JUDGMENT : 1. The present Second Appeal has been preferred by the defendants/appellants questioning the concurrent judgments rendered by the District Judge, Pauri Garhwal, in Civil Appeal No. 01 of 2013 ‘Ramesh Chandra Singh & Others vs. Himanshu & Others’, whereby, by virtue of the judgment rendered by the Appellate Court on 02.03.2017 it has resulted into the affirmation of the judgment of the learned Trial Court rendered in Suit No. 40 of 1990 ‘Sangram Singh & Others vs. Mahavir Singh & Others’. By virtue of the judgment of the Trial Court dated 17.12.2012 the Suit was partially decreed in relation to Khasra No. 2381, whereby, the defendants/appellants were directed to remove the construction, which was existing on the aforesaid Khasra recorded with the plaintiffs. 2. The initial argument which was raised by the learned counsel for the defendants/appellants was to the effect that prior to rendering the decree pertaining to Khasra No. 2381, there had been no demarcation or identification of the property, which became essential on account of the subsequent amendment, which was being carried by the plaintiff in Suit by incorporating in Khasra No. 2380 in the decree sought in the plaint. This question would not have bothered because the Suit was only partially decreed for Khasra No. 2381, the finding of which has been affirmed by both the Courts. This plea may not be tenable for the defendants/appellants. 3. The Trial Court while dealing with the aforesaid issue and plea regarding identification of the property over which their existed the disputed construction raised by the defendants/appellants petitioner, as a matter of fact, the Trial Court has got it inspected through Amin and the report of which finds place as exhibit-III and exhibit-IV. Even the Prescribed Authority’s order, which is exhibit-V, the SDM, Pauri, has identified the existence of the property in question over which the unauthorized shop, which has been constructed by the defendants/appellants is said to be existing. The finding to the said effect has been dealt with by the learned Trial Court in its finding on issue no. Even the Prescribed Authority’s order, which is exhibit-V, the SDM, Pauri, has identified the existence of the property in question over which the unauthorized shop, which has been constructed by the defendants/appellants is said to be existing. The finding to the said effect has been dealt with by the learned Trial Court in its finding on issue no. 5 has recorded as under, which is quoted hereunder: ^^izfroknhx.k }kjk jktLo foHkkx ds deZpkfj;ksa ,oa vf/kdkfj;ksa ls feydj lkft'k dh tkudkjh gksus ij oknh Jherh lqUnjh nsoh us iq= /kqzoizdk'k us ljdkjh vehu ls fnukad 21-7-90 dks fookfnr Hkwfe dh iSekbZ'k djokbZ ftldh fjiksVZ ,oa uD'kk izLrqr fd;k tk jgk gSA bl iSekbZ'k ls Hkh izfroknhx.k dk fuekZ.k dk;Z [kljk ua0 2380 o 2381 esa gh ik;k x;kA izfroknhx.k }kjk fuekZ.k dk;Z dh xfr rst djus ij oknhx.k ds vksj ls fnukad 23-6-90 dks ,d izkFkZuki= ijxuk eftLVªsV ikSM+h dks fn;k x;k tks fd izfroknhx.k ij rkehy djk fn;k fQj Hkh izfroknhx.k pksjh Nqis dk;Z djrs jgsA ijUrq izfroknhx.k euoj flag }kjk fnukad 14-5-90 ,oa 6-6-90 ds chp fcuk fdlh vf/kdkj ds fookfnr Hkwfe ij Hkou fuekZ.k gsrq [kqnku ,oa dVku dk;Z vkjEHk dj fn;kA mlds ckn fnukad vehu ds tfj;s fookfnr Hkwfe dh tkap djokbZ x;h ftldh fjiksVZ i=koyh esa dkxt la[;k 11x o 12x gSA bl iSekbZ'k esa izfroknhx.k }kjk fd;k tk jgk fuekZ.k dk;Z [ksr ua0 2380 o 2381 esa gh ik;k x;kA izfroknhx.k yqd&fNi dj fuekZ.k dk;Z djrs jgs rFkk izfroknhx.k }kjk fookfnr Hkwfe ij pkj nqdkuksa dk fuekZ.k dj fn;k x;k ftuesa ls nks nqdkuksa ij izfroknhx.k }kjk Nr ugha Mkyh x;h gSA^^ 4. The learned Trial Court while considering with the rival contentions of the parties had framed the following issues: ^^7- mHk; i{kksa ds vfHkopuksa ds vk/kkj ij okn esa fuEukafdr okn fcUnq fojfpr fd;s x;s gSa%& 1- D;k okfnuh Jherh lqUnjh nsoh xzke cSUtokM+h iV~Vh uknyL;wa ftyk ikSM+h x<+oky ds gky cUnkscLrh [kkrk la0 62 ds [kljk uEcjku 2380] 2381 dh 6@16 ukyh Hkwfe dh fof/kiw.kZ Lokfeuh gS\ tSlk fd okn i= ds izLrj la0 6 esa vfHkdfFkr fd;k x;k gS] ;fn gka rks izHkko \ 2- D;k okfnuh izfroknh x.k ls crkSj {kfriwfrZ :Ik;s 11]250@& izkIr djus dh vf/kdkfj.kh gS] tSlk fd okn i= ds izLrj la0 16 esa vfHkdfFkr fd;k x;k gS \ 3- D;k xzke cSUtokM+h iV~Vh uknyL;wa ds rRdkyhu [k0[kk0 la0 62 esa fLFkr [ksr ua0 2379 dk lewpk jdck] [ksr ua0 2380 dk lewpk jdck rFkk [ksr ua0 2381 e/;s 4 eqV~Bh