JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. Aggrieved by fastening liability to pay the award passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-II, Una, the appellant-Insurance Company has filed the instant appeal. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the claimants/respondents No. 1 to 4 filed a claim petition under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (fort short, the Act) claiming therein compensation to the tune of Rs.5,69,500/- on account of death of Rajiv Kumar, who died in a motor vehicular accident that took place on 13.2.2011 at Village Takka, Tehsil and District Una. It was claimed that the claimants were dependent upon the deceased, who was working as helper with Universal Computer at Una and was drawing a salary of Rs.3300/- per month and, thus, they have been deprived of such income. 3. Since the question raised in this appeal is with regard to the award amount of compensation and the legality thereof, the defence raised by the driver-cum-owner of the offending vehicle as also the Insurance Company need not be referred to. 4. The learned Tribunal after recording the evidence and evaluating the same, vide impugned award dated 23.2.2013 concluded that the annual income of the deceased was Rs. 43,200/- per annum and on the basis of such income awarded compensation of Rs.3,80,800/- along with interest @ 7.5% per annum to the claimants from the date of filing of the petition till the deposit of the award amount. 5. Aggrieved by the impugned award, the appellant-Insurance Company has filed the instant appeal primarily on the ground that the claim petition under Section 163-A of the Act was not maintainable as the income of the deceased exceeded maximum slab of Rs.40,000/- - per annum. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case. 7. At the outset it needs to be noticed that there can be no quarrel with the legal preposition, as propounded by the learned counsel for the appellant as it is more than settled that the protection provided under Section 163-A of the Act is to the victims whose income slab is upto Rs.40,000/- per annum and not to the victims whose income slap is more than Rs. 40,000/- per annum. 40,000/- per annum. The income is not even negotiable as the claimants cannot be permitted to abandon a part of the claim and restrict the same to Rs.40,000/- per annum in order to avail the remedy under Section 163-A of the Act. 8. Reference in this regard can conveniently be made to the judgment of learned Division Bench of this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Sihnu Ram and ors., 2017 ACJ 2186 , wherein it was observed as under: 48. The protection provided under Section 163-A of the MV Act is to the victims whose income slab is up to Rs. 40,000/- per annum and that remedy is not available to the victims whose income slab is more than Rs. 40,000/- per annum. If the Claims Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the income slab of the victim is more than Rs. 40,000/- , the remedy under Section 163A of the MV Act cannot be pressed into service, but, as discussed hereinabove, it can be treated as claim petition under Section 166 of the MV Act by providing opportunity to the claimants to prove rash and negligent element, which is sine quo non for determining the claim petition under Section 166 of the MV Act and opportunity is also required to be provided to the respondents to raise all defences available to them in terms of the mandate of the MV Act. 49. The claimants cannot be permitted to abandon a part of their claim and restrict the same to 40000/ per annum in order to avail the remedy under Section 163-A of the MV Act. That is not the aim, object and scope of the Legislation. If that would have been so, then there was no need to prescribe the income slab and in case the claimants are allowed to do so, it will amount to rewriting the provisions of Section 163-A of the MV Act. 9. Yet the question that arises for consideration is whether the claimants had ever pleaded or proved that the income of the deceased was more than Rs.40,000/- per annum and whether the learned Tribunal had on the basis of the evidence rightly assessed the income of the deceased to be Rs.43,200/- per annum or the same was an arithmetical and calculating error. 10. 10. In order to determine this question, one only need to refer to para 20 of the impugned award, which reads as under: The petitioners No. 1 and 2 are the parents and petitioners No. 3 and 4 are brothers of the deceased. It has been claimed that they were dependent upon the deceased for their livelihood. The respondents have not disputed that petitioner No. 1 and 2 and not parents and petitioners No. 3 and 4 are not his brothers. Nothing could be extracted from PW4 Hem Raj that they were not dependent upon the deceased. It has been mentioned in the petition that the deceased was 20 years old at the time of accident. The postmortem report, Ext.PW2/ A also mentions his age as 20 years. No contrary evidence has been led that deceased was not 20 years old. PW5 Vinod Thakur as observed above has established that deceased was getting Rs.2,300/- per month from him. The deceased was hale and hearty. He was working in the computer shop meaning thereby that he was well trained and certainly could have earned Rs3,300/- per month. No contrary evidence to this effect has been led and in the absence of contrary evidence on record, said income can be accepted without any hesitation which is even less than the minimum wages of Rs.120/- per day, which is guaranteed under MANREGA. Therefore, the annual income of the deceased comes to Rs.43,200/-. 