JUDGMENT : S.J. Kathawalla, J. 1. Rule, returnable forthwith. 2. The Petitioner before us is an ex-employee of the Respondent No. 1 Bank and is stated to be the General Secretary of the Central Bank Employees Union, Mumbai. Certain disputes have arisen between the Petitioner and the Respondent No. 1 Bank, as a consequence of which disciplinary proceedings came to be initiated by Respondent No. 1 against the Petitioner. 3. In the course of the disciplinary proceedings, certain issues arose between the parties in connection with the Defence Representative sought to be engaged by the Petitioner to defend him in the disciplinary proceedings, culminating in Petitions filed in this Court and certain orders being passed therein. The Defence Representative whom the Petitioner desired to represent him is a gentleman by the name of Mr. Prabhakar C. Marpakwar. It was the stand of the Petitioner in certain Petitions earlier filed in this Court that under the applicable Regulations titled as "Disciplinary Action Procedure" Regulations, and in particular Clause 12(a)(ii), the Petitioner was entitled to appoint Mr. Marpakwar as his Defence Representative. The relevant portion of Regulation 12 is reproduced herein-below: "12. The procedure in such cases shall be as follows: (a) An employee against whom disciplinary action is proposed or likely to be taken shall be given a charge-sheet clearly setting forth the circumstances appearing against him and a date shall be fixed for enquiry, sufficient time being given to him to enable him to prepare and give his explanation as also to produce any evidence that he may wish to tender in his defene. He shall be permitted to appear before the Officer conducting the enquiry, to cross-examine any witness on whose evidence the charge rests and to examine witnesses and produce other evidence in his defence. He shall also be permitted to be defended. (i) (x) by a representative of a registered trade union of bank employees of which he is a member on the date first notified for the commencement of the enquiry. He shall also be permitted to be defended. (i) (x) by a representative of a registered trade union of bank employees of which he is a member on the date first notified for the commencement of the enquiry. (y) where the employee is not a member of any trade union of bank employees on the aforesaid date, by a representative of a registered trade union of employees of the bank in which he is employed : OR (ii) at the request of the said union by representative of the state federation or all India Organisation to which such union is affiliated; OR (iii) with the Bank's permission, by a lawyer. He shall also be given a hearing as regards the nature of the proposed punishment in case any charge is established against him. (b) .. (c) .. (d) If the representative defending the employee is an employee of the same bank at an outstation branch within the same State, he shall be relieved on special leave (on full pay and allowances) to represent the employee and be paid one return fare. The class of fare to which he will be entitled would be the same as while travelling on duty. In case of any adjournment at the instance of the bank/enquiry officer, he may be asked to resume duty and if so, will be paid fare for the consequential journey. He shall also be paid full halting allowance for the period he stays at the place of the enquiry for defending the employee as also for the days of the journeys which are undertaken at the bank's cost." 4. By diverse orders passed by this Court in the above Petitions, the Petitioner was permitted to be represented in the Disciplinary Proceedings by Mr. Marpakwar. The admitted position is that Mr. Marpakwar is not an employee of the Respondent No. 1 Bank. It is stated in the Petition that he is the Chairman of one All India Central Bank Employees Congress and also the President of Central Bank Staff Union, Nagpur, residing at Nagpur. It is the Petitioner's case that Mr. Marpakwar is a member of a State Federation or All India Organization to which the Petitioner's union is affiliated, thus falling under Clause 12(a)(ii) of the Regulations. 5. It is the Petitioner's case that Mr. Marpakwar is a member of a State Federation or All India Organization to which the Petitioner's union is affiliated, thus falling under Clause 12(a)(ii) of the Regulations. 5. The present Petition has been filed by the Petitioner contending that in the course of the disciplinary proceedings, certain costs were incurred for the travel of Mr. Marpakwar, which the Petitioner sought to claim vide his letter dated 29th December 2017 addressed to the Respondents. These costs/claims are referred to as TA/DA ("TA/DA"). The Respondents rejected the request for reimbursement of TA/DA, vide letter dated 4th December 2017, on the ground that there was no provision for reimbursement of TA/DA to a Defence Representative who was not an in-service/retired staff member/employee. 