ORDER : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. Heard Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sudhir I. Nanavati, learned senior counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr. Mihir J. Thakore, learned senior counsel for respondent No.2. 2. In present petition the petitioner has prayed for below quoted reliefs: “17A. That the Honourable court be please to issue appropriate writ under Article 226 of Constitution of India against Respondent No.1, quashing and setting aside of award of tender bearing No.NHSRCL/CO/SBIHUB/2018/7 to Respondent 2 as Illegal, Arbitrary, Irrational and Unreasonable and violative of Article 14 and Article 19(1)(G) of the Constitution of India in addition to, being in contravention of procedure laid down in tender for examination, comparison and evaluation of price bids. B. That the Honourable court be please to issue appropriate orders or directions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against Respondent No.1 and call for the entire record of tender Process and the minutes of the meeting of tender committee and the bid documents submitted by Respondent 2 and further be please to declare the price bid of Respondent No.2 as being in noncompliance of mandatory tender conditions and therefore disqualified and liable to be rejected. C. That the Honourable court be please to direct Constitution of an independent tender evaluation committee comprising of experts and be further be please to issue appropriate directions for examination, evaluation and comparison of technical and Financial bids for award of tender and further be please to direct the said tender committee to record reasons for its recommendation to Respondent No.1 and that pursuant to the said recommendation being received Respondent No.1 shall take decision qua award of tender de novo. D. That the Honourable court be please to direct Respondent no.1 and Respondent No.2 to maintain status quo in regard to execution of works under the subject tender and further be pleased to stay letter of intent awarded to Respondent no.2 till the pendency of present petition. E. That the Honourable Court be please to set aside the entire tender as the same incorporates ambiguous evaluation criteria which are neither in consonance with CVC Guidelines nor with the principles of equality and certainty as enshrined in Article 14 of Constitution of India.” 3. As is evident from the relief prayed for in present petition (para 17A), the petitioner is aggrieved by 'examination, comparison and evaluation of price bids'. As is evident from the relief prayed for in present petition (para 17A), the petitioner is aggrieved by 'examination, comparison and evaluation of price bids'. According to the petitioner said process was undertaken and carried out in contravention of the process laid down in the tender. 4. So far as the factual backdrop is concerned, the petitioner has, so as to support and justify reliefs prayed for, averred and stated that: “2. The petitioner states that respondent No.1 National high speed rail Corporation ltd (NHRCL) is a Government Company and a state within the meaning of article 12 of the Constitution of India. That National High-Speed Rail Corporation Ltd (NHRCL) – Respondent No.1 invited bids for construction of high-speed rail terminal building vide Tender No.NHSRCL/CO/SBIHUB/2018/7 on 7th August 2018. The petitioner subscribed to the bid package No.NHSRCL/CO/SBIHUB/2018/7 and thereafter submitted technical and financial bid in strict compliance to the tender conditions. The bidding documents consisted of part 1, 2 & 3 and the bidding procedure along with bidding forms were contained in part 1 of the bidding document. The petitioner herein produces part 1 of the bidding document containing instructions to the bidders and evaluation and qualification criteria in consideration of the bid. The copy of part 1 of document is annexed and marked with as Annexure-A. 3. The petitioner states that the technical bid was required to be submitted along with the financial bid in a sealed cover (as it was a single-stage Two-Envelope Bidding process) by on or before 2:45 PM dated 17th October 2018 and accordingly, bids were received by Respondent No.1, from petitioner and from respondent 2 and from other qualified bidders. The petitioner states and submits that both the petitioner and respondent, including few other bidders, were successful in technical bid and that there is no dispute or challenge to the Basic Technical Qualification between the parties. The petitioner however does raise a grievance of non-evaluation of comparative experience, quality of workmanship and better suitability on the basis of technical bid as consideration and the basis for award of the contract. That after opening of technical bid and adequately satisfying the technical criteria and qualification required for opening of price bid, the price bid with respect to the tender was opened on 14th December 2018 and since price bid of respondent 2 was lower than that of petitioner. That after opening of technical bid and adequately satisfying the technical criteria and qualification required for opening of price bid, the price bid with respect to the tender was opened on 14th December 2018 and since price bid of respondent 2 was lower than that of petitioner. Respondent 2 has been awarded the letter of intent (LOI) of the contract in regard to the subject tender. The petitioner states that letter of intent has been issued by respondent 1 to respondent 2 and that the copy of said letter of intent has been demanded by the present petitioner vide communication dated 18/1/2019 however the same being not available is not produced herein. The petitioner has also demanded employers debriefing for not accepting the bid of the petitioner and has sought reasons for failure of respondent No.1 to award the subject contract to this petitioner, since the petitioner claims to have superior workmanship, experience and quality in regard to execution of contract for construction of high-speed rail terminal as compared to respondent no.2. The copy of letter dated 18/1/2019 is annexed and marked as Annexure B.” 4.1 From the said narration and from the material on record, it has emerged that the petitioner is a limited company registered under provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and it has place of business and its registered office at Vadodara, Gujarat. 4.2 So as to invite bids to award contract for 'design and build works for construction of Sabarmati Highs-peed Rail Terminal for Mumbai and Ahmedabad High-speed Railway Project', on 7.8.2018, the respondent No.1, a government company, issued Notice bearing No.NHSRCL/CO/SBIHUB/2018/7 and invited bids from eligible bidders for construction of High-speed Rail Terminal Building. 4.3 The said Terminal Building is proposed to be constructed at Sabarmati, Ahmedabad Gujarat. 4.4 In response to said notice the petitioner submitted its bid in response to the said Notice Inviting Tenders [NIT]. The respondent No.2 also submitted its bid in response to same NIT. 4.5 The said NIT and the tender document provide, inter alia, that the bidders willing to participate in the bidding process shall have to obtain tender document from the office of respondent No1 at New Delhi. 4.6 The tender document and NIT instructed the bidders that the tender shall be submitted at the office of Managing Director of respondent No.1 at New Delhi. 4.6 The tender document and NIT instructed the bidders that the tender shall be submitted at the office of Managing Director of respondent No.1 at New Delhi. 4.7 The petitioner obtained/subscribed tender document and submitted its Technical & Price Bids at the specified address (at New Delhi) which comprised technical bid as well as financial bid. 4.8 Likewise, the respondent No.2 also obtained and subscribed/submitted its Bids at New Delhi. 4.9 According to the provisions in the tender document, all bids were to be received and were actually received at the address mentioned for that purpose in their tender document (i.e. at New Delhi). 4.10 The tender also provide for 'Prebid meeting' at New Delhi. The said meeting was convened on 29.8.2018 at New Delhi. 4.11 The bids were to be scrutinised by the Committee constituted for said purpose. The technical bids were opened by the Committee at New Delhi on 17.10.2018. 4.12 With regard to technical bids, the Scrutiny Committee took the decision at New Delhi on 7.12.2018 according to which the technical bids by the petitioner, the respondent No.2 and few other bidders qualified. 4.13 Subsequently, the price bids were opened at New Delhi on 14.12.2018 and the Committee constituted for said purpose considered the price bids as per the schedule mentioned in the tender document at New Delhi. 4.14 The committee examined, compared evaluated and assessed the price bids during its meeting at New Delhi and the committee also prepared its recommendation at New Delhi. 4.15 Thereafter, the Committee conveyed, on 7.1.2019, its recommendation to the competent authority at New Delhi. 4.16 The Competent Authority considered said recommendation on 8.1.2019 and took the decision at New Delhi (to award contract to respondent No.2). 4.17 Thereupon, Letter of Acceptance dated 9.1.2019 came to be issued from the office of respondent No.1 at New Delhi. 4.18 According to the petitioner, since the price bid of respondent No.2 was lower than that of petitioner, the respondent awarded Letter of Intent in favour of respondent No.2. The petitioner felt aggrieved by the said decision of respondent No.1 and filed present petition on and around 21.1.2019. 5. In this backdrop, the petitioner has taken out present petition and prayed for above quoted relief. 6. After hearing the petitioner on 30.1.2019 this Court passed below quoted order: “1. Heard Mr.Joshi, learned senior counsel with Mr.Shah, learned advocate for the petitioner. 2. 5. In this backdrop, the petitioner has taken out present petition and prayed for above quoted relief. 6. After hearing the petitioner on 30.1.2019 this Court passed below quoted order: “1. Heard Mr.Joshi, learned senior counsel with Mr.Shah, learned advocate for the petitioner. 2. By means of present petition, the decision of respondent No.1 to award a Contract (related to Tender Package bearing No.NHSRCL/CO/SBIHUB/2018/7) to respondent No.2 is challenged 3. One of the contentions which is raised by the petitioner is to the effect that according to the terms of the tender, Submission of Letter of Price Bid is an essential condition and that at the time of opening of Price Bid, it had emerged that respondent No.2 had not submitted, along with its Bid, Letter of Price Bid with seal & signature of the bidder. According to the petitioner, the said defect by respondent No.2 amounts to breach or noncompliance of essential condition of Tender. 4. The petitioner claims that it had brought the said defect to the notice of respondent No.1 vide its communication dated 14.12.2018 (i.e. on the same day when the price bids were opened) and subsequently vide letter dated 10.1.2019 followed by yet another letter dated 18.1.2019. 5. The petitioner claims that it has not received any response from respondent No.1. 6. Mr. Joshi, learned senior counsel for the petitioner referred to various terms and conditions of the Tender, including clause 11.3 (which is part of Instructions to the bidders). He also relied on the provisions under Part5 of the Bidding Document, more particularly the provisions related to Payment Schedule. 7. It is also submitted that according to the information to the petitioner, probably Letter of Intent is issued on or around 18.1.2019, however, formal contract is yet not executed. 8. It is claimed that respondent No.2 is declared L1, however, the basis of comparison is not known because Letter of Price Bid has not been submitted by respondent No.2. 9. Issue Notice returnable on 11.2.2019. 10. Till next date, respondent No.1 shall maintain status quo as on 30.1.2019. Direct service is permitted today.” 7. In response to the notice, respondent Nos.1 and 2 entered appearance. The said respondents filed their respective reply. 7.1 In this reply the respondent No.1 raised objection against maintainability of the petition on the ground that the petition is not maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction. Direct service is permitted today.” 7. In response to the notice, respondent Nos.1 and 2 entered appearance. The said respondents filed their respective reply. 7.1 In this reply the respondent No.1 raised objection against maintainability of the petition on the ground that the petition is not maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction. The preliminary objection against present petition is raised in para 4.1 – below mentioned terms:- “4.1 In view of the prayers prayed in the Petition including quashing and setting aside of the award of Tender bearing Package No. NHSRCL/CO/SBIHUB/2018/7 in favour of Respondent No. 2, as all material, essential and integral part of cause of action have arisen at New Delhi in a much as the performance of contract does not confer Territorial Jurisdiction to this Hon'ble Court an therefore, this Hon'ble Court may not exercise it Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” 8. At the time of hearing of the petition, the learned Counsel for respondent No.1 reiterated and pressed in service above mentioned preliminary objection against maintainability of the petition. 9. Learned senior counsel for the respondents No.1 and No.2 also requested that the said objection may be decided first before considering the petition on merits. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner did not oppose said request and accepted to respond said objection. He maintained that this Court has jurisdiction – territorial jurisdiction also – to entertain and decide the petition and it may not be disposed at threshold on the said ground or objection. Both sides have addressed the Court with reference to the said preliminary objection. Besides this, in light of the decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Management of Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd., Madras v. The Workers and others [ AIR 1963 SC 569 ] and in the decision in case of K. Sagar, Managing Director, Kiran Chit Fund, Musheerabad v. A. Bal Reddy & Anr. [ 2008 (7) SCC 166 ], we deem it proper to decide the said preliminary objection at the outset. 10. Mr. Nanavati, learned senior counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that the entire process from inception till the date on which the Letter of Intent came to be issued, has taken place at New Delhi. [ 2008 (7) SCC 166 ], we deem it proper to decide the said preliminary objection at the outset. 