JUDGMENT : Jahangir Jamshed Munir, J. 1. Heard Sri Amit Kumar Singh, learned Advocate holding brief of Sri Bhanu Dutt Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri D.P. Singh, learned senior Advocate assisted by Sri Harish Chandra Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 4 and Sri Vinod Kant, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Sri Rajesh Kumar, learned standing counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Sri Anuj Kumar, learned Advocate has appeared for the respondent Gaon Sabha. 2. Sri D.P. Singh, learned senior Advocate assisted by Sri Harish Chandra Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 4 has made a statement at the Bar that he does not wish to file a counter-affidavit, and the matter may be disposed of on merits. 3. This appeal has been filed from a judgment and decree of Sri Rajesh Kumar, Member, Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad passed in Second Appeal No. 12 of 2005-06, dated 28.1.2019, whereby he has allowed the appeal from an appellate decree of the Commissioner, Chitrakoot Dham Division, Banda, dated 23.12.2005, and restored the decree of the trial court, dated 9.3.2005, passed by the Assistant Collector, Karvi in Suit No. 123 of 2004 from a final decree for partition passed in the said suit. 4. The petitioner, Dharm Raj was defendant to the suit whereas respondent No. 3, Mithu Lal was the plaintiff. Dharm Raj, the petitioner is hereinafter referred to as the "defendant" whereas Mithu Lal, respondent No. 3 is hereinafter referred to as the "plaintiff. The plaintiff and the defendant are brothers, both being sons of one Kondu, and claim a half share in the suit property. To this extent, there is no quarrel between parties. It may mentioned here that respondent Nos. 4 and 5 are transferees from the plaintiff pendente lite. 5. The suit property, that is subject-matter of partition, is agricultural land detailed at the foot of the plaint at page 20 of the paper-book. It comprises six khasra plot numbers in all, admeasuring an area of 1.962 hectares, situate at Mauja Kasahai, Pargana Karvi, District Chitrakoot. Hence, there is also no issue between parties that the preliminary decree, determining share of parties passed in the suit on 10.11.2004, is in accordance with law and acceptable to them. It comprises six khasra plot numbers in all, admeasuring an area of 1.962 hectares, situate at Mauja Kasahai, Pargana Karvi, District Chitrakoot. Hence, there is also no issue between parties that the preliminary decree, determining share of parties passed in the suit on 10.11.2004, is in accordance with law and acceptable to them. Hostilities in this case appear to have commenced at the stage of drawing up a final decree where lots were drawn and the suit property had to be partitioned by metes and bounds. On the basis of a report submitted by the Halka Lekhpal dated 30.11.2004, separate lots of parties were drawn up, that were objected to by the defendant. The objections were sustained by an order dated 4.1.2005, and the Lekhpal was ordered to submit a fresh report regarding his proposal about the lots to be drawn between parties. The Lekhpal submitted a fresh report dated 7.2.2005, to which the defendant again objected. On occasion, the Assistant Collector heard the parties on the defendant's objection. He held that the dispute between parties regarding specific division of the suit property appears to be on ground that the plaintiff had been given certain plot numbers that had about forty-two trees of eucalyptus, five trees of seesam, one neem tree, one mango tree, a tree of mahua, three bamboo trees, seven trees of ber, besides certain other fruit bearing trees, the valuation of which had not been made by the Lekhpal. The court recorded a finding that the lots proposed by the Lekhpal showed that there is no difference in the valuation of the land divided between the plaintiff and the defendant, but held that so far as trees about which the parties are at issue, it was directed that in all the various numbers, both parties would have equal rights over the standing trees. Therefore, the Lekhpal's proposal submitted through his report dated 7.2.2005 was accepted for the drawing up of a final decree by an order dated 9.3.2005, with the modification regarding rights of parties to the enjoyment of trees, wherever they might be located, in whichever plot. A final decree was directed to be drawn up, accordingly. 6. The defendant appealed from the final decree of the trial court dated 9.3.2005 to the Commissioner, Chitrakoot Dham Division, Banda, under Section 331 (3) of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. A final decree was directed to be drawn up, accordingly. 6. The defendant appealed from the final decree of the trial court dated 9.3.2005 to the Commissioner, Chitrakoot Dham Division, Banda, under Section 331 (3) of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. The Commissioner after hearing the appeal took note of the defendant's objection that the objection was not just about division over the parties' rights as to trees, but it was about two plots of land bearing Gata Nos. 926 and 675, that were not fairly divided as these were roadside plots, and were included in the share allotted in the land of the plaintiff. There was, therefore, no even division of the half share between parties in terms of the preliminary decree. The appellate court allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the trial court to pass a final decree afresh, after permitting the parties to lead evidence regarding valuation of plot Nos. 926 and 675. The plaintiff carried a second appeal from the appellate order of the Commissioner dated 23.12.2005, remanding the case to the trial court to pass a final decree afresh. The aforesaid second appeal being Second Appeal No. 12 of 2005-06 came up for determination before the Board of Revenue, who proceeded to dismiss this appeal, and in the next breadth wrote, that the decrees of the appellate court and the trial court are set aside with an order of remand that they should decide the matter afresh in accordance with the guidance in the judgment, after affording the parties opportunity to lead evidence and hearing them. The operative portion of the order dated 3.11.2011, in the precise words employed, is