ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioners along with Mr. Sreenu Garapati, Advocate. 2. Heard Mr. Rajiv Nandan Prasad, counsel appearing on behalf of Central Bureau Investigation (Opposite Party). 3. This Criminal Revision application has been filed against the order dated 22.01.2015 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-X-Cum-Special Judge, CBI, Dhanbad whereby the learned court has rejected the petition for discharge under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the learned court below has fixed the case for framing of charge. The case arises out of R.C. Case No. 12(A) /09D, under Section 120(B) IPC read with Section 420 of IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,1988. 4. The case of the prosecution in short is that the petitioners, who are the ex-servicemen and Directors of M/S Maa Lilori Transport Pvt. Ltd., an Ex-Servicemen coal transportation company working with Bharat Coking Coal Limited, Dhanbad, along with other accused persons including some employees of Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL) entered into criminal conspiracy amongst themselves during 2008-2009 and in furtherance thereof, with dishonest intention, did not deploy the minimum 75% Ex-servicemen in its employees strength at Bastacola area of BCCL, Dhanbad at any point of time and managed false and fabricated documents vis. Bi-annual report etc. to cover the deployment of civilians in place of Ex Service Men (ESM). The false documents were accepted and entertained by co-accused Jwala Prasad, Area Sales Officer/siding Manager, who further gave excellent performance report in favour of the Agency M/s Maa Lilori Transport Private Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as the ESM Company) who was allowed to raise monthly bill and was paid approx. 5.14 crores during the period from 20.06.2008 onwards without observing the laid down norms of Director General of Resettlement (herein after referred to as DGR). The work of transportation awarded to M/s Maa Lilori Transport Private Company Limited was at Schedule of rate (SOR rate), which is higher than the rate for the same work awarded to Private Transporters and the differential with respect to the work undertaken is alleged to the tune of approx. Rs. 58 lakhs. It is further alleged that the accused persons entered into Criminal conspiracy with each other, cheated BCCL, Dhanbad by causing wrongful loss of Approx. Rs. 58 lakhs to it and corresponding wrongful gain to themselves. Rs. 58 lakhs. It is further alleged that the accused persons entered into Criminal conspiracy with each other, cheated BCCL, Dhanbad by causing wrongful loss of Approx. Rs. 58 lakhs to it and corresponding wrongful gain to themselves. 5. Upon investigation, charge-sheet was submitted and cognizance was taken against the accused persons under section 120(B) IPC read with Section 420 of IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The present petitioners, being the Directors of the ESM company and ex-servicemen were charge-sheeted under Section 120B read with section 420 of IPC. The petitioners filed petition for discharge which has been rejected by the impugned order. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioners while advancing his argument submits that although a copy of the petition for discharge has not been filed before this Court, but the points raised by the petitioners before the learned court below have been recorded in the impugned order. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the entire scheme and the role of Director General of Rehabilitation (DGR) was explained by the accused before the learned court below. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in order to provide an opportunity to Ex. Servicemen of army for resettlement and with the aim of having Union free captive transport organizations in coal subsidiaries, a scheme was formulated between the erstwhile Ministry of Energy and Ministry of Defence in the year 1979 and a Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter referred to as MOU) was signed between D.G.R. Ministry of Defence and Coal India Limited on 8.4.93. Para – 18 of said MOU clearly specifies that modalities of fixing rates and escalation, to be paid yearly, was to be formulated by Coal India in consultation with D.G.R., which normally remains about 10% above the SOR rates, in order to successfully achieve the primary objective of Ministry of Defence. The formation of Pvt. Ltd. Company, by all eligible Ex. Serviceman selected, is the sole responsibility of DGR. After feasibility study by the sponsoring Directors, the company is formed and registered with the Registrar of Companies as a Pvt. Ltd. Company under Companies Act, 1956. The memorandum of articles of association is approved by DGR. The formation of Pvt. Ltd. Company, by all eligible Ex. Serviceman selected, is the sole responsibility of DGR. After feasibility study by the sponsoring Directors, the company is formed and registered with the Registrar of Companies as a Pvt. Ltd. Company under Companies Act, 1956. The memorandum of articles of association is approved by DGR. It is the responsibility of the DGR to ensure that all individuals forming or participating in the Pvt. Limited Company are only entitled ESM/Widows/dependents and that they are suitable and financially sound. It is evident from para-4 of MOU, that the formation of ESM transport company and all eligibility