10. Mr. Nanavati, learned senior counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that the entire process from inception till the date on which the Letter of Intent came to be issued, has taken place at New Delhi. Any action or any step in pursuance of and in furtherance of the notice inviting tender and the tender process has not occurred within the jurisdiction of this Court and that, therefore, this Court does not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain present petition. So as to support and justify the submissions, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that: [i] the registered office of respondent No.1 is at New Delhi; [ii] the notice inviting tender came to be issued from the office of respondent No.1 from the office of respondent at New Delhi; [iii] all addenda and corrigenda were floated at New Delhi; [iv] the tender document and all information related to the tender/tender process were issued from the office of respondent No.1 at New Delhi; [v] pre-bid meeting in accordance with the provisions under the tender document was convened on 29.8.2018 at New Delhi; and [vi] all bidders including the petitioner attended pre-bid meeting at New Delhi; [vii] all bidders submitted in their respective bids (physical documents) at New Delhi; [viii] the technical bid as well as price bid were opened by tender opening committee at New Delhi; [ix] the decision by the tender opening committee came to be taken on 7.12.2018 at New Delhi; [x] The committee submitted its recommendation to the respondent No.1 to award the contract to respondent No.2 on 7.1.2019 at New Delhi; [xi] the authority considered recommendation and took the decision on 8.1.2019 to award contract to respondent No.2 at New Delhi; [xii] letter of Acceptance/Letter of Intent in favour of respondent No.2 came to be issued from the office at New Delhi. [xiii] Learned senior counsel for respondent No.1 also emphasised that the registered office of the respondent No.1 and office of the Managing Director of respondent No.1 are at New Delhi. On strength of the said details, Mr.Nanavati, learned senior counsel submitted that all steps and actions have taken place at New Delhi and therefore, the petition is not maintainable before this Court. On strength of the said details, Mr.Nanavati, learned senior counsel submitted that all steps and actions have taken place at New Delhi and therefore, the petition is not maintainable before this Court. Learned senior counsel for the respondent No.1 emphasised that according to the petitioner, the respondent No.1 has allegedly contravened 'procedure laid down in the tender for examination of the tender, comparison of tender and evaluation of price bid”, however, the said steps/action viz. examination, comparison, evaluation occurred at and were taken at New Delhi. Mr.Nanavati, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the decisions in the cases of Alchemist Ltd. and Another vs. State Bank of Sikkim and Others [2007) 11 SCC 335], Brij Bhal Singh Gautam vs. Union of India and others [ AIR 1998 All 132 ], Khalid A. Hakim vs. Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Authority under Payment of Wages Act and Others [ 2009 (3) GLR 2065 ]. 11. Per contra, Mr. Joshi, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that so as to determine as to whether the petition is maintainable before this Court and whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition, the Court has to consider whether the cause of action or part of cause of action has arisen within territorial jurisdiction of this Court or not. Mr. Joshi, learned senior counsel placed reliance on clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution and submitted that even if part of cause of action has taken place within territorial jurisdiction of the Court, then the petition would be maintainable and the Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner emphasised that the cause of action takes in its fold all steps and actions taken during the tender process. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that [i] the respondent No.1 has one office at Ahmedabad; and [ii] the project is to be executed at Ahmedabad (i.e. within territorial jurisdiction of the Court). He submitted that according to clause 42.5, respondent No.1 is obliged to respond to the bidders' request for debriefing and respondent No.1 is also obliged to give response in reply to the petitioner's request which has its office in the State. He submitted that according to clause 42.5, respondent No.1 is obliged to respond to the bidders' request for debriefing and respondent No.1 is also obliged to give response in reply to the petitioner's request which has its office in the State. According to learned senior counsel for the petitioner the said fact attracts jurisdiction of this Court and establish that the petition is maintainable before this Court and the Court has territorial jurisdiction to decide this petition. 12. We have considered rival submissions and material available on record as well as the decision on which the learned senior counsel contesting the parties relied. 13. So as to determine the said objection, it is necessary to take into account certain provisions from the tender document. The relevant provisions are found under the heading of 'Notice invitation for bids' read thus: “(3) Interested eligible Bidders may obtain further information from and inspect the Bidding Documents at the office of :- (4) Managing Director National High Speed Rail Corporation Limited (NHSRCL) 2nd Floor, Asia Bhawan, Road No.205, Sector 9, Dwarka, new Delhi110077, India Tel: +911128070000 Fax: +911128070250. Email: tenderhsrterminal@nhsrcl.in The Bidding Documents shall be available for sale at the office of NHSRCL at the address as mentioned vide Para 3 above, during 11.00 hrs to 17.00 hrs on all working days from August 7th, 2018 to October 04th, 2018. (7) Bids must be delivered to the address specified in the bid documents on or before 2:45 P.M. (IST 14:45 Hrs) of October 5th, 2018 and must be accompanied by a Bid Security of INR 3,50,00,000 (Indian Rupees Three Crores fifty lakh only). (8) Only Technical Bid will be opened in the presence of Bidders' representatives who choose to attend bid opening at 3.00 P.M. (IST 15:00 Hrs) on October 5th, 2018 at the office of :- National High Speed Rail Corporation Limited 2nd Floor, Asia Bhawan, Road No.205, Sector 9, Dwarka, New Delhi110077, India (9) Interested eligible Bidders who have purchased the Bidding Document are invited to attend a Pre-Bid meeting to be held on August 29th 2018. The venue and time are as follows:- Venue: National High Speed Rail Corporation Limited 2nd Floor, Asia Bhawan, Road No.205, Sector9, Dwarka, New Delhi110077 Time: IST 11:00 hrs Participation in this Pre-Bid meeting is not mandatory.” Under Section 2 of the tender document (bid datasheet) the details of employment are mentioned which read thus: ITB 1.1 The Employer is: National High Speed Rail Corporation Limited Address: 2nd Floor, Asia Bhawan, Road No.205, Sector9, Dwarka, New Delhi110077, India ITB 7.4 A Pre-bid meeting will take place at the following date, time and place:- Date: August 29th 2018 Time: 11:00 Hrs Place: National High Speed Rail Corporation Limited 2nd Floor, Asia Bhawan, Road No.205, Sector 9, Dwarka, New Delhi110077, India A site visit will NOT be organized by the Employer. Bidders may visit site before meeting. ITB 24.1 For Bid submission purposes only, the Employer's address: Attention: Managing Director, National High Speed Rail Corporation Limited Street Address: Asia Bhawan, Road No.205, Sector 9, Dwarka, New Delhi, India Floor/Room number: 2nd Floor City : New Delhi PIN Code : 110077 Country : India The deadline for Bid submission is: Date : October 5th, 2018 Time: 14.45 hrs. IST ITB 27.1 The opening of the Technical Bid shall take place at: Organization: National High Speed Rail Corporation Limited Street Address: Asia Bhawan, Road No.205, Sector 9, Dwarka, India Floor/Room number: 2nd Floor City: New Delhi PIN Code: 110077 Country: India Date: October 5th, 2018 Time: 15:00 hrs. IST 42.5 After notification of award, unsuccessful Bidders may request, in writing, to the Employer a debriefing seeking explanations on the grounds on which their Bids were not selected. The Employer shall promptly respond, in writing, to any unsuccessful Bidders who, after the notification of award in accordance with ITB 42.1, request a debriefing.” 14. Above quoted provision bring out and make it clear that the respondent No.1 had made it clear that entire Tender process will be conducted at New Delhi and the competent authority is the Managing Director and his office is at New Delhi. In this context, it is necessary to mention that in view of the said provision entire Tender process from inception (issuance of NIT) till issuance of LOI/LOA has actually taken place (at New Delhi) outside territorial jurisdiction of this Court. This aspect is not in dispute. 15. In this context, it is necessary to mention that in view of the said provision entire Tender process from inception (issuance of NIT) till issuance of LOI/LOA has actually taken place (at New Delhi) outside territorial jurisdiction of this Court. This aspect is not in dispute. 15. So far as the objection on ground of territorial jurisdiction is concerned, the petitioner heavily relies on clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution. The said clause is subsequently inserted in Article 226 of the Constitution [by 15th Amendment (Act 1963) which originally inserted clause (1A) and 42nd Amendment (Act 1976) substantially recast the said Article]. 15.1 Thus, for examining the issue on hand, it is necessary to consider the position prior to Amendment under Article 226 of the Constitution and “post amendment” position. 15.2 The position prior to amendment is succinctly explained with illuminating observation by Apex Court in the decision in case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh vs. Union of India [ AIR 1961 SC 532 ] wherein Apex Court observed, inter alia, that: ““8. The Constitution Bench in that case considered that the language of Art. 226 of the Constitution was "reasoriably plain" and that the exercise of the power conferred by that Article was subject to a twofold limitation, namely, (1) that the power is to be exercised "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction" and (2) that the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue the writs must be "within those territories". In other words, the writ of the Court could not run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction and that the person or authority affected by the writ must be amenable to the Court's jurisdiction, either by residence or location within those territories. 13. ..... What we have to see, therefore, is whether the words of Art. 226 mean that the person or authority to whom a writ is to be issued has to be resident in or located within the territories of the High Court issuing the writ? . . . . So far as an authority is concerned, there can be no doubt that if its office is located therein it must be within the territory. . . . . So far as an authority is concerned, there can be no doubt that if its office is located therein it must be within the territory. But do these words mean with respect to an authority that even though its office is not located within those territories it will be within those territories because its order may affect persons living in those territories? Now it is clear that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by Art. 226 does not depend upon the residence or location of the person applying to it for relief; it depends only on the person or authority against whom a writ is sought being within those territories. It seems to us therefore that it is not permissible to read in Art. 226 the residence or location of the person affected by the order passed in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court. That jurisdiction depends on the person or authority passing the order being within those territories and the residence: or location of the person affected can have no relevance on the question of the High Court's jurisdiction. Thus if a person residing or located in Bombay, for example, is aggrieved by an order passed by an authority located, say, in Calcutta, the forum in which he has to seek relief is not the Bombay High Court though the order may affect him in Bombay but the Calcutta High Court where the authority passing the order is located. It would, therefore, in our opinion be wrong to introduce in Art. 226 the concept of the place where the order 841 passed has effect in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court which can give relief under Art. 226. The introduction of such a concept may give a rise to confusion and conflict of jurisdictions. Take, for example, the case of an order passed by an authority in Calcutta, which affects six brothers living, say, in Bombay, Madras, Allahabad, Jabalpur, Jodhpur and Chandigarh. The order passed by the authority in Calcutta has thus affected persons in six States. Can it be said that Art. 226 contemplates that all the six High Courts have jurisdiction in the matter of giving relief under it? The answer must obviously be 'No', if one is to avoid confusion and conflict of jurisdiction. .... The order passed by the authority in Calcutta has thus affected persons in six States. Can it be said that Art. 226 contemplates that all the six High Courts have jurisdiction in the matter of giving relief under it? The answer must obviously be 'No', if one is to avoid confusion and conflict of jurisdiction. .... If we were to introduce in Art. 226 the concept of the place where the order is to have effect we would not be advancing the purposes for which Art. 226 has been enacted. On the other hand, we would be producing conflict of jurisdiction between various High Courts as already shown by the illustration given above. Therefore, the effect of an order by whomsoever it is passed can have no relevance in determining the jurisdiction of the High Court which can take action under Art. 226. Now, functioning of a Government is really nothing other than giving effect to the orders passed by it. Therefore it would not be right to introduce in Art. 226 the concept of the functioning of Government when determining the meaning of the words "any person or authority within those territories". By introducting the concept of functioning in these words we shall be creating the same conflict which would arise if the concept of the place where the order is to have effect is introduced in 842 Art. 226. There can, therefore, be no escape from the conclusion that these words in Art. 226 refer not to the place where the Government may be functioning but only to the place where the person or authority is either resident or is located. So far therefore as a natural person is concerned, he is within those territories if he resides there permanently or temporarily. So far. as an authority (other than a Government) is concerned, it is within the territories if its office is located there. So far as a Government is concerned it is within the territories only if its seat is within those territories. 