Hkwfe o’kZ 1973 esa ikSM+h&nsoizkx eksVj ekxZ ds fy;s v/;kIr dh xbZ ftlds dkj.k oknhx.k dks [ksr ua0 2380 o 2381 dh 6 eqV~Bh Hkw Hkkx ij dksbZ LoRo iznRr izkIr gS] tSlk fd izfroknh ds izfrokni= ds izLrj la0 21 esa vfHkdfFkr fd;k x;k gS \ 4- D;k xzke cSatokM+h iV~Vh ukUnyL;wa ds [k0[k0 la0 62 ds [ksr ua0 2380 jdck 4 ukyh] [ksr ua0 2381 dh 2 ukyh 12 eqV~Bh ckcr tks foØ; i= fnukad 13-03-1974 dks fu"ikfnr fd;k x;k] og voS/k foØ; i= gS] D;ksafd foØ; i= fu"iknu ls iwoZ gh mDr [ksr uacjku ij dksbZ LoRo gkfly ugha jg x;k Fkk] tSlk fd izfroknh ds izfrokni= ds izLrj la0 23 esa vfHkdfFkr fd;k x;k gS \ 5- D;k izfroknhx.k fookfnr Hkwfe ij o"kZ 1974 ls fujarj csjksdVksd dkfct py vk jgs gSa vkSj izfrdwy dCts ds vk/kkj ij izfroknhx.k dks fookfnr Hkwfe ij LoRo izkIr gks pqds gSa] tSlk fd izfroknh d izfrokni= ds izLrj la0 24 esa vfHkdfFkr fd;k x;k gS \ 6- D;k nkok oknh dky ckf/kr gS \ 7- D;k bl U;k;ky; dks ekStwnk okn lquus dk {ks=kf/kdkj izkIr ugha gS \ 8- D;k oknh }kjk nkos dk ewY;kadu de fd;k x;k gS vkSj ml ij de U;k;”kqYd vnk fd;k x;k gS \ 9- okfnuh fdl vuqrks"k dks ikus dh vf/kdkfjuh gS \^^ 5. While determining the finding on the same, and in particular, with which this Court would be concerned is the finding on issue nos. While determining the finding on the same, and in particular, with which this Court would be concerned is the finding on issue nos. 1 & 3 it has specifically being recorded that considering the entries made in the Khatoni as produced before the learned Trial Court by the plaintiff being Paper No. exhibit-II, it showed that the plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the property recorded in Khasra 2381 having an area of 6 Muthi on basis of sale deed dated 13.03.1974, i.e. Paper No. 8x. Consequently, considering the fact that the plaintiff since being the owner in pursuance to the sale deed dated 13.03.1974, which has never been declared as to be void by any competent court, it has been yet again while deciding the issue no. 4, the Trial Court has held the exclusive ownership of the plaintiff and, consequently based on the survey, the Trial Court had partially decreed the Suit only in relation to Khasra No. 2381 only, whereby, a direction was issued to remove any unauthorized shop, which has been constructed by the defendants/appellants. Relevant portion of which is quoted hereunder: ^^18- esjs }kjk foØ; i= dkxt la[;k 9x@1 yxk;r 9x@3 dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA mDr foØ;i= ,d jftLVMZ foØ;i= gS ftlesa fd foØsrk cqf)flag }kjk okfnuh dks 5 ukyh Hkwfe foØ; fd;s tkus dk dFku gSA i=koyh ds voyksdu ls Li"V gS fd mDr foØ;i= dks fujLr fd;s tkus gsrq fdlh i{k us l{ke U;k;ky; esa pqukSrh ugha nh gS rFkk Hkwfe ds foØ; ds laca/k esa fdlh izdkj dk fookn fdlh vU; [kkrsnkj ds lkFk ugha gS vkSj u gh fdlh lg [kkrsnkj }kjk mDr foØ;i= dks pqukSrh nh x;h gSA 9x [krkSuh ds voyksdu ls Hkh ;g Li"V gS fd okfnuh ds ukr fookfnr Hkwfe foØ; ds fnukad ds i'pkr~ jkTkLo vfHkys[kksa esa ntZ gks pqdh gSA vFkkZr~ okfnuh crkSj Lokfeuh foØhr Hkwfe esa dkfct gSA ;gka ;g Hkh Li"V gksrk gS fd tc rd dksbZ iathd`r nLrkost fdlh l{ke U;k;ky; }kjk 'kwU; vFkok fujLr ?kksf"kr ugha dj fn;k tkrk rc rd og nLrkost fof/kekU; ,oa izHkkoh jgrk gSA ;g fufoZokn gS fd u rks iwoZ esa gh] u orZeku esa okfnuh ds gd esa fu”ikfnr mDr foØ;i= 9x fnukafdr 13-3-74 dks 'kwU; ?kksf"kr djokus gsrq dksbZ okn fdlh l{ke U;k;ky; esa fopkjk/khu ugha gSA^^ 6. Defendants/appellants without any material alternatively has raised plea of adverse possession, which stood decided against him. Defendants/appellants without any material alternatively has raised plea of adverse possession, which stood decided against him. 7. The defendants/appellants has put challenge to the said judgment of the learned Trial Court dated 17.12.2012 by preferring an Appeal being Civil Appeal No. 01 of 2013 ‘Ramesh Chandra Singh & Others vs. Himanshu & Others’. The Appellate Court too vide its judgment dated 02.03.2017 had dismissed the Appeal and has affirmed the judgment of the learned Trial Court. 8. Heard Mr. M.S. Tyagi, learned counsel for the appellants. 9. Learned counsel for the defendants/appellants before the Second Appellate Court has raised two preliminary issues to draw the attention of this Court for the purposes of considering the admission of the Second Appeal. The first argument which has been extended by the learned counsel for the defendants/appellants was that no decree of the nature as issued by the learned Trial Court on 17.12.2012 could have been issued in the absence of there being an identification of the property in question. 