6. It is this rejection by the Respondents that has been challenged in the present Petition. The present Petition thus gives rise to the question as to whether, under the relevant Regulations and certain Circulars referred to hereafter, the Petitioner is entitled to seek reimbursement of costs incurred by a third party/non employee engaged by the Petitioner as his Defence Representative. 7. Mr. Singhvi learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Petitioner has made the following submissions: (i) Having regard to certain Circular issued by the Indian Banks' Association ("IBA") dated 25th April 2011 ("2011 Circular"), 12th July 2012 ("2012 Circular") and 19th November 2015 ("2015 Circular"), he submits that Mr. Marpakwar, being a Defence Representative, was entitled to receive reimbursement of TA/DA for the trips made to Mumbai to defend the Petitioner in the disciplinary proceedings. (ii) While originally under the 2011 Circular and the 2012 Circular only Defence Representatives who were in service appear to be entitled to TA/DA, the 2015 Circular makes it clear that both serving and retired Defence Representatives would be entitled to reimbursement of TA/DA. (iii) The 2015 Circular makes it clear that both in-service and retired persons acting as Defence Representatives were entitled to TA/DA and reliance was placed upon certain illustrative instances set out in the Additional Affidavit dated 23rd February 2019, filed on behalf of the Petitioner. (iv) To not grant TA/DA to a Defence Representative such as Mr. Marpakwar would be to render the very opportunity of defence illusory and the object of appointing a Defence Representative would be defeated. 8. Mr. (iv) To not grant TA/DA to a Defence Representative such as Mr. Marpakwar would be to render the very opportunity of defence illusory and the object of appointing a Defence Representative would be defeated. 8. Mr. Singhvi has placed reliance on a judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal reported in the matter of S. Pandian & Ors. V. Director B.C.G. Vaccine Laboratory,1990 13 ATC 650 Madras, and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the challenge to the said Order in the matter of Director, B.C.G. Vaccine Laboratory, Madras Vs. S. Pandian & Ors., (1997) 11 SCC 346 . Mr. Singhvi submits that from the judgment of the Supreme Court it is clear that the employees in question were provided reimbursement of fees for a legal practitioner engaged by them in the Disciplinary Proceedings, even though there was no specific provision for the same. He submits that on a parity of reasoning, the Petitioner herein ought to be provided with reimbursement of TA/DA in respect of Mr. Marpakwar. 9. Per Contra, Mr. Cama on behalf of the Respondent No. 1 Bank submitted as under: (i) The entire object of the Regulations was not to assist a charge sheeted employee per se, but to ensure that an employee of the Bank who was required to attend disciplinary proceedings and therefore missed work should not be put to prejudice and should be duly compensated for the costs involved in travelling and attending before the Disciplinary Authorities. (ii) A perusal of clauses 12(a) and 12(d) of the Regulations clearly shows that there is a distinction made between employees acting as Defence Representatives and third parties such as Mr. Marpakwar, who admittedly was not an employee, and was appointed pursuant to clause 12(a)(ii) of the concerned Regulations. (iii) Clause 12(d) of the Regulations makes it clear that only an employee of the Bank would be entitled to reimbursement of TA/DA. (iv) The Circulars, when correctly read, do not further the Petitioner's stand, and merely clarify that TA/DA will be paid both to retired employees as also the employees who are currently in service of the bank; the underlying position therefore clearly is that TA/DA will be payable to a Defence Representative, if at all, only if the Defence Representative is either a serving or retired employee of the Bank, which is not the case so far as Mr. Marpakwar is concerned. Marpakwar is concerned. (v) While the Respondent No. 1 Bank's position in its Affidavit dated 18th June 2019 is that the 2015 Circular is not applicable to the Respondent No. 1 Bank and that the Respondent No. 1 Bank is governed by a separate Circular dated 23rd July 2012 annexed to the Affidavit of the Respondent No. 1 Bank, even on a demurrer that the 2015 Circular applies, it would only apply to employees and not to a third party such as Mr. Marpakwar. 10. Mr. Cama has distinguished the judgments cited by the Petitioner on facts. He therefore submits that the Petition be dismissed. 11. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and having perused the concerned Regulations and the Circulars relied upon, we are of the view that the Petition is required to be dismissed for the reasons set out hereafter. 12. The relevant Regulations, when properly analysed, would show that they set out the Disciplinary Action Procedure to be followed by the Respondent No. 1 Bank in case of disciplinary proceedings instituted by the Bank. Clause 12(a) of the Regulations sets out the persons who may be engaged by the charge-sheeted employee as his Defence Representative. It is clear that Clause 12(a)(i) contemplates certain categories of Defence Representatives who are employees of the Respondent No. 1 Bank, whereas clauses 12(a)(ii) and 12(a)(iii) contemplate third parties/non employees being engaged as Defence Representative. Pertinently, Clause 12(a)(iii) even contemplates a lawyer being engaged as a Defence Representative. Clause 12(a) thus shows that the framers of the Regulations were conscious of the distinction between employees and non-employees acting as Defence Representatives. 13. Being mindful of the above distinction, in Clause 12(d) of the Regulations, it has been specifically provided that an employee of the Bank at an outstation branch within the same State shall be entitled to reimbursement of the travelling costs incurred in acting as a Defence Representative. This clause makes it clear that the right to reimbursement is restricted only to employees of the Respondent No. 1 Bank who are required to travel for the purpose of attending disciplinary proceedings in which they are engaged as Defence Representatives. This clause makes it clear that the right to reimbursement is restricted only to employees of the Respondent No. 1 Bank who are required to travel for the purpose of attending disciplinary proceedings in which they are engaged as Defence Representatives. Pertinently, this clause has certain checks and balances to ensure that the sums claimed by way of reimbursement are kept within a fare structure which the Bank is aware of; this avoids the Respondent No. 1 Bank from being subjected to claims for exorbitant sums beyond its control, towards TA/DA. The Regulation specifically provides that the employee in question will be entitled only to the same class of fare to which he is eligible while traveling on duty. As aforestated, this ensures that the Bank is not put to uncontrolled expenditure by reason of the charge-sheeted employee claiming exorbitant or arbitrary or inflated sums by way of reimbursement of TA/DA. 14. Consciously, the Regulations do not make any such similar provisions for non-employees engaged as Defence Representatives. This would be logical having regard to the fact that the Respondent No. 1 Bank would have no control over the amount expended for traveling expenses of a Defence Representative who was not an employee and for whom therefore there is no fixed class of fare. Were the Respondent No. 1 Bank called upon to pay TA/DA claimed for a non employee/third party, absent any stipulated class of fare as is prescribed for employees, it would potentially render the Respondent No. 1 Bank liable to pay such/any sums as may be claimed by the Defence Representative/the charge-sheeted employee at their sole ipse dixit. This would be entirely unfair and would constitute an unreasonably harsh burden imposed upon the Respondent No. 1 Bank, and therefore consciously was not provided for in the Regulations. 15. The above conclusion that we have arrived at would also appear to us to be a logical position. It would be entirely untenable for the Respondent No. 1 Bank to be foisted with the uncapped liability to reimburse the travelling expenses of a non-employee/third party Defence Representative. As set out above, Clause 12(a)(iii) even contemplates the charge-sheeted employee engaging a lawyer as a Defence Representative. It would be entirely untenable for the Respondent No. 1 Bank to be foisted with the uncapped liability to reimburse the travelling expenses of a non-employee/third party Defence Representative. As set out above, Clause 12(a)(iii) even contemplates the charge-sheeted employee engaging a lawyer as a Defence Representative. The Respondent No. 1 Bank would have no control over the expenses of such lawyer/non-employee and it is unreasonable to expect that they would nonetheless be required to foot the bill for the travelling expenses of such lawyer or non-employee. 