14. ....... Therefore, the view taken in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao(1) and K.S. Rashid and Son v. The Income-tax Investigation Commission (2) that there is twofold limitation on the power of the High Court to issue writs etc. 14. ....... Therefore, the view taken in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao(1) and K.S. Rashid and Son v. The Income-tax Investigation Commission (2) that there is twofold limitation on the power of the High Court to issue writs etc. under Art. 226, namely, (i) the power is to be exercised 'throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction', that is to say, the writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction, and (ii) the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be "within those territories" which clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories, is the correct one. 16. Article 226 as it stands does not refer anywhere to the accrual of cause of action and to the jurisdiction of the High Court depending on the place where the cause of action accrues being within its territorial jurisdiction. Proceedings under Art. 226 are not suits; they provide for extraordinary remedies by a special procedure and give powers of correction to the High Court over persons and authorities and these special powers have to be exercised within the limits set for them. These two limitations have already been indicated by us above and one of them is that the person or authority concerned must be within the territories over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. Is it possible then to overlook this constitutional limitation and say that the High Court can issue a writ against a person or authority even though it may not be within its territories simply because the cause of action has arisen within those territories? It seems to us that it would be going in the face of the express provision in Art. 226 and doing away with an express limitation contained therein if the concept of cause of action were to be introduced in it. ......... The concept of cause of action cannot in our opinion be introduced in Art. 226, for by doing so we shall be doing away with the express provision contained therein which requires that the person or authority to whom the writ is to be issued should be resident in or located within the territories over which the High Court has jurisdiction. It is true that this may result in some inconvenience to persons residing far away from New Delhi who are aggrieved by some order of the Government of India as such, and that may be a reason for making a suit. able constitutional amendment in Art. 226. But the argument of inconvenience, in our opinion, cannot affect the plain language of Art. 226, nor can the concept of the place of cause of action be introduced into it for that would do away with the two limitations on the powers of the High Court contained in it.” 17.....In this case our reconsideration of the matter has confirmed the view that there is no place for the introduction of the concept of the place where the impugned order has effect or of this concept of functioning of a Government, apart from the location of its office concerned with the case, or even of the concept of the place where the cause of action arises in Art. 226 and that the language of that article is plain enough to lead to the conclusion at which the two cases of this Court referred to above arrived. If any inconvenience is felt on account of this interpretation of Art. 226 the remedy seems to be a Constitution amendment. There is no scope for avoiding the inconvenience by an interpretation which we cannot reasonably, on the language of the Article adopt and which the language of the article does not bear.” 15.3 Then Article 226 came to be amended and clause 2 came to be inserted. After the amendment in Article 226 of the Constitution and introduction of clause 2 under Article 226 of the Constitution, occurrence of cause of action has widened the base and conferred power and territorial jurisdiction to High Court to entertain a petition in case where “cause of action” has arisen, wholly or in part, within the territory where the Court exercises the jurisdiction. Thus, now the constraints, which Hon'ble Apex Court noticed and discussed in the decision in case of learned Tribunal. Col. Khajoor Singh do not exist. Now, if it is shown that cause of action or part of it has arisen within the territory of the Court where the petition is submitted, then the Court can exercise jurisdiction and decide the dispute. Col. Khajoor Singh do not exist. Now, if it is shown that cause of action or part of it has arisen within the territory of the Court where the petition is submitted, then the Court can exercise jurisdiction and decide the dispute. This position is explained by Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision in case of Alchemist Limited & Anr. v. State Bank of Sikkim & Ors. [ AIR 2007 SC 1812 ] in following terms: “18. It may be stated that by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, Clause (1A) was renumbered as Clause (2). The underlying object of amendment was expressed in the following words :- "Under the existing Article 226 of the Constitution, the only High Court which has jurisdiction with respect to the Central Government is the Punjab High Court. This involves considerable hardship to litigants from distant places. It is, therefore, proposed to amend Article 226. So that when any relief is sought against any Government, authority or person for any action taken, the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises may also have jurisdiction to issue appropriate directions, orders or writs". (Emphasis supplied) 19. The effect of the amendment was that the accrual of cause of action was made an additional ground to confer jurisdiction on a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 20. As Joint Committee observed :- "This clause would enable the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The Committee feel that the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises in part only should also be vested with such jurisdiction". 21. The legislative history of the constitutional provisions, therefore, make it clear that after 1963, cause of action is relevant and germane and a writ petition can be instituted in a High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which cause of action in whole or in part arises.” 16. 21. The legislative history of the constitutional provisions, therefore, make it clear that after 1963, cause of action is relevant and germane and a writ petition can be instituted in a High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which cause of action in whole or in part arises.” 16. The exercise of court's power and authority to decide claim and dispute can be divided or classified in different class or category e.g. (a) the territory where the cause of action arises i.e. territorial jurisdiction; (b) pecuniary or monetary value of the subject matter which the court can entertain i.e. pecuniary jurisdiction; (c) subject related jurisdiction i.e. power to decide claim/dispute of particular subject or nature or category e.g. consumer dispute or family-matrimonial dispute, revenue cases, landlord and tenant, criminal offence, dispute related to service etc. 17. So as to appreciate and decide the issue on hand, it is appropriate to take into account following observations from decided cases which have bearing on the issue on hand: [a] In case of Oil and Natural Gas Limited vs. Utpal Kumar Basu 1994 (4) SCC 711 the Hon'ble Apex Court took into account below mentioned facts: 2. The Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC), a Government of India Undertaking, has a Gas Processing Plant at Hazira in the State of Gujarat. Engineers India Limited (EIL) acting as consultants for ONGC issued an advertisement dated 2761991 in the leading newspapers of the country including those in circulation in West Bengal calling for tenders for setting up of a Kerosene Recovery Processing Unit at the Hazira Complex in Gujarat. According to the said advertisement the tenders containing offers were to be communicated to EIL at New Delhi. NICCO, having its registered office in Calcutta, read and became aware of the tender notice printed in the 715 Times of India circulated within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. The tenders were to be scrutinised by a Tender Committee and the final decision was to be taken by a Steering Committee at New Delhi presided over by the Chairman of ONGC. NICCO, along with others, submitted their offer or bid in response to the tender notice. All the bids were scrutinised by EIL at New Delhi. NICCO's bid was rejected on the ground that it did not fulfill the requisite experience criteria stipulated in the tender. NICCO, along with others, submitted their offer or bid in response to the tender notice. All the bids were scrutinised by EIL at New Delhi. NICCO's bid was rejected on the ground that it did not fulfill the requisite experience criteria stipulated in the tender. The recommendations made by the EIL were considered by the Tender Committee. The Tender Committee, however, expressed the view that NICCO satisfied the experience criteria and they too should be called for the clarificatory meeting proposed to be held by EIL at New Delhi. The said meeting was held by the EIL with various bidders including NICCO some time in July-August 1992. After the said meeting EIL once again reiterated its earlier view that NICCO lacked the experience criteria. The Tender Committee reexamined the view of EIL and agreed with the same some time in October 1992. In view of the said development NICCO was not recommended for short-listing by the Tender Committee. NICCO represented and their representations were considered by the EIL as well as the Tender Committee but they saw no reason to depart from their earlier view. The final decision was taken by the Steering Committee on 2711993 at New Delhi, pursuant whereto it was decided to award the contract to M/s CIMMCO Ltd. Thereupon NICCO filed the aforesaid writ petition in the High Court of Calcutta. In the said writ petition CIMMCO was not made a party. On the application of CIMMCO this Court directed that it be joined in the appeal as a corespondent.” Having regard to the said facts Hon'ble Apex Court observed that: “5. ... On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or impart, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ 'is issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court, That is at best its case in the writ petition. 7. ... EIL was appointed by ONGC as its consultant. In that capacity, EIL issued the advertisement from New Delhi calling for tenders and this advertisement was 1 ILR (1889) 16 Cal 98,102: 15 IA 156 718 printed and published in all the leading newspapers of the country including the Times of India in circulation in West Bengal. The tenders or bids were to be forwarded to EIL at New Delhi. EIL was expected to scrutinise the tenders and make its recommendations to the Tender Committee constituted by ONGC. The final decision was, however, to be taken by the Steering Committee at New Delhi presided over by the Chairman, ONGC. Accordingly, the tender of NICCO was examined by EIL at New Delhi and it recommended its rejection on the ground that NICCO did not satisfy the experience criteria requisite for the grant of contract. On the first occasion, the Tender Committee did not agree with the said recommendation and directed the EIL to call NICCO at the clarificatory meeting proposed to be held in New Delhi. In obedience to the said direction, EIL invited NICCO along with the other bidders, but once again recommended its rejection on the ground that it did not satisfy the experience criteria. The Tender Committee which met in New Delhi reviewed its earlier decision and accepted the recommendation of EIL which was also accepted by the Steering Committee at New Delhi on 2711993. It was at this point of time that the decision to award the contract to CIMMCO was taken at New Delhi. Counsel for ONGC, therefore, contended that all these events took place outside the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court and merely because NICCO had read the advertisement in the Times of India in circulation in West Bengal and had forwarded its tender from its registered office in Calcutta and followed it up by a revised offer, it cannot be said that any part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court .... 8. 8. From the facts pleaded in the writ petition, it is clear that NICCO invoked the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court on the plea that a part of the cause of action had arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. According to NICCO, it became aware of the contract proposed to be given by ONGC on reading the advertisement which appeared in the Times of India at Calcutta. In response thereto, it submitted its bid or tender from its Calcutta office and revised the rates subsequently. When it learnt that it was considered ineligible it sent representations, including fax messages, to EIL, ONGC, etc., at New Delhi, demanding justice. As stated earlier, the Steering Committee finally rejected the offer of NICCO and awarded the contract to CIMMCO at New Delhi on 2711993. Therefore, broadly speaking, NICCO claims that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court because it became aware of the advertisement in Calcutta, it submitted its bid or tender from Calcutta and made representations demanding justice from Calcutta on learning about the rejection of its offer. The advertisement itself mentioned that the tenders should be submitted to EIL at New Delhi; that those would be scrutinised at New Delhi and that a final decision whether or not to award the contract to the tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. Of course, the execution of the contract work was to be carried out at Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore, merely because it read the advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. Besides the fax message of 1511993, cannot be construed as conveying rejection of the offer as that fact occurred on 2711993. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even if the averments in the writ petition are taken as true, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. 14. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even if the averments in the writ petition are taken as true, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. 