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Tripura High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 16 (TRI)

Ramu Goswami v. State of Tripura

2019-02-08

ARINDAM LODH

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 06.08.2015 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court no. 5, West Tripura, Agartala in case no. S.T. 41(T-2) of 2014 whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default to suffer further simple imprisonment for one month under Section 498-A of the IPC and also to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default to suffer further imprisonment for three months under section 306 of the IPC. 2. Heard Mr. Ratan Datta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Mr. B. Choudhuri, learned PP appearing for the respondent. 3. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the younger sister of the complainant, was given marriage with the appellant and after 3/4 months of the marriage the appellant started physical and mental torture upon the victim to bring cash amount from her house and the victim bearing all sorts of torture continued her matrimonial life in the house of the appellant. Out of the wedlock, the victim also gave birth of a female child. On 09.10.2013 at night, as well as on 10.10.2013 the victim was being brutally assaulted, poured kerosene oil herself and set herself on fire. Thereafter, the victim was shifted to GBP hospital where she succumbed to her injuries. 4. The trial Judge, while convicting the appellant has relied upon three prosecution witnesses, namely, PW-1 (Smt. Minati Debnath), PW-4 (Sri Swapan Debnath) and PW-9 (Sri Uttam Paul). PW-1 and PW-4 are the sister and brother of the deceased respectively. PW-9, was introduced for the first time at the time of trial. In course of investigation neither PW-9 was examined by the investigating officer nor his name was found in the charge sheet. 5. This is a case where a house-wife has committed suicide within a period of seven years of her marriage with the appellant. Let me first examine the evidence adduced by PW-1, PW-4 and PW-9, for the sake of convenience. PW-1, who is the elder sister of the deceased has stated that after 3/4 months of the marriage, the husband-appellant used to torture upon the deceased demanding money from the house of the parents of the deceased. Once her brother also paid Rs. Let me first examine the evidence adduced by PW-1, PW-4 and PW-9, for the sake of convenience. PW-1, who is the elder sister of the deceased has stated that after 3/4 months of the marriage, the husband-appellant used to torture upon the deceased demanding money from the house of the parents of the deceased. Once her brother also paid Rs. 20,000/- to the appellant for the purpose of business which was one year before the incident. She has further deposed that after getting the information of her admission in the hospital she went to see her and at that time her deceased sister told her that on 09.10.2013 at night she was severely beaten by her husband and on the morning of 10.10.2013 also the appellant had beaten her. The deceased further told this witness that after the marriage she was not happy for a single day due to torture by the appellant. Further, her husband always used to remain intoxicated and did not like to work and there was always demand of money from her parents house. She has further deposed that due to the unbearable torture, her sister set herself on fire. PW-1 has also deposed that her brother was trying to settle the dispute with the help of local leaders, but, it yielded no result. In her cross-examination, PW-1 has stated that the appellant was passing his life with poverty. However, she did not know whether the appellant used to run his family with financial help of his relatives. Her statement, which she made under section 161 Cr.P.C was drawn to find out as to whether she made such statement that her brother had paid Rs. 20,000/- to the appellant for his business. This statement was not found in her statement recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. PW-4, the brother of the deceased had made similar statement in court of trial that he had paid Rs. 20,000/- to the appellant before one year of her death and he went to GB hospital to see his deceased sister when she told him that she lost all hopes in her life and due to torture by her husband, she set fire on her body. In cross-examination, PW4, had volunteered that the appellant had been living with financial crisis because of the fact that he was apathetic to work. In cross-examination, PW4, had volunteered that the appellant had been living with financial crisis because of the fact that he was apathetic to work. PW-9, in his deposition has stated that when he went to the hospital to see the deceased, she told him that the appellant used to make physical torture upon her and on the previous day of the occurrence as well as on the day of the occurrence, she was beaten by the appellant which led her to set on fire. 6. On the basis of the statements, as aforestated, the trial court has held that all the ingredients of section 498-A and 306 of the IPC have been made out and he recorded the conviction and sentence against the appellant, as indicated here-in-above. 