JUDGMENT : Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J. Heard Mr. Atanu Banerjee, the learned counsel for the appellant. 2. The appellant has preferred this Second Appeal against the judgment dated 27.05.2014 and decree following thereupon drawn on 10.06.2014 passed in Title Appeal No.6 of 2010 passed by the learned District & 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Chatra whereby the said Title Appeal has been dismissed against the judgment and decree dated 21.12.2009 passed by the learned Munsif, Chatra in Title Suit No.26 of 2006. 3. The case of the appellant before the trial court was that the plaintiff is the owner of the property duly mentioned in schedule-A to the plaint. The plaintiff has acquired the land of Khata No.1/9, Plot No.9/25, 6.17 acres of village Palha Pragna Dantar, Police Station-Huntergunj, District-Chatra by virtue of a registered deed of gift vide gift deed No.1944 dated 19.03.1991 from Masomat Nago wife of late Sakur Mian and came in khas cultivating possession over the gifted land. The plaintiff/ appellant is the sister’s son of Most. Nago, who was serving his aunt (mausi) since long as there was none to look after her. The property which has been acquired by the plaintiff from Masomat Nago by means of gift deed duly mentioned in the Schedule-A to the plaint. Originally the lands of khata No.1/9 plot No.09/25 of village Palha Pragna Danmtar, Police Station-Huntergunj at present P.S. Bashishth Nagar, Jori was recorded in the survey record of right as G.M. Khas land Malik Ramgarh Raj. The further case of the appellant was that one Salamat Mian who was settled raiyat of the village Palha took settlement of 6.17 acres of land in suit plot No.9/25 of khata No.1/9 with other lands from ex-landlord Ramgarh Raj rectified by hukumnama and came in possession over the same from the date of settlement. The settlee Salamat Mian paid rent to the ex-landlord and after vesting of village to State demanded for the settled land and opened in the name of Salamat Mian. Salamat Mian also paid rent to the Government and thereafter obtained government rent receipts. The settlee Salamat Mian paid rent to the ex-landlord and after vesting of village to State demanded for the settled land and opened in the name of Salamat Mian. Salamat Mian also paid rent to the Government and thereafter obtained government rent receipts. The said Salama Mian who was in physical possession over the settled land but in the year 1968 due to some urgency and to meet his urgent need he transferred the suit land in the year 1968 vide registered Sale Deed to his daughter Nago Devi doner of the plaintiff and put her in khas possession over the same. Thereafter, Nago Devi after purchase came in exclusive possession over the same and exercised her all sorts of rights over the same. The name of the purchaser Nago Devi was mutated in the Serista of government vide Mutation Case No.12/1969-70 and she paid rent to the State and obtained government rent receipts. The further case of the plaintiff was that the defendants who are nephew of Mostt. Nago, gave a false assurance to maintain her and on such false assurance the defendants got a registered sale deed executed by Mostt. Nago on 03.02.1977 in their favour without payment of a single farthing agreeing that they will execute a deed of agreement in favour of Mostt. Nago Devi. A false promoise was made by the defendants that they will maintain the vendor Mostt. Nago and will provide food, clothing, etc. failing which the said Nago Devi will have a right to cancel the deed and they came in permissive possession over the same. The said Mostt. Nago Devi executed the deed of sale on 03.02.1977 in favour of defendants , namely, Md. Nizamuddin Mian and Md. Manauwar Mian and on the same day after executing the agreement in favour of Mostt. Nago handed over the same to her. They maintained Nago Devi for sometime and she cancelled the aforesaid deed vide registered deed of cancellation No.5279 dated 02.11.1985. It is the further case of the plaintiff that one Manauwar Mian being a son of Choikidar of Bashisth Nagar P.S. started creating trouble and mischief with Mostt. Nago Devi and the defendants became rigid to disturb the peaceful possession of Mostt. Nago as such seeing no alternative she filed a petition before the learned S.D.M., Chatra. A proceeding under section 144 of Cr.P.C. was also drawn up. The said Mostt. Nago Devi and the defendants became rigid to disturb the peaceful possession of Mostt. Nago as such seeing no alternative she filed a petition before the learned S.D.M., Chatra. A proceeding under section 144 of Cr.P.C. was also drawn up. The said Mostt. Nago executed deed of gift in favour of plaintiff on 25.04.1991 and handed over her title and possession over the suit land to the plaintiff and since then the plaintiff became the absolute owner of the suit property. The defendats filed appeal before the A.C. Hazaribag