JUDGMENT : Sudhir Agarwal, J. Heard Sri Pankaj Agarwal, learned counsel for appellant. None has appeared on behalf of respondents through called in revise, hence I proceed to decide this appeal ex parte since it is pending for last 38 years. 2. This is a defendant's appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "CPC") arising from judgment and decree dated 24.08.1981 passed by Sri Akhtar Abbas, I Additional Civil Judge, Agra in Civil Appeal No.237 of 1980 whereby it has allowed plaintiff's appeal, set aside judgment and decree dated 19.05.1980 passed by Sri P. K. Agrawal, Ist Additional Munsif, Agra in Original Suit No.412 of 1978 whereby suit was dismissed; and the suit has been decreed. 3. Appeal was admitted by treating ground no.6 as substantial question of law and it reads as under : "Whether the findings recorded by the lower appellate court without considering the reasons for decision given by the trial court is not supported by the evidence on record and the lower appellate court has arbitrarily recorded a finding that Asharfi Lal Pradhan examined by defendant has admitted the fact that the disputed land is the same in respect of which lease has been executed in favour of the plaintiff while the statement of Asharfi Lal Pradhan is otherwise and he has categorically stated that Dungar, Plaintiff was never given possession of the disputed land nor any lease was executed in respect of the same in favour of plaintiff and on the contrary the disputed land was given to the defendant appellant on lease by the Gaon Sabha?" (emphasis added) 4. Facts in brief giving rise to present appeal are that Dungar Singh, plaintiff-respondent 1 (hereinafter referred to as 'Plaintiff') instituted Original Suit no.412 of 1975, vide plaint dated 09.08.1975, in the Court of Munsif, Agra, impleading Nihali alias Nehal Singh, son of Devi Singh as defendant 1 (hereinafter referred to as "Appellant"), and Roshan Singh, son of Jagan Nath (now deceased and substituted by his legal heirs) as performa defendant no.2 (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent 2"). Initially suit was filed praying for issue of a decree of permanent injunction in favour of plaintiff and respondent 2 against appellant, restraining him from interfering in peaceful possession of plaintiff and respondent 2 over the plot, details whereof are given at the bottom of plaint, either by taking forcible possession or raising any construction or in any other manner. Subsequently, suit was amended and amendment was allowed by Trial Court vide order dated 24.08.1979, and prayer was amended by seeking a mandatory injunction directing appellant to hand over possession of disputed property after removing boundary wall and other constructions raised on disputed property during pendency of the suit. 5. Plaint case set up by plaintiff is that disputed land was allotted by Gaon Sabha, Abheypura on 30.10.1970 to plaintiff and his brother, (respondent 2) on payment of Rs.150/- and actual possession was also handed over after demarcating the disputed land on the spot. Since then plaintiff and respondent 2, both were in actual possession of disputed land and using the same for tethering cattle, keeping bitora and other agricultural purposes. They had also raised one hut etc on the said land. Appellant has no right, title or otherwise interest in the said plot, but in an illegal manner and in collusion with Sub Inspector, Malpura, attempted to take possession of disputed land and raise construction, giving threats to plaintiff and respondent 2, hence the suit. 6. Suit was contested by appellant filing a written statement dated 08.11.1975 denying claim of plaintiff regarding allotment of disputed land by Gaon Sabha to plaintiff and respondent 2. Their possession and use of disputed land was also denied. It was alleged that appellant himself is in actual possession of disputed land and there exists a construction of residential house and his entire family is residing therein. The disputed land was actually allotted to appellant by Gram Sabha, Abheypura vide order dated 14.04.1968 and since then, appellant raised his 'Chappar' (thatch) over said land and is residing therein. Even details of boundary given in plaint was disputed and it is said that incorrect boundaries have been given; plaintiff is making an attempt to usurp land of appellant, which was allotted to him by Gaon Sabha vide order dated 14.04.1968. 7. Even details of boundary given in plaint was disputed and it is said that incorrect boundaries have been given; plaintiff is making an attempt to usurp land of appellant, which was allotted to him by Gaon Sabha vide order dated 14.04.1968. 7. After amendment of plaint, an additional written statement dated 08.05.1978 was filed whereagainst it was reiterated by appellant that disputed land was allotted to him and he had raised his valuable construction thereon and his entire family is residing therein. 