7. It reminds me to a decision of the apex court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1984 SC 1622 , where the apex court in paragraph 48 has held thus: "Before discussing the evidence of the witnesses we might mention a few preliminary remarks against the background of which the oral statements are to be considered. All persons to whom the oral statements are said to have been made by Manju when she visited Beed for the last time, are close relatives and friends of the deceased. In view of the close relationship and affection any person in the position of the witness would naturally have a tendency to exaggerate or add facts which may not have been stated to them at all. Not that is done consciously but even unconsciously the love and affection for the deceased would create a psychological hatred against the supposed murderer and, therefore, the court has to examine such evidence with very great care and caution. Even if the witnesses were speaking a part of the truth or perhaps the whole of it, they would be guided by a spirit of revenge or nemesis against the accused person and in this process certain facts which may not or could not have been stated may be imagined to have been stated unconsciously by the witnesses in order to see that the offender is punished. This is human psychology and no one can help it". 8. It will also be beneficial to me to take note of section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which is reproduced here-in-below in extenso: "114. This is human psychology and no one can help it". 8. It will also be beneficial to me to take note of section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which is reproduced here-in-below in extenso: "114. Court may presume existence of certain facts -- The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Illustrations The Court may presume -- (a) xxxxx (b) xxxxx (c) xxxxx (d) xxxxx (e) xxxxx (f) xxxxx (g) That evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it; (h) xxxxx (i) xxxxx". 9. PW-10, the investigating officer of the case who has submitted the charge sheet, has stated that, on 10.10.2013 the previous investigating officer S.I. Mamtaj Hasina, had examined the witnesses, namely, Swapan Debnath, victim Basanti Debnath, Smt. Minati Debnath, Kiranjit Chakraborty, Sandhya Goswami, Manju Mitra, Uttam Mitra, Jiban Debnath and recorded their statement under section 161 Cr.P.C. Had there been any statement of Basanti Debnath, the deceased, recorded by the investigating officer, then, why such statement was not surfaced before the court and the question came again, why it was withheld. In my opinion, by the conduct of the prosecution, an adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution in view of section 114(g) of the Evidence Act. Further, that statement, which was made by deceased Basanti Debnath to the previous investigating officer, Mamtaz Hasina, that statement can be treated as dying declaration under section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. 10. I find that the deceased had made a dying declaration which was recorded by PW-3, Deputy Collector, SDM office, Sadar. In the dying declaration, it is written that "I, myself, has set fire on my person after pouring kerosene". It is manifest that she could have indicated the appellant that he was the person who always intended to drive her to commit suicide, but, inspite of her full conscious mind, she did make it. All other witnesses are the neighboring witnesses who deposed that the appellant was a very simple type of person who had no ability to work hard. Among these witnesses, only two witnesses have said that sometimes the appellant used to take liquor. 11. All other witnesses are the neighboring witnesses who deposed that the appellant was a very simple type of person who had no ability to work hard. Among these witnesses, only two witnesses have said that sometimes the appellant used to take liquor. 11. The word "abet" has not been explained in section 306 of Indian Penal Code. However, Strouds Judicial Dictionary of words and phrases in 7th Edition, Volume I has defined the word "abet" in the manner as follows which may be a useful guidance to find out the meaning: "Based on the concept which is found in the words of Hawkins J. in R. v Coney 51 L.J.M.C. 78 : "To constitute an aider or abettor, some active steps must be taken, by word or action, with intent to instigate the principal or principals. Encouragement does not, of necessity, amount to aiding and abetting. It may be intentional or unintentional. A man may unwittingly encourage another in fact by his presence, by misinterpreted gestures, or by his silence or non-interference- or he may encourage intentionally by expressions, gestures, or actions, intended to signify approval. In the latter case he aids and abets; in the former he does not. It is no criminal offence to stand by a mere passive spectator of a crime. But the fact that a person was voluntarily and purposely present witnessing the commission of a crime, and offered no opposition to it, though he might reasonably be expected to prevent it, and had the power so to do or at least to express his dissent, might, under some circumstances, afford cogent evidence upon which a jury would be justified in finding that he willfully encouraged, and so aided and abetted. But it would be purely a question for the jury whether he did so or not" Further, according to Blacks Law Dictionary, 10th Edition, the word "abet" means- (i) to aid, encourage or (2) to support (crime) by active assistance. The word "Abettor" is also defined in Blacks Law Dictionary, which means someone who instigate the commission of a crime or advise and encourage others to commit by. 12. Section 306 IPC reads as under: "Abetment of suicide. The word "Abettor" is also defined in Blacks Law Dictionary, which means someone who instigate the commission of a crime or advise and encourage others to commit by. 12. Section 306 IPC reads as under: "Abetment of suicide. -- If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine". 