JUDGMENT : R. Devdas, J. The writ petitioners and the private respondents in W.P.No.38563-64/2009 are before this Court calling in question the order dated 21.01.2015 passed by the learned Single Judge. Therefore the appeals are heard together and disposed of by this common order. 2. Section 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as 'PTCL Act' for short) provides that an application may be made by any interested party or on information given in writing by any person or suo motu the Assistant Commissioner, if satisfied that the transfer of any granted land is null and void under Sub-Section (1) of Section 4, he may cause notice to the person affected, give reasonable opportunity of being heard and, by order take possession of such land after evicting all persons in possession thereof in such manner as may be prescribed. One such application was made by Sri Krishnappa, the appellant in W.A.No.774/2015, contending that his grandfather Sri Anjanappa was granted 2 acres of land in Old Sy.No.31/10, New Sy.No.84 of Sriramanahalli, Hesarghatta Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, initially under the Grow More Food scheme and after confirmation, the grant certificate was issued to Anjanappa on 03.09.1949, with a condition of non-alienation for a period of ten years. It was further contended that though the condition stipulated in the grant certificate restricts alienation for a period of ten years, as per the prevailing Rules i.e., Government Order No.2828 LR 89-38-10 dated 13.12.1938, lands granted in favour of Depressed Class persons shall not be alienated forever. 3. It was contended that since Anjanappa sold the granted land to one Sri H.T.Subba Rao on 29.12.1967, the first sale and all further transfers were hit by the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Act. The Assistant Commissioner allowed the application by order dated 22.02.2008 and directed resumption and restoration of the land in favour of the applicant. When the matter was taken up in appeal, under Section 5A of the Act, before the Deputy Commissioner, the appeal was dismissed. Consequently, the writ petitions came to be filed and by order dated 21.01.2015, the learned Single Judge set aside the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner and remitted the matter back to the Deputy Commissioner to reconsider the matter on certain facts and on the question of adverse possession. 4. Consequently, the writ petitions came to be filed and by order dated 21.01.2015, the learned Single Judge set aside the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner and remitted the matter back to the Deputy Commissioner to reconsider the matter on certain facts and on the question of adverse possession. 4. The grantee (which means the person claiming under the grantee and the original applicant before the Assistant Commissioner) contends, in his writ appeal, that both the fact finding authorities had concurrently held that there is no dispute on facts and the legal position, therefore, the learned Single Judge could not have remitted the matter back for reconsideration. On the other hand, the purchasers (the writ petitioners) contend that the learned Single Judge, having held that the issue regarding stipulation of non-alienation for ten years and the finding of the Assistant Commissioner being contrary to the condition of stipulation and the same having been covered by a decision in the case of Mariyappa Vs. Thimmarayappa, (2004) ILR(Kar) 3298 could not have remitted the matter for reconsideration. 5. Sri Prakash T.Hebbar, learned Counsel appearing for the purchasers draws the attention of this Court to some of the recent decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Vivek M.Hinduja and Others. Vs. M.Ashwatha and Ors., 2017 SCCOnLineSC 1858 and Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi Vs. State of Karnataka and Anr, 2017 1 KarLR 5 (SC) to contend that the application filed by the grantee requires to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches. It is contended that the action initiated after a period of 20 years to 25 years, as in the case of Vivek M.Hinduja, 2017 SCCOnline SC 1858 and Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi, 2017 1 KarLR 5 (SC) seeking resumption and restoration, have been rejected on the ground of enormous delay. While drawing the attention of this Court to two decisions of co-ordinate Benches, in the case of Sri. Narayanappa and Anr. Vs. the Deputy Commissioner & Ors., in W.A.No.6698-6699/2017, decided on 09.08.2018 and Sri. Nagaraju Vs. While drawing the attention of this Court to two decisions of co-ordinate Benches, in the case of Sri. Narayanappa and Anr. Vs. the Deputy Commissioner & Ors., in W.A.No.6698-6699/2017, decided on 09.08.2018 and Sri. Nagaraju Vs. M.Vijayakrishna & Ors., in W.A.No.908/2019 and connected matters, decided on 12.06.2019, the learned Counsel submits that in view of the decisions of the Apex Court in Vivek M.Hinduja, 2017 SCCOnLineSC 1858 and Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi, 2017 1 KarLR 5 (SC) the writ petition preferred by the purchasers had to be allowed and there was no need to remit the matter back to the Assistant Commissioner. 6. Per contra, Smt.M.V.Susheela, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the grantee, submits that the question of limitation in filing an application seeking resumption and restoration of granted land, under the Act, does not arise. It is submitted that a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in the case of G.M.Venkatareddy & Anr. Vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Kolar, 2012 2 ILR(Kar) 3168 had an occasion to deal with a similar situation, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Ningappa Vs. Deputy Commissioner, in Civil Appeal No.3131 of 2007 decided on 14.07.2011, had observed that if considerable delay occurs, action under the Act cannot be taken. Heavy reliance had been placed on the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ningappa (supra) and prayers were made in the pending writ petitions before this Court, to dispose of the matters on the basis of the order in Ningappa (supra). 