8. Trial Court formulated nine issues, which read as under : ^^1- D;k okn dkuwuu pyus ;ksX; ugha gS\ 2- D;k oknh fookfnr Hkwfe dk Lokeh gS\ 3- D;k izfroknh fookfnr Hkwfe dk Lokeh gS\ 4- D;k oknh ;k izfroknh fookfnr Hkwfe ij dkfct gSa] ;fn gka rks bldk izHkko\ 5- D;k okn fof'k"V vuqrks"k vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 34] 38 o 41 ls ckf/kr gS\ 6- D;k oknh fdlh mi'ke ds ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ 7- D;k okn dk ewY;kadu de fd;k x;k gS rFkk U;k; 'kqYd de fd;k x;k gS\ 8- D;k bl U;k;ky; dks okn dh lquokbZ dk vf/kdkj ugha gS\ 9- D;k okn /kkjk 331 tehankjh mUewyu vf/kfu;e ds izkfo/kkuksa ls ckf/kr gS\** (1) Whether the suit is not legally maintainable? (2) Whether the plaintiff is owner of the disputed land? (3) Whether the defendant is the owner of the disputed land? (4) Whether the plaintiff or defendant are in possession of the property in suit, if so, its effect? (5) Whether the suit is barred by Sections 34, 38 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act? (6) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? (7) Whether the suit is under valued and court fees paid is sufficient? (8) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the Suit? (9) Whether the suit is barred by Section 331 of U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act?" (English translation by Court) 9. (6) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? (7) Whether the suit is under valued and court fees paid is sufficient? (8) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the Suit? (9) Whether the suit is barred by Section 331 of U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act?" (English translation by Court) 9. Issues (2) and (3), both, were taken together and relying on Exhibit A-3, a documentary evidence produced by appellant, which is a receipt issued by Gaon Sabha on 14.04.1968, Trial Court held that southern portion of Plot no.206 was allotted to defendant (appellant) but Survey Map, Paper No.51C/2 shows that disputed land is covering Plot nos.206, 209, 204 and 205 and it is not the case of appellant also that he was allotted land in any other plot except Plot no.206, hence, it is evident that land in dispute was not entirely owned by appellant. Trial Court also observed that in order to succeed in suit, it is plaintiff who has to prove its case and it has produced Exhibit A-1, a receipt dated 30.10.1970 which shows that Gaon Sabha allotted Plots No.206 and 209, which is a very big plot. Since allotment in Plot no.206 was made to both parties, it was necessary for the plaintiff to demonstrate as to which part of Plot no.206 was allotted to him, but Exhibit A-1 was not an evidence to show as to which part of Plot no.206 or 209 was allotted to plaintiff. The boundaries given by plaintiff were found to cover Plots no.204, 205, 206 and 209 and as per Survey Report, Paper No.51C/2, admittedly all were not allotted to plaintiff. There was no other documentary evidence to show as to which part of plot was allotted to plaintiff and oral evidence of Roshan Singh as PW-1; Bhanwar Singh, PW-2 and Beni Singh as PW-3 only state that disputed plot was in possession of plaintiff, but which land was actually allotted to plaintiff, nothing could be proved by them. On the contrary, Asharfi Lal, DW-1 and Anar Singh, DW-2 appeared to support claim of appellant and Asharfi Lal, who was the then Gram Pradhan when disputed land was allotted, was clearly said that land in dispute was not the same which was allotted to plaintiff. On the contrary, Asharfi Lal, DW-1 and Anar Singh, DW-2 appeared to support claim of appellant and Asharfi Lal, who was the then Gram Pradhan when disputed land was allotted, was clearly said that land in dispute was not the same which was allotted to plaintiff. In view thereof, it answered Issues (2) and (3) holding that plaintiff has failed to prove that disputed land is the same which was allotted to him by Gaon Sabha and even appellant failed to prove that disputed land is the same which was allotted to him. Then coming to Issue (4) with regard to possession, Trial Court held that admittedly appellant had raised a boundary wall over disputed land. According to plaintiff, this boundary wall was raised after filing of suit, but the suit was filed on 09.08.1975 and Court Commissioner was appointed on 10.08.1975 who submitted his report, Paper 13C/3 which shows that on the spot a boundary wall of 54 m length and 1 m height was found and this construction was not possible overnight as sought to be contended by plaintiff. It, therefore, held that property in dispute was in possession of appellant and not plaintiff. Thereafter, Issues (1), (8) and (9) were taken together and Court held that suit was maintainable in Civil Court and it is not barred by limitation or otherwise. Issue (5) was answered against defendant and Issue (7), already treated as a preliminary issue was decided vide order dated 11.03.1980. Consequently, Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 19.05.1980, dismissed the suit. 10. Plaintiff brought the matter in Civil Appeal No.237 of 1980 before District Judge, Agra and it has been decided and allowed by judgment and decree dated 24.08.1981 passed by Sri Akhtar Abbas, I Additional Civil Judge, Agra (hereinafter referred to as "LAC"). 