13. Further, in aid of the dictionary, meaning of the words, as aforementioned, I may gainfully refer a decision of a learned Judge of the Gauhati High Court [Justice I.A. Ansari (Retd.)] where his Lordship has dealt with the scope of sections 306 IPC read with section 107 IPC in Vishal Agarwal v. State of Assam and another reported in (2012) 5 GLR 819, which reads as under: "6. While dealing with the scope of section 306, IPC, it is necessary that one understands as to what the word abetment conveys under the Indian Penal Code. Section 107, IPC which is most relevant in this reads: A person abets the doing of a thing, who - First- instigates any person to do that thing, or Secondly- engages with one or more other person, or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; Thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing 7. Broadly speaking, abetment, as contemplated in section 107, IPC, falls into three distinct categories, namely, (i) a person can be said o abet the doing of a thing, when such a person instigates the other person to do that thing or (ii) when a person engages with one or more other person(s) in any conspiracy in the doing of that thing or (iii) when any person intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, doing of a thing. 8. In short, thus, the offence of abetment is committed, when a person instigates another to do a thing or when he enters into a conspiracy for doing of a thing or when he intentionally aids, by illegal act or omission, the doing of that thing. 9. The question, now, is as to whether intention is an integral part of the offence of abetment. 9. The question, now, is as to whether intention is an integral part of the offence of abetment. In this regard, it is necessary to point out that when a person enters into a conspiracy to do a thing, he not only knows, but also intends the effect of doing that thing, which he has conspired with one or more persons to do. Similarly, when such a person commits the offence of abetment by aiding, such aiding, in the face of the provisions of section 107, IPC has to be intentional". 14. In the facts of the present case, the definition of "abetment" as provided under section 107 IPC is very much relevant to settle the position of law to attract section 306 IPC. While section 306 IPC seeks to punish those who abet the commission of suicide of others, whether the person has abated the commission of suicide of others is to be gathered from the given facts and circumstances of a particular case and be found out by continuous conduct of the accused involving his mental element. 15. A three-Judge bench of the apex court in Pawan Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2017) 7 SCC 780 , while dealing with the scope of application of sections 306 and 107 of the IPC, in paragraph 35, 36 and 37 has observed thus: "35. Analysing the concept of "abetment" as found in Section 107 IPC, a two-Judge Bench in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) in ( 2009 16 SCC 605 has held: (SCC p.610,paras 13 & 15) "13. As per the section, a person can be said to have abetted in doing a thing, if he, firstly, instigates any person to do that thing; or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation to Section 107 states that any wilful misrepresentation or wilful concealment of material fact which he is bound to disclose, may also come within the contours of "abetment". Explanation to Section 107 states that any wilful misrepresentation or wilful concealment of material fact which he is bound to disclose, may also come within the contours of "abetment". It is manifest that under all the three situations, direct involvement of the person or persons concerned in the commission of offence of suicide is essential to bring home the offence under Section 306 IPC. x x 15. As per clause Firstly in the said section, a person can be said to have abetted in doing of a thing, who "instigates" any person to do that thing. The word "instigate" is not defined in IPC. The meaning of the said word was considered by this Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh[19]." In the said authority, the learned Judges have referred to the pronouncement in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh. In the said authority, the learned judges have referred to the pronouncement in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chattisgarh, reported in (2001) 9 SCC 618 . 36. The word "instigate" literally means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. A person is said to instigate another person when he actively suggests or stimulates him to an act by any means or language, direct or indirect, whether it takes the form of express solicitation or of hints, insinuation or encouragement. Instigation may be in (express) words or may be by (implied) conduct. 37. The word "urge forwards" means to advise or try hard to persuade somebody to do something, to make a person to move more quickly in the particular direction, specially by pushing or forcing such person. Therefore, a person instigating another has to "goad" or "urge forward" the latter with the intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act with a latter. In order to prove abetment, it must be shown that the accused kept on urging or annoying the deceased by words, taunts until the deceased reacted. A casual remark or something said in routine or usual conversation should not be construed or misunderstood as "abetment". 16. The apex court in Pawan Kumar (supra) at paragraph 38, 39 and 40, has observed thus: "38. Analysing further, in Randhir Singh and another v. State of Punjab [ (2004) 13 SCC 129 ], the Court has observed thus: (SCC p. 134, para 12)- "12. 16. The apex court in Pawan Kumar (supra) at paragraph 38, 39 and 40, has observed thus: "38. Analysing further, in Randhir Singh and another v. State of Punjab [ (2004) 13 SCC 129 ], the Court has observed thus: (SCC p. 134, para 12)- "12. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding that person in doing of a thing. In cases of conspiracy also it would involve that mental process of entering into conspiracy for the doing of that thing. More active role which can be described as instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is required before a person can be said to be abetting the commission of offence under Section 306 IPC." [emphasis supplied] 39. In Praveen Pradhan v. State of Uttaranchal & another [ (2012) 9 SCC 734 ], it has been ruled: (SCC p. 741, para 18) "18. In fact, from the above discussion it is apparent that instigation has to be gathered from the circumstances of a particular case. No straitjacket formula can be laid down to find out as to whether in a particular case there has been instigation which forced the person to commit suicide. In a particular case, there may not be direct evidence in regard to instigation which may have direct nexus to suicide. Therefore, in such a case, an inference has to be drawn from the circumstances and it is to be determined whether circumstances had been such which in fact had created the situation that a person felt totally frustrated and committed suicide. " [emphasis supplied] 40. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of West Bengal [ (2010)1 SCC 707 ], the Court, after referring to the authorities in Randhir Singh (supra), Kishori Lal v. State of M.P. [ (2007) 10 SCC 797 ] and Kishangiri Mangalgiri Goswami v. State of Gujarat [ (2009) 4 SCC 52 ], has held:- (SCC p 712, para 12) "12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306IPC is not sustainable." 17. In Vishal Agarwal (supra), the apex court, in paragraph 20 and 23, has held thus: "20. Turning to the inherent difference between what section 498A penalizes or what section 306 punishes, it needs to be pointed out that a careful reading of section 498A shows that when a wife is subjected to cruelty to such an extent that a woman, placed in her position, is likely to commit suicide, an offence under section 498A is complete irrespective of the fact whether the woman, so subjected to cruelty actually commits suicide or not. Conversely, it is also true that merely because of the fact that a wife, who has been subjected to cruelty, commits suicide, it will not, automatically, make out a case of abetment in commit suicide. 23. In an offence under section 306, IPC, therefore, it is imperative for the prosecution to prove that the woman committed suicide not merely because of the fact that she was subjected to cruelty, but that she was subjected to cruelty with a view to making her commit suicide. No winder, therefore, that the Supreme Court, in Sushil Kumar v. Union of India (2005) 6 SCC 281 , observed, at para 11, thus: 11. The basis difference between the two sections, i.e., section 306 and section 498A is that of intention. Under the latter, cruelty committed by the husband or his relations drag the woman concerned to commit suicide while under the former provision suicide is abetted and intended." 18. At this juncture, I feel it necessary to discuss section 113A of the Evidence Act, 1872, which is as under: "113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman. Under the latter, cruelty committed by the husband or his relations drag the woman concerned to commit suicide while under the former provision suicide is abetted and intended." 18. At this juncture, I feel it necessary to discuss section 113A of the Evidence Act, 1872, which is as under: "113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman. -- When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. 1 [113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman. -- When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband." Explanation. -- For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." 19. Simultaneously, it is also necessary to extract section 498-A of the IPC, which is as under: "498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty -- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty -- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation. -- For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means -- (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand". 20. In the backdrop of the above legislature, as outlined, here-in-above, the proof of willful conduct driving the woman to commit suicide is a sine qua non for entering into a finding of "cruelty" against a person charged. His conduct, will be of such a nature that it only point towards the commission of suicide or to cause any grievous hurt or injury in his/her limb or any body part thereof. [emphasis supplied] 21. It again takes me to take note of the decision in Randhir Singh and another v. State of Punjab, reported in (2004) 13 SCC 129 , where the principle of section 306 IPC has been enunciated, and the relevant part therefrom are set out hereunder: "12. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding that person in doing of a thing. In cases of conspiracy also it would involve that mental process of entering into conspiracy for the doing of that thing. More active role which can be described as instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is required before a person can be said to be abetting the commission of offence under Section 306 IPC. 13. In cases of conspiracy also it would involve that mental process of entering into conspiracy for the doing of that thing. More active role which can be described as instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is required before a person can be said to be abetting the commission of offence under Section 306 IPC. 13. In State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal, AIR (1994) SC 1418 this Court has observed that the courts should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domiestiv life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given', society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty". 22. Thus, it is manifest, from the principle as enunciated in Randhir Singh (supra), the courts must be extremely careful to evaluate the facts and circumstances of each and every case to ascertain as to whether "cruelty" has been made out to the victim only to force her to commit suicide and the same was further intended to induce the victim to end her life by committing suicide. 