14. Before we part we must clarify that we have confined ourselves to deciding whether on the averments made in the petition any part of the cause of action is shown to have arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. Even if we had come to the conclusion that the averments disclosed that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the said Court and therefore the petition could be entertained by that Court, it would still have been open for the opposite party to dispute the said averments and if the opposite party were to succeed in showing that the averments were not true and correct, the petition, though entertained, would fail for want of jurisdiction.” [b] In case of Union of India vs. Adani Exports Limited [ 2002 (1) SCC 567 ] Hon'ble Apex Court considered issue of territorial jurisdiction in light of the factual backdrop mentioned in paragraph No. 6 which reads thus: “(6) For deciding the above issue, it is necessary to first notice the contentions raised in the special civil applications to establish the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. Contentions regarding the cause of action and the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court are pleaded in the applications at para 16 which read thus: The petitioners carry on business of export and import from Ahmedabad. The orders for export and import are placed from and executed from Ahmedabad. The documents and payments for export and imports are sent/made at Ahmedabad. The credit of duty claimed in respect of exports were handled from Ahmedabad since export orders were received at Ahmedabad and payments also received at Ahmedabad. The non-granting and denial of utilisation of the credit in the said Pass Book shall effect the business of the Petitioners at Ahmedabad. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have regional offices at Ahmedabad. A substantial part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. This Honourable Court has therefore, jurisdiction to entertain, try and dispose of this Petition. Having regard to the said facts Hon'ble Apex Court observed that: “10. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have regional offices at Ahmedabad. A substantial part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. This Honourable Court has therefore, jurisdiction to entertain, try and dispose of this Petition. Having regard to the said facts Hon'ble Apex Court observed that: “10. We are unable to accept this finding of the High Court. The view of the High Court that this Court in the case of Oswal Woollen (supra) had held that the existence of the registered office of a Company would ipso facto give a cause of action to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the registered office of such Company is situated, is not correct. As a matter of fact, in the case of Oswal Woollen (supra), the question of territorial jurisdiction in the sense with which we are concerned now, did not arise at all. In that case, the observations of the Court were as follows :- Having regard to the fact that the registered office of the Company is at Ludhiana and the principal respondents against whom the primary relief is sought are at New Delhi, one would have expected the writ petition to be filed either in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana or in the Delhi High Court. The writ petitioners, however, have chosen the Calcutta High Court as the forum perhaps because one of the interlocutory reliefs which is sought is in respect of a consignment of beef tallow which has arrived at the Calcutta Port. We do not desire to probe further into the question whether the writ petition was filed by design or accident in the Calcutta High Court when the office of the Company is in the State of Punjab and all the principal respondents are in Delhi. 12. We will now examine whether any of the facts mentioned in Paragraph 16 of the applications or for that matter in the entire special civil applications would give rise to any part of the cause of action at Ahmedabad, at least for the purpose of conferring territorial jurisdiction on the High Court at Ahmedabad. At this stage, it is relevant to mention that it is an admitted fact that none of the respondents in the civil applications (Appellants herein) are stationed at Ahmedabad. At this stage, it is relevant to mention that it is an admitted fact that none of the respondents in the civil applications (Appellants herein) are stationed at Ahmedabad. It is also an admitted fact that the passbook in question, benefit of which the respondent is seeking in the civil applications, is issued by an authority who is stationed at Chennai. The Designated Authority who is the competent person in respect of the matters concerning the Pass Book Scheme and who discharges various functions under the Scheme is also stationed at Chennai. The entries in the passbook under the concerned Scheme are to be made by the authorities at Chennai. The export of prawn made by the respondents and the import of the inputs benefit of which the respondents are seeking in the applications, also will have to be made through the same Port i.e. Chennai. 13. Inspite of the above admitted facts, the respondents herein plead that as per the plea raised by them in paragraph 16 of the special civil application, the following facts give rise to the cause of action conferring territorial jurisdiction on the Court at Ahmedabad. They are : (i) the respondents carry on their business of export and import from Ahmedabad ; (ii) their orders of export and import are placed from and are executed at Ahmedabad ; (iii) documents and payments for export and import are sent/made at Ahmedabad ; (iv) the credit of duty claimed in respect of exports were handled from Ahmedabad since export orders were received at Ahmedabad and payments also received at Ahmedabad ; (v) non-granting and denial of utilisation of the credit in the passbook will affect the business of the respondents at Ahmedabad ; (vi) respondents have executed a bank guarantee through their bankers at Ahmedabad as well as a Bond at Ahmedabad. 17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application as in this case, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the court to decide a dispute which has, at least inpart, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the courts territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. If we apply this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in Paragraph 16 of the petition, in our opinion, fall into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad. 18. As we have noticed earlier, the fact that the respondents are carrying on the business of export and import or that they are receiving the export and import orders at Ahmedabad or that their documents and payments for exports and imports are sent/made at Ahmedabad, has no connection whatsoever with the dispute that is involved in the applications. Similarly, the fact that the credit of duty claimed in respect of exports that were made from Chennai were handled by the respondents from Ahmedabad have also no connection whatsoever with the actions of the appellants impugned in the application. The non-granting and denial of credit in the passbook having an ultimate effect, if any, on the business of the respondents at Ahmedabad would not also, in our opinion, give rise to any such cause of action to a court at Ahmedabad to adjudicate on the actions complained against the appellants. 21. For the reasons stated above, these appeals succeed and the same are hereby allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. ...” [c] In case of M/s. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr. [AIR 2004 SC 2301], Hon'ble Apex Court considered the facts summarized in para 2 and 3 of the said decision, which read thus: “2. The appellant is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act. Its registered office is at Mumbai. It obtained a loan from the Bhopal Branch of State Bank of India. [AIR 2004 SC 2301], Hon'ble Apex Court considered the facts summarized in para 2 and 3 of the said decision, which read thus: “2. The appellant is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act. Its registered office is at Mumbai. It obtained a loan from the Bhopal Branch of State Bank of India. The respondent No. 2 issued a notice for repayment of the said loan from Bhopal purported to be in terms of the provisions of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. 3. Questioning the vires of the said Act, the said writ petition was filed before Delhi High Court by the appellant herein which was dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.” Having considered said backdrop, Hon'ble Apex Court observed that: “18. The facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on the Court. 27. When an order, however, is passed by a Court or Tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority. 29. In view of clause (2) of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India now if a part of cause of action arises outside the jurisdiction of the High Court, it would have jurisdiction to issue a writ. The decision in Khajoor Singh (supra) has, thus, no application. Forum Conveniens 30. 29. In view of clause (2) of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India now if a part of cause of action arises outside the jurisdiction of the High Court, it would have jurisdiction to issue a writ. The decision in Khajoor Singh (supra) has, thus, no application. Forum Conveniens 30. We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens. (See Bhagar Singh Bagga v. Dewan Jagbir Sawhany, AIR 1941 Cal 670; Mandal Jalal v. Madanlal, (1945) 49 CWN 357; Bharat Coking Coal Limited v. M/s. Jharia Talkies and Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. (1997) CWN 122; S. S. Jain and Co. and another v. Union of India and others (1994) CHN 445; M/s. New Horizon Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1994 Delhi 126).” [d] In case of Alchemist Limited & Anr. v. State Bank of Sikkim & Ors. [ AIR 2007 SC 1812 ], Hon'ble Apex Court observed that:- “10. The respondents, in this connection, relied upon the following facts; (i) Registered and Corporate Office of the first-respondent Bank is at Gangtok, i.e. Sikkim; (ii) Secretariate of the second-respondent State is situated at Gangtok, i.e. Sikkim; (iii) Offers were called for from various parties at Gangtok; (iv) All offers were scrutinized and a decision to accept offer of the Appellant-Company was taken by the first-respondent Bank at Gangtok; (v) The State Government's decision not to approve the proposal of the Appellant-Bank was taken at Gangtok; (vi) The meeting of the Board of Directors of the first-respondent Bank was convened at Gangtok and a resolution was passed to withdraw the letter dated February 20, 2004 at Gangtok; (vii) A communication was dispatched by the first-respondent Bank to the Appellant-Company on February 23, 2004 from Gangtok. 27. In our opinion, the High Court was wholly justified in upholding the preliminary objection raised by the respondents and in dismissing the petition on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction. 41. 27. In our opinion, the High Court was wholly justified in upholding the preliminary objection raised by the respondents and in dismissing the petition on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction. 41. From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down in catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the petitioner-appellant, would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a 'part of cause of action', nothing less than that.” [e] In the decision in case of National Textile Corp. Ltd vs. Haribox Swarlram [ (2004) 9 SCC 786 ] Hon'ble Apex Court considered the issue with regard to territorial jurisdiction in backdrop of the facts which are summarized in para3 of the decision which reads thus: “3. The case set up in the writ petition is as follows. The writ petitioners had been purchasing various quantities of cloth from Finlay Mills Limited and Gold Mohur Mills Limited, both situate in Bombay. The petitioners entered into contracts specified in Annexure-A to the writ petition and made advance payment against the same. The concerned mills supplied and delivered the goods to the petitioners from time to time but a substantial part of the contract remained unexecuted. By the letter dated 26.9.1993 the mills were requested to take necessary steps for immediate delivery of the goods, in respect whereof payment had already been made. The mills vide their letter dated 29.9.1993 intimated that deliveries could not be effected as the banking transaction and accounts of the mills had been frozen, but assured that arrangements were being made to deliver the goods as early as possible. The management of the mills was taken over by the Central Government on 18.10.1993 under Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Ordinance, 1983 which was subsequently replaced by Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1993 on 25.12.1993. The management of the mills was taken over by the Central Government on 18.10.1993 under Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Ordinance, 1983 which was subsequently replaced by Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1993 on 25.12.1993. The Central Government constituted National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) Limited for the purpose of managing the textile undertakings which in turn as additional custodian took over the management of the two textile undertakings. The writ petitioners, thereafter approached the appellants for release of the goods and one bale of contractual specification was delivered but 12 bales were detained by the Excise Authorities, as a consequence whereof the same were not delivered. The National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) vide their letter dated 15.3.1984 requested the Officer on Special Duty of taken over mills including Gold Mohur Mills and Gold Mohur Mills to furnish particulars in prescribed proforma to enable it to take up the matter with the Central Government for taking action under section 11(1) of the Act for the purpose of cancelling or varying any contract or agreement entered prior to pre-take over period which action had to be taken on or before 14.4.1984. After giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. the textile mills called upon the writ petitioners to verify the pre-take over contracts and joint meetings took place for the said purpose and the matter was referred back to the Officer on Special Duty. The writ petitioners then vide their letter dated 13.10.1984 requested the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) Ltd. to deliver the balance quantity of cloth in terms of the pending contracts and to adjust all sums of money which had been paid by way of advance. The writ petitioners then vide their letter dated 13.10.1984 requested the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) Ltd. to deliver the balance quantity of cloth in terms of the pending contracts and to adjust all sums of money which had been paid by way of advance. The appellants sent a reply on 7.11.1994 stating that (1) all the outstanding contracts had been cancelled on the date of take over as they were not binding upon them; (2) the deposits that were made with the erstwhile management were not specifically marked towards any of invoice of packed material and as such could not be adjusted against any future delivery and the writ petitioners will have to claim this amount from the erstwhile management since the custodian is prohibited from discharging any liability pertaining to pre-take over period; and (3) there were no invoices against which payments were received from the petitioners prior to take over and as such the question of effecting delivery of paid stocks did not arise. The writ petitioners made several representations and they were informed by the letter dated 4.10.1989 that the matter relating to delivery of cloth in pursuance of pre-take over contracts was under active consideration. However, no delivery was effected. The writ petition was thereafter filed in December, 1989 seeking the reliefs mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment.” In backdrop of said facts, Hon'ble Apex Court considered the issue about territorial jurisdiction and observed and held that :- “10. Under Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court is empowered to issue writs, orders or directions to any Government, authority or person exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. Cause of action as understood in the civil proceedings means every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. To put it in a different way, it is bundle of facts which taken with law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. ... 