11. Lac has not formulated any point for determination in its judgment and proceeded to consider the matter on merits in a general way. It has, however, allowed appeal by holding that plaintiff has been successful in proving that he is the owner of disputed property and near about the period when suit was presented, he was in possession of disputed property which has been unauthorizedly taken in possession by appellant and, therefore, Trial Court has erred in recording otherwise finding. 12. It has, however, allowed appeal by holding that plaintiff has been successful in proving that he is the owner of disputed property and near about the period when suit was presented, he was in possession of disputed property which has been unauthorizedly taken in possession by appellant and, therefore, Trial Court has erred in recording otherwise finding. 12. Apparently, judgment of LAC is not consistent with requirement of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC, since, framing of point of determination is mandatory and it has been said repeatedly by Apex Court as well as this Court that, Appellate Court, if has passed a judgment which is not consistent with Order 41 Rule 31, it is patently illegal and is not a valid judgment. LAC has to render the judgment consistent with provision of Order 41, Rule 31 C.P.C.. The findings recorded and inference drawn as also reasons assigned by Trial Court must have to be reversed by LAC after discussing the same. An otherwise judgment of reversal cannot be passed. 13. In S.V.R.Mudaliar (Dead) by Lrs. and Ors. Vs. Rajabu F.Buhari (Mrs) (Dead) by Lrs. and Ors., (1995) AIR SC 1607, Court in paras 14 and 15 of the judgment has upheld the contention that though Appellate Court is within its right to take a different view on the questions of fact, but that should be done after adverting to the reasons given by Trial Court in arriving at the findings in question. Appellate Court before reversing a finding of fact has to bear in mind the reasons ascribed by Trial Court. Apex Court relied and followed earlier decision of Privy Council in Rani Hemant Kumari Vs. Maharaja Jagadhindra Nath, 10 CWN 630 and in para 15 of the judgment said: "There is no need to pursue the legal principle, as we have no doubt in our mind that before reversing a finding of fact, the appellate court has to bear in mind the reasons ascribed by the trial court. This view of ours finds support from what was stated by the Privy Council in Rani Hemant Kumari Vs. This view of ours finds support from what was stated by the Privy Council in Rani Hemant Kumari Vs. Maharaja Jagadhindra Nath,1906 10 CalWN 630, wherein, while regarding the appellate judgment of the High Court of judicature at Fort William as "careful and able", it was stated that it did not "come to close quarters with the judgment which it reviews, and indeed never discusses or even alludes to the reasoning of the Subordinate Judge." (emphasis added) 14. Following the above decision, Hon'ble B.L.Yadav, J in Smt. Sona Devi Vs. Nagina Singh and Ors., (1997) AIR Patna 67 observed that whenever judgment of LAC is a judgment of reversal, it is the primary duty of Appellate Court while reversing findings of Trial Court, to consider reasons given by Trial Court and those reasons must also be reversed. Unless that is done, judgment of lower Appellate Court cannot be held to be consistent with the requirement of Order 41, Rule 31, which is a mandatory provision. 15. The above view has also been followed recently in Jaideo Yadav Vs. Raghunath Yadav & Anr., (2009) 3 PLJR 529 wherein the Court said that Trial Court recorded its findings but LAC had not reversed the said findings and rather on the basis of some findings of its own, appeal was allowed by LAC without appreciating findings of Trial Court on the concerned issue. The court then said : "The law is well settled in this regard that where the judgment of the lower appellate court is a judgment of reversal it is primary duly of the appellate court to consider the reasons given by the trial court and those reasons must also be reversed." 16. This court has also followed the same view in Doodhnath and Anr. Vs. Deonandan and others, (2006) AIR Allahabad 3. 