application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. to be not maintainable. Sri Rakesh Pande, learned Senior Advocate submits that several summons were sent to the judgment debtor-revisionist which were served as evident from reports of officer server and report of post man. The proviso to Section 17(1) of the Act 1887 is mandatory and non compliance thereof would render the application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. to be not maintainable. Even if there was some error in the decree, the revisionist would have moved an application for security under the proviso to Section 17(1) of the Act, 1887. In support of his submissions Sri Rakesh Pande relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Kedarnath Vs Mohan Lal Kesarwani & Ors, (2002) 1 ARC 186. Discussion and Findings: 7. I have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsels for the parties. 8. The judgment debtor-revisionist was inducted as tenant for 11 months by the decree holder-respondent. Finding has been recorded in the impugned order that summons in SCC Case No.05 of 2017 being paper No.17D/5 (summon dated 4.9.2017), 17D/4 (summon dated 12.10.2017), 17D/1 & 17D/3 (summon & registered postal receipt), 17D/6 (registered envelop and AD of summons), 17D/10 (envelope of summons sent by registered post) and 17D/9 (certificate of postal department for delivery of registered letter and acknowledgement dated 7.9.2017 on 16.9.2017) are available on record. Paper No.17D/5 bears report of the process server regarding refusal by the revisionist to receive summons in presence of witnesses. Paper No.17D/4 (summons dated 12.10.2017) bears report of the process server for affixation of summons in presence of witness. Paper No.17D/1 (summons dated 16.10.2017) bears report of process server that the wife of the judgment debtor-revisionist refused to receive summons and consequently it was affixed on the door of the house. Paper No.17D/6 (summons sent by registered post on 7.9.2017) is the envelope sending summons by registered post which bears report of the postman that ^^izkIrdrkZ ds ?kj ckj&ckj tkus ij og ugha feyrk vr% okil^^ Paper No. 17D/10 (envelope of sending summons by registered post on 17.10.2017) bears the report of the postman that ^^izkIrdrkZ ugh feyrs ?kj crk;k fd ckgj x;s gS irk ugha dc vk;s^^ Paper No.17 D/9 is the report of post office to the effect that the registered letter with acknowledgement dated 7.9.2017 has been delivered on 16.9.2017. On these facts the court drew inference that the judgment debtor-revisionist was having knowledge of the case. On these facts the court drew inference that the judgment debtor-revisionist was having knowledge of the case. It also noted the fact that the SCC case No.05 of 2017 was proceeded ex parte after recording the sufficiency of service of summons upon the judgment debtor-revisionist. 9. It is undisputed that the application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. was filed by the judgment debtor-revisionist on 3.7.2018 without compliance to the proviso to sub Section 1 of Section 17 of the Act, 1887. The application and a chalan for depositing the amount was submitted on 4.7.2018 and it was deposited on 12.7.2018. The proviso to Section 17(1) of the Act, 1887, is relevant for the purposes of the case and, therefore, Section 17 is reproduced below:- "Application of the Code of Civil Procedure.--(1) 1 [The procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), shall, save in so far as is otherwise provided by that Code or by this Act,] be the procedure followed in a Court of Small Causes in all suits cognizable by it and in all proceedings arising out of such suits: Provided that an applicant for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte or for a review of judgment shall, at the time of presenting his application, either deposit in the court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment, or give [such security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment as the Court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed.] (2) Where a person has become liable as surety under the proviso to sub-section (1), the security may be realised in manner provided by section [145] of the Code of Civil Procedure, [1908 (5 of 1908)]". 10. The proviso to Section 17(1) of the Act 1887 with regard to application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. was interpreted by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kedarnath (supra) (paras 7, 9, 10 & 11) and it was held that an application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. filed without complying with the proviso to Section 17 (1) of the Act 1887, is not maintainable. Paras 7, 9, 10 and 11 of the judgment in the case of Kedarnath (supra) is reproduced below: "7. Paras 7, 9, 10 and 11 of the judgment in the case of Kedarnath (supra) is reproduced below: "7. The object behind establishing Small Cause Courts conferred with jurisdiction to try summarily such specified category of cases which need to be and are capable of being disposed of by adopting summary procedure of trial is to secure an