criteria are guided by DGR fixed norms and condition in pursuance of various clauses of MOU. Similar is the case in respect of MOU between DGR and CIL, which spells out responsibility and obligation to be fulfilled by both DGR and its sponsored ESM transport company and CIL separately, in order to accomplish the twin tasks of resettlement of ESM by DGR and Coal transportation of coal subsidiary. It was further submitted that all the vehicles were allowed by the concerned authority (Area Sales Manager and Project Officers of different Mines of Bastacola Area), and this was also the observation of CBI in its final reports. It has been specifically mentioned in the charge-sheet at Column No. 10 that DGR should evolve a system to ensure compliance of MOU provision regarding deployment of Ex-servicemen, their vehicles and their payments and if DGR finds anything in variance with the MOU, his office will inform the CIL and initiate suitable action. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the DGR has neither been made accused nor a witness in the present case, deliberately, and in the aforesaid circumstances, it is apparent that no offence U/S 420 IPC is made out against the petitioners. It is further submitted that even if the entire allegation is taken to be true, no offence U/S 420 IPC read with section 120B and Sec. 13(2) r/w Sec. 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, is made out against the petitioners. 9. It is further submitted that even if the entire allegation is taken to be true, no offence U/S 420 IPC read with section 120B and Sec. 13(2) r/w Sec. 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, is made out against the petitioners. 9. It has been further submitted on behalf of petitioners, that the entire work of transportation was done on a contractual basis and an agreement was drawn between the ESM Company and the Coal Company and if at all there was a violation of terms and conditions of the contractual agreement, it is a case of Civil liability. The charge against the ESM-company and the petitioners is that they did not submit their annual report, despite reminder from DGR, and such charge is misleading, because the company could not have submitted its annual report before it started its operation on 20.5.2018. 10. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners further submits as under: - i. As per the Memorandum of Understanding, all the reports and returns in connection with Ex-servicemen Companies were to be submitted as per clause 21. Admittedly the work orders which were issued to the company, namely, M/s Maa Lilori Transport Pvt. Ltd., Dhanbad, was issued pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding entered into between Ex-Servicemen Coal Transport Companies with the Ministry of Energy and Ministry of Defence. A report was submitted, which is the basis of launching the prosecution, which was signed by the executive Director of the said company, namely, Santosh Bhattacharjee and admittedly the report was not signed by any of the petitioners, though they were the directors. In such circumstances, the act or omission, if any, is attributable only to the said Executive Director of the company, and merely because the petitioners are also the directors of the company, they could not have been made the petitioners, co-accused in the instant case. He further submits that the petitioners are the directors of the aforesaid company and there is no specific role assigned to the petitioners. ii. It is submitted that the primary responsibility for the purposes of compliance of various clauses of the Memorandum of Understanding was that of the Director General of Resettlement, who has neither been made accused nor been made a witness of the case deliberately. iii. ii. It is submitted that the primary responsibility for the purposes of compliance of various clauses of the Memorandum of Understanding was that of the Director General of Resettlement, who has neither been made accused nor been made a witness of the case deliberately. iii. The counsel for the petitioners further submits that by the same impugned order, the discharge petition of another co-accused, namely, Amrendra Kumar, was also rejected. Amrendra Kumar filed Criminal Revision No. 106 of 2015 against the impugned order dated 22.01.2015. This Hon’ble Court vide judgment dated 10.07.2015 has been pleased to quash the impugned order with respect to the Amrendra Kumar, although he was also a signatory to the said report. The counsel submits that the ground for allowing the criminal revision No. 106 of 2015 filed by Amrendra Kumar was that the authentication of any information given under column 7, 8 and 9 of the report, which was never required to be authenticated by the said Amrendra Kumar. He submits that on this aspect of the matter, the case of the petitioners is similarly placed as admittedly the petitioners are also not the signatories of the said report and such report was not submitted by them. He further submits that the report itself having been submitted under the signature of Santosh Bhattacharjee, Executive Director of the Company, no criminality can be alleged against the petitioners and the petitioners cannot be held liable for the acts and omissions of said Santosh Bhattacharjee. The learned counsel submits that apart from this report, there is no material in the entire records against the petitioners. He has referred to the report to submit that in the one