17. Framing of points of determination as required under Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. is also necessary. In G. Amalorpavam and others Vs. R.C. Diocese of Madurai, (2006) 3 SCC 224 , Court said: "The question whether in a particular case there has been substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC has to be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case. In G. Amalorpavam and others Vs. R.C. Diocese of Madurai, (2006) 3 SCC 224 , Court said: "The question whether in a particular case there has been substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC has to be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case. Non-compliance with the provisions may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void, and may be ignored if there has been substantial compliance with it and the higher appellate court is in a position to ascertain the findings of the lower appellate court. It is no doubt desirable that the appellate court should comply with all the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. But if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. Where the appellate court having considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail, come to any conclusion and its findings are supported by reasons even though the point has not been framed by the appellate court there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and the judgment is not in any manner vitiated by the absence of a point of determination. Where there is an honest endeavour on the part of the lower appellate court to consider the controversy between the parties and there is proper appraisement of the respective cases and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other considerations appearing on both sides is clearly manifest by the perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court, it would be a valid judgment even though it does not contain the points for determination. The object of the rule in making it incumbent upon the appellate court to frame points for determination and to cite reasons for the decision is to focus attention of the court on the rival contentions which arise for determination and also to provide litigant parties opportunity in understanding the ground upon which the decision is founded with a view to enable them to know the basis of the decision and, if so considered appropriate and so advised, to avail the remedy of second appeal conferred by Section 100 CPC." (emphasis added) 18. In Santosh Hazari Vs. In Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , dealing with the question of compliance of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C., Court said: "The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. The task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial court is an easier one. The appellate court agreeing with the view of the trial court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice (see Girja Nandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhury). We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. While writing a judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial court must weigh with the appellate court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same Presiding Judge who authors the judgment. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact." (emphasis added) 19. In Union of India and another Vs. As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact." (emphasis added) 19. In Union of India and another Vs. Ranchod and others, (2007) 14 SCC 326 referring to earlier decisions in Santosh Hazari (supra) and G. Amalorpavam (supra), Court found that there was a complete non-compliance of Order 41 Rule 31, hence set aside the judgment of Appellate Court observing in para 10 of the judgment as under: "10. There being total non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of Order XLI Rule 31 CPC we have no option but to set aside the judgment of the High Court and remand the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration of the appeals." 20. In B.V. Nagesh and another Vs. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy, (2010) 13 SCC 530 , Court in para 4 of the judgment said: "4. ....Rule 31 mandates that the judgment of the appellate Court shall state: (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) reasons for the decision; and- (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. The appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial Court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case therein is open for re-hearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put-forth and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate Court. Sitting as a court of appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. 21. In H. Siddiqui Vs. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. 