JUDGMENT : 1. This is the defendants’ Second Appeal, wherein, he has questioned the judgment and decree as rendered by the learned Trial Court on 18.07.2017 passed by the 1st Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dehradun, in Original Suit No. 61 of 2011 ‘Manjeet Johar & Others vs. Super Service Station & Others’, whereby, the Suit of the plaintiff for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent had been decreed. The aforesaid judgment on being put to challenge by the defendants/appellants before the 1st Appellate Court by filing an Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the Court of 3rd Additional District Judge being Civil Appeal No. 76 of 2017 ‘Super Service Station & Others vs. Manjeet Johar & Others’, whereby the Civil Appeal preferred by the defendants/appellants had been dismissed, and as a consequence thereto, he had been directed to vacate the premises and to pay the arrears of rent as well as the damages for the property for its user. 2. The brief facts as involved in the present Second Appeal was that admittedly according to the defendants’ own case they were having a lease hold rights, which was created in his favour on 01.04.1972 by the predecessor/owner Mr. Anil Gupta, who had later on sold the said property in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents by virtue of the registered sale deed dated 06.11.2009. It is the case of the plaintiff that since the defendant, who was inducted as a tenant has committed a default in remittance of the rent w.e.f. 01.11.2009 to 31.08.2010, the defendants had issued notices under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on 28.09.2010, as a consequence thereto, the plaintiff/respondent had terminated the tenancy of the defendants/appellants and had expressed that he does not want to continue the defendant as to be the tenant in the premises of the owner plaintiff/respondent. The Suit was contested by the defendants/appellants before the learned Trial Court on the pretext that he was inducted as a tenant on land having dimension of 85 feet x 100 feet, which bears new municipal number as 3/2/1 Haridwar Road, Dehradun on 01.04.1972 by the predecessor/owner and later on the rent was enhanced by the predecessor on 31.03.2002 to Rs. 5,000/- per month. The defendants/appellants contested the proceedings on the following grounds: “(i) Plaintiff is not the purchaser of property by a registered sale deed. 5,000/- per month. The defendants/appellants contested the proceedings on the following grounds: “(i) Plaintiff is not the purchaser of property by a registered sale deed. (ii) The predecessor owner has given liberty to defendant to construct pump, tank, fitting, container etc. (iii) Lease as executed on 01.04.1972 was renewed and extended with enhanced rent of Rs.5,000/- per month by lease deed dated 31.03.2002. (iv) It was thereafter the property in dispute was sold to plaintiff/respondent. (v) defendants/appellants denied to commit any default in payment of rent and is depositing the rent in the Court. (vi) Defendants/appellants admits issuance of notice 28.09.2010, terminating the tenancy on ground of default and intention of the landlord/plaintiff not to continue with tenancy was without authority and against law. (vii) Suit before the Civil Court was barred as the defendants’ case was the remedy for plaintiff/respondent was to have filed suit under Provinial Small Causes Courts Act. (viii) Lastly he submitted that he had remitted the rent on receipt of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act when the same was refused to be accepted by the plaintiff/respondent.” 3. The Suit proceeded exparte against defendant no. 4 vide Trial Court’s order dated 18.07.2014. 4. On exchange of pleadings, the learned Trial court had framed the following issues: ^^1- D;k oknhx.k fookfnr lEifRr ds Lokeh gSa\ 2- D;k izfroknhx.k fookfnr lEifRr esa 5000@& izfrekg dk fdjk;snkj gksrs gq, oknhx.k dks 01-11-2009 ls fdjk;k vnk ugha fd;k gS\ 3- D;k oknhx.k }kjk uksfVl fnukafdr 28-09-2010 }kjk fookfnr lEifRr esa izfroknhx.k dh fdjks;snkjh lekIr fd;k x;k gS\ 4- D;k oknhx.k fookfnr lEifRr ds lEcU/k esa izfroknhx.k ls vUr%dkyhu C;kt izkIr djus gsrq vf/kdkjh gS\ 5- vuqrks"k] ;fn dksbZ gks] ftls ikus ds oknhx.k gdnkj gSa\^^ 5. While dealing with the issue no. 1, the learned Trial Court has concluded that considering the sale deed on 31.10.2009, i.e., paper no. 46C1/46C/61 which admittedly stood executed in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents and was a registered document registered before the Sub-Registrar he became the owner of the property in question, which was a piece of land having a dimension of 85 to 100 feet, which was carrying a monthly rent of 5,000/- per month. 46C1/46C/61 which admittedly stood executed in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents and was a registered document registered before the Sub-Registrar he became the owner of the property in question, which was a piece of land having a dimension of 85 to 100 feet, which was carrying a monthly rent of 5,000/- per month. It was further admitted in the proceedings that the defendants/appellants had admitted to remit the rent to the plaintiffs/respondents by issuing drafts and cheques, which were refused to be accepted by the plaintiffs on the ground that since the tenancy has been terminated and it has ceased to exist on account of issuance of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act expressing the intention not to continue with the tenancy any further, hence, there was a cessation of relationship of landlord and tenant and, hence, there was a denial to accept the rent. However, the learned Trial Court while considering the aforesaid aspect and unrebutted evidence on record to the effect that the plaintiffs/respondents happens to be the bonafide owner of the property in question, had decided the issue no. 1 in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants/appellants. 