12. To put it in a different way, it is bundle of facts which taken with law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. ... 12. In the present case, the textile mills are situate in Bombay and the supply of cloth was to be made by them ex-factory at Bombay. According to the writ petitioners, the money was paid to the mills at Bombay. The learned Single Judge after a detailed discussion of the matter held that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The Division Bench has reversed this finding on the ground that concluded contract had come into existence which could be cancelled only after giving an opportunity of hearing and consequently the question of revocation of the contract at its Calcutta address would constitute a cause of action. In our opinion, the view taken by the Division Bench is wholly erroneous in law. It was nowhere pleaded in the writ petition that the appellant herein had initiated any action under Section 11 of the Act by issuing any notice to the writ petitioner for cancellation of the contract. In fact, it is stated in para 18 of the petition that the Central Government did not follow the procedure prescribed in Section 11 for cancellation of contract. Regarding the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, the relevant statement was made in para 73 of the writ petition wherein it was stated as under : "73. Your petitioner carries on business and maintains all accounts at the aforesaid place of business within the jurisdiction. Your petitioner states that by reason of the aforesaid, your petitioners have suffered loss and damage at its said place of business within the jurisdiction. All notices and correspondences referred to hereinabove addressed to your petitioner has been received by your petitioner at your petitioner's place of business within the jurisdiction. In the circumstances this Hon'ble Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the present application." 12.1 As discussed earlier, the mere fact that the writ petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or that the reply to the correspondence made by it was received at Calcutta is not an integral part of the cause of action and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and the view to the contrary taken by the Division Bench cannot be sustained. In view of the above finding, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. However, in order to avoid any further harassment to the parties and to put an end to the litigation, we would examine the matter on merits as well.” [f] In the decision in case of Eastern Coalfields Ltd vs. Kalyan Banerjee [ (2008) 3 SCC 456 ] Hon'ble Apex court considered said issue in light of the fact that the respondent before Hon'ble apex Court was an employee of the Eastern Coalfields Limited and was employed at Mugma area in district of Dhanbad, Jharkhand. The General Manager of the area whose office is also situate at Mugma was his appointing and disciplinary authority. The service of the respondent came to be terminated at Mugma, Jharkhand. However he filed writ application before Calcutta High court. In the said case Hon'ble apex Court held that:- 9.As regards the question as to whether situs of office of the appellant would be relevant, this Court noticed decisions of this Court in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal [ AIR 1976 SC 331 ] and U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow vs. State of U.P. and others [ (1995) 4 SCC 738 ] to hold:- "26. The view taken by this Court in U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad that the situs of issue of an order or notification by the Government would come within the meaning of the expression "cases arising" in clause 14 of the (Amalgamation) Order is not a correct view of law for the reason hereafter stated and to that extent the said decision is overruled. In fact, a legislation, it is trite, is not confined to a statute enacted by Parliament or the legislature of a State, which would include delegated legislation and subordinate legislation or an executive order made by the Union of India, State or any other statutory authority. In a case where the field is not covered by any statutory rule, executive instructions issued in this behalf shall also come within the purview thereof. Situs of office of Parliament, legislature of a State or authorities empowered to make subordinate legislation would not by itself constitute any cause of action or cases arising. In a case where the field is not covered by any statutory rule, executive instructions issued in this behalf shall also come within the purview thereof. Situs of office of Parliament, legislature of a State or authorities empowered to make subordinate legislation would not by itself constitute any cause of action or cases arising. In other words, framing of a statute, statutory rule or issue of an executive order or instruction would not confer jurisdiction upon a court only because of the situs of the office of the maker thereof. 27. When an order, however, is passed by a court or tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words, as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority." 12......These directions are authorities for the proposition that only that court will have jurisdiction within which, the entire cause of action had arisen. In this case, no part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. 13. In view of the decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the entire cause of action arose in Mugma Area within the State of Jharkhand, we are of the opinion that only because the Head Office of the appellant company was situated in the State of West Bengal, the same by itself will not confer any jurisdiction upon the Calcutta High Court, particularly when the Head Office had nothing to do with the order of punishment passed against the respondent.” [g] At this stage, profitable reference can be had to the decision in case of Brij Bhai Singh Gautam v. Union of India & Ors. [AIR 1998 Allahabad 132], the factual backdrop involved in said case is summarized by High Court in para No.2 of the decision which reads thus: “2. [AIR 1998 Allahabad 132], the factual backdrop involved in said case is summarized by High Court in para No.2 of the decision which reads thus: “2. A synoptical resumption of the relevant facts necessary to appreciate the moot question raised across the bar, may be set out and they are that the Divisional Manager, Central Railways with its Head Office stationed at Jabalpur invited applications from respectable and experienced caterers vide advertisement dated 10111996 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition) for grant of catering contract in respect of Manikpur Railway Station, that the petitioner and opposite party No. 3 were amongst the applicants for grant of Theka appertaining to Manikpur Railway Station for which interview was held on 2421997 at Jabalpur and in the ultimate analysis, the decision tilted in favour of respondent No. 3, who was awarded Theka vide separate orders dated 1451997, for running Tea, Coffee, Namkeen, Sweet and Fruit stalls as well as refreshment rooms Veg. and non-veg; that the Theka aforestated, as mentioned in the order, is to ensure for a period of five years between 20597 and 1952002; and that it is these contracts awarded by two separate orders dated 1451997, which are sought to be quashed by means of the present petition basically on ground that the opposite party No. 3 does not satisfy the experience criterion. The two contracts were awarded each on yearly licence fee fixed at Rs. 50,000/and Rs. 18,000/respectively, subject to the conditions enumerated in the orders (Annexures-9 and 10).” Having regard to said facts, Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that: “9. Such being the concept of 'cause of action', the question that surfaces for examination in the instant case is whether any part of the 'cause of action' arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. As already noticed, the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the situs of contract, i.e. the place where the contract is to be performed, is an integral part of 'cause of action.' The submission made by the learned counsel does not commend itself for acceptance in the spectrum of the allegations made in the writ petition and prayers made therein. We are of the considered view that in a writ petition seeking issuance of the writ of certiorari for quashing of the contracts awarded in favour of the Opposite Party No. 3 and for mandamus, order or direction directing the appropriate authority to award catering contracts in question to the petitioner, the place where the contract is to be performed i.e. the situs of contract cannot be posited as integral part of 'cause of action. The illegality, if any, in award of the contract in favour of the Opposite Party No. 3, cannot be said to have been indulged in at the place where the contract is to be performed inasmuch as the decision to award contracts in favour of the Opposite Party No. 3 was admittedly taken at Jabalpur. In order to qualify for the reliefs claimed in the writ petition, all that the petitioner has to do is to establish that the contracts have been awarded to Opposite Party No. 3 in breach of the conditions particularly the condition appertaining to experience stipulated in the advertisement and those contained in the new catering policy. The place where the contract is to be performed would have no bearing on the decision on the relevant question aforestated. In this view of the matter, the situs of contracts in the instant case, has no nexus with the alleged illegality in award of contract, the decision in respect of which was taken at Jabalpur and, therefore, we are of the firm view that no part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. In this view of the matter, the situs of contracts in the instant case, has no nexus with the alleged illegality in award of contract, the decision in respect of which was taken at Jabalpur and, therefore, we are of the firm view that no part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. We may, however, hasten to quip that position may alter in a petition raising grievances on breach of contract in which situation, the situs or the place where the contract has to be performed, may form part of 'cause of action.' The observation made by the Supreme Court in the case of Swaika Properties reported in AIR 1989 SC 1239 that the jurisdiction of the Court in a matter of contract, will depend on the situs of the contract and the cause of action arising through connecting factors will not apply to the facts of the present case inasmuch as that was a case founded on a concluded contract between the parties whereas in the present case no contract has been entered into between the petitioner on one hand and the Railway Administration on the other. The petitioner, on the other hand, is seeking a direction calling upon Railway Administration to award contracts in question in his favour after quashing the contracts in favour of Opposite Party. No. 3. As such, the observations made in para 12 of the Report, AIR 1989 SC 1239 are unavailing to the petitioner. 10. In the conspectus of what we have discussed above, we converge to the conclusion that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. Needless to say, the petitioner shall be at liberty to seek his remedy elsewhere. [h] In case of Ramanlal Kanjibhai Baranda v. Commandant & Ors. [SCA No.3956/2005] as well as in case of NKR Bhatia v. ONGC Ltd. [Letters Patent Appeal No.1050/2012] in case of Sarjeet Singh Maidhan v. Union of India [ 2011 (1) GLH 714 ]. In the said three decisions, the Court did not accept and entertain the plea that the order of termination of service was served in Gujarat and that therefore, the cause of action arose within jurisdiction of this Court. In the decision in case of Sarjeet Singh Maidhan (supra), Hon'ble Division Bench observed, inter alia, that:- “10. In the said three decisions, the Court did not accept and entertain the plea that the order of termination of service was served in Gujarat and that therefore, the cause of action arose within jurisdiction of this Court. In the decision in case of Sarjeet Singh Maidhan (supra), Hon'ble Division Bench observed, inter alia, that:- “10. The Full Bench came to the conclusion that place of residence of petitioner at District Ballia in State of Uttar Pradesh would not confer territorial jurisdiction on Allahabad High Court the petitioner was dismissed from service in Court Martial proceedings in State of West Bengal and as even part of cause of action had not arisen in State of Uttar Pradesh and the writ petition was not maintainable. 11. In view of the discussions made above, we are of the considered opinion that since the petitioner was declared as deserter while he was in service at Assam, either the High Court at Guhati would have jurisdiction or where the petitioner's representation was rejected, i.e. at Gaya (Bihar), Patna High Court would have jurisdiction, but High Court of Gujarat would not have territorial jurisdiction as no cause of action wholly or in part has arisen in Gujarat. The argument of counsel for the petitioner that since the petitioner was residing in Gujarat State, therefore, on the ground of residence, he is entitled to maintain this Special Civil Application, is liable to be rejected. 