against the order of the learned Land Reforms Deputy Collector who after condoning the delay admitted the appeal and after establishment of new District Record re-transferred to the file of Additional Collector, Chatra and in the meantime the said Nago Devi died and on 09.07.1999 the plaintiff Aley Rasool was made party on 21.07.1999 replacing the name of Most. Nago Devi. The Additional Collector passed the order setting aside the order of L.R.D.C. by admitting the time barred appeal of the defendants vide order dated 12.05.2006. The defendants on 10.07.2006 held out threats to the plaintiff to spoil the paddy grown by the plaintiff over the suit land. The further case of the appellant is that the defendants had no right to claim the suit property as their sale deed has already been cancelled by Mostt. Nago for breach of contract. The status of the defendants became trespassers. The plaintiff is having a valid right, title, interest and possession over the suit land by remaining continuous possession over the suit land over 12 years has acquired the right of adverse possession also over the same. 4. On the other hand, the case of the defendants were that the suit is not maintainable under the law and the facts and is fit to be dismissed. The suit is barred by law of limitation and adverse possession, the principle of equity, waiver, estoppel, acquiescence as well as non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties. The suit has been under-valued. The plaintiff is not the owner of the suit land. The plaintiff has no right, title, interest or possession over any portion of the suit land rather, these defendants have right, title, interest and possession over the suit land. The suit has been under-valued. The plaintiff is not the owner of the suit land. The plaintiff has no right, title, interest or possession over any portion of the suit land rather, these defendants have right, title, interest and possession over the suit land. The plaintiff never acquired right, title and interest over the suit land, i.e., 06.17 acres land in plot No.9/25 under Khata No.1/9 of village Palha by virtue of registered deed of gift No.1944 dated 19.03.1991. It was the further case pleaded by the defendants that the said deed of gift is a paper transaction and at the time of execution of the aforesaid deed of gift Mostt. Nago had no right, title, interest and possession over the suit land. Mostt. Nago had acquired exclusive right, title, interest and possession of the suit land through registered sale deed executed in the year 1968. It was also admitted that her name was mutated and she paid rent to the State and got rent receipt in her name. It is further averred that in the year 1977 Mostt. Nago fell in urgent need of money and she had no way to raise money and she sold 6.17 acres land in plot No.9/25 under Khata No.1/9 of village Pulha, P.S. Hunterganj, District-Hazaribagh through registered sale deed No.407 dated 03.02.1977 and since the date of purchase these defendants came in their exclusive possession and acquired valid right, title, interest and possession over the suit land. The further case of the defendants was that Mostt. Nago negotiated to several villagers but no body became ready t purchase the suit land on such higher consideration. So far the agreement as contended by the plaintiff is concerned that has been denied by the defendants. On the basis of the above facts, the learned trial court framed the following issues: “(i) Is the suit maintainable in the present form? (ii) Has the plaintiff got any cause of action for the suit? (iii) Is the suit barred by law of limitation and adverse possession?” (iv) It is suit barred by the law of equity, estoppel, waiver and acquiescence? (v) Is the suit bad for non-joinder and misjoinder of necessary parties? (vi) Whether the plaintiff has undervalued the suit and the value of suit land is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court? (iii) Is the suit barred by law of limitation and adverse possession?” (iv) It is suit barred by the law of equity, estoppel, waiver and acquiescence? (v) Is the suit bad for non-joinder and misjoinder of necessary parties? (vi) Whether the plaintiff has undervalued the suit and the value of suit land is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court? (vii) Whether the agreement for maintenance was executed with the sale deed executed by Nago in the favour of defendants? (viii) Whether the plaintiff has acquired right, title, interest and possession by virtue of gift deed executed by Nago in the favour of plaintiff? (ix) Is the plaintiff entitle for the relief sought for and any other relief? 