4. While dealing with the issue no. 2 pertaining to the default, which has been committed by the defendants (appellants herein), the Court has come to a conclusion that the factum of having remitted the rent within the time specified as per the lease deed, the burden of proof was casted on the defendants/appellants, which he failed to discharge by the defendants/appellants himself in view of the provisions contained under Section 103 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the fact which stands established that there exists a relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendants was a fact which stood admitted by the defendants by their own act when they attempted to pay the rent defaulted to the plaintiffs/respondents by issuing draft and cheques after termination of tenancy and also the evidence on record proves that according to the conduct of the defendants/appellants, he himself admits the fact that there was an arrear of rent, which stood defaulted by him. Consequently, the Suit was decreed by the judgment dated 18.07.2017. 5. Consequently, the Suit was decreed by the judgment dated 18.07.2017. 5. The said judgment on a challenge being given before the Appellate Court has been affirmed and the finding which has been recorded after appreciation of evidence on record pertaining to the cessation of relationship of landlord and tenant in pursuance to the notice issued by the plaintiffs/respondents to the defendants/appellants. The Court has concurrently recorded that the deficiency in remittance of rent stood proved and since tenancy stood terminated on account of the default committed by the defendants/appellants has dismissed the Appeal and affirmed the judgment of the learned Trial Court. 6. On scrutiny of the aforesaid judgment, this Court is of the view that the substantial question of law as framed by the appellant in his memorandum of appeal to the following effect do not arise for consideration for the reason that if the implications of the Order 14 Rule 1, 2 & 3, which has sought to be pressed by the defendants/appellants before this Court is considered, he ought to bear in mind that simultaneously there happens to be a provision contained under Order 14 Rule 5, wherein, the defendants/appellants could have requested the Court to frame the issues as he desired based on pleadings to be decided by the Court. Having not done so, the burden cannot be shifted upon the Court to have wrongly or inappropriately framed the issues by invoking Order 14 Rule 1, 2 & 3. Substantial questions of law are quoted hereunder: “1. Whether a decree for eviction can be passed when mandatory notice itself is illegal and does not fall within the parameters of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act? 2. Whether the judgment and decree passed by learned lower trial court can be sustained being contra to the mandate of order 14 rule 1, 2 & 3 C.P.C. as a relevant issue was not framed not findings have been recorded. 3. Whether the judgment passed by learned lower appellate court can be sustained being contra to the mandate of order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. as neither issue wise findings have been recorded nor relevant points for determination been framed?” 7. Thus the said substantial question of law does not arise to be decided by this Court as both courts have recorded a finding that notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act was rightly issued. Thus the said substantial question of law does not arise to be decided by this Court as both courts have recorded a finding that notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act was rightly issued. The first substantial question of law, which has been framed by the defendants/appellants, is to the effect that the notice as issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was illegal. This question also do not find any relevance to be considered for the reason being that admittedly the defendants/appellants had by his conduct of remittance of rent to the plaintiffs has admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant and further he admits the fact that with the revision of rent made by the predecessor/landlord as back as in 2002, the building was having a rent of 5,000/-, which was outside the purview of Act of 1972, hence, cessation of tenancy by the notice issued under Section 106 did not suffer from any apparent and legal error nor the defendants/appellants before the Court below had pleaded or produced any evidence to show as to the manner in which his contention pertaining to the illegality of the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act could be sustained. 8. Consequently, this Court is of the view that the Second Appeal is concluded by finding of facts concurrently recorded by both the Courts. Hence, it does not call for any interference by this Court. Accordingly, the same is dismissed.