12. In the case in hand, the petitioner was declared deserter in State of Assam, his representation was rejected at Gaya in State of Bihar. No part of cause of action had arisen in State of Gujarat, therefore, this Special Civil Application is dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to approach the appropriate authority or legal Forum.” A profitable reference can also be had to the decision in case of Textile Labour Union vs. Union of India wherein the petitioner challenged order passed by the AAIFR as well as BIFR, at Delhi. The said petition came to be filed before this Court. In the said case Division Bench of this Court observed and held that:- 7. Coming to the facts of this case, a Scheme was floated by BIFR, as per its impugned order at Annexure-A, way back on 30102002, which includes several clauses. The said petition came to be filed before this Court. In the said case Division Bench of this Court observed and held that:- 7. Coming to the facts of this case, a Scheme was floated by BIFR, as per its impugned order at Annexure-A, way back on 30102002, which includes several clauses. The petitioner is aggrieved with only a portion of Clause E (v) of para5 of it whereby the wages of the workers have been frozen for 5 years. That period would come to an end in this October 2007. When there is an agreement arrived at with the management, at the instance of Operating Agency and when BIFR had passed the order at Delhi and the appeal was also filed at Delhi, which was dismissed on the ground of limitation, then, in our considered opinion, this Court will have no jurisdiction. If at all any Court had jurisdiction, then it would be the Delhi High Court. Even assuming for the sake of argument that this Court had also parallel territorial jurisdiction, then also, relying on the judgment of 3 Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kusum Ingods case (supra), we would have refused to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens, as, in our considered opinion, proper forum would be the Delhi High Court. 8. In view of above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that there is lot of substance in the first preliminary objection raised by Shri Vakil for respondent Nos. 2 and 3, namely, that this Court has no jurisdiction. Therefore, without going into the merits of the case and without considering other preliminary objections raised in this petition, we simply dismiss this petition only on the ground of territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No costs.” 17.1 Above mentioned decisions and the observation quoted above explain when the facts pleaded by the petitioner can be considered material and essential facts and which facts would constitute integral part of cause of action and when the cause of action can be termed as “arisen within Court's jurisdiction”. 18. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No costs.” 17.1 Above mentioned decisions and the observation quoted above explain when the facts pleaded by the petitioner can be considered material and essential facts and which facts would constitute integral part of cause of action and when the cause of action can be termed as “arisen within Court's jurisdiction”. 18. In light of said observation and before we consider the facts and details mentioned in the petition and the submissions, it would be appropriate to note and keep in focus the principles (for determining territorial jurisdiction) which can be deduced from precedents; viz:- [1] It is petitioner's obligation to mention relevant details and set out factual premise and lay foundation for maintaining the petition. [2] All and sundry facts mentioned by the petitioner or each and every facts pleaded in the petition do not, ipso-facto, give rise to and they do not metamorphose in cause of action but only those facts which have nexus and relevance with and have bearing on the lis involved in the case would constitute cause of action. [3] Differently put, the facts which are “integral part” of the cause of action can confer territorial jurisdiction to the Court where the petition is instituted and the facts which have no bearing with the lis or dispute involved in the case do not give rise to cause of action. [4] The burden to establish that the facts pleaded in the petition have given birth to the cause of action and those facts or actions have, wholly or in part, arisen within the territory where the Court exercises the jurisdiction, is squarely and only on the petitioner. [5] Whether the cause of action wholly or in part, has arisen within territorial jurisdiction of High Court must be decided in light of the nature and character of the proceedings. [5] Whether the cause of action wholly or in part, has arisen within territorial jurisdiction of High Court must be decided in light of the nature and character of the proceedings. [6] The relevant facts which can constitute “cause of action” and how the cause of action has arisen within the territory where the Court exercises jurisdiction must be clearly and specifically mentioned because the Court's satisfaction must emerge from expressly mentioned facts and the Court would not sit with magnifying glass and would not search for necessary averments and/or probe in the maze of facts to find out as to whether the petition reflects necessary details or not and as to whether cause of action has actually arisen within the territory of Court's jurisdiction. [7] The facts mentioned in the petition should be read and considered in “asitis” manner and without entering into detailed examination security of the facts pleaded by the petitioner. [8] The Court would not add anything or read something more (in the averments in the petition) than what is actually and exactly averred and mentioned by the petitioner. Otherwise, such process would result into usurping jurisdiction which is, otherwise, not available in light of the facts actually pleaded by the petitioner. 19. With this prologue, we return to the preliminary objection. 19.1 In present case the question which arise is: whether on pleaded facts it can be said that the cause of action has arisen within the territory where the Court exercises jurisdiction. 20. It is the case and assertion of respondent No.1 that nowhere in the petition the petitioner has specifically averred that the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen within jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore and in view of the objection, it is necessary to consider the facts pleaded and the details mentioned by the petitioner. 20.1 In the petition, the petitioner has averred and stated that:- “DISQUALIFICATION FOR FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRICE BID: 4. The Petitioner states that at the time of opening of the financial bid the General Manager-Projects of the Employer was personally present and this Petitioner has objected in writing before the authority evaluating the price Bid that Respondent 2 has failed in complying with the mandatory conditions of submission of price bid as required by the tender document. The Petitioner states that at the time of opening of the financial bid the General Manager-Projects of the Employer was personally present and this Petitioner has objected in writing before the authority evaluating the price Bid that Respondent 2 has failed in complying with the mandatory conditions of submission of price bid as required by the tender document. This Petitioner states that “The Letter of Price Bid” was conspicuously Absent in the Price Bid Envelope Submitted by Respondent 2 and Since representative of petitioner herein was personally present at the stage of Price Bid opening a specific objection has been raised to that effect. That it was specifically objected to that on account of failure to comply with mandatory condition of submitting letter of price bid as contained in section 5 of part 1 of bidding documents, the tender of Respondent 2 must suffer rejection on the basis that the bid of the Respondent is not responsive and in the form required and expected by the Tender Conditions. The Petitioner states that the said endorsement and objection was made by this Petitioner before the authority which has duly recorded the same but has not furnished any copy thereof to the Petitioner and hence the honourable court be pleased to call for Entire Record pertaining to this tender along with minutes. DISCRETION CONTRARY TO EXPRESS TENDER CONDITIONS: 5. The Petitioner states and submits that Respondent No. 2 has been awarded the LoI of the contract on the sole criteria of being L1 and having submitted a lower price bid than that compared to this Petitioner which was L2. That Respondent No.1 Quoted the Price of Rs.3,28,00,00,000/as lump sum price and this Petitioner Quoted price of Rs.3,31,91,11,111/towards Price bid. That the price difference between the bids quoted by Respondent 2 and the Petitioner is 3.91 crores. That without item wise break up and evaluation of the price bids of a respective parties, Respondent No. 1 has awarded the contract LoI without application of mind and without considerations of principles set forth in the tender document and more particularly ITB 38, 29 and 41 of tender conditions contained in section 1 part 1 of tender titled as Instructions to Bidders. UNWARRANTED RELAXATION OF MANDATORY CONDITION: 6. UNWARRANTED RELAXATION OF MANDATORY CONDITION: 6. The Petitioner states and submits that section 5 of part 1 of bidding document provides for various forms required to be annexed for submission of the financial bid. The Petitioner states that Respondent No. 2 submitted form 4.0 schedule 1 to schedule No. 3 without the submission of price bid required in the form of letter of price bid as contained in section 5. The Respondent 2 has wholly defaulted in submission of the letter of price bid containing final price bid and undertakings as required by tender document. The Petitioner states that despite Respondent 2 not adhering to the mandatory condition of the form in which the price bid was to be submitted, the provisions of the tender have been relaxed by the employer in favor of the Respondent 2 in the circumstances when the tender does not provide for relaxation of any provision. FAILURE TO EVALUATE, COMPARE AND EXAMINE BIDS:- 7. The Petitioner states that 'Letter of price bid' required to be submitted along with the financial bid was a mandatory condition of the tender and grave prejudice has been caused to this Petitioner on account of non-submission of 'letter of price bid' by Respondent 2 as it has deprived Respondent 1employer of adequate material to evaluate examine, compare and correct arithmetical error as mandatorily required to be done before exercise of discretion in award of contract. That plain reading of clause 18.1 clearly require the employer to call for item wise breakup of price bid from prospective bidders. That clause 6.4, clause 12 and clause 11.3 of the bidding document section 1 part 1 clearly stipulated that submission of letter of price bid is a mandatory requirement to be complied with for submission of financial bid and constitutes an integral and inseparable segment of price bid to be submitted by the bidder. That clause 6.4, clause 12 and clause 11.3 of the bidding document section 1 part 1 clearly stipulated that submission of letter of price bid is a mandatory requirement to be complied with for submission of financial bid and constitutes an integral and inseparable segment of price bid to be submitted by the bidder. The Petitioner states that in absence of letter of price bid submitted by Respondent 2 it can be very clearly seen that Respondent No. 2 did not submit the bid in form and manner required by the tender document implying that Respondent 2 has not agreed to accept tender conditions and therefore despite Respondent 2 having defaulted in furnishing of undertakings and submission of financial bid as required by the tender document, Respondent No. l-employer has unduly, unwarrantedly, discriminatorily and without comparing the technical strengths and financial strengths of respective bidders has proceeded to award LoI for the contract of the tender to the lowest L1 bidder i.e. to Respondent 2 in total defiance and disregard to the rules of logic, rationality, equity and mandatory evaluation of comparative merits and demerits as contemplated by tender conditions. The exercise of discretion in award of contract is therefore vitiated and have rendered it bad in law. PROCEDURAL IMPROPRIETY AND IRRATIONALITY:- 8. The Petitioner states that criteria of awarding tender to the lowest bidder L1 while ignoring certain important criteria like workmanship and quality on the basis of experience and past work executed by bidders, as contemplated in terms of the tender, is in complete defiance to the tender condition as merely because a bidder is lowest L1 cannot be the sole criteria for award of contract. The Petitioner states that when the tender itself states that lowest evaluated bid is not the sole criteria for award of contract, the employer is required to apply his mind to objectively compare the technical and financial bid submitted to it and make an informed decision while maintaining the minutes of the meetings and the notings in the tile as regards considerations which weighed for award of contract to the bidder. NATURE OF PREJUDICE AND ARBITRARINESS:- 9. NATURE OF PREJUDICE AND ARBITRARINESS:- 9. The Petitioner states that Respondent l-employer failed to give effect to the mandatory condition as required in ITB 18.3, 18.4 to 18.6 requiring bidder to submit details pertaining to providing price against each item in the manner and detail called for in the price schedules included in section 4 so as to enable employer to evaluate and compare price bids and the method adopted for arriving at the total price of the bid excluding discounts. The Petitioner states that Respondent No.l-employer in failing to call for item wise detailed price, as required in ITB 18.3 has committed serious breach of tender conditions and occasioned grave prejudice to this Petitioner as the non-compliance thereof occasioned failure of employer (R1) to evaluate and compare price bids on objective basis in the absence of material available for comparison. Hence the Challenge in this petition is not of the nature challenging evaluation of tender committee but disability of tender committee to evaluate in absence of material and exercise of discretion in absence of any material available with committee to examine or evaluate bids. That Tender committee (if there was any) had no material before it to compare price bids and hence failed in carrying out objective and comparative analysis of Financial Bids thus failing in exercise of discretion as in law vitiating the decision making process. FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED IN TENDER:- 10. The Petitioner states that since there was no material before the tender committee to evaluate and compare the rates in absence of item wise price details being sought from the bidders, grave prejudice is caused to this Petitioner in failure of Respondent No. 1 to examine arithmetical errors at the stage of evaluation of bids as mandatorily provided in ITB 36 and ITB 38. This petitioner nor the committee can say if price difference was on account of arithmetical error or unrealistic pricing or giving of certain discounts which otherwise was not possible to give. The Petitioner states that in absence of item wise details being made available before Respondent No. 1 it was not possible for employer to determine if the lowest evaluated bid price is seriously unbalanced or front loaded which resulted in internal inconsistency of pricing. The Petitioner states that in absence of item wise details being made available before Respondent No. 1 it was not possible for employer to determine if the lowest evaluated bid price is seriously unbalanced or front loaded which resulted in internal inconsistency of pricing. The Petitioners therefore submits that tender committee did not follow the procedure required in law for exercise of lawful discretion and decided to award contract to the lowest bidder without considering other most important and relevant aspects in award of the contract like workmanship, past experience and capacity. The clause 39 of instructions to bidders specifically require employer to compare and evaluate prices of responsive bids to determine lowest evaluated. The said clause clearly requires employer to ascertain the lowest bid by comparison of item wise prices and not to believe the price quoted in schedule No. 3 as a gospel truth. The consideration of tender committee to award contract without comparison of item wise prices and exercising of checks and balances as required and provided for in ITB 38.5 has resulted in award of contract without following the procedure as laid down in the tender conditions and tantamounting to deviation in violation of mandatory conditions as required by tender document. That despite clear stipulation in the tender that no deviation from the terms and conditions shall be allowed, Respondent 1employer has deviated from the mandatory terms of examining and evaluating the price bids by calling item wise breakups and failed to ensure that the price bid is not unbalanced or frontloaded in the opinion of the employer and that the price bid submitted is clear of any internal price inconsistency. The Petitioner states that despite failure of Respondent 2 to submit letter of price bid containing breakups of discounts and total price bid, the award of contract LoI by employer-Respondent 2 is without any rational criteria or objective basis in the absence of material available with it for the purpose of comparison of price bids and failure of employer to confer appropriate weight to technical expertise and experience of the respective bidders before determining the award of contract. 