specific column of the report, i.e. name of the director at site dealing with the coal subsidiary, has been mentioned as Santosh Bhattacharjee and it was Santosh Bhattacharjee alone who was responsible for the entire conduct of the business of the company. In such circumstances, the petitioners have been wrongly made accused in the instant case merely because the petitioners are also directors of the company who admittedly have no role to play in the commission of alleged offence. iv. The learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to the judgment passed in Cr. In such circumstances, the petitioners have been wrongly made accused in the instant case merely because the petitioners are also directors of the company who admittedly have no role to play in the commission of alleged offence. iv. The learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to the judgment passed in Cr. M.P. No. 768 of 2011 disposed of on 05.07.2013 which, as submitted, was decided in relation to another similar case wherein it was held that the basic ingredient of offence under Section 420 of the IPC was not made out. The counsel further submits that a person cannot be roped in for an offence under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code in absence of any incriminating material and no allegation can be made on the basis of assumption and presumption. v. The learned counsel has referred to the judgments reported in 2019 SCC ONLINE SC 588 (Para-23); (2015) 4 SCC 609 and (2012) 9 SCC 512 (Para-24) to submit that under the facts and circumstances of this case there is no vicarious liability upon the petitioners, as the materials collection during investigation reveal that it was the Santosh Bhattacharjee alone who was responsible for the entire conduct of the business of the company. vi. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that otherwise also the entire allegation is apparently based on violation of the terms and conditions of agreement and is accordingly pure civil dispute. Thus, the present criminal proceeding is an abuse of process of law. 11. Counsel appearing on behalf of CBI, on the other hand, while opposing the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners has referred to the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2018) (2) JBCJ 235 (SC) Para 31 and 32, to submit that the scope of the revision is very limited and there is neither any illegality nor any perversity in the impugned order and accordingly the impugned order ,does not call for any interference. He submits that some of the points which have been raised by the petitioners before this court were never raised before the learned court below particularly the point that the entire responsibility of conducting the business of the company was that of the executive director and it is the executive director who had submitted the report under his signature on the basis of which the criminal case has been launched. He further submits that, otherwise also, there is enough material in the case diary to send the petitioners for trial which is evident from Para 8, 9 and 10 of the counter affidavit. The learned counsel has further referred to the case-diary and he refers to the statement of Sri R. Krishna Murthy (141 of the case-diary) to submit that in the statement of Sri R. Krishna Murthy it has been recorded that all the three directors though permanent resident of Delhi/Chandigarh, after the formation and affirmation of the company, namely, M/s Maa Lilori Transport Pvt. Ltd., Dhanbad, they used to come for supervising the transport work. He further submits that the statement of the said witness is sufficient for the purposes of coming to a conclusion that there is more than prima facie case made out against the petitioners for the alleged offence. He submits that the statement of Sri. R. Krishna Murthy is supported by the statement of other witnesses as well. He has also referred to the by-annual report and has submitted that against the name of the petitioners, they have been indicated to be Liaison Officers. He submits that the petitioners are at liberty to raise all the points argued by the learned counsel at the stage of trial and at the stage of discharge such points cannot be appreciated. 12. After hearing the counsel for the parties and after considering the materials on record, this Court finds as follows: (a) Upon perusal of the FIR, it appears that the DGR had issued sponsorship letter addressed to Chief General Manager, BCCL and directed the aforesaid ESM company to undertake coal transportation work in BCCL for the period of 5 years from the date of commencement of work as per the terms and conditions mentioned therein and pursuant thereto two work orders No. 205 and 239 dated 17.06.2008 and 30.06.2009 was issued by the coal company in favour of the aforesaid ESM company for transportation of coal in the area from 20.06.2008 to 31.03.2009. The period for the work order was extended and further work orders were issued and accordingly, as per the FIR, during the period from 20.06.2008 to 17.07.2009, the aforesaid company transported about 16,00,000 metric tonnes of coal from different collieries to Railway Siding and received an amount of rupees seven crores and odd from the area Office Bastacola of BCCL. The period for the work order was extended and further work orders were issued and accordingly, as per the FIR, during the period from 20.06.2008 to 17.07.2009, the aforesaid company