11. It would be noticed from the above that the learned Tribunal has assessed income of the deceased to be Rs.3300/- per month and further observed that the same has to be accepted without hesitation as the same is less than minimum wages of Rs.120/per day, which is guaranteed under MANREGA and when it got down to ultimate calculation, the learned Tribunal for some strange reasons and without any basis held the annual income of the deceased to be Rs.43,200/- instead of (Rs.3300x12) = Rs.39600/-. 12. Thus, it is apparent that it was only an arithmetical and calculating mistake committed by the learned Tribunal. Even otherwise, the learned Tribunal had itself not assessed the income of the deceased to be Rs.43,200/- instead of Rs.39,600/- per annum. 13. 12. Thus, it is apparent that it was only an arithmetical and calculating mistake committed by the learned Tribunal. Even otherwise, the learned Tribunal had itself not assessed the income of the deceased to be Rs.43,200/- instead of Rs.39,600/- per annum. 13. Even after having rejected the plea of the appellant-Insurance Company, the award still requires to be modified and now, the compensation will now have to be assessed on the basis of the income of the deceased to be calculated at Rs.39,600/- instead of Rs.43,200/-. 14. The learned Tribunal has wrongly applied multiplier of 13 on the basis of the age of the parents of the deceased as against the age of the deceased. Since the deceased was merely 20 years old at the time of ill-fated accident, therefore, multiplier of 17 has to be applied as per table set out in the second schedule of the Act. 15. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid discussion, it can conveniently be held that the monthly income of the deceased would work out to be Rs. 3300/- and after deduction of 1/3rd of the income towards maintaining himself (Rs.1100/-), monthly income would work out to be Rs. 2200/- and annual to be Rs.26,400/-. In this way, the claimants, after applying multiplier of 17 would be entitled to Rs.4,48,800/- towards loss of contribution to family. 16. Learned counsel for the claimants has fairly conceded that only a sum of Rs. 2000/- and Rs.25,00/- towards general damages, namely, funeral expenses and loss of estate, would be admissible to the claimants under Section 163-A of the Act. 17. It would be noticed that on the basis of the aforesaid calculations, the claimants are entitled to more amount than their entitlement as per the award. It would also be noticed that the claimants have not filed cross-objections or cross-appeal, however, this Court in exercise of its power under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure can always pass an enhanced award on the basis of the material available on record. 18. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under: “33. Power of court of Appeal. 18. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under: “33. Power of court of Appeal. The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised In favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection, and may, where there have been decrees in cross suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees: Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under section 35A, in pursuance of any objection on which the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order.” 19. It cannot be disputed that the object of the aforesaid rule is to empower the Appellate Court to do complete justice between the parties. This rule gives the Court ample power to make an order appropriate to meet the ends of justice. It enables the Appellate Court to pass any decree or order which ought to have been made and to make such further order or decree as the case may be in favour of all or any of the parties even though the appeal is as to part only of the decree; and such party or parties may not have filed an appeal. The necessary condition for exercising the power under the rule is that the parties to the proceedings are before the Court and the question raised properly arises out of the judgments of the lower Court. In that event, the Appellate Court can consider any objection to any part of the order or decree of the Court and set it right. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the circumstances under which the power can be exercised and each case therefore must depend upon its own facts. In that event, the Appellate Court can consider any objection to any part of the order or decree of the Court and set it right. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the circumstances under which the power can be exercised and each case therefore must depend upon its own facts. Although, the general principle is that a decree is binding on the parties to it until it is set aside in appropriate proceedings. Ordinarily, the Appellate Court must not vary or reverse a decree/order in favour of a party who has not preferred any appeal. But in exceptional cases, the rule enables the Appellate Court to pass such decree or order as sought to have been passed even if such decree or order would be in favour of parties who have not filed any appeal. 