11. 11. The Petitioner states that pursuant to award of letter of intent (L01) by Respondent 1 to Respondent 2, this Petitioner vide letter dated 10/01/19 has informed Respondent No. 1 that Respondent 2 did not submit the price bid and despite non submission as required by the tender conditions, Respondent 2 has been awarded the contract simply considering the net price mentioned in schedule No. 1 in schedule 4.1, which is merely an annexure to Price Bid. The copy of said letter is annexed and marked with as Annexure C. BID DISQUALIFICATION 12. The Petitioner states that upon asking the managing director of Respondent 1~ employer as to why the bid of Respondent 2 is not rejected for outright noncompliance with mandatory conditions of tender document, it was responded orally that there is no such provision in the contract and thus the managing director while construing and evaluating the Price bid gave a total go by to the provisions of mandatory conditions of ITB 11.3 and ITB 12, which clearly provided for disqualification of such bid. FAILURE TO CONSTITUTE TENDER EVALUATION COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS IN THE FIELD FAILURE TO RECORD REASONS:- 13. The Petitioner states that in a tender for contract of the magnitude involving the work of Rupees over 328 crores, the employer has failed in constituting tender evaluation committee comprising of experts for the purpose of evaluation of technical bids and price bids respectively. The Petitioner further states that the tender committee of Respondent 2 has not recorded any reasons while evaluating, examining and comparing price bids to arrive at the conclusion as to who shall be awarded the contract. That the employer has therefore flouted the procedure required to be followed in law for distribution of public largesse and execution of public works contract as laid down by honourable Supreme Court of India in various authorities. 20.2 In light of the said narration in the petition, it comes out that the said entire set of facts and actions have taken place at New Delhi. From the said narration it also comes out that in the petition, the petitioner has not specifically and expressly averred that the cause of action has arisen within the territory where the Court exercises jurisdiction. From the said narration it also comes out that in the petition, the petitioner has not specifically and expressly averred that the cause of action has arisen within the territory where the Court exercises jurisdiction. However, so as to counter the objection by respondent No.1, the petitioner has, in its rejoinder averred and claimed that:- “4.1 I say and verily submit that respondent No. l is guilty of suppression of material fact that its office is located in Ahmedabad at in Ahmedabad at; Office of the CPM, NHSRCL, 20, 2nd Floor, 4D Square Mall, VisatGandhinagar Highway, Motera, Ahmedabad 380005 and hence respondent No. l is within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Gujarat. Therefore by virtue of ratio laid down by the 7 Judges bench of the Honourable Supreme Court of India in the case of Lt Col Khajoor Singh versus Union of India reported at Air 1961 SC 532 in cases of Corporation having permanent or temporary offices located within the jurisdiction of the state, High Court of the state shall have jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue writs to such a Corporation. This petitioner therefore submits that the honourable High Court of Gujarat is vested with adequate jurisdiction Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue writs to respondent No. 1 who has offices within the territorial limits of the state of Gujarat. That apart from the said fact of presence of respondent No. 1 authority within the territory limits of Gujarat, it has been pleaded by respondent 1 in para 5.1 that state of Gujarat has 25% stake-holding in the formation of joint-venture company, thus the Honourable Gujarat High Court shall have adequate jurisdiction to issue a writ to a government Corporation where state of Gujarat has a controlling stake and is a joint-venture partner. This petitioner therefore denies and refutes the claim of respondent No. l as regards lack of jurisdiction of this court.” 21. Actually, from the petition and the petitioner's rejoinder-counter, it emerges that even after the respondent raised the objection, the petitioner has, in its rejoinder, mentioned only two facts (to claim that cause of action has, in part, arisen within this Court's jurisdiction) viz. (a) one office of respondent is situate within the State of Gujarat; and (b) the State of Gujarat holds 25% share in the respondent No.1 company. 22. (a) one office of respondent is situate within the State of Gujarat; and (b) the State of Gujarat holds 25% share in the respondent No.1 company. 22. Having regard to this position, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner endeavoured to submit that the petitioner demanded debriefing and any response/reply is not received by the petitioner, but the reply, when given, will be received by the petitioner within the Court's jurisdiction and the decision to award contract to L1 bidder amounts to rejection of petitioner's price bid and that since the petitioner's office is within the Court's jurisdiction the cause of action can be said to have arisen within jurisdiction of this Court because the petitioner is situate within the Court's jurisdiction. It is necessary to mention that said contention is urged during the hearing but it is not raised – mentioned in the petition. 23. In light of the details mentioned in the petition and the rejoinder affidavit it comes out that the petitioner has essentially raised dispute and grievance against the process of examination, comparison and evaluation of price-bid submitted by the bidders in respect to NIT issued by respondent No.1. 23.1 In respect of the Tender process including the process of examination, comparison and evaluation of price-bid the petitioner has alleged below mentioned irregularities: [a] Disqualification (of respondent No.1) or failure to submit price bid. On this count, the petitioner has alleged that the respondent No.2 failed to comply mandatory condition of submission of price bid in accordance with tender document, inasmuch as “the letter of price bid of respondent No.2 was conspicuously absent”. Undisputedly, the tender document was issued from the technical as well as price bids were received at and scrutinized at the office of respondent No.1 at New Delhi i.e. all events and actions took place at New Delhi. It is also alleged that though the petitioner specifically raised objection (the said objection also was submitted at New Delhi). In light of such defect and asserted that the tender of respondent No.2 must suffer rejection, the respondent No.1 did not respond. [b] Discretion (allegedly exercise by respondent No.1) contrary to express tender condition. It is also alleged that though the petitioner specifically raised objection (the said objection also was submitted at New Delhi). In light of such defect and asserted that the tender of respondent No.2 must suffer rejection, the respondent No.1 did not respond. [b] Discretion (allegedly exercise by respondent No.1) contrary to express tender condition. In this context, the petitioner, while admitting the fact that the price bid of respondent No.1 is undisputedly lower than its own bid (bid submitted by the petitioner) the petitioner has alleged that the respondent No.1 decided to award the contract on sole criteria that the respondent No.2 emerged as L1 bidder and that said decision is taken without application of mind and without considering item wise break-up. The said decision and all proceeding/actions which led the respondent No.1 occurred and took place at New Delhi. None of those actions, including the process of taking decision, has taken place within this Court's jurisdiction. [c] Unwarranted relaxation of mandatory condition. On this count, the petitioner has alleged that the respondent No.2 submitted Form 4.2 without submission of letter of price bid and the respondent No.1 relaxed the provision of tender in favour of respondent No.2 though the tender does not provide for relaxation. [d] Failure to evaluate/compare and examine bids. In this context, the petitioner has alleged that on account of non-submission of price bid, the respondent No.1 did not get the opportunity of having adequate material to examine, compare and correct arithmetical details/errors. It is alleged that the respondent No.1 has unduly and unwarrantedly and without comparing technical and financial strengths decided to award contract to L1 bidder. Entire process of examination of technical and price bids, their evaluation and comparison and decision based on such examination were taken at New Delhi. [e] Procedural impropriety and irrationality. The petitioner has alleged that the decision or action of awarding tender to L1 bidder ignoring other criteria like workmanship and quality on the basis of experience is in defiance of tender condition and that being listed bidder (L1 bidder) cannot be sole criteria for awarding contract. This process and action occurred at New Delhi. [f] Nature of prejudice and arbitrariness. The petitioner has alleged that the respondent No.1 failed to call for item wise details and thereby committed serious breach of tender condition and the respondent No.1 failed to evaluate and compare price bids on objective basis. This process and action occurred at New Delhi. [f] Nature of prejudice and arbitrariness. The petitioner has alleged that the respondent No.1 failed to call for item wise details and thereby committed serious breach of tender condition and the respondent No.1 failed to evaluate and compare price bids on objective basis. The petitioner has asserted that “the challenge in this petition is “... against disability of tender committee to evaluate in absence of material and exercise of discretion....” The said process was also undertaken at New Delhi. [g] Failure to follow procedure prescribed in tender. The petitioner has alleged that the respondent No.1 failed to examine arithmetical error at the stage of evaluation of bids as mandatorily provided in ITB 36 and ITB 38. The petitioner has made reference of clause 39, ITB 38.5. It is alleged that the committee did not follow procedure and that despite stipulation in the tender that no deviation shall be allowed, the respondent No.1 deviated from mandatory terms of examining and evaluating price bids by calling item wise breakups. Like all other process, this process also was taken at New Delhi. [h] Bid disqualification. The petitioner has alleged that “the managing director while construing and evaluating price bid gave total go-bye to the provision of material conditions of ITB 11.3 and ITB 12 which clearly provided for disqualification of such bid. All bidders submitted the price bids at the address mentioned in the Tender i.e. at New Delhi. All price Bids were examined, evaluated and compared at New Delhi. [i] Failure to constitute tender evaluation committee of experienced in the field and failure to record reasons. The committee constituted by respondent No.1 were constituted at New Delhi and the committee convened the meetings, discussed and evaluated the bids, prepared and recorded the recommendations at New Delhi and the decision about L1 bidder was also taken at New Delhi. 24. When the facts and details mentioned by the petitioner are considered in light of the terms of tender and the observation by Hon'ble Court in abovementioned decisions, which serve as beacon to decide the issue on hand, it emerges that none of the said facts or actions or alleged irregularities have taken place and/or arisen within this Court's jurisdiction. 24. When the facts and details mentioned by the petitioner are considered in light of the terms of tender and the observation by Hon'ble Court in abovementioned decisions, which serve as beacon to decide the issue on hand, it emerges that none of the said facts or actions or alleged irregularities have taken place and/or arisen within this Court's jurisdiction. 24.1 Besides the said details the only premise on which the petitioner claims that cause of action have arisen within the jurisdiction of this court are that (i) the respondent No.1 has an office within the jurisdiction of this court; and (ii) the State Government has 25% share in the respondent No.1 company. Though it is not urged in the petition, not even in the rejoinder, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner tried to bring in picture the contention on the premise that it will receive the reply from respondent No.1 (with regard to debriefing) within the State. 25. Now, so far as the submission by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner on the ground that respondent No.1 has office within the jurisdiction of this Court, is concerned, it is necessary to note that any action, right from the inception of the tender process, i.e. issuance of NIT until the decision taken by respondent to consider respondent No.2 as L1 bidder and issuance of LOI/LOA to respondent No.2, have not taken place at the office situate at Ahmedabad. 