JUDGMENT : Ajay Bhanot, J. 1. The petitioner at the relevant point in time was working as Junior Accountant in the respondent Corporation. 2. The petitioner has assailed the order dated 06.04.2010 passed by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner was reverted to the pay-scale of Rs. 3285/-per month. The petitioner took the order dated 06.04.2010 in appeal. The appeal of the petitioner was rejected by the competent authority by order dated 15.01.2011. 3. The petitioner is aggrieved by the orders dated 06.04.2010 passed by the disciplinary authority and the order dated 15.01.2011 passed by the appellate authority. The aforesaid orders are assailed in the instant writ petition. A further relief to the following effect has been sought for in the instant writ petition: "iii. To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to ensure the payment of salary with all emoluments subsequent upon the quashing of the impugned orders dated 06.04.2010 and 15.01.2011 with interest @ 18% per annum with effect from 06.04.2010 till its actual payment to the petitioner." 4. Ms. Himadri Batra, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 2 to 5 raises a preliminary objection that the instant writ petition is barred by delay and laches. The instant writ petition has been instituted after a delay of more than 3 years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action. Learned counsel for the respondent Ms. Himadri Batra relies upon the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Tax No. 1261 of 2018 in the case of P. P. Polyplast (P) Ltd. and another Vs. Union of India and another. 5. Sri P.S. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner in response to the preliminary objection submits that the petitioner had sought review of the order passed by the appellate authority. The review application was submitted by the petitioner on 23.07.2013. The review application was not decided by the appellate authority compelling the petitioner to approach this Court by instituting a writ petition, registered as Writ A No. 8087 of 2014, Krishna Gopal Sharma Vs. State of U.P. and Others. After the dismissal of the aforesaid writ petition by this Court on 12.02.2014, the petitioner instituted the instant writ petition. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 7. State of U.P. and Others. After the dismissal of the aforesaid writ petition by this Court on 12.02.2014, the petitioner instituted the instant writ petition. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 7. For the purpose of a judgment on the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents, certain relevant facts are established beyond the pale of dispute. 8. The punishment order reverting the petitioner to a lower pay-scale was passed by the disciplinary authority on 06.04.2010. The petitioner took the order of punishment in appeal. The appellate authority rejected the appeal of the petitioner by order dated 15.01.2011. The petitioner claims to have filed a review application on 23.07.2013 seeking review of the order passed by the appellate authority. It is claimed by the petitioner that the appellate authority did not decide the review application. Consequently, the petitioner invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer to direct the respondents authority to decide the review application submitted by the petitioner on 23.07.2013. The writ petition so instituted by the petitioner and registered as Writ A No. 8087 of 2014 Krishna Gopal Sharma Vs. State of U.P. and Others, was dismissed by a judgment entered by this court on 12.02.2014. Considering the relevance of the aforesaid judgment, it is extracted hereunder for ease of reference: "Heard counsel for the petitioner and learned standing counsel on behalf of respondent No. 1. By means of this writ petition, the sole prayer made is for a mandamus to respondent No. 2 to consider and decide the review/appeal filed by the petitioner on 23.07.2013 for reviewing the order dated 15.01.2011 passed by respondent No. 2. From the facts stated in the writ petition, it is clear that the petitioner, who was a Junior Accountant was punished by order dated 06.04.2010 whereby, he was reverted to the basic pay of Rs. 3285/- per month. Against the said order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, the petitioner filed an appeal under Rule 61 of the U.P. State Tourism Development Corporation Employees Service Rules, before the Board. By order dated 15.01.2011, the Board had dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner. The petitioner, thereafter, claims to have filed a review/appeal on 23.07.2013 before the respondent No. 2 and has prayed for a writ of mandamus to the said authority to decide the same expeditiously. By order dated 15.01.2011, the Board had dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner. The petitioner, thereafter, claims to have filed a review/appeal on 23.07.2013 before the respondent No. 2 and has prayed for a writ of mandamus to the said authority to decide the same expeditiously. On being asked as to under which provision, the review/appeal would lie to respondent No. 2, reliance has been placed on Rule 61, which is reproduced below: "61. Appeal : An appeal against an order of the appointing authority imposing any penalty, shall lie to the Board within one month of the date of service of the order and the Board's decision on such appeal shall be final. Provided that a joint appeal shall not be entertained. Provided further that where a penalty has been imposed by the Board or by the appointing authority with the approval of the Board, the person on whom the penalty has been imposed may apply to the Board for revision of its decision within one month of the date of service of the order." Perusal of the aforesaid Rule would show that the order passed in appeal by the Board is final and no review. revision or further appeal lies before any Authority. As such, the review/appeal said to have been filed by the petitioner on 23.307.2013 before the respondent No. 2 against the decision of the Board is not maintainable and, therefore, no mandamus can be issued to decide the same. Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the second proviso to Rule 61. However, the case of the petitioner is not covered under the said second proviso to Rule 61 inasmuch as, in the case of the petitioner, the penalty has not been imposed by the Board or by the appointing authority with the previous approval of the Board. The case of the petitioner is covered by first part of Rule 61. It is for the said reason that the petitioner had already availed the remedy of appeal before the Board. Accordingly, the contention made by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no force. The writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed." 9. The cause of action of the instant writ petition arose on 06.04.2010 and 15.01.2011. 10. Admittedly, the petitioner has approached this Court after a delay of more than 3 years. 11. Accordingly, the contention made by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no force. The writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed." 9. The cause of action of the instant writ petition arose on 06.04.2010 and 15.01.2011. 10. Admittedly, the petitioner has approached this Court after a delay of more than 3 years. 11. The review application filed by the petitioner in the year 2013 and likewise the writ petition filed in the year 2014 registered as Writ A No. 8087 of 2014, Krishna Gopal Sharma Vs. State of U.P. and Others, do not create a cause of action for the petitioner. The review application filed in the year 2013 was a mere device to tide over the issue of delay and laches. Similarly, the order passed by this Court on 12.02.2014 does not provide the petitioner with a panacea for the delay. 12. There is no satisfactory explanation for delay and laches on part of the petitioner. The petitioner did not invoke any legal remedy for 3 years after the cause of action first arose. The inaction of the petitioner for long years has to be addressed first and before his claim can be considered on merits. 13. The Division Bench of this Court while considering the issue of entertaining a writ petition which is barred by delay and laches in the case of P. P. Polyplast (P) Ltd. (supra) held thus: 14. The issue and consequence of delay and laches on part of a litigant to approach the Court, the rights created by an innocuous order passed by this Court to decide the belated claim of a litigant, ingenious devices adopted by litigants to escape the responsibility and consequences of delay and the consequences of a belated claim made by an indolent litigant on the state exchequer are the issues, which arise for consideration in the instant controversy. The like issues arose for determination before a Single Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Jiauddeen Vs. State of U.P. and 3 others registered as Writ-A No.15043 of 2018. This Court in the case of Jiauddeen (supra) after a survey of the authorities in point answered the aforesaid issues by holding thus: "12. The like issues arose for determination before a Single Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Jiauddeen Vs. State of U.P. and 3 others registered as Writ-A No.15043 of 2018. This Court in the case of Jiauddeen (supra) after a survey of the authorities in point answered the aforesaid issues by holding thus: "12. The courts are required by law to apply their mind to the question and consequences of delay and laches and enter a finding thereon, before exercising their discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. The courts have consistently observed that delay and laches on part of the litigant will disentitle him to any relief. In this regard the Hon'ble Supreme Court has settled the law with clarity and observed it with consistency. 14. The line of authorities on this point both consistent and long. It would be apposite to cite same authorities which would give a good sense of law on the point. 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R & M Trust Vs. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group and others reported at 2005 (3) SCC 91 while declining to exercise discretion in favour of a litigant who was not vigilant to his rights, held thus :- "There is no doubt that delay is a very important factor while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. We cannot disturb the third party interest created on account of delay. Even otherwise also why Court should come to rescue of person who is not vigilant of his rights." 16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Balwant Regular Motor Service reported at AIR 1969 SC 329 held thus:- "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy." 17. A similar sentiment was echoed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India reported at 2007 (9) SCC 274 the Hon'ble Supreme Court opined as under:- "the High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction." 18. When the issue of delay and laches came up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shankara Co-op Housing Society Ltd. Vs. M. Prabhakar and Ors reported at 2011(5)SCC 607 the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated settled position of law and confirmed the well established criteria which has to be considered before exercise of discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The relevant portion is extracted here-in-below:- "53. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are: (1) there is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its own facts. They are: (1) there is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its own facts. (2) The principle on which the court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the Petitioners. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the Petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the Petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay." 19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also noticed the ingenuous devices adopted by unscrupulous litigants to tide over the delay and laches on part of such litigants. One such commonly used device is by filing a representation to the authorities after a long delay. Such litigants then approach the Court with an innocuous prayer to decide the representation. Once such representation is decided in compliance of orders of the court, it is claimed that a fresh cause of action has arisen. Stale wine does not became fresh in a new bottle. The Hon'ble Supreme Court saw through the designs of such litigants and foiled their intent in no uncertain terms. 20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court considered this issue in the case of C. Jacob Vs. Director of Geology & Min. Indus. Est. and another reported at 2008 (10) SCC 115 . The law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court would guide the fate of the case. The relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference :- "6. Director of Geology & Min. Indus. Est. and another reported at 2008 (10) SCC 115 . The law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court would guide the fate of the case. The relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference :- "6. Let us take the hypothetical case of an employee who is terminated from service in 1980. He does not challenge the termination. But nearly two decades later, say in the year 2000, he decides to challenge the termination. He is aware that any such challenge would be rejected at the threshold on the ground of delay (if the application is made before Tribunal) or on the ground of delay and laches (if a writ petition is filed before a High Court). Therefore, instead of challenging the termination, he gives a representation requesting that he may be taken back to service. Normally, there will be considerable delay in replying such representations relating to old matters. Taking advantage of this position, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition before the Tribunal/High Court seeking a direction to the employer to consider and dispose of his representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely allow or dispose of such applications/petitions (many a time even without notice to the other side), without examining the matter on merits, with a direction to consider and dispose of the representation. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any `decision' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to `consider'. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to `consider'. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored" 21. A similar view was taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.S. Rathore Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported at 1989 (4) SCC 582 . The relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference :- "It is proper that the position in such cases should be uniform. Therefore, in every such case only when the appeal or representation provided by law is disposed of, cause of action shall first accrue and where such order is not made, on the expiry of six months from the date when the appeal was filed or representation was made, the right to sue shall first accrue. Submission of just a memorial or representation to the Head of the establishment shall not be taken into consideration in the matter of fixing limitation." 22. Law has long set its face against delay in approaching the court. The courts have consistently declined to condone the delay and denied relief to litigants who are guilty of laches. Litigants who are in long slumber and not vigilant about their rights are discouraged by the courts. Belated claims are rejected at the threshold. Rip Van Winkles have a place in literature, but not in law ! 23. All this is done on the foot of the rule of delay and laches. Statutes of limitation are ordained by the legislature, rule of laches was evolved by the courts. Sources of the law differ but the purpose is congruent. Statutes of limitation and the law of delay and laches are rules of repose. 24. The rule of laches and delay is founded on sound policy and is supported by good authority. The rule of laches and delay is employed by the courts as a tool for efficient administration of justice and a bulwark against abuse of process of courts. 25. Some elements of public policy and realities of administration of justice may now be considered. 26. While indolent litigants revel in inactivity, the cycle of life moves on. New realities come into existence. 25. Some elements of public policy and realities of administration of justice may now be considered. 26. While indolent litigants revel in inactivity, the cycle of life moves on. New realities come into existence. Oblivious to the claims of the litigants, parties order their lives and institutions their affairs to the new realities. In case claims filed after inordinate delay are entertained by courts, lives and affairs of such individuals and institutions would be in a disarray for no fault of theirs. Their lives and affairs would be clouded with uncertainty and they would face prospects of long and fruitless litigation. 