JUDGMENT : Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, J. 1. This writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner-landlord assailing the judgment dated 12/07/2013 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Sawaimadhopur, by which it has dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner-landlord against the judgment dated 03/03/2011 passed by the learned Rent Tribunal, Sawaimadhopur by which the it has dismissed the application filed by the petitioner-landlord under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 for eviction. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner-landlord submits that there is perversity in the judgments passed by both the courts below and the provisions of the Act of 2001 have wrongfully been read. Learned counsel, while assailing the judgments passed by both the courts below, has taken this Court to the order passed by the learned Rent Tribunal and pointed out that the learned Rent Tribunal has rejected contention of the petitioner-landlord for personal necessity of the premises on the ground that the petitioner-landlord had rented out the premises after the premises having fallen vacant on 20/12/2003 from the erstwhile tenant Nathulal to the present respondent-tenant on 15/10/2004. The learned Rent Tribunal, therefore, has wrongfully assumed that if the petitioner required the shop (rented premises) for his personal necessity, then the petitioner-landlord ought not have rented out the premises to the respondent-tenant in 2004 and could have used the premises for the purpose of his own business after the rented premises (shop) was got vacated from the earlier tenant Nathulal. Learned counsel submits that regarding reasonable and personal bonafide necessity, in terms of Section 9(i) of the Act of 2001, it is not required that the reasonable and personal bonafide necessity is to be seen on the day when the properly was given on rent but is to be seen on the day when the application is moved for seeking eviction. It is submitted that the application for eviction was moved in 2010 and thus, there is a perversity in the judgment of the learned Rent Tribunal which has been erroneously upheld by the Appellate Rent Tribunal. 3. It is submitted that the application for eviction was moved in 2010 and thus, there is a perversity in the judgment of the learned Rent Tribunal which has been erroneously upheld by the Appellate Rent Tribunal. 3. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner-landlord that the learned Rent Tribunal has committed an error of law which has been upheld by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal on the ground that the notice sent to the respondent-tenant on 15.10.2005 was for the period less than four months of default and therefore, the application moved on the ground of default in payment of rent was in terms of Section 9(a) of the Act of 2001 was wrongly decided against the petitioner-landlord. It is submitted that admittedly both the courts below have not given a finding that there was any default at all and in-fact there was a default of payment of rent from 15.06.2005 upto 14.02.2010 i.e. for a period of 56 months. However, both the courts-have only looked into the period mentioned in the notice to reach to a conclusion that there was no default although no such evidence had come on record. Learned counsel further pointed out that it had come on record before both the courts below that the petitioner-landlord was earlier carrying on his business in rented premises wherein a decree was passed for handing over possession of the shop to the landlord and in the High Court an undertaking was given to handover the shop to the landlord whereafter the petitioner is unable to do his business of tent house which he has been doing for more than 30-35 years and thus, he had a personal bonafide and reasonable necessity of his own property. The said aspect has been completely ignored by both the courts below and therefore, the judgments impugned passed by both the courts below are required to be set aside. 4. Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondent-tenant submits that in terms of the Act of 2001, for raising the ground under Section 19(a), there is a precondition that a notice must be given by the landlord to the tenant by registered post wherein the period for the rent due from the tenant was mentioned as less than four months and therefore, the learned Rent Tribunal has rightly reached to the conclusion. It is further submitted that the notice was sent in 2005 while the application for eviction was moved in 2010 and therefore, it cannot be believed that there was default in payment of rent. Secondly, counsel submits that the petitioner-landlord was carrying on business even on the day when the shop was let out to the respondent-tenant and therefore, if he had bonafide necessity, he ought not have rented out the property to the respondent-tenant. Counsel also submits that this Court, in writ jurisdiction, would not set aside the concurrent findings of fact and this Court would not exercise its power to merely correct the errors of law or facts or just because another view than one taken by the Tribunal, of-course subordinate to it, is a possible view. He relies on the judgment rendered by High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Indrasen Jain vs. Rameshwar Das, 2005(9) SCC 225 and judgment rendered at Principal Seat of this Court at Jodhpur in Gendkanwar and Ors. vs. Bhanwar Lal, 2014(2) RCR (Rent) 417. 5. Having noticed the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties and having perused the orders passed by both the courts below, this Court finds that while it is true that this Court would not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact, however, the question before this Court is whether the interpretation of the provisions of the Act of 2001 and the provisions therein was correctly made? 6. Section 9 of the Act of 2001 provides the grounds on which a landlord may move application for eviction of the tenancy which reads as under:- "9. 6. Section 9 of the Act of 2001 provides the grounds on which a landlord may move application for eviction of the tenancy which reads as under:- "9. Eviction of tenants.-Not withstanding anything contained in any other law or contract but subject to other provisions of this Act, the Rent Tribunal shall not order eviction of tenant unless it is satisfied that,- (a) the tenant has neither paid not tendered the amount of rent due front him for four months.