21. In H. Siddiqui Vs. A. Ramalingam, (2011) 4 SCC 240 , Court after referring Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C., in para 18 of the judgment, said: "18. The said provisions provide guidelines for the appellate court as to how the court has to proceed and decide the case. The provisions should be read in such a way as to require that the various particulars mentioned therein should be taken into consideration. Thus, it must be evident from the judgment of the appellate court that the court has properly appreciated the facts/evidence, applied its mind and decided the case considering the material on record. It would amount to substantial compliance of the said provisions if the appellate court's judgment is based on the independent assessment of the relevant evidence on all important aspect of the matter and the findings of the appellate court are well founded and quite convincing. It is mandatory for the appellate court to independently assess the evidence of the parties and consider the relevant points which arise for adjudication and the bearing of the evidence on those points. Being the final court of fact, the first appellate court must not record mere general expression of concurrence with the trial court judgment rather it must give reasons for its decision on each point independently to that of the trial court. Thus, the entire evidence must be considered and discussed in detail. Such exercise should be done after formulating the points for consideration in terms of the said provisions and the court must proceed in adherence to the requirements of the said statutory provisions." (emphasis added) 22. This has been followed subsequently also in United Engineers and Contractors Vs. Secretary of Govt. of A.P. and others, (2013) AIR SC 2239 and A.M. Sangappa @ Sangappa Vs. Sangondeppa and another, (2014) 2 AWC 1153 (SC). 23. In the present case, LAC, in my view, has not considered the matter in accordance with law correctly and there is no compliance of Order 41, Rule 31 C.P.C. 24. Secretary of Govt. of A.P. and others, (2013) AIR SC 2239 and A.M. Sangappa @ Sangappa Vs. Sangondeppa and another, (2014) 2 AWC 1153 (SC). 23. In the present case, LAC, in my view, has not considered the matter in accordance with law correctly and there is no compliance of Order 41, Rule 31 C.P.C. 24. However, I also proceed to consider the substantial question of law formulated in this case to find out whether LAC has taken a view which is founded on evidence or not. LAC has relied on Survey Map dated 04.03.1978, Paper No.51C/2 prepared by Krishna Pal Singh Pathak, Amin which was admitted in evidence vide Court's order dated 13.07.1978. It shows that Plot nos.204, 205, 206 and 209 are adjacent to each other and disputed land falls in some part of all four plots. This findind recorded by LAC reads as under : ^^vkjkth uacjh 209 ls feyh gq;h mŸkj iwjc esa vkjkth uacjh 206 gS vkSj nksuks vkjkft;r dh if'peh es<+s ,d lh/k esa gSA vkjkth uacjh 206 ds if'Pke mlds cjkcj esa fpiVh gq;h vkjkth la[;k 205 gS rFkk vkjkth uacj 209 ds if'Pke esa fpiVh gq;h vkjkth la[;k 204 gSA mijksDr pkjksa vkjkth uEcjku ,d nwljs ls fpiVs gq, gSA fookfnr Hkwfe mDr pkjksa vkjkth uEcjku esa iM+rh gS ftldk vf/kdka'k vkjkth uacj 209 esa vkSj FkksM+k va'k vkjkth uacj 206 esa iM+rk gS vkSj FkksM+k FkksM+k va'k vkjkth uacj 204 ,oa 205 esa Hkh iM+rk gSA vkjkth uacj 206 ,oa 209 esa fookfnr Hkwfe dk iM+us okyk va'k 2 fcLok ls vf/kd ugha gSA bl izdkj losZ{k.k ds vk/kkj ij fookfnr Hkwfe dk yxHkx 2 fcLok va'k vkjkth uacjh 206 ,oa 209 esa gh iM+rk gSA oknh Lohd`r :i ls vkjkth uacj 206 ,oa 209 esa 2 fcLok Hkwfe dk izfroknh la[;k 2 ds lkFk vkoaVh gSA mijksDr Hkwfe vkjkth uacj 209 dk mRrjh] if'peh Hkkx rFkk vkjkth uacj 206 dk nf{k.kh] if'peh Hkkx gksuk uD+'ks ls tkfgj gSA oknh }kjk nkf[ky dh x;h jlhn dkxt+ la[;k 10d esa ml dks nh x;h Hkwfe dk jdok ,oa uacj nt+Z gS fdUrq pkSgnh ugha nh gq;h gSA^^ "Adjacent to Araji no 209, there lies Araji no 206 in the north-east while western ridges of both the Arajis are in a straight line. To the west of, and adjacent to, Araji no 206, lies Araji no 205; and to the west of, and adjacent to, Araji no 209, lies Araji no 204. All the aforesaid four Arajis are adjacent to one another. The disputed land falls under the aforesaid Araji numbers. Its maximal part is under Araji no 209 and some part of it is under Araji no 206 while some parts of it fall under Araji nos 204 and 205. The part of the disputed land falling under Araji nos 206 and 209 does not exceed 2 bishwas. In this way, going by the survey, nearly 2 bishwa part of the disputed lands falls only under Araji nos 206 and 209. The plaintiff, admittedly, is a joint allottee with defendant no 2 to two bishwa land under Araji nos 206 and 209. Northern and western parts of Araji no 209 and southern and western part of Araji no 206 are perceptible in the map. Receipt being paper no 10-ka filed by the plaintiff mentions the area and number of the land allotted to him but not the boundaries thereof." (English translation by Court) (emphasis added) 25. The above finding clearly shows that disputed land shown by plaintiff cover even those plots which were not admittedly allotted to him and, therefore, what was said by appellant is evident from above findings recorded by LAC that