ORDER : 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent Central Coalfields Limited (CCL). 2. Perused the impugned judgment and the relevant materials pointed out by learned counsel for the parties from the pleadings on record, which include Annexure-2, report of the Area Age Determination Committee dated 15.02.1991 whereby age of the writ petitioner/appellant herein was determined as 40 years, duly acknowledged by the writ petitioner also by endorsing his signature thereupon; Annexure-9, Form-A of Coal Mines Provident Fund containing the declaration by the person employed in that coal mines i.e. appellant, wherein at column 10 the date of birth is mentioned as 16.03.1959 and the Implementation Instruction No. 76 of the NCWA providing procedure for determination/ verification of age of the employees as produced by the parties. 3. Learned Writ Court by the impugned judgment dated 21.07.2015 passed in W.P. (S) No. 5607 of 2010 rendered a finding that determination of age of the petitioner as 40 years as on 15.02.1991 does not require interference in the background fact that the writ petitioner neither challenged the method of conducting of the medical examination nor at any point of time, immediately after the report of Area Age Determination Committee, raised his grievance before the authorities, rather he approached this Court in 2010 after superannuation notice was issued on 29.08.2009/22.09.2009. Reliance was placed upon the case of Seema Ghosh vs. TISCO, (2006) 7 SCC 722 . 4. Learned counsel for the appellant relying upon clause ‘C’ and ‘F’ of Implementation Instruction No. 76, has submitted that the Area Age Determination Committee should have referred the case of the writ petitioner for age determination to the Apex Medical Board at the Headquarter in view of the glaring disparity in the date of birth recorded in the Identity Card and the apparent age of the employee. Clause ‘C’ and ‘F’ of Implementation Instruction No. 76 is quoted hereunder: “(C) Age Determination Committee/Medical Board above will be constituted by the Management. In the case of employees whose date of birth cannot be determined in accordance with the procedure mentioned in (B) (i) (a) or (B) (i) (b) above, the date of birth recorded in the records of the company, namely, Form B register, CMPF Records and Identity Cards (un-tampered) will be treated as final. In the case of employees whose date of birth cannot be determined in accordance with the procedure mentioned in (B) (i) (a) or (B) (i) (b) above, the date of birth recorded in the records of the company, namely, Form B register, CMPF Records and Identity Cards (un-tampered) will be treated as final. Provided that where there is a variation, in the age recorded in the records mentioned above, the matter will be referred to the Age Determination Committee/Medical Board constituted by the Management for determination of age. (F) Where the Management (i.e.) Area Age Assessment Committee consisting of General Manager, Personnel Manager and Medical Officer-in- charge of the Area is satisfied that there is a glaring disparity between the date of birth recorded in the identity cards and the apparent age of the employee, the cases may be referred to the Apex Medical Board located at Headquarters of the company for determination of age.” 5. Learned counsel for the respondent CCL has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of G.M. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. West Bengal vs. Shib Kumar Dushad, (2000) 8 SCC 696 where under the Apex Court upon taking note of the Implementation Instruction No. 76 at para 19 of the report, held at para 17 and 20 of the report as under: “17. The date of birth of an employee is not only important for the employee but for the employer also. On the length of service put in by the employee depends the quantum of retiral benefits he would be entitled to. Therefore, while determining the dispute in such matters courts should bear in mind that a change of the date of birth long after joining service, particularly when the employee is due to retire shortly, will upset the date recorded in the service records maintained in due course of administration should not generally be accepted. In such a case the burden is heavy on the employee who comes to the court with the case that the date of birth in the service record maintained by the employer is untrue and incorrect. The burden can be discharged only by producing acceptable evidence of a clinching nature. In such a case the burden is heavy on the employee who comes to the court with the case that the date of birth in the service record maintained by the employer is untrue and incorrect. The burden can be discharged only by producing acceptable evidence of a clinching nature. We are constrained to make this observation as we find that in a large number of cases employees who are on the verge of retirement raise a dispute regarding correctness of the date of birth entered in the service record and the courts are inclined to pass an interim order for continuance of such employee beyond the date of superannuation on the basis of the entry of date of birth in the service record. Such a situation cannot be commended for the reason that the court in passing such an interim order grants a relief to the employee even before determining the issue regarding correctness of the date of birth entered in the service record. Such interim orders create various complications. Anticipated vacancy for which the employee next in the line has been waiting does not materialise, on account of which the junior is denied promotion which he has all along been led to believe will be his due on the retirement of the senior. 20. From the provisions in the instructions referred to above, it is clear that in case of dispute over the date of birth of an existing employee who has neither a Matriculation Certificate/Secondary School Certificate nor a statutory certificate in which the Manager has certified the entry regarding the date of birth to be authentic the employer is to refer the matter to the Medical Board. Therefore, no fault can be found with the action taken by the appellant to refer the case of the respondent to the Medical Board. The Medical Board as laid down in the instructions is to consider the matter on the evidence available with the colliery management and in accordance with the requirement of medical jurisprudence. As noted earlier, in the present case the Medical Board determined the age of the respondent to be 52 years in 1988 and the employer (appellant) accepted such determination. The Medical Board as laid down in the instructions is to consider the matter on the evidence available with the colliery management and in accordance with the requirement of medical jurisprudence. As noted earlier, in the present case the Medical Board determined the age of the respondent to be 52 years in 1988 and the employer (appellant) accepted such determination. In the circumstances there was hardly any scope for the High Court to interfere with the date of birth as determined by the employer (appellant herein) and issue a writ of mandamus that the date as claimed by the employee (the respondent herein) should be accepted.” 6. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that since there was doubt regarding the date of birth of the employee, procedure for age determination was followed and never challenged till the superannuation notice was issued upon him 18 years after the age determination. Learned Single Judge has taken a correct view of the matter, which does not suffer from any error of law or facts warranting different view by the Appellate Court. 7. We have considered the submission of learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent; facts and circumstances noted above; applicable provisions and also the judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by the parties. Since the employer management followed the procedure for age determination prescribed under the NCWA through the Area Age Determination Committee in the light of the discrepancy in age in certain document of the employee and assessed it to be 40 years as on 15.02.1991 and no challenge thereto was made by the employee till he received superannuation notice in 2009, the learned Writ Court did not find any illegality or arbitrariness on the part of the management to interfere therein. We do not find any reason to take a different view of the matter as no error has been made out in the findings of the learned Writ Court. 8. Accordingly, the instant appeal is dismissed.