5. After considering all the aspect, the learned trial court came to the finding that the plaintiff has not been able to prove his right, title, interest and possession over the suit land and, accordingly, the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved with this, the appellant herein preferred the Title Appeal which was numbered as Title Appeal No.6 of 2010 which was disposed of vide judgment dated 27.05.2014. The appellate court after considering all these aspects including the evidences adduced by the parties came to the finding that plaintiff/appellant is not entitled for any relief and accordingly the appeal was dismissed on contest. Aggrieved with this, the appellant has preferred the Second Appeal before this Court. 6. Mr. Atanu Banerjee, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that there is perversity in the order of the learned trial court as well as the appellate court. The Second Appeal is fit to be admitted on substantial question of law. By way of referring the evidence of D.W.1 he submits that in his cross-examination in paragraph no.19 of the cross-examination he has stated that Mostt. Nago was my phua and in paragraph no.28 he has stated that there was house of Mostt. Nago over the suit land. In paragraph no.22 he has stated that Alay Rasool is living in the western boundary of disputed land since our knowledge after the death of Mostt. Nago. By way of referring page 14 of the judgment of the trial court, he submits that trial court has wrongly said that Mostt. Nago Devi had no right, title, interest and possession over the suit land. Mostt. Nago. By way of referring page 14 of the judgment of the trial court, he submits that trial court has wrongly said that Mostt. Nago Devi had no right, title, interest and possession over the suit land. Mostt. Nago Devi had no right to execute sale deed of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff and the plaintiff had not acquired right, title, interest and possession over the suit land by virtue of aforesaid gift deed because Nago Devi sold the suit land to the plaintiff on 03.02.1977 by registered sale deed no.407 which was acted upon. By way of referring this observation of the trial court he submits that the finding of the trial court is contrary to the evidence of D.W.1. He further submits that the appellate court has also not appreciated the evidences and facts of this case in right perspective and wrongly came to the conclusion that the trial court was rightly dismissed the suit. 7. Having gone through the records and hearing the learned counsel for the appellant, this Court finds that the trial court as well as the appellate court after discussing all the aspects of the matter including the evidences, exhibits and certain judgments came to the conclusion that the appellant has not been able to prove his right, title and interest. There is concurrent finding of both the courts. It is well-settled that it is not possible for the second appellate court to interfere with such finding of the first appellate court only on the ground that the first appellate court had not come to the grips with the reasoning given by the trial court as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of “Arumugham (dead) by LRs. & Ors. Vs. Sundarambal & Anr.” reported in (1999) 4 SCC 350 . Paragraph no.14 of the said judgment is quoted here in below : “14. From the aforesaid judgment of the three-Judge Bench in Ramachandra Ayyar case it is clear that this Court held that the second appellate court cannot interfere with the judgment of the first appellate court on the ground that the first appellate court had not come to close grips with the reasoning of the trial court. From the aforesaid judgment of the three-Judge Bench in Ramachandra Ayyar case it is clear that this Court held that the second appellate court cannot interfere with the judgment of the first appellate court on the ground that the first appellate court had not come to close grips with the reasoning of the trial court. It is open to the first appellate court to consider the evidence adduced by the parties and give its own reasons for accepting the evidence on one side or rejecting the evidence on the other side. It is not permissible for the second appellate court to interfere with such findings of the first appellate court only on the ground that the first appellate court had not come to grips with the reasoning given by the appellate trial court. The aforesaid judgment of this Court in Ramachandra Ayyar case specifically distinguished Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Maharaja Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur rendered by the Privy Council on the ground that that was a case wherein the High Court was dealing with a first appeal. The observations made by the Privy Council in that context would not be applicable to cases where the second appellate court was dealing with the correctness of the judgment of the first appellate court which reversed the trial court.” 8. As a cumulative effect of the above discussions, this Court finds that there is no substantial question of law involved in this Second Appeal and, accordingly, this Second Appeal stands dismissed.