7. His Lordship Justice Vikramajit Sen, as he then was the Chief Justice of this Court, writing the judgment for the Division Bench, observed that when a condition of non-alienation is stipulated in the grant, title of land in question has not been absolutely granted to the grantee. Their title by adverse possession against the State was for a period of over 30 years prior to the date of coming into force of the Act. It was therefore held that transfer made in contravention to the conditions would necessarily mean that the grantee cannot give a better title than what he had, to the purchaser and that title has the burden of non-alienation either for a particular period or for all period to come. If any sale is effected contrary to those provisions, the same would enable the authorities to resume the lands in question. If any sale is effected contrary to those provisions, the same would enable the authorities to resume the lands in question. Having regard to Section 5(3) of the Act, it was held that a legal fiction is enacted in sub-section (3) of Section 5 to state that if a person is found to be in possession of the granted land, then, said person should be regarded as a person who has acquired the granted land by transfer. A presumption lies, unless the contrary is proved, that such person has acquired the land by a transfer which is null and void. Having discussed the provisions of the Act and various decisions of the Apex Court, it was held that dismissal of an application or writ petition on the ground of laches is irreconcilable with the elaboration and enunciation of the law of adverse possession made previously by larger Benches. Further more, it was submitted that the decision in G.M.Venkatareddy, 2012 2 ILR(Kar) 3168 was sought to be assailed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLA (C)Nos.17985/2012 and 23874/2012. By order dated 16.07.2012, the Hon'ble Supreme Court declined to interfere and dismissed the Special Leave Appeals, holding as under: "carefully perused the well crafted and well reasoned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and are convinced that the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench did not commit any error by refusing to entertain the petitioner's challenge to the orders passed by the competent authority and the appellate authority respectively. The Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed." Similarly SLA (C) No.23874/2012 was also dismissed. 8. The Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed." Similarly SLA (C) No.23874/2012 was also dismissed. 8. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the learned Single Judge erred in placing reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mariyappa vs. N.Thimmarayappa, (2004) ILR(Kar) 3298 on the question of adverse possession, since the question of adverse possession in relation to the provisions of the Act stood emphatically decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of D.N.Venkatarayappa and Another vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (1997) 7 SCC 567 wherein it was held that the purchaser is required to plead and prove that he/she disclaimed the title under which he/she came into possession, set up adverse possession with necessary animus of asserting open and hostile title to the knowledge of the true owner and the latter allowed the farmer, without any let or hindrance, to remain in possession and enjoyment of the property, adverse to the interest of the true owner until the expiry of the prescribed period. The classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Further more, having regard to the decisions of the larger bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manchegowda and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (1984) 3 SCC 301 Their Lordships in R.Chandevarappa and Others Vs. State of Karnataka, (1995) 6 SCC 309 held that in the context of the Act, while considering the claim of adverse possession of the purchaser of a granted land from the original grantee, the person who comes into possession under colour of title from original grantee, if he intends to claim adverse possession as against the State, such a person must disclaim his title of the State and the State had not taken any action thereon within the prescribed period. It is therefore submitted that the learned Single Judge could not have remitted the matter back to the Deputy Commissioner for reconsideration on the question of adverse possession. 9. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that the writ petition was erroneously allowed by the learned Single Judge on 21.01.2015. The petition was not allowed on the ground of delay and laches. In fact, such a contention was not put forth before the learned Single Judge. 9. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that the writ petition was erroneously allowed by the learned Single Judge on 21.01.2015. The petition was not allowed on the ground of delay and laches. In fact, such a contention was not put forth before the learned Single Judge. It is submitted that had the said question of delay and laches been put forth before the learned Single Judge, in view of the unequivocal opinion as on the date of the decision in the writ petition, such a plea would have been negatived. The learned Senior Counsel submits that as a routine, the ground of delay and laches were taken by the purchasers in all the petitions and the same have been negatived by this Court and by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, until the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi, 2017 1 KarLR 5 (SC) 10. The learned Senior counsel further submits that the purchasers should not be allowed to take advantage of the recent decisions in Nekkanti, 2017 1 KarLR 5 (SC) and Vivek Hinduja, 2017 SCCOnLineSC 1858 since the question of delay and laches were never raised or argued before the fact finding authorities or the learned Single Judge. Indeed, the grantee is taken by surprise that the question of delay and laches is raised for the first time before this Court, that too because of the latest decision in the case of Nekkanti, 2017 1 KarLR 5 (SC) and Vivek Hinduja, 2017 SCCOnLineSC 1858 Even otherwise, it is submitted that the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti, 2017 1 KarLR 5 (SC) and Vivek Hinduja, 2017 SCCOnLineSC 1858 should not be taken or read in the manner that without affording an opportunity to the grantee to explain the delay, if any, the decisions could be made applicable and the grantee who has succeeded before the fact finding authorities should be shown the door. It is therefore submitted that the minimum that is required is to afford an opportunity under the principles of natural justice, to the grantee to explain the delay, if any. 11. We have heard Sri Prakash T.Hebbar, learned counsel for the purchasers and Smt. M.V.Susheela, learned Senior Counsel for the grantee. We have perused the writ papers and have given anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsels. 12. 11. We have heard Sri Prakash T.Hebbar, learned counsel for the purchasers and Smt. M.V.Susheela, learned Senior Counsel for the grantee. We have perused the writ papers and have given anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsels. 12. The learned Single Judge was of the opinion that when the stipulation in the grant certificate restricted alienation for a period of 10 years, the Assistant Commissioner could not have relied upon the Rules to hold that a restriction covenant of 'non-alienation forever' could not be read into the grant certificate. The matter was remitted back to the Deputy Commissioner to consider the question of adverse possession raised by the purchasers. As rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel, the question of adverse possession in the context of PTCL Act has been authoritatively answered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various cases, including D.N.Venkatarayappa, (1997) 7 SCC 567 and R.Chandevarappa, (1995) 6 SCC 309 Therefore, remittance for reconsideration on that ground was not warranted. On the other contention of whether ten years of non-alienation is applicable or non-alienation 'forever' is applicable to a grant made under 'Grow More Food Scheme' or any other grant for that matter has also been authoritatively settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Guntaiah and Others vs. Hambamma and Others, (2005) 6 SCC 228 13. Guntaiah, (2005) 6 SCC 228 explicitly holds that the purchaser has no locus standi to challenge any of the terms of a grant and intendment of the Act did not infringe Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. It was held that the prohibition regarding alienation is a restrictive covenant binding on the grantee. The grantee is not challenging that condition. In all these proceedings, challenge is made by the third party who purchased the land from the grantee. The third party is not entitled to say that the conditions imposed by the grantor to the grantee were void. As far as contract of sale is concerned, it was entered into between the Government and the grantee and at that time the third party purchaser has no interest in such transaction. In the case of Maj. Gen.J.K.Koshy and The Assistant Commissioner, Bangalore in W.A. No.16558/2011 disposed of on 11.07.2012, it has been held that if the period of non-alienation imposed in the grant is contrary to the Rules, the Rules shall prevail. In the case of Maj. Gen.J.K.Koshy and The Assistant Commissioner, Bangalore in W.A. No.16558/2011 disposed of on 11.07.2012, it has been held that if the period of non-alienation imposed in the grant is contrary to the Rules, the Rules shall prevail. In fact that was the position of law declared in Siddalingaiah vs. State of Karnataka, (1989) ILR(Kar) 2311 which was followed in many other matters. Therefore, no fault could be found in the decision of the fact finding authority that the period of non-alienation provided under the prevailing Rules should be made applicable. 14. We shall now consider the submissions regarding the application of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti, 2017 1 KarLR 5 (SC) and Vivek Hinduja, 2017 SCCOnLineSC 1858 to the present case. In this regard, a few facts which are germane, are required to be looked into. We have perused the grounds urged in the writ petition. It is found at paragraph No.12 in the grounds raised by the purchasers, in W.P.No.38561-38564/2009, it is stated that the application made by the grantee, seeking resumption and restoration of the granted land after a period of 30 years, was barred by law of limitation and the application ought to have been dismissed for delay and laches. But, such a ground is not taken in the appeal, before this Court. The learned counsel for the purchasers, fairly conceded that he is not aware as to whether the plea of delay and laches were raised before the Assistant Commissioner. It is evident from the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner that the question of delay and laches was neither raised nor considered. 