ORDER 1. This common order will dispose of Writ Petition No. 16992/2011, Writ Petition No. 20504/2014 and Writ Petition No. 23/2015. The facts are taken from Writ Petition No. 16992/2011. The petitioner, a widow aged about 75 years of age, has filed this petition aggrieved by the show cause notice dated 21.5.2010 and order dated 21.5.2010 cumulatively marked as Annexure P-1. By said notice, the petitioner was directed to show cause as to why in exercise of power under section 251 read with section 32 of M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (Code), the petitioner’s land described in the notice be not permanently recorded as Government “Medh/Pond”. In addition, an order dated 21.5.2010 is passed whereby provisionally or as an interim measure, the said land was directed to be registered as Government “Pond/Bheeta” and concerned Tehsildar was directed to correct the revenue record. The petitioner was directed to show cause as to why this interim order dated 21.5.2010 should not be made absolute. The petitioner was directed to submit his defence alongwith the relevant documents. 2. Shri P.N. Pathak and Shri Sanjay Seth, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are lawful titleholder/bhumiswamy of these lands. Shri Pathak by taking this Court to the pleadings of the petition urged that petitioner is the owner in possession of land bearing khasra Nos. 20, area 3.83 acre, 19, area 0.69 acre and 28, area 1.83 acre. The total land of these three numbers comes to 6.35 acres situated in village Saokhi. The petitioner purchased this land from Shri Kishorilal Agrawal vide sale-deed dated 18.3.1985 Annexure P-3. The mutation panji dated 12.4.1986 reflects the name of Kishorilal. The petitioner has placed reliance on “Rin Pustika” Annexure P-5 and relevant khasra entries from 1964-65 to 1996-97 filed as Annexure P-9. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as per the then prevailing Rewa Land Revenue and Tenancy Code, 1935 (Code of 1935) an “Intjam Guard Book” was prepared which contains the name of Kishorilal. The said entry was made on the direction of ‘Pawaidar’ who was statutorily recognized to undertake aforesaid exercise. By taking this Court to the relevant document Annexure P-6 (page 30), Shri Pathak urged that the patta was granted in favour of Kishorilal by the order of competent authority. These documents are more than 60 years old and cannot be called in question/doubted. By taking this Court to the relevant document Annexure P-6 (page 30), Shri Pathak urged that the patta was granted in favour of Kishorilal by the order of competent authority. These documents are more than 60 years old and cannot be called in question/doubted. The ownership and possession of Kishorilal from 1951-52 till 1985 is clear from the aforesaid revenue record. After 1985, the petitioner became owner and is in possession of land in question. 4. The petitioner has assailed the impugned notice/order of Collector on the ground that in the light of Full Bench judgment of this Court reported in 2010(5) MPHT 137 (Ranveer Singh and others v. State of MP), the power of revision can be exercised within a reasonable time. The Full Bench calculated that reasonable time to be 180 days within which revisional power can be exercised. Shri Pathak made an attempt to draw parallel between section 32 and section 50 of the Act and contended that both these powers which are analogous in nature can be exercised within a reasonable time. The exercise of power after more than half century is impermissible and runs contrary to the dicta of Full Bench judgment in the case of Ranveer Singh (supra). The next contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that as per a conjoint reading of sections 157 and 158(d)(i) of the Code, the petitioner is the bhumiswamy and impugned orders issued against her are without authority of law. It is submitted that a title which is being enjoyed by the petitioner cannot be disturbed in the manner it is sought to be done by the Collector. Reliance is placed on AIR 1970 SC 997 (Nainsingh v. Koonwarjee and others). Section 117 of the Code is relied upon to contend that there exists a presumption about the correctness of the revenue entries. The petitioner has filed various revenue records alongwith the petition but respondents have not chosen to rebut the same in their reply. In absence thereto, in the light of section 117 of the Code, the entries must be treated as correct. Section 116 of the Code is relied upon to contend that there is a statutory method prescribed in the event somebody wants correction in the revenue entry. Thus, assuming revenue entries were incorrect, it was open to the competent authority to seek correction as per the procedure known to law. Section 116 of the Code is relied upon to contend that there is a statutory method prescribed in the event somebody wants correction in the revenue entry. Thus, assuming revenue entries were incorrect, it was open to the competent authority to seek correction as per the procedure known to law. Reliance is placed on AIR 2003 SC 1659 (State of Maharashtra v. The Jalgao Municipal Corporation) wherein it was held that if a Statute prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in the same manner and other methods are forbidden. Thus, Shri Pathak urged that order of learned Collector by bypassing the statutory method mentioned in section 116 of the Code cannot sustain judicial scrutiny. 