23. With a further rider, that, if the victim of committing suicide appears to be hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, family discord and difference in domestic life, quite common to suicide to which he/she belongs to such factors were not aimed to induce a similarly circumstanced individual to resort to such a step, the accused charged with "abetment" would not be held guilty. 24. Looking back again to the evidence of PW-1, PW-4 and PW-9, particularly, PW-1 and PW-4, the related witnesses of the victim, and placing reliance upon the decision of Briddhichand (supra), this court must be extremely careful in assessing the evidence of these related witnesses being the full blooded brother and sister of the deceased. 25. 24. Looking back again to the evidence of PW-1, PW-4 and PW-9, particularly, PW-1 and PW-4, the related witnesses of the victim, and placing reliance upon the decision of Briddhichand (supra), this court must be extremely careful in assessing the evidence of these related witnesses being the full blooded brother and sister of the deceased. 25. Further, keeping in mind, societal scenario, as observed in Briddhichand (supra), I should not be oblivious that the victim belonged to a lower strata of the society where this kind of taking liquor and torture towards wife without the intention to kill or cause any harm to her body is a common phenomenon. 26. There is no specific reference of any past incident in their statement in course of trial and no specific date and time was mentioned when the deceased was subjected to cruelty or torture prior to the two dates, which they only mentioned when she committed suicide. Moreso, the conduct of the accused prior or after the incident is required to be reckoned with. The appellant himself took care of his deceased wife after the incident when she was taken to hospital. He was arrested at the time of purchasing medicine. None of the prosecution witness has deposed that the accused used to torture the victim with the clear intention and motive to force her to commit suicide. Except using the word "cruelty" the prosecution witness did not state anything in detail about the nature of torture or treatment. Moreover, the post mortem report and the medical examination of the deceased revealed that there is no mark of injury on the person of the deceased and the doctor (PW-8) has opined that "cause of death is septisemic shock due to burn injury". In the report, I do not find any mark of injury. I have also noticed the examination of PW-8, the doctor, where he has deposed that the word "dermal" burn injury means only the dermis i.e. layer of skin were affected due to burn injury. A plain reading of this finding of the doctor leads me to infer that there was no deep or severe injury suffered by the victim from which I may infer that the torture was of such a grave nature which drove the victim to commit suicide. 27. Mr. A plain reading of this finding of the doctor leads me to infer that there was no deep or severe injury suffered by the victim from which I may infer that the torture was of such a grave nature which drove the victim to commit suicide. 27. Mr. B. Choudhury, learned PP has urged this court that the presumption should be drawn in the present case under section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act. 28. Mr. R. Datta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant controverting the submission of learned PP has relied upon the decision of the apex court in Hans Raj v. State of Haryana, reported in 2004 Cri. L.J. 1759, wherein the apex court in paragraph 14, 15 and 16 has held as under: "14. Unlike Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, a statutory presumption does not arise by operation of law merely on proof of the circumstances enumerated in Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act. Under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act the prosecution has first to establish that the woman concerned committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband (in this case) had subjected her to cruelty. Even if these facts are established the Court is not bound to presume that the suicide had been abetted by her husband. Section 113-A gives a discretion to the Court to raise such a presumption, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, which means that where the allegation is of cruelty it must consider the nature of cruelty to which the woman was subjected, having regard to the meaning of word cruelty in Section 498-A I.P.C. The mere fact that a woman committed suicide within seven years of her marriage and that she had been subjected to cruelty by her husband, does not automatically give rise to the presumption that the suicide had been abetted by her husband. The Court is required to look into all the other circumstances of the case. One of the circumstances which has to be considered by the Court is whether the alleged cruelty was of such nature as was likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of the woman. The Court is required to look into all the other circumstances of the case. One of the circumstances which has to be considered by the Court is whether the alleged cruelty was of such nature as was likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of the woman. The law has been succinctly stated in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618 wherein this Court observed : "This provision was introduced by the Criminal Law (Second) Amendment Act, 1983 with effect from 26-12-1983 to meet a social demand to resolve difficulty of proof where helpless married women were eliminated by being forced to commit suicide by the husband or in-laws and incriminating evidence was usually available within the four corners of the matrimonial home and hence was not available to anyone outside the occupants of the house. However, still it cannot be lost sight of that the presumption is intended to operate against the accused in the field of