15. The decision in G.M.Venkatareddy, 2012 2 ILR(Kar) 3168 has been pressed into service with all vehemence. As noted above, the decision of the co-ordinate bench in G.M.Venkatareddy, 2012 2 ILR(Kar) 3168 has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on more than one occasion. However, we find that the SLP's seeking to assail the decision in G.M.Venkatareddy, 2012 2 ILR(Kar) 3168 have been dismissed at the threshold. As noted above, the decision of the co-ordinate bench in G.M.Venkatareddy, 2012 2 ILR(Kar) 3168 has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on more than one occasion. However, we find that the SLP's seeking to assail the decision in G.M.Venkatareddy, 2012 2 ILR(Kar) 3168 have been dismissed at the threshold. While the Hon'ble Supreme Court has specifically overruled the decisions of this Court in the case of R.Rudrappa vs. The Deputy Commissioner & Others, (2000) 1 KarLJ 523 , Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka, (2006) 4 KarLJ 303 and G.Maregouda vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 2 KLJ(ShN) 4B Chitradurga District, which had held that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the PTCL Act and therefore an application can be made at any time, stands overruled. 16. In Vivek Hinduja, 2017 SCCOnLineSC 1858 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also negatived the submission that the outer limit for initiating action should be 30 years, in view of the law declared in Manchegowda, (1984) 3 SCC 301 and Sunkara Rajayalakshmi and others vs. State of Karnataka, (2009) 12 SCC 193 It was held that reliance placed on the observations in Manchegowda, (1984) 3 SCC 301 and Sunkara Rajayalakshmi, (2009) 12 SCC 193 are not apposite and are made with reference to period of prescription in respect of Government properties under the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, unless and until the decisions in Nekkanti, 2017 1 KarLR 5 (SC) and Vivek Hinduja, 2017 SCCOnLineSC 1858 are reconsidered, either in the light of the decision of the co-ordinate bench in G.M.Venkatareddy, 2012 2 ILR(Kar) 3168 or for any other reason, this Court is bound by the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Nekkanti, 2017 1 KarLR 5 (SC) and Vivek Hinduja, 2017 SCCOnLineSC 1858 17. However, we find sufficient force in the argument of the learned Senior Counsel that in a subsequent judgment, in the case of Satyan vs. Deputy Commissioner and others, Civil Appeal Nos.2976-2983/2019 decided on 30.04.2019, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a delay of eight years by itself cannot come in the way of competent authority taking the action, as limitation principles would not apply, as observed in Amrendra Pratap Singh vs. Tej Bahadur Prajapati and others, (2004) AIR SC 3782 with reference to the decisions in Nekkanti, 2017 1 KarLR 5 (SC) and Vivek Hinduja, 2017 SCCOnLineSC 1858 Their Lordships held that those cases involved huge gaps of around 20 to 30 years, and in that context, held that delay of 8 years could not be held to term the action as void, considering that it is in respect of a beneficial legislation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes community. Though there is considerable force in the submission of the learned Senior Counsel that since absolute title has not vested in the grantee and there is violation of condition, the State may take steps within a period of 30 years to recover the land, failing which any interested person may move an application and seek resumption in favour of the State in order to enable the State to regrant the land in favour of any other SC/ST person, within a reasonable period, we feel such submissions may be made before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 18. The learned Senior Counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Amrendra Pratap Singh, (2004) AIR SC 3782 where it was held that the prescription of the period of 12 years in Article 65 of the Limitation Act becomes irrelevant sofar as the immoveable property of a tribal is concerned. The Tribal need not file a civil suit which will be governed by law of limitation; it is enough if he or any one on his behalf moves the State or the State itself moves into action to protect him and restores his property to him. To such an action neither Article 65 nor Section 27 of the Limitation Act thereof would be attracted. To such an action neither Article 65 nor Section 27 of the Limitation Act thereof would be attracted. It was categorically held that acquisition of title in favour of a non tribal by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession over the immoveable property belonging to a tribal, is prohibited by law and cannot be countenanced by the Court. Though the provisions of the Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property (By Scheduled Tribes) Regulation, 1956, which fell for consideration in Amrendra Pratap Singh, (2004) AIR SC 3782 are akin to the provisions of the PTCL Act, we have to bear in mind that the decisions in Nekkanti, 2017 1 KarLR 5 (SC) and Vivek Hinduja, 2017 SCCOnLineSC 1858 and Satyan, Civil Appeal Nos.2976-2983/2019 have dealt with the provisions of the PTCL Act. It is by now well settled that a judicial decision is an authority for what it actually decides and not for what can be read into it by implication or by assessing an assumed intention to the judges, and inferring from it a proposition of law which the judges have not specifically laid down in the pronouncement. 19. Similarly, the decision of a larger bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan Housing Board vs. New Pink City Nirman Sahakari Samiti Limited, (2015) AIR SC 2126 which was relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel does not deal with the question as to whether an application made by a grantee seeking resumption and restoration of granted land requires to be made within a reasonable period. 