16. The Circulars relied upon by Mr. Singhvi to support his contention that the travelling expenses of Mr. Marpakwar are required to be reimbursed, do not in fact assist the Petitioner. The Circulars (without going into Respondent No. 1 Bank's contention that the 2015 Circular has not been adopted by Respondent No. 1 Bank) do not more than clarify that the reimbursement of TA/DA is not restricted only to a serving employee acting as a Defence Representative but is also applicable to a retired employee of Respondent No.1 Bank who is acting as a Defence Representative. The title of each of the Circular makes it clear that the Circulars pertain to reimbursement of TA/DA to serving, retired or dismissed employees, but in all cases the common thread is that the reimbursement is contemplated only for an employee. The 2012 Circular clarifies that in the case of retired/dismissed employees, the reimbursement of TA/DA will be at the rate admissible to a person in the cadre/grade which he was holding at the time of his retirement or leaving the bank's services. This is in line with Clause 12(d) of the Regulations referred to by us above. 17. The 2015 Circular, although predominantly in respect of witnesses, once again contemplates reimbursement for "serving/retired employees". This Circular too does not make any reference to or appear to have any applicability to, third party/non-employee Defence Representatives. 18. It is thus clear from an analysis of the above Regulations and the Circulars that the reimbursement of TA/DA have consciously and specifically been provided only for serving, retired or dismissed employees of Respondent No.1 Bank who are acting as Defence Representatives. The Petitioner has been unable to show a single Regulation or Circular which would compel Respondent No.1 Bank to reimburse the traveling expenses and/or TA/DA of a non employee/third party Defence Representative. The Petitioner has been unable to show a single Regulation or Circular which would compel Respondent No.1 Bank to reimburse the traveling expenses and/or TA/DA of a non employee/third party Defence Representative. Accordingly, it is untenable for the Petitioner to contend, on the basis of the Regulations and the Circulars, that the Respondent is entitled for reimbursement of travelling expenses for Mr. Marpakwar, who is admittedly not a serving, retired or dismissed employee of Respondent No. 1. 19. We cannot accept the submission of Mr. Singhvi that the non reimbursement of travelling expenses would render the defence of Petitioner illusory. Nothing stopped the Petitioner from engaging the services of an employee of Respondent No.1 Bank, serving, dismissed or retired, in which case he would have been entitled to reimbursement of travelling expenses. It is not as if the Petitioner was not aware of the concerned Regulations, having himself repeatedly invoked the same in the earlier rounds of litigation filed in this Court. This being the position, being fully conscious of the Regulations specifically providing for reimbursement of TA/DA only for employees, the Petitioner chose to engage Mr. Marpakwar as his Defence Representative. The Petitioner cannot simultaneously seek to invoke the Regulations when it suits his purposes and yet seek to deviate from the Regulations or seek something beyond the Regulations, as he is attempting to do in the present case. It is not the grievance of the Petitioner in the present case that the Defence Representative has not been heard, and accordingly, there is nothing illusory about the opportunity to defend which is given to the Petitioner. 20. The judgments of the Central Administrative Tribunal and the Supreme Court are entirely inapplicable in the facts of the present case. Admittedly, the judgment of the Supreme Court turns on the special facts in that case set out in paragraph 5 of the judgment. Neither the Central Administrative Tribunal nor the Supreme Court were dealing with a situation in which there was a specific Regulation providing for reimbursement of costs to the persons named in the Regulations. In the present case, there is an express provision in the Regulations and in the Circulars for reimbursement to employees. The present matter is a fit case where the expression expressio unious et exclusio alterius would apply. In the present case, there is an express provision in the Regulations and in the Circulars for reimbursement to employees. The present matter is a fit case where the expression expressio unious et exclusio alterius would apply. The Regulations with which we are concerned, having expressly contemplated a Defence Representative being both an employee and a non-employee, consciously provided for reimbursement of TA/DA only to Defence Representatives who were employees. Thus, it was consciously provided that only those persons would be entitled to reimbursement and non-employees were specifically excluded from the ambit of reimbursement of TA/DA. Thus, on the facts of the case before us, we find that the judgment of the Supreme Court, will have no applicability. 21. In the above circumstances, we are of the view that the Respondent No. 1 Bank was justified in its refusal to reimburse travelling expenses of the Defence Representative Mr. Marpakwar. The Petition is therefore dismissed, with no order as to costs.