20. The scope of the rule has repeatedly come up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, but I need only refer to the judgment rendered in Pralhad and others vs. State of Maharashtra and another (2010) 10 SCC 458 wherein it was held: “18. The provision of Order 41 Rule 33 CPC is clearly an enabling provision, whereby the appellate Court is empowered to pass any decree or make any order which ought to have been passed or made, and to pass, or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require. Therefore, the power is very wide and in this enabling provisions, the crucial words are that the appellate court is empowered to pass any order which ought to have been made as the case may require. The expression “order ought to have been made” would obviously mean an order which justice of the case requires to be made. This is made clear from the expression used in the said Rule by saying “the court may pass such further or other order as the case may require”. This expression “case” would mean the justice of the case. Of course, this power cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict or a prohibition clamped by law. 19. In fact, the ambit of this provision has come up for consideration in several decisions of this Court. This expression “case” would mean the justice of the case. Of course, this power cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict or a prohibition clamped by law. 19. In fact, the ambit of this provision has come up for consideration in several decisions of this Court. Commenting on this power, Mulla (Civil Procedure Code, 15th Edn., p. 2647) observed that this Rule is modeled on Order 59 Rule 10 (4) of the Supreme Court of Judicature of England, and Mulla further opined that the purpose of this Rule is to do complete justice between the parties. 20. In Banarsi vs. Ram Phal (2003) 9 SCC 606 , this Court construing the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 CPC held that this provision confers powers of the widest amplitude on the appellate Court so as to do complete justice between the parties. This Court further held that such power is unfettered by considerations as to what is the subject matter of the appeal or who has filed the appeal or whether the appeal is being dismissed, allowed or disposed of while modifying the judgments appealed against. The learned Judges held that one of the objects in conferring such power is to avoid inconsistency, inequity and inequality in granting reliefs and the overriding consideration is achieving the ends of justice. The learned Judges also held that the power can be exercised subject to three limitations: firstly, this power cannot be exercised to the prejudice of a person who is not a party before the Court; secondly, this power cannot be exercised in favour of a claim which has been given up or lost; and thirdly, the power cannot be exercised when such part of the decree which has been permitted to become final by a party is reversed to the advantage of that party. (See SCC p. 619, para 15 : AIR para 15 at p. 1997). It has also been held by this Court in Samundra Devi vs. Narendra Kaur (2008) 9 SCC 100 SCC (para 21), that this power under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict. 22. (See SCC p. 619, para 15 : AIR para 15 at p. 1997). It has also been held by this Court in Samundra Devi vs. Narendra Kaur (2008) 9 SCC 100 SCC (para 21), that this power under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict. 22. In view of the aforesaid interpretation given to Order 41 Rule 33 CPC by this Court, we are of the opinion that the High Court denied the relief to the appellants to which they are entitled in view of the Constitution Bench decision in K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala, (1994) 5 SCC 593 . by taking a rather restricted and narrow view of the scope of Order 41 Rule 33 CPC and also on a misconstruction of the ratio in Paripoornan.” 21. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the compensation that would eventually work out is as under: Sr. No. Award passed by the Tribunal Modified Award by this Court 1. Loss of dependency: Rs.2,80,800/- Loss of dependency: Rs.4,48,800/- Loss of love and affection: Rs.35,000/- Nil 2. Conventional charges including funeral expenses= Rs15,000/- Rs. 2,000/- and Rs.2,500/- towards conventional heads, namely, funeral expenses and loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses. 4. Total = Rs.3,30,800/- Total = Rs.4,53,300/- 22 For the forgoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed and in the aforesaid terms, the impugned award, dated 23.2.2013, passed by the learned Tribunal is modified to the extent that the claimants would now be entitled to get a total compensation of Rs.4,53,300/instead of Rs.3,30,800/along with interest @ 7.5% per annum, from the Insurance Company, to be apportioned amongst them as ordered by the learned Tribunal, from the date of filing of the petition till its realization. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. The parties are left to bear their own costs.