27. The delay would entrench independent third party rights, which cannot be dislodged. The deposit of subsequent events obscures the original claim and alters the cause itself. The refusal to permit agitation of stale claims is based on the principle of acquiescence. In certain situations, the party by its failure to raise the claim in time waives its right to assert it after long delay. 28. The rule of delay and laches by preventing the assertion of belated claims puts to final rest long dormant claims. This policy of litigative repose, creates certainty in legal relations and curtails fruitless litigation. It ensures that the administration of justice is not clogged by pointless litigation. 29. The above stated position of law on the question of delay and laches on part of the petitioner is applicable to the facts of the case. There is no satisfactory explanation of the delay in writ petition. The claims of the petitioner are made on public money. The relief sought is against the State Government to release of back wages within interest. The specific facts of this case have raised a larger question of law. The facts of the case need of closer look. 30. Claims on the state exchequer have to be scrutinized with care. They directly impact the fiscal discipline of the state and have a bearing on the economy of the state. A liberal view on delay and laches in such cases would lead to endless and irresponsible claims on the state exchequer. 31. The claims on the State exchequers are not interminable and the State exchequer is not inexhaustible. The State exchequer is not an easy prey and litigation is not a fail safe gamble for lazy and unscrupulous litigants. A liberal view on delay and laches in such cases would lead to endless and irresponsible claims on the state exchequer. 31. The claims on the State exchequers are not interminable and the State exchequer is not inexhaustible. The State exchequer is not an easy prey and litigation is not a fail safe gamble for lazy and unscrupulous litigants. The courts are the sentinels of law and stand guard against delayed and dishonest claims on public money. 32. The claim of the petitioner is both delayed and dishonest. 33. The delay and laches in this case are fatal to the writ petition. The delay and laches have not been satisfactorily explained. The delay in making the claim is admitted. The dishonesty of the claim has to be probed. 34. The petitioner has claimed interest from the state at the rate of 18%, for delay in payment of backwages. 35. The delay has been caused by petitioner, but he wants the state to pay for it. The petitioner wants to take advantage of his own faults. The petitioner wants his defaults to become the source of a windfall. This is the danger in stale claims of backwages. The relief sought by him has to be rejected." 11. Clearly diligence is a virtue in law and indolence is fatal to a cause. There is another aspect to the matter. The petitioner's relief for refund with interest of duty paid is a claim on the state exchequer. The petitioner by demanding interest for all these years (since the accrual of cause of action) has in essence claimed a windfall for his own default. This is an attempt to seek unjust enrichment from the state exchequer. A mandamus cannot issue to enforce a dishonest and an iniquitous claim. 12. Moreover, the claim for a refund of duty paid is not a recurring cause of action. The cause of action arises when the claim for refund accrues. The injury is complete when the refund of duty paid becomes due but is denied either directly by an express order or impliedly by inaction. There is no continuing wrong though the perceived effect of the denial of refund may continue indefinitely. 13. The above legal narrative can be fortified by the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare Vs. There is no continuing wrong though the perceived effect of the denial of refund may continue indefinitely. 13. The above legal narrative can be fortified by the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare Vs. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan reported at AIR 1959 SC 798 . The relevant part of the judgment is extracted herein below:- "It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury." 14. In view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Jiauddeen (supra) and the admitted facts of the case, this writ petition is not maintainable on the grounds of delay and laches on part of the petitioner." 15. In the light of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of P. P. Polyplast (P) Ltd. (supra), the mere filing of a review application in the facts of this case is not sufficient to condone the delay. Neither is the order entered by this Court in Writ A No. 8087 of 2014, Krishna Gopal Sharma Vs. State of U.P. and Others, on 12.02.2014 of any avail to the petitioner. 16. Further the petitioner has claimed 18% interest w.e.f 06.04.2010. The petitioner by demanding interest for all these years (since the accrual of cause of action) has in essence claimed a windfall for his own default. This is an attempt to seek unjust enrichment from the state exchequer. A mandamus cannot issue to enforce a dishonest and an iniquitous claim. 17. The explanation for the delay in filing the instant writ petition is rejected. The delay and laches in filing the instant writ petition are fatal to the cause of the petitioner. The writ petition is dismissed.