transported about 16,00,000 metric tonnes of coal from different collieries to Railway Siding and received an amount of rupees seven crores and odd from the area Office Bastacola of BCCL. As alleged in the FIR, there are two types of rates for transportation of coal; one is called Schedule of Rate (SOR) for private transporters and another is called ESM Rate (Ex-Servicemen). The rate given to ESM is higher than the rate of SOR for the same work which is the part of the welfare measure for re-settlement of Ex-servicemen. Under the scheme there was a provision of tipper attachment by the ESM company and in the case of the aforesaid ESM company only threes ESMs were benefited from the scheme. During investigation, it also transpired that the aforesaid ESM company was not submitting its annual report to the DGR for which certain letters were issued. The aforesaid ESM company was said to have commenced its operation w.e.f. 20.06.2008 with ten tippers and one pay loader as per approved strength and it wanted to increase its fleet to 30 persons and three pay loaders, but till 05.02.2010, no permission was granted by DGR for enhancement of fleet or hiring of tippers. However, the report was subsequently submitted which did not tally with the wage sheets of the employees. The FIR gives the details of the report as submitted by the aforesaid ESM company as well as the details, which came to light by virtue of wage sheets and discrepancy in connection with the list of employees and list of vehicles deployed, was also projected in the FIR itself. The FIR also discloses the vehicles deployed, but not shown in the annual/bi-annual reports, all of which related to private persons. On the basis of the investigation and the materials collected during investigation, it was concluded that the ESM Company had no right to claim ESM rate suppressing the fact about utilizing hired vehicles and employing civilian employees during the relevant period. It has been alleged that such act amounted to cheat the coal company causing loss to the extent of the difference between ESM rate and SOR rate during the relevant period. It has been alleged that such act amounted to cheat the coal company causing loss to the extent of the difference between ESM rate and SOR rate during the relevant period. The charge-sheet also gives the details regarding the role of DGR (Director General of Rehabilitation) stating that the role of DGR is that of facilitating the scheme. The concerned coal company is the principal employer and directly responsible for the functioning of the ESM Company dealing with coal loading and transportation. Accordingly, the annual and bi-annual reports to be forwarded to the DGR, were required to be authenticated by the principal employer as well as the ESM company and the responsibility to check the correct deployment of vehicle/equipment/employment of ESM etc., fell within the purview of concerned coal company. It has also been stated in the charge-sheet itself that when any complaint is received against the ESM Coal Company, the DGR carries out checks to ascertain the veracities of the complaint and take action as deemed necessary. In the charge-sheet, it has also come to light that in the case of the aforesaid ESM company, no permission was given by DGR for hiring any tippers/pay loaders or for enhancement of fleets. It has also been mentioned in the charge-sheet that a copy of the work orders issued to the aforesaid ESM company, was also served upon the concerned person of the coal company and accordingly the accused persons knew that ESM company was supposed to employ/deploy 75% ESMs and thus the conditions of work orders/Memorandum of Understanding was violated causing loss to the coal company, as it resulted in payment of ESM charges through employment/deployment of civilian persons, who were otherwise entitled only to SOR charges which is much lower. Thus, deployment of civilian and payment to them at ESM rate is the root of the alleged offence. In the charge-sheet, it has also been mentioned that the ESM Company and its directors including the petitioners had submitted false/bogus annual and bi-annual reports and on account of the aforesaid commission/omission caused wrongful loss to the coal company and wrongful gain to the accused ESM Company. In this background, it was alleged that the aforesaid facts prima facie discloses commission of offences punishable under Section 120B read with section 420 IPC and Sec. 13(2) r/w Sec. 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In this background, it was alleged that the aforesaid facts prima facie discloses commission of offences punishable under Section 120B read with section 420 IPC and Sec. 13(2) r/w Sec. 