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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 1601 (HP)

Surinder Mohan v. Raj Kumar Mehra

2019-10-24

SANDEEP SHARMA

body2019
JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. 1. Instant Revision Petition filed under Section 24(5) of the HP Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, lays challenge to order dated 23.8.2019, passed by the learned Rent Controller Shimla, whereby an application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC, having been filed by the petitioner-tenant (hereinafter referred to as the tenant), seeking therein permission to amend his reply to the rent petition in CIS CNR No. HPSH120018302019, CIS case Type CMA, CIS CNR Regd. No. 921/2019 in Case No. 6102 of 2017/12, came to be dismissed. 2. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record vis-à-vis impugned order passed by the learned court below, this Court finds no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order and as such, no interference of this Court is called for. 3. In nutshell, case of the tenant is that since factum with regard to extension of verandah by putting iron girders in the outer wall of the back portion of the building, came to his notice during the cross-examination conducted upon the petitioner as well as his witness namely Sh. B.C. Sharma, necessity has arisen to amend the written statement so that it may be proved that respondent-landlord possesses sufficient area for carrying out his business activities. Tenant further averred in the application that since with the extension of verandah, area of shop being run by the landlord has increased six times, tenant be permitted to amend the written statement specifically denying therein case of the landlord that he requires shop occupied by the tenant for extension of his business activities. However, having perused material available on record, especially statements made by land lord as well as his witness Sh. B.C. Sharma, this Court finds that at no point of time, admission, if any, came to be made on behalf of the landlord, himself or his witness that verandah on the back side of the shop of the landlord came to be extended recently. No doubt, statement made by the landlord suggests that on the back side of the shop being run by him, there exists verandah, but that cannot be a ground for the tenant to pray for amendment in the written statement. No doubt, statement made by the landlord suggests that on the back side of the shop being run by him, there exists verandah, but that cannot be a ground for the tenant to pray for amendment in the written statement. Had the landlord or his witness admitted that verandah has been extended recently, probably tenant was well within right to seek amendment in his reply, but as has been noticed herein above, there is nothing in the statement of landlord or his witness that verandah alleged to have been extended, has been extended after filing of the reply to the rent petition. 4. Close scrutiny of cross-examination conducted upon the landlord and his witness named herein above, nowhere suggests that tenant was able to establish on record that verandah was extended by the landlord after commencement of the trial and even after filing of application for amendment filed by the tenant prior to filing of the application at hand. Record clearly reveals that tenant had earlier also filed application for amendment, which was dismissed by this Court, but subsequently two additional issues were framed pursuant to directions passed by this Court. Since tenant has failed to prove extension of verandah, if any, by the landlord after commencement of the trial, learned trial Court rightly rejected his application for amendment. 5. Under amended provisions of Order VI, rule 17 CPC, no amendment can be allowed after commencement of trial, especially if same is not based upon subsequent circumstances or if the same could not be raised despite due diligence before commencement of trial, but having taken note of the explanation rendered on record by the tenant for not pleading the fats now intended to be pleaded by way of amendment, this Court is in agreement with finding returned by the court below that application for amendment has not been filed bonafidely. 6. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Union of India and another reported in (2011) 12 SCC 268 have held that where an application is filed after the commencement of the trial, it must be shown that despite due diligence, said amendment could not have been sought earlier. Their lordships have held as under: "7. The above provision deals with amendment of pleadings. By Amendment Act 46 of 1999, this provision was deleted. Their lordships have held as under: "7. The above provision deals with amendment of pleadings. By Amendment Act 46 of 1999, this provision was deleted. It has again been restored by Amendment Act 22 of 2002 but with an added proviso to prevent application for amendment being allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. The proviso, to some extent, curtails absolute discretion to allow amendment at any stage. Now, if application is filed after commencement of trial, it must be shown that in spite of due diligence, such amendment could not have been sought earlier. The purpose and object of Order VI Rule 17 of the Code is to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just. Amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right and under all circumstances, but the Courts while deciding such prayers should not adopt a hyper-technical approach. Liberal approach should be the general rule particularly, in cases where the other side can be compensated with costs. Normally, amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid multiplicity of litigations." 7. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Chakreshwari Construction Private Limited vs. Manohar Lal, (2017)5 SCC 212 , has culled out certain principles for allowing or rejecting the application for amendment, which are as under:- "13. The principle applicable for deciding the application made for amendment in the pleadings remains no more res integra and is laid down in several cases. In Revajeetu Builders and Developers vs. Narayanaswamy & Sons, (2009)10 SCC 84 , this Court, after examining the entire previous case law on the subject, culled out the following principle in para 63 of the judgment which reads as under: (SCC p. 102) "63. On critically analyzing both the English and Indian cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment: (1) whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case; (2) whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide; (3) the amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money. (4) refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple litigation. (5) whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case; and (6) as a general rule, the court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application. These are some of the important factors which may be kept in mind while dealing with application filed under Order 6 Rule 17. These are only illustrative and not exhaustive." 8. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly held that while allowing/rejecting the application for amendment of the plaint, it is to be seen whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case. In the case at hand, application for amendment is not bonafide and no prejudice, if any, would be caused to the applicant, if amendment proposed to be made, is not allowed. 9. Moreover, this Court finds that learned court while passing impugned order has categorically recorded in para 7 of its order that tenant has already taken preliminary objections qua the maintainability of the eviction petition and when the question of alleged extension of verandah was put to the petitioner and his witness, it was never objected to by the petitioner on the ground that these are beyond pleadings of the case and as such, tenant is always at liberty to prove the alleged extension of verandah by way of leading cogent and convincing evidence. 10. Having carefully perused provisions contained under Order 6 Rule 2 CPC, this Court is not in agreement with Mr. R.K. Bawa, learned senior Counsel, that since fact with regard to extension of verandah has not been specifically pleaded in reply, it may not be permissible for the tenant to prove the same by way of evidence as has been observed in para-7 because careful perusal of provisions contained in Order 6 Rule 2 CPC clearly suggests that though pleadings should contain statement in concise form and the material facts on which the party intends to rely for his claim or defence, but not the evidence, by which they are to be proved. 11. Consequently, in view of the above, present petition is dismissed being devoid of any merits. 11. Consequently, in view of the above, present petition is dismissed being devoid of any merits. However, having taken note of the fact that instant proceedings are pending adjudication since 2012, this Court hopes and trust that court below would make sincere efforts to conclude the proceedings expeditiously. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.