9. This argument as extended by the learned counsel for the defendants/appellants is contrary to the findings, which has been recorded by the learned Trial Court in its issue no. 5, where Amin had proved encroachment, wherein, there was sufficient material including the documents of title of the plaintiff showing them to be the owner of the property and also the identification of the property, which has been made by the report of the Amin dated 20.07.1990, which shows the existence of the construction in question to be on Khasra No. 2381. 10. Even otherwise the factum of encroachment and raising of unauthorized construction has been recorded in the findings on issue no. 9. 11. Hence, this argument as extended by the learned counsel for the appellants pertaining to the identification of the property is not acceptable by this Court and is consequently rejected. 12. The second argument which has been extended by the learned counsel for the appellants is in relation to the substantial question of law no. 1 as framed by him pertaining to the implications of the provisions contained under Order VI Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order VI Rule 14 of the CPC reads as under: “14. 12. The second argument which has been extended by the learned counsel for the appellants is in relation to the substantial question of law no. 1 as framed by him pertaining to the implications of the provisions contained under Order VI Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order VI Rule 14 of the CPC reads as under: “14. Pleading to be signed-Every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader (if any): Provided that where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorized by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf.” 12. This Court is of the view that the provisions contained under Order VI Rule 14, which constitutes to be the manner and fashion in which the pleadings are to be produced before the Court below the said provision is procedural law and not substantive law, which could determine a right of a person, who does not hold a title over the property, which was the subject matter of the Suit. Not even this, admittedly according to the argument extended by the learned counsel for the appellants, he has contended that he has taken the aforesaid ground for pressing his Appeal before the Court below, particularly, as contained in ground no. 3. What is relevant would be here is that mere pleading of a ground in the memorandum of Appeal does not mean that as a matter of fact it was actually pressed into issue for consideration before the Appellate Court for the reason that the provisions contained under Order 14 Rule 5 to be read with Order 41 Rule 31, was still available for the defendants/appellants to have called upon the Appellate Court to formulate the aforesaid issue and got the finding recorded pertaining to the impact of the provisions contained under Order VI Rule 14. Having not done so merely referring to the paragraph 3 of the memorandum of appeal will not attract the provisions contained under Order VI Rule 14, and more particularly, at the second appellate stage. 13. Having not done so merely referring to the paragraph 3 of the memorandum of appeal will not attract the provisions contained under Order VI Rule 14, and more particularly, at the second appellate stage. 13. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that even according to the grounds taken in ground 3, 2 it is an admitted case by the defendants/appellants that he has got nothing to do with the property lying in Khasra No. 2381 because he had been otherwise unable to substantiate his title in relation to the said property, which stood settled with the plaintiff as would be apparent from exhibit-II, i.e. the Khatoni, as well as sale deed dated 13.03.1974, which was under consideration before the Court below. 14. In view of the above, this Court is of the view that the present Second Appeal is concluded by concurrent findings of facts and no substantial question of law as framed in the Second Appeal is called for to be answered by this Court. No other question was argued by defendants/appellants. 15. Consequently, this Second Appeal fails and is dismissed. 16. However, there would be no order as to cost.