expeditious disposal and to curtail the lengthy procedure of litigation. Excepting an order for compensatory costs in respect of false or vexatious claims or defences or an order imposing fine or directing the arrest or detention in the civil prison of any person (except where such arrest or detention is in execution of a decree), orders and decrees of courts of small causes are not appealable: they are only revisable by the High Court (or by District Court under Section 115 of CPC as amended in its application to State of U.P.). The jurisdiction to entertain and hear an application to set aside a decree passed ex-parte or for a review of judgment by courts of small causes is sought to be qualified and narrow down by imposing condition as to deposit or giving security for performance or compliance by enacting proviso to sub-section (1). Such a provision fits in the scheme of the PSCC Act. Although there is no authoritative pronouncement by this Court (none brought to our notice) interpreting the nature and scope of the proviso however, the learned counsel for the appellant brought to our notice a number of decisions delivered by the High Courts of Allahabad, Oudh, Madras, Orissa, Rajasthan and Lahore which have taken the view that the proviso is mandatory and non-compliance therewith would entail dismissal of the application because such non-compliance cannot be condoned or overlooked by the court. They are, to wit : Mohammad Ramzan Khan Vs. KhubiKhan,1938 AIR Lahore 18 (DB), Murari Lal Vs. Mohammad Yasin, (1939) AIR Allahabad 46, Mt. Shikhani Vs. Bishambhar Nath,1941 AIR(Oudh) 103, Jagdamba Prasad & Ors. Vs. Ram Das Singh & Anr., (1943) AIR Allahabad 288, Roshan Lal Vs. Brij Lal Amba Lal Shah, (1949) AIR Madras 419, Khetra Dolai Vs. Mohan Bissoyi, (1961) AIR Orissa 37, and Dhanna Vs. Arjun Lal, (1963) AIR Raj. 240. Mohammad Yasin, (1939) AIR Allahabad 46, Mt. Shikhani Vs. Bishambhar Nath,1941 AIR(Oudh) 103, Jagdamba Prasad & Ors. Vs. Ram Das Singh & Anr., (1943) AIR Allahabad 288, Roshan Lal Vs. Brij Lal Amba Lal Shah, (1949) AIR Madras 419, Khetra Dolai Vs. Mohan Bissoyi, (1961) AIR Orissa 37, and Dhanna Vs. Arjun Lal, (1963) AIR Raj. 240. As the present case arises from the State of Uttar Pradesh, the learned counsel for the appellant cited a series of decisions delivered by Allahabad High Court so as to show the view of the law being consistently taken there. There are : Krishan Kumar Vs. Hakim Mohd., (1978) AllLJ 738, Sharif Vs. Suresh Chand & Ors, (1979) AWC 256, Roop Basant Vs. Durga Prasad & Anr.,1983 1 ARC 565, Mohd. Islam Vs. Faquir Mohammad,1985 1 ARC 54, Krishan Chandra Seth Vs. Dr. K.P. Agarwal & Anr., (1988) 1 ARC 310, Mamta Sharma Vs. Hari Shankar Srivastava & Ors.,1988 1 ARC 341, Mohd. Yasin Vs. Jai Prakash, (1988) 2 ARC 575, Purshottam Vs. Special Additional Sessions Judge, Mathura & Ors.,1991 2 ARC 129, Ram Chandra (deceased L.Rs.) & Ors. Vs. IXth Additional District Judge, Varanasi & Ors., (1991) AIR Allahabad 223; 1991(1) ARC 501, Sagir Khan Vs. The District Judge, Farrukhabad & Ors., (1996) 27 AllLR 540 1996(1) ARC 414 ; Mohammad Nasen Vs. Third Additional District Judge, Faizabad & Ors., (1998) AIR Allahabad 125, Beena Khare Vs. VIIIth Additional District Judge, Allahabad & Anr., (2000) 2 ARC 616 . 9. A bare reading of the provision shows that the legislature have chosen to couch the language of the proviso in a mandatory form and we see no reason to interpret, construe and hold the nature of the proviso as directory. An application seeking to set aside an ex-parte decree passed by a Court of Small Causes or for a review of its judgment must be accompanied by a deposit in the court of the amount due from the applicant under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment. The provision as to deposit can be dispensed with by the court in its discretion subject to a previous application by the applicant seeking direction of the court for leave to furnish security and the nature thereof. The proviso does not provide for the extent of time by which such application for dispensation may be filed. The provision as to deposit can be dispensed with by the court in its discretion subject to a previous application by the applicant seeking direction of the court for leave to furnish security and the nature thereof. The proviso does not provide for the extent of time by which such application for dispensation may be filed. We think that it may be filed at any time up to the time of presentation of application for setting aside ex-parte decree or for review and the Court may treat it as a previous application. The obligation of the applicant is to move a previous application for dispensation. It is then for the court to make a prompt order. The delay on the part of the court in passing an appropriate order would not be held against the applicant because none can be made to suffer for the fault of the court. 