plaintiff was not able to specify the part of land which was allotted and possession whereof was given to him in Plots no.206 and 209. LAC has also observed that only 2 biswa land was allotted. Plaintiff's witnesses have only said in their oral deposition that plaintiff was in possession of disputed land, but same facts apply to appellant also. DW-1 who was the then Gram Pradhan, specifically said that the land allotted to plaintiff and respondent 2 was in north west corner of Plot no.209 and west corner towards North of Plot no.206. DW-2 Anar Singh, who was also Gram Pradhan, said that both plots are adjacent to each other and plaintiff was given land at same place in both the plots. Thereafter LAC proceeded to apply its own conjectures that land shown in survey map allotted to plaintiff would cover only Plots no.206 and 209 and nothing remains thereafter. DW-2 Anar Singh, who was also Gram Pradhan, said that both plots are adjacent to each other and plaintiff was given land at same place in both the plots. Thereafter LAC proceeded to apply its own conjectures that land shown in survey map allotted to plaintiff would cover only Plots no.206 and 209 and nothing remains thereafter. With respect to possession it has recorded a finding that receipts of purchase of bricks produced by appellant are dated 28.07.1975 and 02.08.1975 whereby 7500 and 2500 bricks were purchased, therefore, construction must have been raised from 28.07.1975 and continued upto 02.08.1975. Suit was filed on 09.08.1975. He has also conjectured that 1 meter height and 5 meter long boundary could have been constructed in overnight and, therefore, possession of land must be held to be taken by appellant after filing of suit. This finding apparently is perverse, inasmuch as, even if it is assumed that bricks were purchased on 28.07.1975 and 02.08.1975, there is no evidence to show that the boundary wall was not existing on 09.08.1975 when suit was instituted by plaintiff, in fact even in para 5 of plaint it is stated that appellant is threatening to raise construction and thereafter amendment was filed admitting possession of appellant though stating that after filing suit in the night of 09.02.1975, boundary wall was constructed. With regard to date of construction of boundary wall mentioned in amendment application of plaintiff, I have seen original record and find that original amendment application, Paper No.53 Ka/1 whereby para 7 was sought to be added as 7A, reads as under : "7A. That after the filing of the suit the deft no.1 quite illegally in the night of 9/2/1975 constructed boundary wall of about 1 meter in height taking advantage of the absence of the plff and defendant no.2 and active help of the police. Although the deft no.1 never came in possession of the plot in suit but the plff is claiming possession also to avoid technical objections." 26. In the amendment application no correction has been sought that the date of construction stated is 09.02.1975. The suit was instituted by plaint dated 09.08.1975. Even in the amendment incorporated in plaint by insertions, Para 7A it has been mentioned that the construction is night of 09.02.1975. In the amendment application no correction has been sought that the date of construction stated is 09.02.1975. The suit was instituted by plaint dated 09.08.1975. Even in the amendment incorporated in plaint by insertions, Para 7A it has been mentioned that the construction is night of 09.02.1975. In absence of any correction or amendment of plaint in this regard it is admitted case of plaintiff that appellant was in possession in February, 1975 and construction was raised and if that be so, finding of LAC otherwise that construction might have been raised overnight after 09.08.1975 i.e. after filing of suit, is clearly perverse. It shows misreading of document. It appears that land in question was already in possession of appellant and before filing of suit it had raised construction of boundary wall, but it was not mentioned in the plaint but suit was subsequently amended. Thus in respect of possession of property in dispute, plaintiff had wrongly stated that possession was taken when he was absent, after filing of suit. It may also be mentioned that if plaintiff was in actual possession of property in dispute, and he was subsequently forcibly dispossessed, and appellant tresspassed the land, in normal course plaintiff would have filed a report in police for illegal trespass by appellant, but no such action was taken. In fact even amendment application was filed after 8 days of filing of suit. 27. The judgment of LAC, recording otherwise finding as discussed above, is clearly perverse and I answer above substantial question of law in favour of appellant. 28. Appeal is, accordingly, allowed with costs. Judgment and decree of LAC dated 24.08.1981 is hereby set aside and Judgment and decree dated 19.05.1980 passed by Trial Court is hereby confirmed.