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. (b) The first point which has been raised by the counsel for the petitioners is that the petitioners have been made accused only by virtue of being the directors of the company, although the another person Santosh Bhattacharjee was the Executive Director of the company and was responsible for the entire work of the company, and on this basis, they have submitted that the petitioners had no role to play. They have also submitted that the petitioners were never signatory to the reports and accordingly the petitioners cannot be made accused. (c) This Court finds from perusal of the charge-sheet that the allegations are not only relating to incorrect information in the annual and bi-annual reports, but also the commission/omission whose details have been narrated in the charge-sheet itself and also mentioned above. Such commissions/omissions have been attributed to the petitioners also and accordingly the ESM company as well as all the three directors have been made accused. In the light of the submissions advanced by the counsel appearing on behalf of the CBI, this Court finds that one of the witnesses during investigation is that of Shri R. Krishna Murthy, who was the Siding in-charge (Coal Transportation) of the aforesaid ESM company. He has mentioned in his statement under Section 161 Cr. P.C. before the CBI, that all the three directors, including the petitioners, are permanent residents of New Delhi/Chandigarh and after formation and operation of the aforesaid ESM company, all the three directors used to come one by one to supervise the transport works and for last three months, the petitioner No. 1 has been residing at Dhanbad and looking full time after transportation work. In view of the aforesaid statement of witness, Sri R. Krishna Murthy, it cannot be said that the petitioners have been made accused only on account of being the Directors of the company and there are no materials against the petitioners. The name of Sri. R. Krishna Murthy appears in the list of the civilian employees of the aforesaid ESM company. The name of Sri. R. Krishna Murthy appears in the list of the civilian employees of the aforesaid ESM company. Further even from perusal of the report which is said to be signed by one employee of BCCL and the Executive Directors of the said ESM Company, it is apparent that the petitioners have been named as Liaison Officer by the 3rd Director, namely, Santosh Bhattacharjee (Administration), although in the report, the name of the Director at site and dealing with the coal company, has been shown to be Santosh Bhattacharjee only. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioners have been made accused merely because they are Directors of the accused company. (d) So far as the judgment which has been relied upon by the counsel for the petitioners reported in (2012) 9 SCC 512 (CBI vs. K. Narayan Rao) is concerned, it deals with framing of charge and discharge of the accused and refers to the case of Sajjan Kumar reported in (2010) 9 SCC 368 , explaining the manner in which jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is to be exercised, which read as follows: - Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC 21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.” (e) Further it has been held as follows: - “From the above decisions, it is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, in that event, it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. A Judicial Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 of the Code is not to act as a mere post office and has to arrive at a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. A Judicial Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 of the Code is not to act as a mere post office and has to arrive at a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. On the other hand, if the Magistrate finds that there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence placed is totally unworthy of credit, it is his duty to discharge the accused at once. It is also settled law that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code, the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. This provision was introduced in the Code to avoid wastage of public time and to save the accused from unavoidable harassment and expenditure. While analysing the role of the respondent herein (A-6) from the charge-sheet and the materials supplied along with it, the above principles have to be kept in mind.” (f) In para 23 of the said judgment, Section 120-A of Indian Penal Code, which defines criminal conspiracy, has been dealt with and while dealing with the ingredient of Section 120-A of IPC, it has been held as follows: - “The ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy are that there should be an agreement between the persons who are alleged to conspire and the said agreement should be for doing of an illegal act or for doing, by illegal means, an act which by itself may not be illegal. In other words, the essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both and in a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available. Accordingly, the circumstances proved before and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. Accordingly, the circumstances proved before and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. Even if some acts are proved to have been committed, it must be clear that they were so committed in pursuance of an agreement made between the accused persons who were parties to the alleged conspiracy. Inferences from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only when such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. In other words, an offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion and surmises or inference which are not supported by cogent and acceptable evidence.” (g) This Court further finds that in Para-25 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has recorded a finding that there was no specific reference to the role of the respondent of the said case along with the main conspirators, although along with the charge-sheet statement of other witnesses were enclosed. (h) This