criminal law. Before the presumption may be raised, the foundation thereof must exist. A bare reading of Section 113-A shows that to attract applicability of Section 113-A, it must be shown that (i) the woman has committed suicide, (ii) such suicide has been committed within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage, (iii) the husband or his relatives, who are charged had subjected her to cruelty. On existence and availability of the above said circumstances, the court may presume that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relatives of her husband. Parliament has chosen to sound a note of caution. Firstly, the presumption is not mandatory; it is only permissive as the employment of expression "may presume" suggests. Secondly, the existence and availability of the above said three circumstances shall not, like a formula, enable the presumption being drawn; before the presumption may be drawn the court shall have to have regard to "all the other circumstances of the case". A consideration of all the other circumstances of the case may strengthen the presumption or may dictate the conscience of the court to abstain from drawing the presumption. A consideration of all the other circumstances of the case may strengthen the presumption or may dictate the conscience of the court to abstain from drawing the presumption. The expression "the other circumstances of the case" used in Section 113-A suggests the need to reach a cause-and-effect relationship between the cruelty and the suicide for the purpose of raising a presumption. Last but not the least, the presumption is not an irrebuttable one. In spite of a presumption having been raised the evidence adduced in defence or the facts and circumstances otherwise available on record may destroy the presumption. The phrase "may presume" used in Section 113-A is defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, which says "Whenever it is provided by this Act that the court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it. 15. The same principle has been reiterated in Sanju Alias Sanjay Singh Sengar v. State of M.P. (2002) 5 SCC 371 . 16. In the State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal and Anr. (1994) 1 SCC 73 this Court observed : "We are not oblivious that in a criminal trial the degree of proof is stricter than what is required in a civil proceedings. In a criminal trial however intriguing may be facts and circumstances of the case, the charges made against the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts and the requirement of proof cannot lie in the realm of surmises and conjectures. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after the introduction of Section 498-A IPC and Section 113-A of Indian Evidence Act. Although, the court's conscience must be satisfied that the accused is not held guilty when there are reasonable doubts about the complicity of the accused in respect of the offences alleged, it should be borne in mind that there is no absolute standard for proof in a criminal trial and the question whether the charges made against the accused have been proved beyond all reasonable doubts must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the quality of the evidences adduced in the case and the materials placed on record. Lord Denning in Bater v. Bater [(1950) 2 All ER 458,459] has observed that the doubt must be of a reasonable man and the standard adopted must be a standard adopted by a reasonable and just man for coming to a conclusion considering the particular subject- matter". 29. In the case at hand, even if this court believes the statement that under influence of liquor, the appellant used to torture the victim, but, it does not lead to the inference that such torture, if any, was only aimed and targeted to drive the victim to commit suicide in absence of any specific statement and proof that the torture was intended to drive her to commit suicide, as I had discussed in the preceding paragraphs. 30. The impact of taking liquor and connecting the same with committing cruelty is dealt with by this court in Haradhan Dutta v. The State of Tripura in Criminal Appeal (J) 66 of 2018, disposed of on 20.06.2008, wherein this court in paragraph 13 has observed thus: "13. The conduct of the accused so far the evidence on record shows that the accused ill-treated his wife all along in the matrimonial home. The accused used to take liquor and after returning home at night, he would pick up quarrel and assault his wife. This evidence of quarrel and ill-treatment or assault cannot be termed and/or taken as instigation on the part of the accused to his wife to commit suicide. Under such facts and circumstances of the case, the finding of conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (First Track Court) cannot sustain and is liable to be interfered". 31. After assessing the entire facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that this is not a fit case to convict the appellant on the charge of committing offence under sections 498-A and 306 of the IPC. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence passed on 06.08.2015 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court no. 5, West Tripura, Agartala in case no. S.T. 41(T-2) of 2014 is set aside and hereby quashed. 32. I have been informed by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the appellant is on bail due to suspension of his sentence by order dated 17.02.2017 passed by this court. The surety stands discharged and the appellant is set at liberty. 33. S.T. 41(T-2) of 2014 is set aside and hereby quashed. 32. I have been informed by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the appellant is on bail due to suspension of his sentence by order dated 17.02.2017 passed by this court. The surety stands discharged and the appellant is set at liberty. 33. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and disposed of.