5. The stand of petitioner is that the consistent entries in the revenue records shows that land/pond was earlier occupied by Kishorilal and thereafter since 1985 by the petitioner. Section 251 of the Code can be invoked only when pond in question is situated in an unoccupied land on the date of commencement of the Code of 1959. At the cost of repetition, Shri Pathak argued that section 251 of the Code is of no assistance to the respondents because the land is consistently shown to be occupied by Kishorilal, the erstwhile owner and then by the petitioner. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on the judgments of this Court reported in 1997 RN 432 (State of MP and others v. Ram Kripal and others), 1995 RN 316 (Gram Panchayat Pathariya v. Dr. K.K. Tiwari and others) and 1998 RN 19 (Gram Panchayat Imlaj v. State of MP). 6. Further more, Shri Pathak submits that alternative remedy under the Code is not an effective one in the present case. After six decades, the petitioner cannot be relegated back to the mercy of learned Collector. The impugned orders are passed in utter violation of principles of natural justice. In view of Committee of Management and another v. Vice Chancellor and others [ AIR 2009 SC 1159 ], the petitioner may not be relegated to avail alternative remedy or submit his defence before the Collector. 7. Per contra, learned Government Advocate urged that the petitioner was only directed to show cause with relevant documents whether he has a right to continue on the lands in question. 7. Per contra, learned Government Advocate urged that the petitioner was only directed to show cause with relevant documents whether he has a right to continue on the lands in question. A provisional/interim order is passed which will attain finality after hearing the petitioner. Thus, it is open to the petitioner to submit his reply to the show cause notice and at this stage no case for interference is made out against a show cause notice. He submits that the impugned order shows that there was no provision of giving a government pond in favour of a private person as per the relevant statute invogue. Document at page 30 on which heavy reliance is placed by petitioner shows that it clearly reflects that revenue records relates to “Khata Sarkari”. The document (Annexure-P-6) nowhere reflects about any order of any competent authority, pursuant to which Kishori Lal’s name could have been recorded in the revenue records. Petitioner has not filed any “Patta” to show that Kishori Lal was given “Patta” by the order of any competent authority. 8. Learned Government Advocate submits that the petitioner has not filed any document to show that he is a “bhoomiswami” in consonance with section 158(d)(i) of the Code. The disputed questions of facts and genuineness of documents cannot be gone into in writ proceedings. Petitioner can file the relevant documents before the Collector, which will be duly examined by him before taking a final decision. The stand of learned Government Advocate is that section 32 begins with a non obstante clause and therefore it has an overriding effect on any other provision of the Code. The Collector is well within its authority in invoking section 32 on the basis of a report of Tahsildar/SDO dated 20.5.2010. He initiated action on the basis of report of Tehsildar/SDO aforesaid which is evident from the order dated 21.5.2010(Annexure-P-1). He also relied on section 250 and 251 of the Code and contended that in the light of judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (Madhukar Sadbha Shivarkar v. State of Maharashtra and others) [ (2015)6 SCC 557 ], no interference is warranted at this stage on the basis of limitation or on any other factual basis. The petitioner may be directed to file response before the Collector. The petitioner may be directed to file response before the Collector. However, it was pointed out by learned Government Advocate that in obedience of the interim order passed by this Court, the respondents have provisionally entered the name of petitioner in the revenue records but restrained him from creating any third party right or alienate the land in question. 