Court finds that in the present case, the witnesses have given their statements regarding the role of the present petitioners who are said to have supervised the transportation work and accordingly it cannot be said that there is no material against the petitioners for the purposes of framing of charge. What was the role of the petitioners and to what extent the petitioners were involved in the alleged offence, is a matter of trial. Accordingly, considering the ratio of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2012) 9 SCC 512 (CBI vs. K. Narayan Rao), this Court does not find any illegality in the impugned order refusing to discharge the petitioners. (i) So far as the second point, regarding contention of the petitioners that the consequences for violation of the Memorandum of Understanding has been mentioned in the agreement itself, which includes termination of contract and accordingly the entire liability is a civil liability flowing from violation of contract is concerned, this Court is of the considered view that merely because the consequences of deviating from the terms and conditions of the contract is mentioned in the contract itself, it cannot be said that the criminal liability arising out of the same contract is totally excluded, even if the basic ingredients disclosing the commission of offence has come up during investigation. In the instant case, it is alleged that right from the beginning, the accused did not abide with the terms of the MOU leading to huge loss to the BCCL as the ESM Company was allegedly paid at the rate of ESM, although the work was done by employing civilians and for civilian lower rate has been fixed by BCCL. It is alleged that such illegality was happening right from the beginning, i.e. right from the stage of issuance of work order and initiation of the work. (j) In the aforesaid facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that there is prima facie no criminal liability in connection with the alleged offence. This Court is of the considered view that institution of criminal case, if made out in the facts and circumstances of the case, is not excluded merely because there is MOU/Agreement providing for consequences of violation of MOU/Agreement. (k) So far as the third point, i.e. arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners in connection with order dated 10.07.2015 passed in Criminal Revision No. 106 of 2015, in the case of co-accused arising out of the same impugned order is concerned, this Court finds that this Court while passing the said order considered the fact that the information given in the annual report was not required to be authenticated by the petitioner of that case, namely, Abrendra Kumar @ Amrendra Kumar, who was an employee of the BCCL. The Hon’ble Court took into account the specific clause in the MOU which reads as follows: - “Specific/relevant portion of the report concerning the local subsidiary will be authenticated by the authorized representative of the coal subsidiary.” (l) The said clause is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the petitioners and the case of the petitioners have been made accused on account of different reasons as already explained above and accordingly is on different footing. In such circumstances, the petitioners cannot take any advantage of the order passed in Criminal Revision No. 106 of 2015. (m) So far as the fourth point regarding the case being Cr. M.P. No. 768 of 2011 is concerned, this Court finds that the said case was decided in the facts and circumstances of another CBI case with regard to another coal company. (m) So far as the fourth point regarding the case being Cr. M.P. No. 768 of 2011 is concerned, this Court finds that the said case was decided in the facts and circumstances of another CBI case with regard to another coal company. In the facts and circumstances of that case, it was found that necessary ingredients of Section 420 of Indian Penal Code were absent and one of the grounds for quashing the charge under Section 420 of IPC was that it never the case of the prosecution that on account of M/s. BCCL being deceived, it suffered damage or loss. In the instant case, the damage or loss cause to the BCCL on account of acts of the accused persons, has not only been clearly mentioned in the charge-sheet, but the same has also been quantified. Accordingly, the judgment passed in Cr. M.P. No. 768 of 2011 dated 05.07.2018, which admittedly relates to another FIR, does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. (n) So far as the judgment which has been relied upon by the counsel for the petitioners reported in 2019 SCC ONLINE SC 588 (Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel vs. State of Gujrat and Another) is concerned, this Court finds that the same does not help the petitioners in any manner. Considering the principle of law laid down in Para-23 of the said judgment, no ground for quashing of the impugned order, is made out in the present case. Para-23 of the aforesaid judgment is reads as follows: - “At the stage of framing the charge in accordance with the principles which have been laid down by this Court, what the Court is expected to do is, it does not act as a mere post office. The Court must indeed sift the material before it. The material to be sifted would be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting is not to be meticulous in the sense that the Court dons the mantle of the Trial Judge hearing