20. A Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Ittyavira Mathai vs. Varkey Varkey and another, (1964) AIR SC 907 held that where a barred suit was entertained and a decree is passed, the said decree cannot be treated as a nullity and ignored in subsequent litigation. If the party aggrieved does not take appropriate steps to have that error corrected, the erroneous decree will hold good and will not be open to challenge on the basis of being a nullity. That being the position with respect to a suit where limitation is prescribed, we are of the considered opinion that a purchaser, who is a respondent before the Assistant Commissioner should have raised a plea that the application should be rejected on account of delay and laches. That being the position with respect to a suit where limitation is prescribed, we are of the considered opinion that a purchaser, who is a respondent before the Assistant Commissioner should have raised a plea that the application should be rejected on account of delay and laches. The decision on merits by the Assistant Commissioner cannot be dismissed as a nullity. 21. Similarly, in a situation where a plea of limitation was not raised at the earliest instance, an application seeking to raise the question of limitation was permitted to be made even at the appellate stage or before the Apex Court in a Special Leave Application. Reference may be made to larger bench decisions in the case of Management of the State Bank of Hyderabad vs. Vasudev Anant Bhide, (1970) AIR SC 196 and Town Municipal Council, Athani vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Courts, Hubli and Others, (1969) AIR SC 1335 In that context, in the case of Town Municipal Council, Athani, (1969) AIR SC 1335 notice of such application, seeking to raise the plea of limitation, was served on the respondent well in time, so that, by the time the appeals came up for hearing they knew this point was sought to be raised by the appellant. Their Lordships held that a question of limitation raises a plea of want of jurisdiction and, in these cases, this question could be decided on the basis of the fact on the record, being a pure question of law. 22. While considering the words "sufficient cause", as provided in Order XXII Rule 9(2) (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Balwant Singh vs. Jagdish Singh and others, (2010) 8 SCC 685 held that liberal construction of the expression "sufficient cause" is intended to advance substantial justice which itself pre supposes no negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bonafide is imputed. The expression "sufficient cause" implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The "sufficient cause" should be such that it persuades the Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. The expression "sufficient cause" implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The "sufficient cause" should be such that it persuades the Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. It would be apposite to notice the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Thirumalai Chemicals Limited vs. Union of India and others, (2011) 6 SCC 739 wherein, on the question of law of limitation, it was held that law of limitation is capable of effectively depriving persons of accrued rights and therefore, they need to be approached with caution. 23. Time and again, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there cannot be straight jacket formula to decide as to what is a reasonable period for filing an application or a writ petition, where there is no prescription of limitation. What is 'reasonable', depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the statutory provisions governing a particular case. To give an illustration, if a person is granted land in the year 1975 and in violation of the terms of grant, alienates the land in the year 1980 and dies immediately thereafter, leaving behind a minor son as his sole legal heir and the son makes an application under Section 5 of the Act, in the year 2000, a few years after attaining majority, the question that begs consideration is whether delay of 20 years in filing the application could be rejected on the ground of unreasonable delay or without sufficient cause? Obviously, the answer would be that sufficient cause is shown. There are any number of precedents where delay of more than 20 years have been condoned in matters relating to payment of compensation under Land Acquisition Act and the like. 24. As noted earlier, there is nothing on record to suggest whether the purchaser raised an objection or plea regarding delay and laches, before the Assistant Commissioner. On the face of the record, it is evident that the grantee was not called upon to explain the delay. The least that is expected, on the principles of audi alteram partem is that an opportunity should be given to the grantee to explain the delay. The grantee, if afforded such an opportunity, may file an affidavit along with cogent evidence and such an explanation may be examined, which would satisfy the basic tenets of law. 25. The least that is expected, on the principles of audi alteram partem is that an opportunity should be given to the grantee to explain the delay. The grantee, if afforded such an opportunity, may file an affidavit along with cogent evidence and such an explanation may be examined, which would satisfy the basic tenets of law. 25. In the light of the above, we are of the opinion that the matter needs to be remanded to the learned Single Judge, for the purpose of affording an opportunity to the applicant (Sri Krishnappa) to file an affidavit explaining the reasons for delay, along with documentary evidence, if necessary. It is for the learned Single Judge to decide, based on the explanation offered and material placed on record, as to whether the application was within reasonable time and if not, whether "sufficient cause" is shown to condone the delay. We therefore proceed to pass the following: ORDER : (i) The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is quashed and set aside. (ii) The matter is remitted back to the learned Single Judge for the purpose of deciding the question of delay.