9. Shri P.N.Pathak, learned counsel for the petitioner in his rejoinder submission relied on the “guard book” (Page 13) and urged that said book as per the Code of 1935 was applicable to “Vindhya Pradesh” and the same was statutorily recognized and entry mentioned in this document shows that a “Patta” was granted by “Ilakedar”. He submits that “Ilakedar” was head of the area namely Pawai. Lastly, it is submitted that respondents have given an evasive reply which shows their bent of mind. 10. Shri Sanjay Seth, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 20504/2014 borrowed the arguments of Shri Pathak and in addition urged that in his case, the learned Collector by order dated 28.3.2005 (Annexure-P-6) permitted the erstwhile owner Smt. Kranti Chib to sell the property by granting express permission under section 165 (6-C) of the Code. The petitioner purchased this property from Smt. Chib by sale-deed dated 11.4.2005 (Annexure-P-5). Thus, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the petitioner has occupied a government land in any manner. 11. No other point is pressed by learned counsel for the parties. 12. I have heard the parties at length and perused the record. 13. Before dealing with the rival contentions of the parties, it is apposite to refer section 32 of the Code, which reads as under : “32. Inherent power of Revenue Courts.-- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Revenue Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court.” 14. Section 50(1) of the Code reads thus : “50. Revision. Inherent power of Revenue Courts.-- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Revenue Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court.” 14. Section 50(1) of the Code reads thus : “50. Revision. - [(1) The Board may, at any time on its motion or on an application made by any party or the Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner or the Collector or the Settlement Officer may, at any time on his own motion, call for the record of any case which has been decided or proceedings is which an order has been passed by any Revenue Officer subordinate to it or him and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if it appears that such subordinate Revenue Office,- (a) has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by this code, or (b) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) has acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the Board or the Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner or the Collector or the Settlement Officer, as the case may be, make such order in the case as it or he thinks fit : Provided that the Board or the Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner or the Collector or the Settlement Officers shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of the proceedings, except where- (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision to the Board, would have finally disposed of the proceedings, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made.” [Emphasis Supplied] 15. The bone of contention of Shri Pathak, learned counsel for the petitioner is that sections 32 and 50 are analogous provisions. The power under both the provisions can be exercised within reasonable time. The Full Bench in the case of Ranveer Singh (supra), has treated that reasonable period as 180 days. Thus, the similar limitation of 180 days must be read into section 32 aforesaid. 16. A careful reading of section 32 and section 50 shows that both the provisions are not analogous/pari materia provisions. The Full Bench in the case of Ranveer Singh (supra), has treated that reasonable period as 180 days. Thus, the similar limitation of 180 days must be read into section 32 aforesaid. 16. A careful reading of section 32 and section 50 shows that both the provisions are not analogous/pari materia provisions. section 32 begins with the expression “nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power…..”. This expression, in my view is given in order to give wide inherent power to the Revenue Court to secure the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of process of the Court. The expression like aforesaid are used as legislative device to give inherent or extra-ordinary power to an authority/Court. 17. Section 32 of the Code is pari materia to section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). In Nain Singh (supra), the Supreme Court opined that under the inherent power recognized by section 151 of CPC, a Court has no power to do which is prohibited by the Code. The same view is taken in 2004 (11) SCC 168 (Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. v. Machado Brothers and others). It was held that if there is no specific provision which prohibits the grant of relief sought in an application filed under section 151 CPC, the Courts have all the necessary powers under section 151 CPC to make a suitable order. Learned counsel for the petitioners could not point out any provision of the Code which prohibits the Revenue Court to invoke the power under section 32. The power ingrained in section 32 of the Code is much wider than the nature of remedy available under section 116 of the Code. section 32 of Code is in no way in conflict with section 116 of the Code. Thus, the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of the Jalgao Municipal Corporation (supra), is of no assistance to the petitioners. 