-Provided that the ground under this clause shall not be available to the landlord if he has not disclosed to the tenant his hank account number and name of the bank in the same Municipal area, in the rent agreement or by a notice sent to him by registered post, acknowledgment due: Provided further that no petition on the ground under [his clause shall he filed unless the landlord has given it notice to the tenant by registered post, acknowledgment due, demanding arrears of rent and the tenant has not made payment of arrears of rent within a period of thirty days from the (late of service of notice. Explanation.-For the purposes of this clause, the rent shall be deemed to have been tendered when the sane is remitted through money order to the landlord by properly addressing the same; [or having been deposited with the Rent Authority;]or (b) the tenant has wilfully caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the premises; or (c) the tenant has without written permission of the landlord made or permitted to be made any construction which has materially altered the premises or is likely to diminish the value thereof; or (d) the tenant has created a nuisance or has done an act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the premises or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the landlord's interest therein; or (e) the tenant has assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or pail of the premises without the written permission of the landlord; Explanation.-If it is established that some person other than the tenant is in the exclusive possession of the whole or part of the premises, it shall he presumed that the tenant has either sub-let or parted with the possession of the whole or part of the premises, as the case may be; or (f) the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord and the latter has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant; or (g) the premises were let out for residential purposes but have been put to commercial use wholly or partially; or (h) the premises were let out to the tenant for residential purposes by reason of his being in the service or employment of the landlord and the tenant has ceased to be in such service or employment; or (i) the premises are requited reasonably and bona fide by the landlord for the use or occupation of himself or his family or for the use of. occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held: Provided that where decree of eviction from any premises is sought by the landlord under Clause (i), he shall he prohibited from letting out the same to any other person within a period of three years and in case the premises are let-out, the tenant shall be entitled for restoration of possession on a petition moved by him before the Rent Tribunal and the Rent Tribunal shall dispose of such petition expeditiously and the procedure as laid down in Sec. 16, shall mutatis mutandis apply; or (j) the tenant has built or acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted suitable premises adequate for his requirement; or (k) the premises have not been used without reasonable cause for the purpose for which they were let fir a continuous period of six months immediately proceeding the date of the petition; or (l) the landlord has been required by any authority under any law to abate the overcrowding of the premises, or (m) the landlord requires the premises in order to carry out any building work.- (i) at the instance of the State Government or a local authority in -pursuance of an improvement scheme or development scheme; or (ii) because the premises hair become unsafe or unfit for human habitation." 7. In the present case, the petitioner-landlord has apparently taken a ground under Section 9(a) and 9(i) of the Act of 2001. Both the courts below have ousted the petitioner-landlord on the ground that notice sent to the respondent-tenant was not for default of four months of rent and therefore, the ground as per Section 9(a) of the Act of 2001 was not available. With regard to Section 9(i) of the Act of 2001, both the courts below have ousted the petitioner-landlord on the ground that the reasonable and bonafide necessity for the use and occupation of the premises was not available on the day when the premises was rented out. Thus, the question arises "as to whether reasonable and bonafide necessity is to be assessed on the day when the premises is let out or on the day when the application for eviction is moved?" 8. To answer the first question, it is necessary to examine how a proviso is to be read in a particular Section. Thus, the question arises "as to whether reasonable and bonafide necessity is to be assessed on the day when the premises is let out or on the day when the application for eviction is moved?" 8. To answer the first question, it is necessary to examine how a proviso is to be read in a particular Section. In "Principles of Statutory Interpretation" by Justice G.P. Singh, while discussing the proviso and its effect, it states that "the normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment". As per the words of Lord Macmillan, "the proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with the case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is confined to that case." "It is qualification of the preceding enactment which is expressed in terms too general to be quite accurate." 8.1. Justice G.P. Singh has examined the proviso with reference to several judgments in his book and states that the proviso is (a) not construed as excluding or adding something by implication; (b) is to be construed in relation to the section or sections to which it is appended; (c) It is to be used as a guide to construction of enactment; (d) At times added to give an effort to the enacting part and justify its necessity; (e) It may be added by way of abandoned caution to allay fears;.(f) At times proviso is used as a fresh enactment; and (g) It may be for broad general rule of construction. 