ORDER : The petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking to quash the Order dated 16.12.2015 passed in M.A.No.3/2006 by the Principal District Judge, Udupi, vide Annexure-A and also the Order dated 21.03.2006 made in case No.7/2004 passed by the second respondent/ Estate Officer, vide Annexure-H. 2. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner is a proprietary concern carrying on the business of a retail petroleum outlet within Udupi Municipal limits on the land bearing Sy.No.111/7 owned by the first respondent/LIC of India. The said business was initially started by one K.V.Shenoy during October 1986 as a partnership concern, till 2003. After the death of K.V.Shenoy, from 01.03.2003, the said concern became the sole proprietorship, since M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, (‘HPCL’ for short) permitted the petitioner to run the dealership with the approval of the first respondent. The dealership agreement was renewed from time to time and the petitioner has been paying the rent regularly to the first respondent. 3. It is further contended that, initially, the first respondent had leased out the land measuring 3702 sq.ft. However, for the purpose of road widening of Malpe-Molakalmuru State Highway, land was acquired by the authorities concerned including the land in question and the first respondent has received the compensation. During the year 2004, the first respondent filed case No.7/2004 before the second respondent against HPCL, for eviction of the petitioner under the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, without arraying the petitioner as a party to the said proceedings. That was challenged by the petitioner in an appeal before the jurisdictional Court which came to be allowed. Thereafter, the petitioner was impleaded and he filed an application for framing preliminary issue with regard to referring the matter to a High Power Committee, since the parties to the dispute were public sector undertakings and directly controlled by the Government of India as per the Circular dated 03.07.2005. The second respondent by an Order dated 21.03.2006, rejected the prayer. The petitioner filed M.A.No.3/2006 before the jurisdictional District Court. The learned District Judge, considering the entire material on record, by the Order dated 16.12.2015, dismissed the appeal. Hence, the present writ petition is filed. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties to the lis. 5. The second respondent by an Order dated 21.03.2006, rejected the prayer. The petitioner filed M.A.No.3/2006 before the jurisdictional District Court. The learned District Judge, considering the entire material on record, by the Order dated 16.12.2015, dismissed the appeal. Hence, the present writ petition is filed. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties to the lis. 5. Sri Nataraj Ballal, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned Order passed by the second respondent, confirmed by the learned District Judge is erroneous and contrary to the material on record and liable to be quashed. He would contend that the impugned Orders passed by the second respondent confirmed by the learned District Judge is in utter violation of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has been carrying on the business from the year 1986, which is an essential commodity, within the municipal limits of Udupi Town. The respondent has initiated proceedings to evict the petitioner from the premises and rent it out to some other tenants at higher rent. 6. He further contended that the petitioner is ready to negotiate with the respondent. The first respondent is receiving lease rents from the petitioner without demur as could be seen from the rent receipt at Annexure-B and therefore, petitioner is not an unauthorized occupant and the second respondent lacks jurisdiction to hold the proceedings under the provisions of ‘Act’. Therefore, obligation is on the second respondent to decide the preliminary issue with regard to maintainability of the proceedings. The same has not been done. The learned District Judge, failed to appreciate the Government Memorandum dated 03.07.2005 issued by the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, which stipulates that the disputes under the ‘Act’ has to be referred to the High Power Committee. Therefore, he sought to allow the writ petition. 7. Per contra, Sri Rajashekhar.K, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 and 2 sought to justify the impugned Order passed by the second respondent confirmed by the learned District Judge and contended that the facts of the present case are similar to the facts in the judgment relied upon by the learned District Judge in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd., vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others reported in AIR 1997 SC 2590 . The learned District Judge has rightly held that the Estate Officer has not committed any error in not framing an issue as sought by the petitioner with regard to his jurisdiction to decide the dispute and referring the matter to the High Power Committee and the question of treating it as preliminary issue does not arise at all. Therefore, he sought to dismiss the writ petition. 