18. The petitioners have placed heavy reliance on section 117 of the Code to bolster their submissions that any revenue entries once recorded under section 117 must be treated as correct. Section 117 of the Code reads as under : “117. Presumption as to entries in land records.- All entries made under this Chapter in the land records shall be presumed to be correct until the contrary is proved.” 19. Section 117 of the Code reads as under : “117. Presumption as to entries in land records.- All entries made under this Chapter in the land records shall be presumed to be correct until the contrary is proved.” 19. A plain reading of the provisions of the Land Revenue Code makes it clear that the scope and purport of section 117 is entirely different; it merely contemplates that the entries in the “land records” shall be presumed to be correct until contrary is proved. What is contemplated, therefore, is a legal presumption which is indeed rebutable. Section 117 does not dispense with proof of the fact projected in khasra entries. [See: 1986 RN 23 (Prabhudayal and another v. Board of Revenue and others)]. Thus such revenue entries are not conclusive proof as canvassed by learned counsel for the petitioners. The genuineness, correctness and legality of such entries can be examined by the competent authority in accordance with law. 20. Apart from this, “dispute” regarding entry in khasra or in any other land record, cannot be entertained under section 116 of the Code, if matter is covered under section 108. Section 108(1)(a) deals with the entry relating to name of Bhumi Swami together with survey number/plot number, area etc. with further details whether land is irrigated or unirrigated. Thus, section 116 of the Code cannot be impediment for exercising power under section 32 of the Code. 21. The matter may be viewed from another angle. The Full Bench in Ranveer Singh (supra), held as under : “38. Ab judicatio for the reasons stated hereinabove we hereby answer the question referred to us as under : The suo motu powers can be exercised by the Revisional Authority envisaged under section 50 of the Code within a period of 180 days from the date of the knowledge of illegality, impropriety and irregularity of the proceedings committed by any Revenue Officer subordinate to it even if the immovable property is Government land or having some public interest. What should be the irreparable loss, it should be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case as no definite yardstick in that regard can be drawn. We have already mentioned hereinabove certain instances which can be said to be the “irreparable loss”.” [Emphasis Supplied] 22. What should be the irreparable loss, it should be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case as no definite yardstick in that regard can be drawn. We have already mentioned hereinabove certain instances which can be said to be the “irreparable loss”.” [Emphasis Supplied] 22. A bare perusal of this para leaves no room for any doubt that the reasonable period which was construed as 180 days, was to be counted from the date of knowledge of illegality, impropriety and irregularity. In 2012(1) MPLJ 562 , [Savina Park Resorts & Tours Pvt. Ltd. v. State of M.P. & others] it was clearly held that for applying the ratio of Ranveer Singh (supra), the pivotal question is as to what is the starting point/date for counting the reasonable period of 180 days. In that case, the petitioner therein urged that it was 26.8.2008 when he preferred application for ratification, whereas State argued that it is 28.10.2009 when the Collector gathered knowledge about the illegalities. This Court considered the judgment of apex Court in the case reported in 1993 Suppl. (2) SCC 497, [Joti Parshad v. State of Haryana], wherein word “knowledge” is defined as under : ““Knowledge” is an awareness on the part of the person concerned indicating his state of mind. “Reason to believe” is another facet of the state of mind. “Reason to believe” is not the same thing as “suspicion” or “doubt” and mere seeing also cannot be equated to believing. “Reason to believe” is a higher level of state of mind. Likewise “knowledge” will be slightly on higher plane than “reason to believe”. A person can be supposed to know where there is a direct appeal to his senses and a person is presumed to have a reason to believe if he has sufficient cause to believe the same.” 23. This Court by following the ratio decidendi of Ranveer Singh (supra), opined that when a complaint in the said case was received by Collector, the said complaint at best create a doubt, but learned Collector gathered knowledge about irregularity/illegality only when enquiry report was produced before him. Thus, the starting point would be the date when enquiry report was produced before him i.e. 22.5.2009. From this date, suo motu power exercised by the Collector is well within 180 days. 24. Thus, the starting point would be the date when enquiry report was produced before him i.e. 22.5.2009. From this date, suo motu power exercised by the Collector is well within 180 days. 24. The impugned order dated 21.5.2010 reads as under: ^^fnukad & 21-5-2010 1- Ádj.k rglhynkj@vuqfoHkkxh; vf/kdkjh lksgkxiqj ds Áfrosnu fnukad 20-5-2010 lfgr ÁkIrA ÁkIr Áfrosnu esa crk;k x;k gS fd xzke lkS[kh esa fLFkr Hkwfe [kljk uEcj 19-20-28 lesfdr jdok 7-03 ,dM+ cUnkscLrh jktLo vfHkys[k esa rkyko] HkhVk uobor esa ntZ gS vkSj bl Hkwfe ij orZeku jktLo vfHkys[k esa Jherh 'kdqUryk ifr /kjeiky egsUæk fuoklh lkS[kh cxSjg dk uke HkwfeLokeh ds rkSj ij ntZ gSA rkykc dh Hkwfe dk vkoaVu vFkok O;oLFkkiu djus dk dksbZ oS/kkfud Ákoèkku dHkh Hkh ÁHkko'khy ugha FkkA vr% mDr Áfof"V dks fujLr djrs gq;s Á'ukèkhu Hkwfe dks 'kkldh; ntZ djuk mfpr gSA 2- Ádj.k iathc) fd;k tk,A 3- Ádj.k dk ijh{k.k fd;k x;kA Á'uk/khu Hkwfe esa rkykc@HkhVk ntZ jgh gS rFkk yksx bldk fuLrkj ds :i esa mi;ksx djrs gSA bl Hkwfe dk dkykUrj esa vukosndx.k Jherh 'kdqUryk ifr /kjeiky egsUæk oxSjg ds uke dh Áfof"V fof/k ds lE;d vkns'k ls ntZ u gksdj ÁFken`"V;k dwV jfpr ,oa =qfViw.kZ <ax ls vukosnd dk uke HkwfeLokeh rkSj ij ntZ gksus ds dkj.k bl Hkwfe dks foØ; dj [kqnZ&oqnZ gksus dh dk;Zokgh ÁkjaHk gS rFkk vkxs Hkh bl Hkwfe ds [kqnZ&oqnZ gksus dh Ácy lEHkkouk gSA ;g Hkwfe uxj ikfydk {ks= 'kgMksy esa fLFkr gksus ds dkj.k dkQh ewY;oku gS rFkk blds dqN Hkkx ij voS/k dCtk gksus ds dkj.k ty laj{k.k ij foijhr ÁHkko iM+ jgk gS rFkk vke fuLrkj esa Hkh ck/kk mRiUu gks jgh gSA ftls nwj djuk yksdfgr esa vko';d gSA 4- vr,o eŒÁŒ Hkw&jktLo lafgrk 1959 dh /kkjk 32 ds rgr ÁnÙk vUrfuZfgr 'kfDr;ksa dk Á;ksx djrs gq, Á'uk/khu Hkwfe dks vUrfje rkSj ij Ádj.k ds fujkdj.k rd 'kkldh; rkykc HkhVk ntZ djus dk vkns'k nsrk gwaA rnuqlkj rglhynkj vfHkys[k lq/kkj djk,A 5- vukosndx.k dks dkj.k crkvks ukfVl tkjh dh tk; fd ;g vkxkeh frfFk ij mifLFkr gksdj mijksDr varfje vkns'k ds lanHkZ esa Á'uk/khu Hkwfe ij vius LoRo ds lEcU/k esa vfHkys[k ,oa viuk i{k ÁLrqr djs vkSj Li"V djs fd D;ksa u eŒÁŒHkwŒjkŒ lafgrk 1959 dh /kkjk&251 ds vUrxZr mDr vkns'k dks LFkkbZ dj fn;k tk, vukosndx.k viuk i{k nLrkost lfgr fnukad 28-6-2010 dks U;k;ky; esa ÁLrqr djsaA vukosndx.k dks lquokbZ dk iw.kZ volj nsus ds mijkUr Ádj.k dk vafre fujkdj.k xq.k&nks"k ds vk/kkj ij fd;k tk ldsxk A is'kh gLrk{kj@& ¼uhjt nqcs½ dysDVj] 'kgMksy e/; Áns'kA** [Emphasis Supplied] 25. The opening sentence of this order shows that learned Collector has initiated action on the basis of a report of Tahsildar/SDO date 20.5.2010. On the very next day, the learned Collector received the aforesaid report he initiated action. Thus, as per the judgment of Ranveer Singh (supra), the limitation of 180 days is to be counted from the date of knowledge of illegality/irregularity. Thus, even assuming that the period of limitation of 180 days is applicable for the sake of argument for exercising of power under section 32 of the Code, the said power has been exercised within said time frame from the date of knowledge of illegality. Needless to emphasize that the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner regarding point of limitation was advanced in order to establish that power exercised beyond limitation is wholly without jurisdiction and, in that event, even a show cause notice can be called in question before this Court and petitioner is not required to file reply and contest the matter before the learned Collector. As analyzed above, no interference is warranted by this Court on the impugned order on the ground of limitation. 26. This will not be out of place to mention here that this Court in 2013(2) MPLJ 573 [Mukesh Singh Chaturvedi v. State of M.P.] dealt with another aspect relating to estoppel. This aspect of “promissory estoppel” has not been specifically raised by the parties in the present case. Yet, it is condign to refer the said judgment because it deals with entries in the revenue record. Pertinently, in the said case, the petitioner therein was claiming right on the basis of revenue record and reply of the Government in State Assembly regarding the relevant revenue entry. In was argued that in view of certified copies of revenue records and reply of Government in “Vidhan Sabha”, the land in question is clearly a private land. This Court considered a Constitution Bench judgment of Supreme Court reported in 1973(2) SCC 650 , [M. Ramanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala and another] which reads as under : “37 … In American Jurisprudence 2d at page 783 paragraph 123 it is stated “Generally, a State is not subject to an estoppel to the same extent as an individual or a private corporation. Otherwise, it might be rendered helpless to assert its powers in government. Otherwise, it might be rendered helpless to assert its powers in government. Therefore as a general rule the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied against the State in its governmental, public or sovereign capacity. An exception however arises in the application of estoppel to the State where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice”. The estoppel alleged by the appellant Ramanatha Pillai was on the ground that he entered into an agreement and thereby changed his position to his detriment. The High Court rightly held that the Courts exclude the