9. In S. Sundaram Pillai & Ors. vs. V.R. Pattabiraman & Ors., (1985) 1 SCC 591 , it was observed by the Apex Court as under:- "43. We need not multiply authorities after authorities on this point because the legal position seems to be clearly and manifestly well established. To sum up, a proviso may serve four different purposes:- (1) qualifying. In S. Sundaram Pillai & Ors. vs. V.R. Pattabiraman & Ors., (1985) 1 SCC 591 , it was observed by the Apex Court as under:- "43. We need not multiply authorities after authorities on this point because the legal position seems to be clearly and manifestly well established. To sum up, a proviso may serve four different purposes:- (1) qualifying. or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment; (2) it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable; (3) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the enactment and thus acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself; and (4) it may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the enactment with the sole object of explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision. 44. These seem to be by and large the main purport and parameters of a proviso. 10. Thus from above, it is apparent that for examining a proviso, the main rule has to be read alongwith provisos. 11. A look at the aforesaid Section 9(a) of the Act of 2001 shows that while the ground mentioned is that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for four months. There are two provisos. The first proviso lays down that the ground regarding the tenant having not paid rent due from him for four months is not available if the landlord has not disclosed to the tenant his bank account number and name of the bank in the same municipal area in the rent agreement or by a notice to him by registered post with acknowledgment due. Thus, as per the aforesaid proviso i.e. requirement of the landlord to inform the tenant about his bank account number either in the rent note or by sending a notice. 12. The second proviso carves out another condition whereby the landlord has to give a notice by registered post demanding arrears of rent and the tenant has not made payment of rent within period of 30 days from the date of service of notice. The words in the proviso do not say that the notice must mention default of payment of rent of four months. The words in the proviso do not say that the notice must mention default of payment of rent of four months. In the opinion of this Court, the proviso has to be independently read in terms of the guidelines laid down herein above as this proviso has to be construed as an additional condition for the success of the ground. The period of arrears of rent which may be demanded by the notice is not required to be the same as four months default which is a ground for eviction under the main clause. This, the demand of arrears is independent of the ground and would not necessarily synchronize with the period of default as a ground for eviction, In other words, the proviso only lays down a sine-qua-non of a notice to be sent to the tenant demanding arrears. The said arrears demanded may be less than four months or may be more than four months and on that ground, the application for eviction cannot be ousted. Once the landlord submits an application before the concerned Tribunal raising a ground of default in payment of rent for four months or more also satisfies the precondition of the two provisos, as noticed above, i.e. information relating to the bank account and a notice demand arrears, the Tribunal shall thereafter examine on facts whether the default is for four months or above independently on the evidence led by the landlord and the tenant. In view thereof, both the courts below have fallen in error in ousting the application of the landlord only on the ground that the notice mentions of default of rent for a period of three and half months. 13. On the basis of the aforesaid interpretation, if the notice is examined, this Court finds that a notice was sent to the tenant through the counsel for the petitioner claiming arrears of rent from 15.06.2005 onward mentioning that the tenant had not paid rent from 15.06.2005 to 31.07.2005 a the rate of Rs. 1200/- per month and from 01.08.2005 to 30.09.2005 at the rate of Rs. 2400/- per month and thereafter upto 15.10.2005 to the tune of Rs. 800/-. 1200/- per month and from 01.08.2005 to 30.09.2005 at the rate of Rs. 2400/- per month and thereafter upto 15.10.2005 to the tune of Rs. 800/-. Since the demand is from 15.06.2005 upto 15.10.2005, which comes to four months and further demand has been made in the notice for paying the rent at the rate of 2400/- per month, thus on facts also, there is a perversity which has crept in. 14. This Court cannot fail to notice that when the application was moved for eviction, the rent for 56 months had not been paid. In the said facts, therefore, the view taken by both the courts below of the default having not been committed on the ground that the notice does not mention four months' default, is found to be illegal and unjustified. 15. On the second aspect relating to section 9(i) of the Act of 2001, this Court finds that the personal and bona fide necessity which the Court has to examine is to be seen on the day when the eviction application is moved and not on the date when the premises was given out on rent. The view taken by both the courts below would result in a situation where the bonafide necessity as a ground of eviction would be understood to be interpreted as bonafide and reasonable necessity of the landlord while giving out the premises on rent. Neither such an interpretation goes well with the provision nor the lawmakers intended to do so otherwise the language of Section 9(i) would have been different. Thus on facts, the view taken by the courts below on the premise that on 15.10.2004 when the shop was rented out to the tenant by the petitioner, the personal and bonafide necessity was available with the petitioner is a wrong interpretation of the legal provisions as laid down under the Act of 2001 and unsustainable. 16. In the circumstances, the instant writ petition is allowed. Both the question, as noted above, are answered in favour of the petitioner. The respondent-tenant is directed to pay the entire arrears of land to the petitioner-landlord and evict the premises on the ground of bonafide and personal necessity of the petitioner. 16. In the circumstances, the instant writ petition is allowed. Both the question, as noted above, are answered in favour of the petitioner. The respondent-tenant is directed to pay the entire arrears of land to the petitioner-landlord and evict the premises on the ground of bonafide and personal necessity of the petitioner. The matter is remanded to the learned Rent Tribunal for passing appropriate orders and decree in terms of the Act of 2001 within a period of one month from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.