reproduced below: vr% f}rh; vihy cyghu gksus ds dkj.k fujLr dh tkrh gS rFkk ijh{k.k U;k;ky; o izFke vihyh; U;k;ky; ds vkns'k fujLr djrs gq, izdj.k ijh{k.k U;k;ky; dks bl funsZ'k ds lkFk izfrizsf"kr fd;k tkrk gS fd os Åij fd, x, laoh{k.kks ds vkyksd esa nksuks i{kks dks lk{; o lquokbZ dk leqfpr volj iznku djus ds mijkar u, fljs ls dqjkZ QkaV rS;kj djs] vkns'k ikfjr djsA 7. This Court must remark here that the order dated 3.11.2011 passed by Sri N.S. Ravi, Member (Judicial) was anything but judicial. It was a contradiction in terms of the appeal being dismissed and the orders under challenge being set aside, with an order of remand. This Court must remark here that the order dated 3.11.2011 passed by Sri N.S. Ravi, Member (Judicial) was anything but judicial. It was a contradiction in terms of the appeal being dismissed and the orders under challenge being set aside, with an order of remand. This order passed in the second appeal being absolutely perverse, it was challenged before this Court by the plaintiff, and this Court taking a very magnanimous view of the matter took it to be the result of some confusion or the product of a typographical error, where the appeal had been dismissed, but the impugned decrees set aside. It was directed by this Court vide order dated 8.12.2008 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 60811 of 2008, that in such circumstances, it was open to the parties to approach the Board of Revenue, seeking suitable correction in the judgment aforesaid. The order dated 8.12.2008 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition is extracted below: "Heard learned counsel for the parties. The main grievance of the petitioner is that the Board of Revenue while remanding the case back to the trial court has observed that the second appeal filed by him is being dismissed, although it ought to have been allowed. A perusal of the impugned judgment of the Board of Revenue goes to show that the court intended to allow the appeal and remand the case back to the trial court to be decided afresh. But, it appears that either under some confusion or due to typographical error, it has been mentioned that the second appeal is being dismissed. In such circumstances, it is open to the parties to approach the Board of Revenue for making suitable correction in the said judgment. In view of above, the writ petition stands disposed of." 8. The plaintiff made an application for review under Section 114 read with Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C. to the Board, which came up before a Division Bench of the Board, who granted the review, recalled the judgment and order dated 3.11.2008 passed in Second Appeal No. 12 of 2005-06, and restored the second appeal to its original file and number to be heard and determined afresh on merits. This is how the second appeal again came up for determination, on occasion before Sri Rajesh Kumar, Member, Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad on 28.1.2019. This is how the second appeal again came up for determination, on occasion before Sri Rajesh Kumar, Member, Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad on 28.1.2019. By means of the judgment and decree dated 28.1.2019, the second appeal was allowed, the decree of the Commissioner in the first appeal was set aside, and that of the trial court was restored. 9. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the manner in which the Board has proceeded to determine the second appeal, does not conform to the requirements of a judgment by a court deciding an appeal from an appellate decree. In paragraphs 1 to 6 of the judgment, the appellate court has referred to the facts of the case, including the meandering course the proceedings had taken and in paragraph 8, he has framed three substantial questions of law, that read as under (translated into English from Hindi vernacular): "(1) Whether the first appellate court could allow the defendant's appeal without any prayer? (2) Whether while passing the impugned decree dated 23.12.2005, the appellate court could pass the judgment without discussing the case laws? (3) Whether the parties have challenged an earlier amicable settlement of their rights arrived at between them?" 10. This Court on a perusal of the substantial questions of law finds them to be most non-substantial and far from being questions of law. The questions framed in no way conform to the requirements of a substantial question of law on the basis of which a second appeal may be determined. What is more intriguing is that none of these substantial questions of law have been dealt with in the page and a half scripted after framing the questions; and, what is written in the judgment is again facts regarding course of proceedings and facts about the dispute involved between parties. Thereafter, surreptitiously an order that would constitute a decree has been passed, which says that the decree of the appellate court is set aside, and that of the trial court restored. There is absolutely no connecting link of reasoning between the conclusions reached and the issues involved. There is absolutely no reference, as already said, to the substantial questions of law, on which the court proposed to decide the appeal. It is quite another matter that the substantial questions of law framed would hardly qualify for such questions. There is absolutely no connecting link of reasoning between the conclusions reached and the issues involved. There is absolutely no reference, as already said, to the substantial questions of law, on which the court proposed to decide the appeal. It is quite another matter that the substantial questions of law framed would hardly qualify for such questions. The judgment under appeal is a patent and classic example of a judgment that does not conform to the essential requirements of a judgment in\appeal. It is hardly any judgment, and, therefore, is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 11. This writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 28.1.2019 is quashed with a remit of the matter to the Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad with a direction to the Chairman of the Board that the second appeal may be placed before some other Member, other than Sri Rajesh Kumar, who decided this appeal. There shall be no order as to costs.