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, it is not in dispute that the second respondent initiated proceedings against the petitioner under the provisions of the ‘Act’. The petitioner appeared before the second respondent and raised preliminary objection with regard to jurisdiction of the Estate Officer/second respondent to conduct the proceedings. The second respondent, considering the objection, by the Order dated 21.03.2006 rejected the request and recorded a finding that, “Disputes like eviction of Company or Public Sector Undertaking premises are not to be dealt with by the High level Officers/ Committee”. The said order was subject matter of appeal in M.A.No.3/2006 on the file of the District Judge, Udupi, who after hearing both the parties, dismissed the appeal and recorded a finding of fact that, “M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited was the monthly building tenant under the respondent as per lease agreement dated 19.04.2001 in respect of immovable property situated in Sy.No.111/7 of Moodanidamboor village, Udupi Taluk. The lease period has expired on 31.07.2004. The tenancy of HPCL was terminated by legal notice dated 09.08.2004 with effect from 31.08.2004 and the HPCL was called upon to surrender vacant possession of the premises. The occupation of the premises by the HPCL has become unauthorized after termination of the tenancy. The premises in question is a public premises within the meaning of Section 2(1)(1) of the ‘Act’. The respondent/LIC has filed case No.7/2004 against HPCL before the Estate Officer for eviction under the provisions of the ‘Act’ on the ground of self-occupation and damages for unauthorized use and occupation of HPCL. The petitioner has sought himself to implead as necessary party to the proceedings contending that he is working under HPCL as dealer of retail outlet and is in physical possession of the premises and running a petrol bunk under the name and style “Mangesh Mahalaxmi Traders. The said application filed before the Estate Officer came to be rejected. The petitioner has sought himself to implead as necessary party to the proceedings contending that he is working under HPCL as dealer of retail outlet and is in physical possession of the premises and running a petrol bunk under the name and style “Mangesh Mahalaxmi Traders. The said application filed before the Estate Officer came to be rejected. Challenging the said Order, petitioner filed M.A.No.5/2005 which came to be allowed and the petitioner was impleaded as second respondent in Case No.7/2004. 9. Thereafter, petitioner filed an application on 07.02.2006 under Section 94(c) and 151 of Code of Civil Procedure raising the question of jurisdiction of Estate Officer in view of the Government Memorandum dated 03.07.2005. On the preliminary issue raised, the respondent contended that the object of issuing direction in this matter was to decide the fiscal disputes in case of major policy matters to save public money and courts valuable time and not to resolve the disputes like eviction of a Company or Public undertaking under the ‘Act’. Accordingly, the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, considering the similar dispute, in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd., vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others reported in AIR 1997 SC 2590 at paragraphs 2 and 3, has held as under: “2. The predecessor of the petitioner Company had taken on rent the disputed premises from the Life Insurance Corporation on the 4th floor of Jeevan Deep Building, Parliament Street, New Delhi. Since the petitioner had not vacated the premises, action was taken for eviction under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act. The petitioner challenged the action in the High Court contending that this Court had issued directions in IAs Nos. 4 and 4 (sic) of 1992 in Civil Appeals Nos. 2058-59 of 1988 to constitute a High Powered Committee to resolve the disputes between the Public Sector Undertaking and the Government of India of the Ministry concerned by a Committee composed of Cabinet Secretary, Secretary in Ministry of Law and Secretary in the Bureau of Public Sector Undertakings to decide the disputes without needless consumption of time and waste of public funds. The petitioner has sought for such a reference and contends that the High Powered Committee should have been constituted and decided the matter. We find no force in the contention. 3. The petitioner has sought for such a reference and contends that the High Powered Committee should have been constituted and decided the matter. We find no force in the contention. 3. The object of issuing direction in those matters was to decide the fiscal disputes in case of major policy matters to save the public money and Court's valuable time, and disputes could amicably be settled between the Public Sector Undertaking and the Government of India or the State Governments. The intention was not to resolve the disputes like eviction of a company or public undertaking under Public Premises (Unauthorised Occupants) Act; such petty disputes are not directed to be dealt with by the high level officers whose duty and time is of very important nature otherwise. Under these circumstances, the High Court has not committed any error warranting interference.” 11. In view of the above circumstances, the impugned order passed by the second respondent confirmed by the learned District Judge is just and property. The petitioner has not made out any ground to interfere with the impugned Orders in exercise of powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, writ petitions are dismissed.