26. None of the actions have occurred or taken place at the said office and the said office has had no role in any event or in any decision or action. The entire set of action including the process of decision making, have taken place at New Delhi. 26.1 According to terms of tender, neither the office at Ahmedabad or any one posted at the office at Ahmedabad was authorized or had any authority in connection with the tender/tender process or any role to play in that regard. 26.2 Undisputedly, all actions/steps during the process have taken place and occurred at New Delhi. The said office or any officer at the said office has not played any role and the said office has not taken any step or any action in the process till the date the committee examined and compared price bids and/or the decision selecting respondent No.2 as L1 bidder came to be taken. The said office or any officer at the said office has not played any role and the said office has not taken any step or any action in the process till the date the committee examined and compared price bids and/or the decision selecting respondent No.2 as L1 bidder came to be taken. Actually, such case has not been setup by the petitioner. It is not even petitioner's allegation or case that any step in respect of the said process has been taken by or at the said office or any action in that regard has been taken at said office. Not even miniscule or fraction of tender process from stage of inception till the stage of decision considering respondent No.2 as L1 bidder and the decision to award contract to respondent No.2 have taken place at the respondent's office at Ahmedabad. No averment and no material on this count is on record. The petitioner has not entered into any correspondence or transaction or even dialogue at the said office or with anyone at said office at Ahmedabad nor any order is issued from said office. Except the statement that the respondent has an office in the State of Gujarat, any other statement or material is not placed on record. Under the circumstances, by any stretch of imagination or with most lenient standard and most liberal stand and approach, it is not possible to persuade ourselves to hold that since the respondent no. 1 has one office in the State this Court acquires or can exercise jurisdiction, more particularly when action or step related to the petitioner's grievance or related to the relief prayed for in para17 or subject matter have been taken at the office of respondent No.1 at Ahmedabad. 26.3 On the other hand, so far as the office or situs of the respondent No.1 is concerned, it is relevant to note that the respondent No.1 has its registered office at New Delhi. According to the terms of tender, the Managing Director is, appointed – nominated as the authority for the tender. The office of Managing Director is at New Delhi and all actions related to tender have taken place and all decision have been taken at New Delhi. The respondent no. 2 is at New Delhi. Like all other bidders the petitioner as well as the respondent no. The office of Managing Director is at New Delhi and all actions related to tender have taken place and all decision have been taken at New Delhi. The respondent no. 2 is at New Delhi. Like all other bidders the petitioner as well as the respondent no. 2 also submitted their bid at New Delhi and along with bids of all other bidders the technical bid as well as price bid of respondent no. 2 were evaluated, examined, assessed and compared at New Delhi. 26.4 Diverse provision from the tender/NIT (which have been quoted hereinabove) have brought out that entire procedure related to the tender in question was scheduled to take place and have actually taken place at New Delhi and not at the office within the State of Gujarat, and not at the office within the State of Gujarat. 27. The second premise urged by the petitioner has to be taken note of only for the purpose of rejection. Merely because the State Government has 25% share in the respondent No.1 company, such fact would not confer power and jurisdiction to this court or even justification to this court to entertain and decide present petition. 28. In our view, neither of the said two facts or the submission that petitioner will receive reply in the State can constitute cause of action much less integral part of cause of action capable and qualified to confer power to this Court and to bring the petitioner within territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Even the facts and details mentioned in para 4 to 13 of the petition cannot attract or confer territorial jurisdiction to this Court because none of the actions/steps more particularly the actions or steps which would constitute integral part of cause of action have taken place within this Court's jurisdiction. 28.1 From the provisions in the tender and from the facts mentioned by the petitioner in para 4 to 13, it has emerged that all facts and all events mentioned by the petitioner including the decision the competent authority whereby authority declared that the respondent No.2 is L1 bidder and entire set of facts and actions which give gave rise to present proceedings and the alleged irregularities and defects (mentioned by the petitioner in para Nos.4 to 13 of the petition) have occurred at New Delhi and not within this Court's jurisdiction. Even the petitioner has nowhere specifically and expressly mentioned and/or demonstrated that the cause of action has arisen within jurisdiction of this Court and this Court has territorial jurisdiction. 29. Further, it is relevant to recall that the petitioner says that it is aggrieved by the process of examining, comparison and evaluation of price bid. It is claimed that the said process and procedure undertaken by respondent No.1 is not in accordance with the procedure laid down in tender document. Undisputed facts have brought out that the said events and actions took place at New Delhi. 29.1 The petitioner has further prayed that this Court should declare that the price bid of the respondent No.2 is in noncompliance of the mandatory tender condition. In this context, it is relevant to note that the respondent No.2 is situate at New Delhi. Like other bidders, the respondent No.2 obtained and submitted its technical bid as well as its price bid at New Delhi and the technical bid as well as price bid of respondent No.2 were, along with bids of other bidders, also considered at New Delhi and the decision of the committee that the price bid of the respondent No.2 is lowest as well as the decision declaring the respondent No.2 as L1 bidder have been taken at New Delhi. 29.2 The petitioner has raised allegation and objection that respondent no. 2 did not comply mandatory condition of subject matter of price bid inasmuch as the respondent No.2 did not submit letter of price. The process of submission of bid by all bidders and the process of scrutiny, evaluation, verification and comparison of price bids (and even Tender bids) was conducted and decision on that count have been taken at New Delhi. 29.3 The petitioner has further prayed that this Court should direct that the respondent No.1 should constitute individual tender evaluation committee comprising experts and it should conduct examination, evaluation and comparison of technical bids and financial bids. In this context, it is relevant to note that at the relevant time, entire Tender process was undertaken at New Delhi and even if said directions were to be issued, then also according to the provision in tender document, entire process has to be undertaken (and even if it were to be undertaken de-novo then also it will have to be undertaken) at New Delhi. 30. 30. Besides this, it is relevant to note that the respondent No.1 is at New Delhi and the NIT was also issued from the office of respondent No.1 at New Delhi. The Tender were to be obtained from and submitted at New Delhi. Even pre-bid meeting was held at New Delhi and the LOI/LOA came to be issued at/from office of respondent No.1 at New Delhi. All process and steps related to Tender and processing, evaluation, scrutiny, comparison of bids have taken place. The Committees which carried out said process, did that work at New Delhi, the committees prepared and submitted their recommendations at New Delhi and the competent authority considered those recommendation and took decisions at New Delhi. The Tender also provides that all steps will be held/take at New Delhi and for all purposes the address will be at New Delhi. 30.1 More important is the fact that till the date when the petitioner filed present petition not only major or substantial steps and actions but entire conspectus of fact, events and actions have occurred and taken place at New Delhi and outside this Court's jurisdiction. 31. By any yardstick cause of action, in present case, has not arisen in the State of Gujarat and/or within the jurisdiction of this Court. 32. So far as the contention that when the decision is conveyed to the petitioner, it will be communicated to the petitioner at its office which is situate at Vadodara and that therefore, this Court has jurisdiction is concerned, it does not assist the petitioner to substantiate the submission that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition. 32.1 In this context, profitable reference can be had to the decision in case of National Textile Corpn. Ltd. & Ors. (supra) and the decision in case of Eastern Coalfields Ltd. (supra) as well as in the case of N.K.Bhatia v. ONGC (D/D 10.9.2012), the decision in case of Sarjeet Singh Madhan v. Union of India (D/D 18.2.2011), the decision in case of Brij Singh Gautam v. Union of India (supra) and other decisions mentioned above. In light of the said decision as well as the decision in case of Adani Exports Ltd. and the decision in case of Alchemist Ltd. (supra), the said submission stands rejected and on said ground or premise this Court cannot assume jurisdiction. In light of the said decision as well as the decision in case of Adani Exports Ltd. and the decision in case of Alchemist Ltd. (supra), the said submission stands rejected and on said ground or premise this Court cannot assume jurisdiction. 32.2 A profitable reference at this stage can also be had to the decision by learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Kamlesh Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India & Ors. [SCA No.12306/2007]. In the said decision, the Court considered the fact that head office of petitioner firm was at Ahmedabad and it had its properties at Mehsana and said petitioner was aggrieved by order of appellate tribunal for Foreign Exchange at New Delhi. In the said case after considering the decision in case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra [ (2000) 7 SCC 640 ] as well as the decision in case of Adani Exports Limited (supra) and various other decisions and after considering the facts involved in the case and precedents, the Court held, inter alia, that none of the events leading to initiation of proceedings for contravention of provision under the Act had occurred within jurisdiction of this Court. In the aforesaid decision, the Court observed, inter alia, that: The facts (i) that the petitioner is resident of Mehsana, (ii) the HUF property of the petitioner, which is likely to be attached, upon dismissal of the appeal for noncompliance of the pre-deposit condition is at Mehsana and (iii) Head office of the firm of Ishwardas Patel is at Ahmedabad, have no relevance for the purpose of deciding question of territorial jurisdiction in this case and they cannot be said to be material or integral part of the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action.” 33. In this backdrop what is not possible by plain and simple reading (of the pleaded facts and relief prayed for) and on the basis of or on strength of the material available on record cannot be done by reading or adding something which is not specifically mentioned or urged i.e. by indirectly assuming what is not pleaded or urged. This would amount to artificially assuming jurisdiction which otherwise does not exist or is not available. 34. This would amount to artificially assuming jurisdiction which otherwise does not exist or is not available. 34. This Court will not usurp or acquire jurisdiction by reading or adding something into narration of facts and/or prayer, when on plain reading of the facts narrated by the petitioner or prayer, it has emerged that any fact or event and cause of action, even in part, has not arisen within this Court's jurisdiction and there is nothing on record – particularly in the facts pleaded in the petition which would establish that the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen within jurisdiction of this Court. 35. In view of the details of the events and actions mentioned by the petitioner with regard to alleged disqualification (of respondent No.1) or failure to submit price bid, discretion (allegedly exercise by respondent No.1) contrary to express tender condition, alleged unwarranted relaxation of mandatory condition, alleged failure to evaluate/compare and examine bids, procedural impropriety and irrationality, alleged failure to follow procedure prescribed in tender and alleged failure to constitute tender evaluation committee of experienced persons in the field and/or failure to record reasons, we are of the view that any action, even part of action, more particularly which are relevant and have nexus with subject matter of the petition and can form integral part of cause of action as well as the petitioner's grievance which had occurred on the date the petition came to be filed, have not taken place within the jurisdiction of this Court. Under the circumstances, we accept and allow preliminary objection raised by respondents. We do not accept present petition for want of territorial jurisdiction. This petition is not maintainable before this Court. 36. Under the circumstances, we accept and allow preliminary objection raised by respondents. We do not accept present petition for want of territorial jurisdiction. This petition is not maintainable before this Court. 36. Before closing we would like to mention that even if we were convinced or persuaded to hold that fraction of action has arisen within territory of this Court then also in light of the observation in paragraph No.30 of the decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Kusum Ingots vs. Allys Limited, we would still refuse to entertain present petition and/or to invoke the jurisdiction in view of the fact that not only major or substantial steps and action have not taken place within this Court's jurisdiction but entire conspectus of facts, events and actions including alleged irregularities or defects (with which or on account of which the petitioner is aggrieved) have arisen at New Delhi and outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Having regard to the doctrine of forum convenience and the view of the Court in above mentioned decision in case of TLA (supra) we would refuse to accept present petition. Therefore, in light of foregoing discussion, the petition is disposed of. Notice is discharged. Orders accordingly. Petition dismissed.