operation of the doctrine of estoppel, when it is found that the authority against whom estoppel is pleaded has owed a duty to the public against whom the estoppel cannot fairly operate.” [Emphasis Supplied] In Mukesh Singh Chaturvedi (supra), this Court opined that “a microscopic reading of this paragraph shows that in American Jurisprudence it is opined that generally the State is not bound by principle of estoppel to the extent and individual or private Corporation is bound by it. Taking a contrary view, as held in American Jurisprudence, will render the Government helpless in its governance. An exception is carved out against the Government for the purpose of operating estoppel by holding that it would operate against the State where it is essential to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. The apex Court opined that the authority against whom estoppel is pleaded owes a duty to public and, therefore, in cases where a public duty is involved, the doctrine of estoppel cannot be made applicable. In the present case, it is obligatory on the part of the respondents to examine the entire revenue record minutely before taking the decision about the nature of the land. The valuable public land is vested with the Government and it is a constitutional and legal obligation on the part of the Government to ensure that no Government land is grabbed or taken away illegally. In Ramanatha Pillai (supra), it was held by five Judges bench of Supreme Court that “promissory estoppel” cannot be pleaded against an authority of the Government, who owe a duty to the public and is acting fairly. In Ramanatha Pillai (supra), it was held by five Judges bench of Supreme Court that “promissory estoppel” cannot be pleaded against an authority of the Government, who owe a duty to the public and is acting fairly. In the present case, the respondents owe a duty to the public and in view of that duty, they are obliged to examine the entire relevant revenue record and ensure that a valuable Government land is not grabbed or enjoyed by anybody without any legal entitlement/title. 27. It was also made clear that Government cannot be compelled to act in a manner which is prohibited in law under the garb of doctrine of promissory estoppel. In no case, the said doctrine can be pressed into service to compel the Government or public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority and power of the Government. No promise can be enforced which is against the public policy. 28. In view of foregoing analysis, it cannot be held that impugned show cause notice/order is wholly without jurisdiction. Thus, the ancillaryquestion is : whether interference is warranted by this Court at this stage when various factual aspects are involved in the matter ? 29. A conjoint reading of show cause notice and order dated 21.5.2010 shows that the prima facie stand mentioned in the notice/order is that land/pond in question was initially registered in the year 1923-24 as Government land which was subsequently converted as private land which is wholly impermissible. The petitioner relied on various revenue entries mentioned hereinabove and has taken a diametrically opposite stand. This factual aspect requires a careful scrutiny by learned Collector. 30. The apex Court in 2004(3) SCC 440 , [Special Director and another v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and another] made it clear that scope of judicial review against an interlocutory order is very limited. It was held as under : “Unless the High Court is satisfied that the show-cause notice was totally non est in the eye of the law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority to even investigate into facts, writ petitions should not be entertained for the mere asking and as a matter of routine, and the writ petitioner should invariably be directed to respond to the show-cause notice and take all stands highlighted in the writ petition. Whether the show-cause notice was founded on any legal premises, is a jurisdictional issue which can even be urged by the recipient of the notice and such issues also can be adjudicated by the authority issuing the very notice initially, before the aggrieved could approach the Court.” [Emphasis Supplied] It was poignantly held in the said case that even if show cause notice is founded on an illegal premises, it is a jurisdictional issue and this issue can also be urged by recipients of notice before the adjudicating authority and said authority can take a decision on it. Thus, even assuming that a jurisdictional issue is involved in the present case, nothing prevents the petitioners to raise said objection while filing reply before the Court below. 