arguments after the entire evidence has been adduced after a full-fledged trial and the question is not whether the prosecution has made out the case for the conviction of the accused. All that is required is, the Court must be satisfied that with the materials available, a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. All that is required is, the Court must be satisfied that with the materials available, a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. A strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be founded on some material. The material must be such as can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial. The strong suspicion cannot be the pure subjective satisfaction based on the moral notions of the Judge that here is a case where it is possible that accused has committed the offence. Strong suspicion must be the suspicion which is premised on some material which commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the prima facie view that the accused has committed the offence.” (o) So far as the judgment reported in (2015) 4 SCC 609 (Sunit Bharti Mittal v. CBI) is concerned, this Court finds that the said judgment also does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case, in as much as, here not only the aforesaid ESM company, but also all its three directors have been made accused. It has come in the case-diary that one witnesses has stated that all the three Directors used to come to supervise the transportation work and one of the conditions which was mentioned in the work order itself, was alleged to have violated which as per the charge-sheet caused wrongful loss to the coal company, namely, M/s. BCCL. (p) In view of the materials available in the case-diary, this Court is not inclined to allow the present revision application and no case has been made out to discharge the petitioners. This Court finds that the impugned order is a well-reasoned order, considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case. This Court does not find any illegality, perversity or impropriety in the impugned order refusing to discharge the petitioners. 13. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid discussions, the present revision application is dismissed. 14. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 15. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, are also dismissed as not pressed. 16. It is made clear that dismissal of this revision application will not prejudice the case of the either parties in any manner whatsoever. It will be open to the petitioners to raise all the points at appropriate stage of the case before the learned court below which are available to them as per law. 17. 16. It is made clear that dismissal of this revision application will not prejudice the case of the either parties in any manner whatsoever. It will be open to the petitioners to raise all the points at appropriate stage of the case before the learned court below which are available to them as per law. 17. Before parting with the judgment, it is important to note that vide order dated 17.07.2019, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court had called for status report from the court concerned, but it appears from the Office note dated 17.08.2019 that the status report was not received. In such circumstances, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 20.08.2019 called for an explanation from the concerned trial court as to why the order of this Court was not complied. Pursuant to order dated 20.08.2019, an explanation was received vide letter dated 31.08.2019, wherein, interalia, it was stated as follows: - “2. that after receiving the aforesaid letter of Hon’ble High Court I had persued the record and had complied the direction of Hon’ble Court and I had submitted the status report vide my office letter no. 681 dated 16.08.2019 and on the same day at about 17.07 P.M the said report was sent through fax to the Hon’ble Court for placing the same before the Hon’ble Court. The said status report alongwith transmission verification report are annexed herewith for kind perusal. 1. I have to further humbly submit that I had complied the direction of aforesaid memo no. 11721 dt. 18.07.2019 of Hon’ble Court within time and the status report sent earlier has been attached herewith for kind perusal of Hon’ble Court, if any inconvenience has been caused I seek unconditional apology from the Hon’ble High Court.” This Court finds that although it was mentioned in the explanation that the said status report along with transmission verification report is annexed herewith for kind perusal, but the transmission verification report, is not on record. Thus, it is not clear as to whether there was lapse on the part of the concerned court below or on the part of the Registry of this Court. Thus, it is not clear as to whether there was lapse on the part of the concerned court below or on the part of the Registry of this Court. In such circumstances, the learned Registrar General is directed to conduct an enquiry as to whether there was lapse on the part of the learned court below or on the part of the Registry of this Court by seeking a copy of the verification report from the learned court below and also by verifying the records supposed to be maintained by the High Court regarding receipt of FAX communications. Upon such enquiry, the learned Registrar General is directed to do the needful so that such errors are not repeated.