10. In the case at hand, the application for setting aside ex parte decree was not accompanied by deposit in the court of the amount due and payable by the applicant under the decree. The applicant also did not move any application for dispensing with deposit and seeking leave of the court for furnishing such security for the performance of the decree as the court may have directed. The application for setting aside the decree was therefore, incompetent. It could not have been entertained and allowed. 11. The trial court was therefore right in rejecting the application. The District Judge in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction could not have interfered with the order of the trial court. The illegality in exercise of jurisdiction by the District Court disposing of the revision petition was brought to notice of the High Court and it was a fit case where the High Court ought to have in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction set aside the order of the District Court by holding the application filed by the respondent as incompetent and hence not entertainable. We need not examine the other question whether a sufficient cause for condoning the delay in moving the application for leave of the court to furnish security for performance was made out or not and whether such an application moved at a highly belated stage and hence not being a 'previous application' was at all entertainable or not." (Emphasis supplied by me) 11. The aforesaid judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly reiterates the mandatory nature of the proviso to Section 17 (1) of the Act 1887. In the case of Sardar Basant Singh Vs. Sardar Satnam Singh, (2016) 1 ARC 326 (para 10), this Court followed the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kedarnath (supra) and held as under: "10. From a bare reading of the relevant portion extracted above it emerges that the Apex Court has held that the provision for deposit can be dispensed with by the Court in its discretion, subject to a previous application by the applicant, seeking directions for leave to furnish security. It has further observed that such application, if presented along with the application for setting aside the ex parte decree, the same may be treated as a previous application. It has also been observed that any delay of the part of the court in passing orders on this previous application will not be held against the tenant." 12. Perusal of the proviso to sub-section 1 of Section 17 of the Act, 1887 and the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kedarnath (supra) leaves no manner of doubt that the proviso is mandatory. An application in the court seeking to set aside an ex-parte decree passed by a Court of Small Causes or for a review of its judgment must be accompanied by deposit of the amount due from the applicant under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment. The discretion has been conferred upon the Court to dispense with the deposit subject to a previous application by the applicant seeking direction of the court for leave to furnish security and the nature thereof. If there is any delay on the part of the Court in passing order on the aforesaid previous application, the delay shall not be held against the tenant, because none can be made to suffer from the fault of the court. 13. In the present case the judgment debtor-revisionist has not moved any application for dispensing with the deposit and seeking the leave of the Court for furnishing security for performance of the decree. Neither any such application was filed nor the deposit of the amount required under the proviso to Section 17(1) was made on the presentation of the application for recall of the ex-parte judgment and decree. Neither any such application was filed nor the deposit of the amount required under the proviso to Section 17(1) was made on the presentation of the application for recall of the ex-parte judgment and decree. Thus, the judgment debtor-revisionist has not complied with the mandatory provisions of the proviso to sub-section 1 of Section 17 of the Act 1887. Therefore, the application of the judgment debtor-revisionist was incompetent. Consequently, it was lawfully rejected by the impugned order dated 18.03.2019. 14. The judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons(supra) relied by learned counsel for the judgment debtor-revisionist relates to the provisions of Section 33 and Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. Section 34(3) of the Act, 1996 specifically provides that an application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33 then from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal. There is no such provision under the Act, 1887. Therefore, the judgment in the case of M/s Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons(supra) relied by learned counsel for the revisionist has no application on the facts of the present case. 15. In view of the above discussion, I do not find any illegality in the impugned order dated 18.3.2019 in Civil Misc. Application No.43 of 2018, passed by the Additional District Judge, Rampur, rejecting the application of the revisionist being paper No.4C under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. 16. For all the reasons aforesaid, I do not find any merit in this revision. Consequently, the revision is dismissed.