31. In 2015(6) SCC 557 , [Madhukar Sadbha Shivarkar (Dead) by Legal Representatives v. State of Maharashtra and others], the apex Court held as under : “27. The said order is passed by the State Government only to enquire into the landholding records with a view to find out as to whether original land revenue records have been destroyed and fabricated to substantiate their unjustifiable claim by playing fraud upon the Tahsildar and appellate authorities to obtain the orders unlawfully in their favour by showing that there is no surplus land with the Company and its shareholders as the valid sub-leases are made and they are accepted by them in the proceedings under section 21 of the Act, on the basis of the alleged false declarations filed by the shareholders and sub-lessees under section 6 of the Act. The plea urged on behalf of the State Government and the de facto complainant owners, at whose instance the orders are passed by the State Government on the alleged ground of fraud played by the declarants upon the Tahsildar and appellate authorities to get the illegal orders obtained by them to come out from the clutches of the land ceiling provisions of the Act by creating the revenue records, which is the fraudulent act on their part which unravels everything and therefore, the question of limitation under the provisions to exercise power by the State Government does not arise at all. For this purpose, the Deputy Commissioner of Pune Division was appointed as the enquiry officer to hold such an enquiry to enquire into the matter and submit his report for consideration of the Government to take further action in the matter. The legal contentions urged by Mr Naphade, in justification of the impugned judgment and order prima facie at this stage, we are satisfied that the allegation of fraud in relation to getting the landholdings of the villages referred to supra by the declarants on the alleged ground of destroying original revenue records and fabricating revenue records to show that there are 384 subleases of the land involved in the proceedings to retain the surplus land illegally as alleged, to the extent of more than 3000 acres of land and the orders are obtained unlawfully by the declarants in the land ceiling limits will be nullity in the eye of the law though such orders have attained finality; if it is found in the enquiry by the enquiry officer that they are tainted with fraud, the same can be interfered with by the State Government and its officers to pass appropriate orders. The landowners are also aggrieved parties to agitate their rights to get the orders which are obtained by the declarants as they are vitiated in law on account of nullity is the tenable submission and the same is well founded and therefore, we accept the submission to justify the impugned judgment and order [Babu Maruti Dukare v. State of Maharashtra, 2006 SCC OnLine Bom 1268 : (2007)1 Bom LR 125] of the Division Bench of the High Court.” [Emphasis Supplied] In para 32 of this judgment, it was laid down that a prima facie view taken by the State Government cannot be found fault with by the Court, at this stage. 32. In view of foregoing analysis, in the considered opinion of this Court, present matters are not fit cases for interference at the stage of issuance of show-cause notice. Even if jurisdictional error has crept in as held in the case of Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse (supra), the petitioners can file their response pregnant with such objections before the learned Collector. The Collector needs to examine the revenue entries meticulously. He is required to examine as to which revenue entries will prevail. Even if jurisdictional error has crept in as held in the case of Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse (supra), the petitioners can file their response pregnant with such objections before the learned Collector. The Collector needs to examine the revenue entries meticulously. He is required to examine as to which revenue entries will prevail. Whether the revenue entries made in the year 1923-24 will prevail or revenue entries made thereafter in the revenue record will hold the field. The learned Collector needs to deal with another aspect whether subsequent revenue entries (if any) in the name of petitioners were recorded in accordance with law or not. This aspect needs consideration for the petitioners of Writ Petition No. 20504/2014 also. The Revenue Authorities are custodian of the records. The learned Collector is best suited to examine the aforesaid factual aspects. Thus, I find no reason to entertain these petitions and deem it proper to permit the petitioners to file their response to the impugned show-cause notices before the Collector along with relevant documents within 30 days from today. In turn, the learned Collector after affording personal hearing to the petitioners shall take a final decision in accordance with law by taking into consideration the objections/response field by the petitioners. If response is filed within 30 days from today, the ad-interim order granted by this Court shall remain in operation till a final decision is taken by learned Collector. 33. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and it shall be the duty of the learned Collector to decide the matter on its own merits in accordance with law. 34. With the aforesaid observations, the petitions are disposed of.